There is a growing demand for agrometeorological information that end-users can use and not just interesting information. lo achieve this, each region/community needs to develop and provide localized climate and weather information for growers. Additionally, provide tools to help local users interpret climate forecasts issued by the National Weather Service in the country. Real time information should be provided for farmers, including some basic data. An ideal agrometeorological information system includes several components: an efficient data measuring and collection system; a modern telecommunication system; a standard data management processing and analysis system; and an advanced technological information dissemination system. While it is conventional wisdom that, Internet is and will play a major role in the delivery and dissemination of agrometeorological information, there are large gaps between the "information rich" and the "information poor" countries. Rural communities represent the "last mile of connectivity". For some time to come, TV broadcast, radio, phone, newspaper and fax will be used in many countries for communication. The differences in achieving this among countries arise from the human and financial resources available to implement this information and the methods of information dissemination. These differences must be considered in designing any information dissemination system. Experience shows that easy across to information more tailored to user needs would substantially increase use of climate information. Opportunities remain unexplored for applications of geographical information systems and remote sensing in agro meteorology.e sensing in agro meteorology.
In order to resolve the problem of change in global climate which is worsening as days go by and to preemptively cope with strengthened restriction on carbon emission, the government enacted 'Framework Act on Low Carbon Green Growth' in 2010 and selected green technology and green industry as new national growth engines. For this reason, the necessity to use the un-utilized waste heat across the whole industrial system has become an issue, and studies on and applications of recycling in the agricultural and fishery fields such as cultivation of tropical crops and flatfishes by utilizing the waste heat and thermal effluent generated by large industrial complexes including power plants are being actively carried out. In this study, we looked into the domestic and overseas examples of having utilized waste heat abandoned in the form of power plant thermal effluent, and carried out economic efficiency evaluation of sturgeon aquaculture utilizing thermal effluent of Yeongwol LNG Combined Cycle Power Plant in Gangwon-do. In this analysis, we analyzed the economic efficiency of a model business plan divided into three steps, starting from a small scale in order to minimize the investment risk and financial burden, which is then gradually expanded. The business operation period was assumed to be 10 years (2012~2021), and the NVP (Net Present Value) and economic efficiency (B/C) for the operation period (10 years) were estimated for different loan size by dividing the size of external loan by stage into 80% and 40% based on the basic statistics secured through a site survey. Through the result of analysis, we can see that reducing the size of the external loan is an important factor in securing greater economic efficiency as, while the B/C is 1.79 in the case the external loan is 80% of the total investment, it is presumed to be improved to 1.81 when the loan is 40%. As the findings of this study showed that the economic efficiency of sturgeon aquaculture utilizing thermal effluent of power plant can be secured, it is presumed that regional development project items with high added value can be derived though this, and, in addition, this study will greatly contribute to reinforcement of the capability of local governments to cope with climate change.
The purpose of this study was to highlight the necessity of a conceptual reestablishment of world university evaluations. The hitherto most well-known and validated world university evaluation systems such as Times Higher Education (THE), Quacquarelli Symonds (QS) or Academic Ranking of World Universities (ARWU) primarily assess big universities with quantitative evaluation indicators and performance results in the rankings. Those Systems have instigated a kind of elitism in higher education and neglect numerous small or local institutions of higher education, instead of providing stakeholders with comprehensive information about the real possibilities of tertiary education so that they can choose an institution that is individually tailored to their needs. Also, the management boards of universities and policymakers in higher education have partly been manipulated by and partly taken advantage of the elitist ranking systems with an economic emphasis, as indicated by research-centered evaluations and industry-university cooperation. To supplement such educational defects and to redress the lack of world university evaluation systems, a new system called 'U-Multirank' has been implemented with the financial support of the European Commission since 2012. U-Multirank was designed and is enforced by an international team of project experts led by CHE(Centre for Higher Education/Germany), CHEPS(Center for Higher Education Policy Studies/Netherlands) and CWTS(Centre for Science and Technology Studies at Leiden University/Netherlands). The significant features of U-Multirank, compared with e.g., THE and ARWU, are its qualitative, multidimensional, user-oriented and individualized assessment methods. Above all, its website and its assessment results, based on a mobile operating system and designed simply for international users, present a self-organized and evolutionary model of world university evaluation systems in the digital and global era. To estimate the universal validity of the redefinition of the world university evaluation system using U-Multirank, an epistemological approach will be used that relies on Edgar Morin's Complexity Theory and Karl Popper's Philosophy of Science.
