• Maritime Security
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• v.5 no.1
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• pp.113-136
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• 2022

China has been pushing for a systematic strategy for territorialization over a long period of time to invade Korea's West Sea (Yellow Sea) in order to create China's territorial water. China's strategy for territorializing the West Sea is an activity in which China curbs the use of South Korea and enforces the illegal use of China in order to dominate the West Sea exclusively. China aided Chinese fishing boats that engaged in illegal fishing in Korea's jurisdiction as a means to territorialize the West Sea, and is opposed to combined exercise and training of Korea and the United States Naval Forces in the West Sea, while intentionally entering KADIZ(Korea Air Defense Identification Zone). In addition, Beijing used 'scientific exploration and research' measures as a pretext for its strategies in order to encroach on Korea's West Sea. China is carrying out such work to announce to the world that China is a systematic and organized country while consistently attempting to dominate the West Sea. China's activities in the West Sea seriously infringe South Korea's sovereignty. In order to respond to China's strategies of territorialization in the West Sea stated above, I analyzed the rejection effect of the ROK-US combined military training in the West Sea and presented a 'proportional response strategy centered on the ROK-US combined forces'. Korea should be able to respond proportionally to China's activities in the seas around the Korean peninsula, and Korea should be able to neutralize China's attempt to a Fait Accompli. In addition, just as China installs buoys in the Korea-China Provisional Measures Zone, Korea should be able to install and actively utilize some devices in the West Sea and for the use of free and open West Sea. Korea should not just wait for the tragic future to come without preparing for China's gradual and long-term strategy, and Seoul needs to respond to China's maritime policy in the West Sea with a more active attitude than it is now. China has historically taken a bold and aggressive response to neighboring countries that are consistent with a passive attitude, on the other hand, Beijing has taken a cautious approach to neighboring countries that respond with an active attitude. It should not be forgotten that Korea's passive response to the Chinese strategy in the name of a 'realistic approach' such as Korea's economic dependence on China for economy will result in China's success for territorialization of the West Sea.

• The Sea:JOURNAL OF THE KOREAN SOCIETY OF OCEANOGRAPHY
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• v.23 no.3
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• pp.125-151
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• 2018

We grouped the names attributed to the seas surrounding the Korean Peninsula in maps published in two major Korean ocean and fisheries science journals over the period from 1998 to 2017: the Journal of the Korean Society of Oceanography (The Sea) and the Korean Journal of Fisheries and Aquatic Science (KFAS). The names attributed to these seas in maps of journal paper broadly were classified into three groupings: (1) East Sea and Yellow Sea; (2) East Sea, Yellow Sea, and South Sea; or (3) East Sea, West Sea and South Sea. The name 'East Sea' was dominantly used for the waters between Korea and Japan. In contrast, the water between Korea and China has been mostly labelled as 'Yellow Sea' but sometimes labelled as 'West Sea'. The waters between the south coast of Korea and Kyushu, Japan were labelled as either 'Korea Strait' or 'South Sea'. This analysis on sea names in the maps of 'The Sea' and 'KFAS' reveals that domestic researchers frequently mix geographical and international names when referring to the waters surrounding the Korean Peninsula. These inconsistencies provide the motivation for the development of a basic unifying guideline for naming the seas surrounding the Korean Peninsula. With respect to this, we recommend the use of separate names for the marginal seas between continental landmasses and/or islands versus for the coastal waters surrounding Korea. For the marginal seas, the internationally recognized names are recommended to be used: East Sea; Yellow Sea; Korea Strait; and East China Sea. While for coastal seas, including Korea's territorial sea, the following geographical nomenclature is suggested to differentiate them from the marginal sea names: Coastal Sea off the East Coast of Korea (or the East Korea Coastal Zone), Coastal Sea off the South Coast of Korea (or the South Coastal Zone of Korea), and Coastal Sea off the West Coast of Korea (or the West Korea Coastal Zone). Further, for small or specific study areas, the local region names, district names, the sea names and the undersea feature names can be used on the maps.

• The Korean Journal of Air & Space Law and Policy
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• v.30 no.2
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• pp.201-248
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• 2015

