• Journal of Nuclear Fuel Cycle and Waste Technology(JNFCWT)
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• v.19 no.4
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• pp.421-433
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• 2021

The present multidisciplinary study, which is a nexus of engineering and political science, investigates how the modernization of Non-Strategic Nuclear Weapons (NSNWs) affects the IAEA safeguards system based on the likelihood of the use of nuclear weapons. To this end, this study examines the characteristics of modernized NSNWs using Monte Carlo techniques. The results thus obtained show that 10 kt NSNWs with a Circular Error Probability (CEP) of 10 m can destroy the target as effectively as a 500 kt weapon with a CEP of 100 m. The IAEA safeguards system shows that the Significant Quantity (SQ) of 1 of plutonium is 8 kg, a parameter that was established when strategic nuclear weapons were dominant. However, the results of this study indicate that in recent years, low-yield nuclear weapons such as NSNWs have been more strategically interesting than strategic nuclear weapons as NSNWs require less plutonium than strategic nuclear weapons. Therefore, we would like to conclude that reducing the SQ of plutonium can result in more robust safeguards and non-proliferation strategies.

• Journal of Radiation Industry
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• v.17 no.4
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• pp.411-416
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• 2023

From Cold War, Nuclear weapons have emerged military power into a very dangerous and important way of each national security. Throughout the era, the U.S. had stationed nuclear weapons in South Korea. But President George Bush initially started the withdrawal of nuclear tactical weapons deployed abroad in 1991. After that, under the protection of the nuclear umbrella, South Korea guarantees that the United States would operate its nuclear weapons to protect South Korea if it would be needed and the economy of South Korea has rapidly developed as more strong countries in the world. However, South Korea has seen and been realized the present state from the recent war between Russia and Ukraine. The protection of the U.S. nuclear umbrella from nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles of North Korea is unlikely to be permanently guaranteed. At the same time, South Korea should consider the security environment changes of surrounding nations such as China as military power acceleration and Russia as re-formation ambition. Because of these reasons, South Korea independently wants to protect itself and have the own nuclear weapons as a way to counter security threats. A majority of South Koreans also definitely believe that North Korea will not denuclearize or give up because North Korea has been having nuclear weapons as the final survival strategy of Kim Jong Un's regime. However, South Korea considers and makes new nuclear strategy through the role and effect of nuclear deterrence strategy in dispute between India and Pakistan and how to overcome the paradox of nuclear deterrence strategy. Therefore, this research is to suggest the effective nuclear deterrence strategy of South Korea from new security threats of surrounding nations through dispute between India and Pakistan. The focus of this research is that what is the role and paradox of nuclear deterrence strategy in dispute between India and Pakistan and how to find the effective nuclear deterrence strategy of South Korea.

• International Journal of Advanced Culture Technology
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• v.11 no.1
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• pp.110-134
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• 2023

North Korea's development and deployment of nuclear weapons increases Pyongyang's diplomatic bargaining leverage. It is a strategic response to counteract the great expansion in US leverage with the collapse of the USSR. Post-Cold War American influence and hegemony is justified partly by claiming victory in successfully containing an allegedly imperialist Soviet Union. The US created and led formal and informal international institutions as part of its decades-long containment grand strategy against the USSR. The US now exploits these institutions to expedite US unilateral global preeminence. Third World regimes perceived as remnants of the Cold War era that resist accommodating to American demands are stereotyped as rogue states. Rogue regimes are criminal offenders who should be brought to justice, i.e. regime change is required. The initiation of summit diplomacy between US President Trump and North Korean leader Kim Jong-un occurred following the January 2018 Hawaiian ballistic missile false alarm. This event and its political consequences illustrate the efficacy of nuclear weapons as bargaining leverage for so-called rogue actors. North Korea is highly unlikely to surrender those weapons that were the instigation for the subsequent summit diplomacy that occurred. A broader, critical trend-focused strategic analysis is necessary to adopt a longer-term view of the on-going Korean nuclear crisis. The aim would be to conceptualize long-term policies that increase the probability that nuclear weapons capability becomes a largely irrelevant issue in interaction between Pyongyang, Seoul, Beijing and Washington.