When the marcher visited Korea in fall 1994, he was shocked to see high rise apartment buildings around the capitol region including Seoul and Suwon, resulting from rising demand of housing because of urban migration followed by second and third industrial development. After 6 years in March 2000, the researcher witnessed more apartment buildings and vinyl house complexes, one of the evidences of continued economic progress in Korea. Korea had to receive the rescue finance from International Monetary Fund (IMF) because of financial crisis in 1997. However, the sign of recovery was seen in a year, and the growth rate of Gross Domestic Products (GDP) in 1999 recorded as high as 10.7 percent. During this period, the Korean government has been working on restructuring of banks, enterprises, labour and public sectors. The major directions of government were; localization, reducing administrative manpower, limiting agricultural budgets, privatization of public enterprises, integration of agricultural organization, and easing of various regulations. Thus, the power of central government shifted to local government resulting in a power increase for city mayors and county chiefs. Agricultural extension services was one of targets of government restructuring, transferred to local governments from central government. At the same time, the number of extension offices was reduced by 64 percent, extension personnel reduced by 24 percent, and extension budgets reduced. During the process of restructuring, the basic direction of extension services was set by central Rural Development Administration Personnel management, technology development and supports were transferred to provincial Rural Development Administrations, and operational responsibilities transferred to city/county governments. Agricultural extension services at the local levels changed the name to Agricultural Technology Extension Center, established under jurisdiction of city mayor or county chief. The function of technology development works were added, at the same time reducing the number of educators for agriculture and rural life. As a result of observations of rural areas and agricultural extension services at various levels, functional responsibilities of extension were not well recognized throughout the central, provincial, and local levels. Central agricultural extension services should be more concerned about effective rural development by monitoring provincial and local level extension activities more throughly. At county level extension services, it may be desirable to add a research function to reflect local agricultural technological needs. Sometimes, adding administrative tasks for extension educators may be helpful far farmers. However, tasks such as inspection and investigation should be avoided, since it may hinder the effectiveness of extension educational activities. It appeared that major contents of the agricultural extension service in Korea were focused on saving agricultural materials, developing new agricultural technology, enhancing agricultural export, increasing production and establishing market oriented farming. However these kinds of efforts may lead to non-sustainable agriculture. It would be better to put more emphasis on sustainable agriculture in the future. Agricultural extension methods in Korea may be better classified into two approaches or functions; consultation function for advanced farmers and technology transfer or educational function for small farmers. Advanced farmers were more interested in technology and management information, while small farmers were more concerned about information for farm management directions and timely diffusion of agricultural technology information. Agricultural extension service should put more emphasis on small farmer groups and active participation of farmers in these groups. Providing information and moderate advice in selecting alternatives should be the major activities for consultation for advanced farmers, while problem solving processes may be the major educational function for small farmers. Systems such as internet and e-mail should be utilized for functions of information exchange. These activities may not be an easy task for decreased numbers of extension educators along with increased administrative tasks. It may be difficult to practice a one-to-one approach However group guidance may improve the task to a certain degree.
With the continued globalization of world markets, transfer pricing has become one of the dominant sources of controversy in international taxation. Transfer pricing is the process by which a multinational corporation calculates a price for goods and services that are transferred to affiliated entities. Consider a Korean electronic enterprise that buys supplies from its own subsidiary located in China. How much the Korean parent company pays its subsidiary will determine how much profit the Chinese unit reports in local taxes. If the parent company pays above normal market prices, it may appear to have a poor profit, even if the group as a whole shows a respectable profit margin. In this way, transfer prices impact the taxable income reported in each country in which the multinational enterprise operates. It's importance lies in that around 60% of international trade involves transactions between two related parts of multinationals, according to the OECD. Multinational enterprises (hereafter MEs) exert much effort into utilizing organizational advantages to make global investments. MEs wish to minimize their tax burden. So MEs spend a fortune on economists and accountants to justify transfer prices that suit their tax needs. On the contrary, local governments are not prepared to cope with MEs' powerful financial instruments. Tax authorities in each country wish to ensure that the tax base of any ME is divided fairly. Thus, both tax authorities and MEs have a vested interest in the way in which a transfer price is determined, and this is why MEs' international transfer prices are at the center of disputes concerned with taxation. Transfer pricing issues and practices are sometimes difficult to control for regulators because the tax administration does not have enough staffs with the knowledge and resources necessary to understand them. The authors examine transfer pricing practices to provide relevant resources useful in designing tax incentives and regulation schemes for policy makers. This study focuses on identifying the relevant business and environmental factors that could influence the international transfer pricing of MEs. In this perspective, we empirically investigate how the management perception of related variables influences their choice of international transfer pricing methods. We believe that this research is particularly useful in the design of tax policy. Because