• Journal of Industrial Convergence
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• v.20 no.12
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• pp.87-96
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• 2022

The Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport has also been promoting the commercialization of land transport technology to commercialize the technologies owned by small and medium-sized venture companies, and to support the transfer and commercialization of public technologies. At this point, in order to improve the investment effect of subsequent new projects and to select excellent research institutes, it is necessary to establish a valid evaluation index system suitable for the purpose of the project. The evaluation index system for subsequent new projects should be linked to the project objectives and goals of the preceding project, and should be selected in consideration of existing evaluation indicators to prevent interruption of research results. Therefore, this thesis sets the evaluation index system into multiple scenarios through hierarchical cluster analysis using the evaluation result data for each evaluation committee for small and medium venture companies participating in the land transportation technology commercialization support project, and then analyzes the structural equation model. As a result of scenario analysis, considering the measurement effect of each path representing the causal relationship between evaluation indicators and the effect of each evaluation index on evaluation items, the scenario with the highest impact on the evaluation result was selected as an improvement plan.

• Journal of Venture Innovation
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• v.5 no.1
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• pp.107-127
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• 2022

Global challenges such as the corona pandemic, climate change and the war-on-tech ensure that the demand who the technologies of the future develops and monitors prominently for will be on the agenda. Development of, and applications in, agrifood, biotech, high-tech, medtech, quantum, AI and photonics are the basis of the future earning capacity of the Netherlands and contribute to solving societal challenges, close to home and worldwide. To be like the Netherlands and Europe a strategic position in the to obtain knowledge and innovation chain, and with it our autonomy in relation to from China and the United States insurance, clear choices are needed. Brainport Eindhoven: Building on Philips' knowledge base, there is create an innovative ecosystem where more than 7,000 companies in the High-tech Systems & Materials (HTSM) collaborate on new technologies, future earning potential and international value chains. Nearly 20,000 private R&D employees work in 5 regional high-end campuses and for companies such as ASML, NXP, DAF, Prodrive Technologies, Lightyear and many others. Brainport Eindhoven has a internationally leading position in the field of system engineering, semicon, micro and nanoelectronics, AI, integrated photonics and additive manufacturing. What is being developed in Brainport leads to the growth of the manufacturing industry far beyond the region thanks to chain cooperation between large companies and SMEs. South-Holland: The South Holland ecosystem includes companies as KPN, Shell, DSM and Janssen Pharmaceutical, large and innovative SMEs and leading educational and knowledge institutions that have more than Invest €3.3 billion in R&D. Bearing Cores are formed by the top campuses of Leiden and Delft, good for more than 40,000 innovative jobs, the port-industrial complex (logistics & energy), the manufacturing industry cluster on maritime and aerospace and the horticultural cluster in the Westland. South Holland trains thematically key technologies such as biotech, quantum technology and AI. Twente: The green, technological top region of Twente has a long tradition of collaboration in triple helix bandage. Technological innovations from Twente offer worldwide solutions for the large social issues. Work is in progress to key technologies such as AI, photonics, robotics and nanotechnology. New technology is applied in sectors such as medtech, the manufacturing industry, agriculture and circular value chains, such as textiles and construction. Being for Twente start-ups and SMEs of great importance to the jobs of tomorrow. Connect these companies technology from Twente with knowledge regions and OEMs, at home and abroad. Wageningen in FoodValley: Wageningen Campus is a global agri-food magnet for startups and corporates by the national accelerator StartLife and student incubator StartHub. FoodvalleyNL also connects with an ambitious 2030 programme, the versatile ecosystem regional, national and international - including through the WEF European food innovation hub. The campus offers guests and the 3,000 private R&D put in an interesting programming science, innovation and social dialogue around the challenges in agro production, food processing, biobased/circular, climate and biodiversity. The Netherlands succeeded in industrializing in logistics countries, but it is striving for sustainable growth by creating an innovative ecosystem through a regional industry-academic research model. In particular, the Brainport Cluster, centered on the high-tech industry, pursues regional innovation and is opening a new horizon for existing industry-academic models. Brainport is a state-of-the-art forward base that leads the innovation ecosystem of Dutch manufacturing. The history of ports in the Netherlands is transforming from a logistics-oriented port symbolized by Rotterdam into a "port of digital knowledge" centered on Brainport. On the basis of this, it can be seen that the industry-academic cluster model linking the central government's vision to create an innovative ecosystem and the specialized industry in the region serves as the biggest stepping stone. The Netherlands' innovation policy is expected to be more faithful to its role as Europe's "digital gateway" through regional development centered on the innovation cluster ecosystem and investment in job creation and new industries.