• Korean Security Journal
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• no.53
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• pp.255-279
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• 2017

The development of North Korea's nuclear weapons has worsened to the sixth nuclear test in 2017, and despite the sanctions of the international community including our government, we have not been able to offer clear solutions and alternatives, and the current measures are not enough in case of North Korea is using nuclear weapons. This study suggests how we should be prepared against the use of nuclear weapons under the premise that North Korea will never give up development of nuclear weapons under any circumstances. The first chapter outlines the current status of our preparedness if North Korea makes a nuclear attack. The second chapter analyzes and evaluates the power of nuclear weapons and North Korea's nuclear weapons threat. In the third chapter, we analyze North Korea nuclear attack and analyze the wartime emergency situation and civil defense posture. Finally, in order to implement the solutions presented in the text, we will identify priorities and summarize further developments.

• Nuclear Engineering and Technology
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• v.50 no.6
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• pp.820-828
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• 2018

The growing nuclear threat has amplified the need for developing diverse and accurate nuclear forensics analysis techniques to strengthen nuclear security measures. The work presented here is part of a research effort focused on developing a methodology for reactor-type discrimination of weapons-grade plutonium. To verify the developed methodology, natural $UO_2$ fuel samples were irradiated in a thermal neutron spectrum at the University of Missouri Research Reactor (MURR) and produced approximately $20{\mu}g$ of weapons-grade plutonium test material. Radiation transport simulations of common thermal reactor types that can produce weapons-grade plutonium were performed, and the results are presented here. These simulations were needed to verify whether the plutonium produced in the natural $UO_2$ fuel samples during the experimental irradiation at MURR was a suitable representative to plutonium produced in common thermal reactor types. Also presented are comparisons of fission product and plutonium concentrations obtained from computational simulations of the experimental irradiation at MURR to the nondestructive and destructive measurements of the irradiated natural $UO_2$ fuel samples. Gamma spectroscopy measurements of radioactive fission products were mostly within 10%, mass spectroscopy measurements of the total plutonium mass were within 4%, and mass spectroscopy measurements of stable fission products were mostly within 5%.

• Journal of Nuclear Fuel Cycle and Waste Technology(JNFCWT)
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• v.22 no.2
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• pp.219-226
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• 2024

Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) has produced weapon-grade plutonium in a graphite-moderated experimental reactor at the Yongbyon nuclear facilities. The amount of plutonium produced can be estimated using the Graphite Isotope Ratio Method (GIRM), even without considering specific operational histories. However, the result depends to some degree on the operational cycle length. Moreover, an optimal cycle length can maximize the number of nuclear weapons made from the plutonium produced. For conservatism, it should be assumed that the target reactor was operated with an optimal cycle length. This study investigated the optimal cycle length using which the Calder Hall MAGNOX reactor can achieve the maximum annual production of nuclear weapons. The results show that lower enrichment fuel produced a greater number of critical plutonium spheres with a shorter optimal cycle length. Specifically, depleted uranium (0.69wt%) produced 5.561 critical plutonium spheres annually with optimal cycle lengths of 251 effective full power days. This research is crucial for understanding DPRK's potential for nuclear weapon production and highlights the importance of reactor operational strategy in maximizing the production of weapons-grade plutonium in MAGNOX reactors.

• Nuclear Engineering and Technology
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• v.56 no.8
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• pp.3155-3166
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• 2024

While several nuclear energy newcomer (NEN) countries have shown interest in small modular reactors (SMRs) as a potential energy source, this interest can generate new uncertainties regarding future nuclear weapons proliferation risks. Therefore, this research seeks to determine whether future SMR deployment in NEN countries will contribute to nuclear weapons proliferation, and how the risks can be mitigated. This research uses the Bayesian network statistical approach in conjunction with surveys of experts to assess nuclear proliferation risks when NEN countries deploy SMRs or a large commercial nuclear reactor. The results indicate that an NEN with a strong commitment to the nuclear non-proliferation norms and a stable security environment will experience a lower probability of having higher proliferation risks relative to the United Arab Emirates. Specifically, we demonstrate that experts anticipate a minimal escalation in proliferation risks across different SMR types. Instead, the results show that enrichment or reprocessing (E&R) facilities, if associated with an SMR, exert a substantial influence on proliferation risks. Lastly, implementing a spent nuclear fuel (SNF) retrieval system could serve as an option to mitigate proliferation risks in an NEN country. These findings offer insights for leading nuclear supplier countries to alleviate the potential proliferation risks by NEN countries.