In Korea the number of unlawful interference act on board aircrafts has been increased continuously according to the growth of aviation demand, and there were 55 incidents in 2000, followed by 354 incidents in 2014, and an average of 211 incidents a year over the past five years. In 1963, a number of states adopted the Convention on Offences and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft (the Tokyo Convention 1963) as the first worldwide international legal instrument on aviation security. The Tokyo Convention took effect in 1969 and, shortly afterward, in 1970 the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft(the Hague Convention 1970) was adopted, and the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil Aviation(the Montreal Convention 1971) was adopted in 1971. After 9/11 incidents in 2001, to amend and supplement the Montreal Convention 1971, the Convention on the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Relating to International Civil Aviation(the Beijing Convention 2010) was adopted in 2010, and to supplement the Hague Convention 1970, the Protocol Supplementary to the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft(the Beijing Protocol 2010) was adopted in 2010. Since then, in response to increased cases of unruly behavior on board aircrafts which escalated in both severity and frequency,, the Montreal Protocol which is seen as an amendment to the Convention on Offences and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft(the Tokyo Convention 1963) was adopted in 2014. Korea ratified the Tokyo Convention 1963, the Hague Convention 1970, the Montreal Convention 1971, the Montreal Supplementary Protocol 1988, and the Convention on the Marking of Plastic Explosive 1991 which have proven to be effective. Under the Tokyo Convention ratified in 1970, Korea further enacted the Aircraft Navigation Safety Act in 1974, as well as the Aviation Safety and Security Act that replaced the Aircraft Navigation Safety Act in August 2002. Meanwhile, the title of the Aviation Safety and Security Act was changed to the Aviation Security Act in April 2014. The Aviation Security Act is essentially an implementing legislation of the Tokyo Convention and Hague Convention. Also the language of the Aviation Security Act is generally broader than the unruly and disruptive behavior in Sections 1-3 of the model legislation in ICAO Circular 288. The Aviation Security Act has reflected the considerable parts of the implementation of national legislation under the Beijing Convention and Beijing Protocol 2010, and the Montreal Protocol 2014 that are the modernized international conventions relating to aviation security. However, in future, when these international conventions would come into effect and Korea would ratify them, the national legislation that should be amended or provided newly in the Aviation Security Act are as followings : The jurisdiction, the definition of 'in flight', the immunity from the actions against the aircraft commander, etc., the compulsory delivery of the offender by the aircraft commander, etc., the strengthening of penalty on the person breaking the law, the enlargement of application to the accomplice, and the observance of international convention. Among them, particularly the Korean legislation is silent on the scope of the jurisdiction. Therefore, in order for jurisdiction to be extended to the extra-territorial cases of unruly and disruptive offences, it is desirable that either the Aviation Security Act or the general Crime Codes should be revised. In conclusion, in order to meet the intelligent and diverse aviation threats, the Korean government should review closely the contents of international conventions relating to aviation security and the current ratification status of international conventions by each state, and make effort to improve the legislation relating to aviation security and the aviation security system for the ratification of international conventions and the implementation of national legislation under international conventions.

• Maritime Security
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• v.5 no.1
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• pp.1-53
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• 2022

One manifestation of the contemporary era of renewed great power competition has been the deepening relationship between China and Russia. Their strengthening military ties, notwithstanding their lack of a formal defense alliance, have been especially striking. Since China and Russia deploy two of the world's most powerful navies, their growing maritime cooperation has been one of the most significant international security developments of recent years. The Sino-Russian naval exercises, involving varying platforms and locations, have built on years of high-level personnel exchanges, large Russian weapons sales to China, the Sino-Russia Treaty of Friendship, and other forms of cooperation. Though the joint Sino-Russian naval drills began soon after Beijing and Moscow ended their Cold War confrontation, these exercises have become much more important during the last decade, essentially becoming a core pillar of their expanding defense partnership. China and Russia now conduct more naval exercises in more places and with more types of weapons systems than ever before. In the future, Chinese and Russian maritime drills will likely encompass new locations, capabilities, and partners-including possibly the Arctic, hypersonic delivery systems, and novel African, Asian, and Middle East partners-as well as continue such recent innovations as conducting joint naval patrols and combined arms maritime drills. China and Russia pursue several objectives through their bilateral naval cooperation. The Treaty of Good-Neighborliness and Friendly Cooperation Between the People's Republic of China and the Russian Federation lacks a mutual defense clause, but does provide for consultations about common threats. The naval exercises, which rehearse non-traditional along with traditional missions (e.g., counter-piracy and humanitarian relief as well as with high-end warfighting), provide a means to enhance their response to such mutual challenges through coordinated military activities. Though the exercises may not realize substantial interoperability gains regarding combat capabilities, the drills do highlight to foreign audiences the Sino-Russian capacity to project coordinated naval power globally. This messaging is important given the reliance of China and Russia on the world's oceans for trade and the two countries' maritime territorial disputes with other countries. The exercises can also improve their national military capabilities as well as help them learn more about the tactics, techniques, and procedures of each other. The rising Chinese Navy especially benefits from working with the Russian armed forces, which have more experience conducting maritime missions, particularly in combat operations involving multiple combat arms, than the People's Liberation Army (PLA). On the negative side, these exercises, by enhancing their combat capabilities, may make Chinese and Russian policymakers more willing to employ military force or run escalatory risks in confrontations with other states. All these impacts are amplified in Northeast Asia, where the Chinese and Russian navies conduct most of their joint exercises. Northeast Asia has become an area of intensifying maritime confrontations involving China and Russia against the United States and Japan, with South Korea situated uneasily between them. The growing ties between the Chinese and Russian navies have complicated South Korean-U.S. military planning, diverted resources from concentrating against North Korea, and worsened the regional security environment. Naval planners in the United States, South Korea, and Japan will increasingly need to consider scenarios involving both the Chinese and Russian navies. For example, South Korean and U.S. policymakers need to prepare for situations in which coordinated Chinese and Russian military aggression overtaxes the Pentagon, obligating the South Korean Navy to rapidly backfill for any U.S.-allied security gaps that arise on the Korean Peninsula. Potentially reinforcing Chinese and Russian naval support to North Korea in a maritime confrontation with South Korea and its allies would present another serious challenge. Building on the commitment of Japan and South Korea to strengthen security ties, future exercises involving Japan, South Korea, and the United States should expand to consider these potential contingencies.