• Journal of Korea Foundry Society
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• v.41 no.2
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• pp.144-152
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• 2021

Based on the analysis of the current state of the world's foundry industry, we looked at the international competitiveness of Korea's foundry industry for the past 20 years. Korea's total foundry production is 2.52 million tons, and the production per company (so-called productivity) is 2,831 tons, which is the eighth largest in the world and down one position for the case of total foundry production, while productivity remains its position compared to three years ago. Korea is the only one of the top 10 foundry to see a decline in production. Similar to the global situation, Korean products consist of 38% of grey csat iron, 31% of ductile cast iron, 15% of aluminum, and 9% of cast steel. In order to obtain statistics on Korea's foundry industry, the survey conducted a service project for approximately nine months from April 2020. Various statistical surveys and sample in-depth surveys by the Korean standard industry class were evaluated for various contents of the domestic casting industry. We also looked at the number of companies, the distribution by region, the number of workers and the percentage of foreigners, and the distribution of each job, as well as the R&D investment status according to the size of the enterprise. Together, sales, exports, sales and various profit ratios were analyzed to measure the earning power of foundry industry. In addition, the classification by grouping the foundry industry according to the process utilized by focusing on each company, and to determine the sales, exports, and yield status for each process was also investigated on the basis. Based on these data, the domestic foundry industry has presented a variety of offers for the following issues for sustainable growth; global ranking, marginal corporate restructuring, training of domestic technical people, differentiated support policies by company size and process.

• The Korean Journal of Financial Management
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• v.21 no.2
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• pp.99-123
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• 2004

We focus in this study on incremental financing decisions and estimate a logit model for the probability a firm will choose a private placement over a public bond issue. We hypothesize that information asymmetry, financial risk, agent cost, and proprietary information may affect a firm's choice between public debt and private placements. We find that as the size of firm increases, the probability of choosing a private placement declines significantly. The age of the firm, however, is not a significant factor affecting the firm's choice between public and privately-placed bond. The coefficients on the firm's leverage and non-investment grade dummy are significantly positive, meaning firms with high financial risk and credit risk select private placements. The findings regarding agency-related variables, PER and Tobin's Q, are somewhat complex. We find significant evidence that firms with high PER prefer private placements to public bonds, suggesting that borrowers with options to engage in asset substitution or underinvestment are more likely to choose private placements. The coefficient of Tobin's Q is negative, but not significant, which weakly support the hold-up hypothesis. When we construct an interaction term on the Tobin's Q with a non-investment rating dummy, however, the Tobin's Q interaction term becomes positive and significant. Thus, high Tobin's Q firms with a speculative rating are significantly more likely to choose a private placement, regardless of the potential hold-up problems. The ratio of R&D to sales, proxy for proprietary information, is positively significant. This result can be interpreted as evidence in favor of a role for proprietary information in the debt sourcing decision process for these firms.

• Journal of Global Scholars of Marketing Science
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• v.17 no.3
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• pp.39-59
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• 2007