• Journal of the Korean Institute of Intelligent Systems
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• v.7 no.1
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• pp.27-33
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• 1997

This project is dedicated to the elaboration of a man-machine system for monitoring the non spread of nuclear weapons, technologies, raw materials. The main purpose of such a system depends on the customer requirements and may be : - control of non proliferation of nuclear technologies, especially those that can be used to manufacture a nuclear explosive device; - the appraisal of the possibility of production of nuclear weapons by a certain country on the basic of its intellectual and scientific-technical potential, its raw material resources, its export-import potential and other parameters.

• Korean Security Journal
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• no.37
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• pp.325-354
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• 2013

The concept of national security and the fundamental system for crisis management have departed from traditional methods and the importance of a national critical infrastructure crisis management has been emphasized. A national critical infrastructure crisis means a situation where human resource, material and functional system that may have a material effect on the critical functions of the government, the vitality and integrity of society, national economy and the safety of the public becomes disabled due to causes such as terrorism or major disasters. Although North Korea had been subject to numerous rounds of negotiations and sanctions as it continually developed nuclear weapons since the 1960s, it has also showed off its nuclear armaments through successful nuclear testings and missile launches. As the development and threat of North Korea's weapons of mass destruction becomes more noticeable and the range of its risk expands, this study focuses on the potential for an absence of leadership for national crisis management where the country's leadership, which should serve the critical role and function of handling national crises, becomes completely destroyed by the unexpected initial attacks by North Korea. As a result, the purpose of this study is to propose safety measures for the country's leadership in preparation for North Korea's threat of nuclear weapons by examining the concept and degree of risk of weapons of mass destruction with a focus on nuclear weapons, analyzing the substance of the threat of North Korean nuclear weapons and evaluating such threat. In conclusion, first, to ensure the normal functioning of a national crisis management system in the event of a national crisis, we must seek safety measures that conform to the scope and succession order of the leadership of the national crisis management for an Enduring Constitutional Government (ECG) and the Continuity Of Operations (COOP). Second, in the event of a national ceremony, the gathering of the country's leadership all together in an open place should be avoided. In unavoidable circumstances, the next in rank that will act on behalf of the current leader should be designated and relevant safety measures should be taken. Third, during time of peace, in preparation for national crises, the scope of protection for the country's leadership should be prescribed and specific security and safety measures should be implemented. Fourth, the succession order for acting president in the case of the death of the president pursuant to Articles 71 and 26(1) of the National Government Organization Act should reconsidered to see whether it is a reasonable provision that takes into consideration a national crisis management that corresponds to the threat of North Korean nuclear weapons and weapons of mass destruction. Pursuant to the Basic Guidelines for National Crisis Management set out under Presidential Directive No. 229, the Korean government is currently operating a case-by-case "crisis management standard manual" and its sub-manuals and has also prepared the Presidential Security Service's security and safety measure regulations regarding the acting president. Therefore, the Korean government should actualize the above points in the case-by-case crisis management standard manual and security and safety measure regulations regarding the acting president to implement and legislate them.

• Journal of the Korea Institute of Military Science and Technology
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• v.20 no.3
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• pp.454-466
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• 2017

North Korea intended to increase the power of its nuclear weapons and standardize warhead to be loaded in ballistic missiles through the $4^{th}$ and $5^{th}$ nuclear tests. In this study, three kinds of nuclear weapons that North Korea might have used in the $4^{th}$ and $5^{th}$ nuclear tests to achieve their technical goals were suggested. Monte Carlo modeling and various technical assessments have shown that boosted fission weapons are most likely to be used. Also, using the empirical formula considering the burial depth of explosion, we found that the yield of the $4^{th}$ and $5^{th}$ nuclear tests is at least twice as strong as that is expected it could be and the initial design power could reach 8kt before amplification. This means that North Korea has already achieved a substantial level of nuclear fusion technology through the $4^{th}$ test and has made a breakthrough in the miniaturization of nuclear weapons through the $5^{th}$ test. After two or three additional tests, North Korea is expected to have nuclear missiles equipped with nuclear warhead by 2020, which is expected to complete ballistic missile development.