• Journal of Korean Society of Transportation
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• v.25 no.5
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• pp.125-133
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• 2007

Through open-sky policy, USA and European selected market principle of multiuser. However, in Asian case, major airlines monopolize airports. It is purpose that analyzes fare competition of Asian Hub Airport and the position of Incheon airport in Asia. Passengers required longer time and distance to go to the destination because direct flights decreases. But passengers increased in airport every year. Because of routes that decrease, airlines provide more services of flights. So airlines prefer to Hub Airports. As a result, both passengers and airlines are profitable by various routs and the increased frequency. On the assumption that distance and fare are related, the final formula is as following that defined the air fare from hub(H) to destination(Z) by logarithm. Analysis showed that log Rdist is not 1 but 0.08. As distance increases, fare doesn't increase. If distance from hub to destination airports is longer, Log dist_HZ is negative. It is that fare decreases from origin to destination via hub or that fare increases from hub to destination. HHI_HZ and HHI_AZ are negative. It means that if the degree of monopolization of hub and origin airports is lager, fare decreases from origin to destination via hub. Or fare increases from hub to destination. And it compares the Incheon airport with the other Asian hub airports and it examines the competitive fare by market division. As compared with the Incheon airport, Singapore, Beijing and Narita airports are higher fares. They compete with the other ones by Asian hub airports. But Hong Kong and Taipei airports must have more passengers through fare competition yet.

• Journal of the Korean Society for Aviation and Aeronautics
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• v.15 no.1
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• pp.38-53
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• 2007

In a seminal judgment of November 2002 (Case C-476/98) relating to the compatibility with Community laws of the 'nationality clause' in the 1996 amending protocol to the 1955 U.S.-German Air Services Agreement, the European Court of Justice(ECJ) decided that the provision constituted a measure of an intrinsically discriminatory nature and was thus contrary to the principle of national treatment established under Art. 52 of the EC Treaty. The Court, rejecting bluntly the German government' submissions relying on public policy grounds(Art. 56, EC Treaty), seemed content to declare and rule that the protocol provision requiring a contracting state party to ensure substantial ownership and effective control by its nationals of its designated airlines had violated the requirement of national treatment reserved for other Community Members under the salient Treaty provision. The German counterclaims against the Commission, although tantalizing not only from the perusal of the judgment but from the perspective of international air law, were nonetheless invariably correct and to the point. For such a clause has been justified to defend the 'fundamental interests of society from a serious threat' that may result from granting operating licenses or necessary technical authorizations to an airline company of a third country. Indeed, the nationality clause has been inserted in most of the liberal bilaterals to allow the parties to enforce their own national laws and regulations governing aviation safety and security. Such a clause is not targeted as a device for discriminating against the nationals of any third State. It simply acts as the minimum legal safeguards against aviation risk empowering a party to take legal control of the designated airlines. Unfortunately, the German call for the review of such a foremost objective and rationale underlying the nationality clause landed on the deaf ears of the Court which appeared quite happy not to take stock of the potential implications and consequences in its absence and of the legality under international law of the 'national treatment' requirement of Community laws. Again, while US law limits foreign shareholders to 24.9% of its airlines, the European Community limits non-EC ownership to 49%, precluding any ownership and effective control by foreign nationals of EC airlines, let alone any foreign takeover and merger. Given this, it appears inconsistent and unreasonable for the EC to demand, $vis-{\grave{a}}-vis$ a non-EC third State, national treatment for all of its Member States. The ECJ's decision was also wrongly premised on the precedence of Community laws over international law, and in particular, international air law. It simply is another form of asserting and enforcing de facto extraterritorial application of Community laws to a non-EC third country. Again, the ruling runs counter to an established rule of international law that a treaty does not, as a matter of principle, create either obligations or rights for a third State. Aside from the legal problems, the 'national treatment' may not be economically justified either, in light of the free-rider problem and resulting externalities or inefficiency. On the strength of international law and economics, therefore, airlines of Community Members other than the designated German and U.S. air carriers are neither eligible for traffic rights, nor entitled to operate between or 'free-ride' on the U.S. and German points. All in all and in all fairness, the European Court's ruling was nothing short of an outright condemnation of established rules and principles of international law and international air law. Nor is the national treatment requirement justified by the economic logic of deregulation or liberalization of aviation markets. Nor has the requirement much to do with fair competition and increased efficiency.