• The Korean Journal of Air & Space Law and Policy
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• v.24 no.1
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• pp.59-89
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• 2009

The objectives of the 1963 Tokyo Convention cover a variety of subjects, with the intention of providing safety in aircraft, protection of life and property on board, and promoting the security of civil aviation. These objectives will be treated as follows: first, the unification of rules on jurisdiction; second, the question of filling the gap in jurisdiction; third, the scheme of maintaining law and order on board aircraft; fourth, the protection of persons acting in accordance with the Convention; fifth, the protection of the interests of disembarked persons; sixth, the question of hijacking of aircraft; and finally some general remarks on the objectives of the Convention. The Tokyo Convention mainly deals with general crimes such as murder, violence, robbery on board aircraft rather than aviation terrorism. The Article 11 of the Convention deals with hijacking in a simple way. As far as aviation terrorism is concerned 1970 Hague Convention and 1971 Montreal Convention cover the hijacking and sabotage respectively. The Problem of national jurisdiction over the offence and the offender was as tangled at the Hague and Montreal Convention, as under the Tokyo Convention. Under the Tokyo Convention the prime base of jurisdiction is the law of the flag (Article 3), but concurrent jurisdiction is also allowed on grounds of: territorial principle, active nationality and passive personality principle, security of the state, breach of flight rules, and exercise of jurisdiction necessary for the performance of obligations under multilateral agreements (Article 4). No Criminal jurisdiction exercised in accordance with national law is excluded [Article 3(2)]. However, Article 4 of the Hague Convention(hereafter Hague Article 4) and Article 5 of the Montreal Convention(hereafter Montreal Article 5), dealing with jurisdiction have moved a step further, inasmuch as the opening part of both paragraphs 1 and 2 of the Hague Article 4 and the Montreal Article 5 impose an obligation on all contracting states to take measures to establish jurisdiction over the offence (i.e., to ensure that their law is such that their courts will have jurisdiction to try offender in all the circumstances covered by Hague Article 4 and Montreal Article 5). The state of registration and the state where the aircraft lands with the hijacker still on board will have the most interest, and would be in the best position to prosecute him; the paragraphs 1(a) and (b) of the Hague Article 4 and paragraphs 1(b) and (c) of the Montreal Article 5 deal with it, respectively. However, paragraph 1(b) of the Hague Article 4 and paragraph 1(c) of the Montreal Article 5 do not specify if the aircraft is still under the control of the hijacker or if the hijacker has been overpowered by the aircraft commander, or if the offence has at all occurred in the airspace of the state of landing. The language of the paragraph would probably cover all these cases. The weaknesses of Hague Article 4 and Montreal Article 5 are however, patent. The Jurisdictions of the state of registration, the state of landing, the state of the lessee and the state where the offender is present, are concurrent. No priorities have been fixed despite a proposal to this effect in the Legal Committee and the Diplomatic Conference, and despite the fact that it was pointed out that the difficulty in accepting the Tokyo Convention has been the question of multiple jurisdiction, for the reason that it would be too difficult to determine the priorities. Disputes over the exercise of jurisdiction can be endemic, more so when Article 8(4) of the Hague Convention and the Montreal Convention give every state mentioned in Hague Article 4(1) and Montreal Article 5(1) the right to seek extradition of the offender. A solution to the problem should not have been given up only because it was difficult. Hague Article 4(3) and Montreal Article 5(3) provide that they do not exclude any criminal jurisdiction exercised in accordance with national law. Thus the provisions of the two Conventions create additional obligations on the state, and do not exclude those already existing under national laws. Although the two Conventions do not require a state to establish jurisdiction over, for example, hijacking or sabotage committed by its own nationals in a foreign aircraft anywhere in the world, they do not preclude any contracting state from doing so. However, it has be noted that any jurisdiction established merely under the national law would not make the offence an extraditable one under Article 8 of the Hague and Montreal Convention. As far as international aviation terrorism is concerned 1988 Montreal Protocol and 1991 Convention on Marking of Plastic Explosives for the Purpose of Detention are added. The former deals with airport terrorism and the latter plastic explosives. Compared to the other International Terrorism Conventions, the International Aviation Terrorism Conventions do not have clauses of the passive personality principle. If the International Aviation Terrorism Conventions need to be revised in the future, those clauses containing the passive personality principle have to be inserted for the suppression of the international aviation terrorism more effectively. Article 3 of the 1973 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Internationally Protected Persons, Including Diplomatic Agents, Article 5 of the 1979 International Convention against the Taking of Hostages and Article 6 of the 1988 Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation would be models that the revised International Aviation Terrorism Conventions could follow in the future.