The international involvement of a firm has been described as a gradual development process "a process in which the enterprise gradually increases its international involvement in many studies. This process evolves in the interplay between the development of knowledge about foreign markets and operations on one hand and increasing commitment of resources to foreign markets on the other." On the basis of Uppsala internationalization model, many studies strengthen strong theoretical and empirical support. According to the predictions of the classic stages theory, the internationalization process of firms have been recognized and characterized gradual evolution to foreign markets, so called stage theory: indirect & direct export, strategic alliance and foreign direct investment. However, termed "international new ventures" (McDougall, Shane, and Oviatt 1994), "born globals" (Knight 1997; Knight and Cavusgil 1996; Madsen and Servais 1997), "instant internationals" (Preece, Miles, and Baetz 1999), or "global startups" (Oviatt and McDougall 1994) have been used and come into spotlight in internationalization study of technology intensity venture companies. Recent researches focused on venture company have suggested the phenomenons of 'born global' firms as a contradiction to the stages theory. Especially the article by Oviatt and McDougall threw the spotlight on international entrepreneurs, on international new ventures, and on their importance in the globalising world economy. Since venture companies have, by definition. lack of economies of scale, lack of resources (financial and knowledge), and aversion to risk taking, they have a difficulty in expanding their market to abroad and pursue internalization gradually and step by step. However many venture companies have pursued 'Born Global Strategy', which is different from process strategy, because corporate's environment has been rapidly changing to globalization. The existing studies investigate that (1) why the ventures enter into overseas market in those early stage, even in infancy, (2) what make the different international strategy among ventures and the born global strategy is better to the infant ventures. However, as for venture's performance(growth and profitability), the existing results do not correspond each other. They also, don't include marketing strategy (differentiation, low price, market breadth and market pioneer) that is important factors in studying of BGV's performance. In this paper I aim to delineate the appearance of international new ventures and the phenomenons of venture companies' internationalization strategy. In order to verify research problems, I develop a resource-based model and marketing strategies for analyzing the effects of the born global venture firms. In this paper, I suggested 3 research problems. First, do the korean venture companies take some advantages in the aspects of corporate's performances (growth, profitability and overall market performances) when they pursue internationalization from inception? Second, do the korean BGV have firm specific assets (foreign experiences, foreign orientation, organizational absorptive capacity)? Third, What are the marketing strategies of korean BGV and is it different from others? Under these problems, I test then (1) whether the BGV that a firm started its internationalization activity almost from inception, has more intangible resources(foreign experience of corporate members, foreign orientation, technological competences and absorptive capacity) than any other venture firms(Non_BGV) and (2) also whether the BGV's marketing strategies-differentiation, low price, market diversification and preemption strategy are different from Non_BGV. Above all, the main purpose of this research is that results achieved by BGV are indeed better than those obtained by Non_BGV firms with respect to firm's growth rate and efficiency. To do this research, I surveyed venture companies located in Seoul and Deajeon in Korea during November to December, 2005. I gather the data from 200 venture companies and then selected 84 samples, which have been founded during 1999${\sim}$2000. To compare BGV's characteristics with those of Non_BGV, I also had to classify BGV by export intensity over 50% among five or six aged venture firms. Many other researches tried to classify BGV and Non_BGV, but there were various criterion as many as researchers studied on this topic. Some of them use time gap, which is time difference of establishment and it's first internationalization experience and others use export intensity, ration of export sales amount divided by total sales amount. Although using a mixed criterion of prior research in my case, I do think this kinds of criterion is subjective and arbitrary rather than objective, so I do mention my research has some critical limitation in the classification of BGV and Non_BGV. The first purpose of research is the test of difference of performance between BGV and Non_BGV. As a result of t-test, the research show that there are statistically efficient difference not only in the growth rate (sales growth rate compared to competitors and 3 years averaged sales growth rate) but also in general market performance of BGV. But in case of profitability performance, the hypothesis that is BGV is more profit (return on investment(ROI) compared to competitors and 3 years averaged ROI) than Non-BGV was not supported. From these results, this paper concludes that BGV grows rapidly and gets a high market performance (in aspect of market share and customer loyalty) but there is no profitability difference between BGV and Non_BGV. The second result is that BGV have more absorptive capacity especially, knowledge competence, and entrepreneur's international experience than Non_BGV. And this paper also found BGV search for product differentiation, exemption strategy and market diversification strategy while Non_BGV search for low price strategy. These results have never been dealt with other existing studies. This research has some limitations. First limitation is concerned about the definition of BGV, as I mentioned above. Conceptually speaking, BGV is defined as company pursue internationalization from inception, but in empirical study, it's very difficult to classify between BGV and Non_BGV. I tried to classify on the basis of time difference and export intensity, this criterions are so subjective and arbitrary that the results are not robust if the criterion were changed. Second limitation is concerned about sample used in this research. I surveyed venture companies just located in Seoul and Daejeon and also use only 84 samples which more or less provoke sample bias problem and generalization of results. I think the more following studies that focus on ventures located in other region, the better to verify the results of this paper.

• Strategy21
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• s.33
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• pp.65-112
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• 2014

Recent trends show that the PRC has stepped aside its "army-centered approach" and placed greater emphasis on its Navy and Air Force for a wider range of operations, thereby reducing its ground force and harnessing its economic power and military technology into naval development. A quantitative growth of the PLA Navy itself is no surprise as this is not a recent phenomenon. Now is the time to pay closer attention to the level of PRC naval force's performance and the extent of its warfighting capacity in the maritime domain. It is also worth asking what China can do with its widening naval power foundation. In short, it is time to delve into several possible scenarios I which the PRC poses a real threat. With this in mind, in Section Two the paper seeks to observe the construction progress of PRC's naval power and its future prospects up to the year 2020, and categorize time frame according to its major force improvement trends. By analyzing qualitative improvements made over time, such as the scale of investment and the number of ships compared to increase in displacement (tonnage), this paper attempts to identify salient features in the construction of naval power. Chapter Three sets out performance evaluation on each type of PRC naval ships as well as capabilities of the Navy, Air Force, the Second Artillery (i.e., strategic missile forces) and satellites that could support maritime warfare. Finall, the concluding chapter estimates the PRC's maritime warfighting capability as anticipated in respective conflict scenarios, and considers its impact on the Korean Peninsula and proposes the directions ROK should steer in response. First of all, since the 1980s the PRC navy has undergone transitions as the focus of its military strategic outlook shifted from ground warfare to maritime warfare, and within 30 years of its effort to construct naval power while greatly reducing the size of its ground forces, the PRC has succeeded in building its naval power next to the U.S.'s in the world in terms of number, with acquisition of an aircraft carrier, Chinese-version of the Aegis, submarines and so on. The PRC also enjoys great potentials to qualitatively develop its forces such as indigenous aircraft carriers, next-generation strategic submarines, next-generation destroyers and so forth, which is possible because the PRC has accumulated its independent production capabilities in the process of its 30-year-long efforts. Secondly, one could argue that ROK still has its chances of coping with the PRC in naval power since, despite its continuous efforts, many estimate that the PRC naval force is roughly ten or more years behind that of superpowers such as the U.S., on areas including radar detection capability, EW capability, C4I and data-link systems, doctrines on force employment as well as tactics, and such gap cannot be easily overcome. The most probable scenarios involving the PRC in sea areas surrounding the Korean Peninsula are: first, upon the outbreak of war in the peninsula, the PRC may pursue military intervention through sea, thereby undermining efforts of the ROK-U.S. combined operations; second, ROK-PRC or PRC-Japan conflicts over maritime jurisdiction or ownership over the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands could inflict damage to ROK territorial sovereignty or economic gains. The PRC would likely attempt to resolve the conflict employing blitzkrieg tactics before U.S. forces arrive on the scene, while at the same time delaying and denying access of the incoming U.S. forces. If this proves unattainable, the PRC could take a course of action adopting "long-term attrition warfare," thus weakening its enemy's sustainability. All in all, thiss paper makes three proposals on how the ROK should respond. First, modern warfare as well as the emergent future warfare demonstrates that the center stage of battle is no longer the domestic territory, but rather further away into the sea and space. In this respect, the ROKN should take advantage of the distinct feature of battle space on the peninsula, which is surrounded by the seas, and obtain capabilities to intercept more than 50 percent of the enemy's ballistic missiles, including those of North Korea. In tandem with this capacity, employment of a large scale of UAV/F Carrier for Kill Chain operations should enhance effectiveness. This is because conditions are more favorable to defend from sea, on matters concerning accuracy rates against enemy targets, minimized threat of friendly damage, and cost effectiveness. Second, to maintain readiness for a North Korean crisis where timely deployment of US forces is not possible, the ROKN ought to obtain capabilities to hold the enemy attack at bay while deterring PRC naval intervention. It is also argued that ROKN should strengthen its power so as to protect national interests in the seas surrounding the peninsula without support from the USN, should ROK-PRC or ROK-Japan conflict arise concerning maritime jurisprudence. Third, the ROK should fortify infrastructures for independent construction of naval power and expand its R&D efforts, and for this purpose, the ROK should make the most of the advantages stemming from the ROK-U.S. alliance inducing active support from the United States. The rationale behind this argument is that while it is strategically effective to rely on alliance or jump on the bandwagon, the ultimate goal is always to acquire an independent response capability as much as possible.