it can concentrate on a few selected factors in consideration of the limited budget of the tax administration with assistance of this research. Data is composed of questionnaire responses from foreign firms in Korea with investment balances exceeding one million dollars in the end of 2004. We mailed questionnaires to 861 managers in charge of the accounting departments of each company, resulting in 121 valid responses. Seventy six percent of the sample firms are classified as small and medium sized enterprises with assets below 100 billion Korean won. Reviewing transfer pricing methods, cost-based transfer pricing is most popular showing that 60 firms have adopted it. The market-based method is used by 31 firms, and 13 firms have reported the resale-pricing method. Regarding the nationalities of foreign investors, the Japanese and the Americans constitute most of the sample. Logistic regressions have been performed for statistical analysis. The dependent variable is binary in that whether the method of international transfer pricing is a market-based method or a cost-based method. This type of binary classification is founded on the belief that the market-based method is evaluated as the relatively objective way of pricing compared with the cost-based methods. Cost-based pricing is assumed to give mangers flexibility in transfer pricing decisions. Therefore, local regulatory agencies are thought to prefer market-based pricing over cost-based pricing. Independent variables are composed of eight factors such as corporate tax rate, tariffs, relations with local tax authorities, tax audit, equity ratios of local investors, volume of internal trade, sales volume, and product life cycle. The first four variables are included in the model because taxation lies in the center of transfer pricing disputes. So identifying the impact of these variables in Korean business environments is much needed. Equity ratio is included to represent the interest of local partners. Volume of internal trade was sometimes employed in previous research to check the pricing behavior of managers, so we have followed these footsteps in this paper. Product life cycle is used as a surrogate of competition in local markets. Control variables are firm size and nationality of foreign investors. Firm size is controlled using dummy variables in that whether or not the specific firm is small and medium sized. This is because some researchers report that big firms show different behaviors compared with small and medium sized firms in transfer pricing. The other control variable is also expressed in dummy variable showing if the entrepreneur is the American or not. That's because some prior studies conclude that the American management style is different in that they limit branch manger's freedom of decision. Reviewing the statistical results, we have found that managers prefer the cost-based method over the market-based method as the importance of corporate taxes and tariffs increase. This result means that managers need flexibility to lessen the tax burden when they feel taxes are important. They also prefer the cost-based method as the product life cycle matures, which means that they support subsidiaries in local market competition using cost-based transfer pricing. On the contrary, as the relationship with local tax authorities becomes more important, managers prefer the market-based method. That is because market-based pricing is a better way to maintain good relations with the tax officials. Other variables like tax audit, volume of internal transactions, sales volume, and local equity ratio have shown only insignificant influence. Additionally, we have replaced two tax variables(corporate taxes and tariffs) with the data showing top marginal tax rate and mean tariff rates of each country, and have performed another regression to find if we could get different results compared with the former one. As a consequence, we have found something different on the part of mean tariffs, that shows only an insignificant influence on the dependent variable. We guess that each company in the sample pays tariffs with a specific rate applied only for one's own company, which could be located far from mean tariff rates. Therefore we have concluded we need a more detailed data that shows the tariffs of each company if we want to check the role of this variable. Considering that the present paper has heavily relied on questionnaires, an effort to build a reliable data base is needed for enhancing the research reliability.
Land was originally communized by a community in the primitive society of Korea, and in the age of the ancient society SAM KUK-SILLA, KOKURYOE and PAEK JE-it was distributed under the principle of land-nationalization. But by the occupation of the lands which were permitted to transmit from generation to generation as Royal Grant Lands and newly cleared lands, the private occupation had already begun to be formed. Thus the private ownership of land originated by chiefs of the tribes had a trend to be gradually pervaded to the communal members. After the, SILLA Kingdom unified SAM KUK in 668 A.D., JEONG JEON System and KWAN RYO JEON System, which were the distribution systems of farmlands originated from the TANG Dynasty in China, were enforced to established the basis of an absolute monarchy. Even in this age the forest area was jointly controlled and commonly used by village communities because of the abundance of area and stocked volume, and the private ownership of the forest land was prohibited by law under the influence of the TANG Dynasty system. Toward the end of the SILLA Dynasty, however, as its centralism become weak, the tendency of the private occupancy of farmland by influential persons was expanded, and at the same time the occupancy of the forest land by the aristocrats and Buddhist temples began to come out. In the ensuing KORYO Dynasty (519 to 1391 A.D.) JEON SI KWA System under the principle of land-nationalization was strengthened and the privilege of tax collection was transferred to the bureaucrats and the aristocrats as a means of material compensation for them. Taking this opportunity the influential persons began to expand their lands for the tax collection on a large scale. Therefore, about in the middle of 11th century the farmlands and the forest lands were annexed not only around the vicinity of the capital but also in the border area by influential persons. Toward the end of the KORYO Dynasty the royal families, the bureaucrats and the local lords all possessed manors and occupied the forest lands on a large scale as a part of their farmlands. In the KORYO Dynasty, where national economic foundation was based upon the lands, the disorder of the land system threatened the fall of the Dynasty and so the land reform carried out by General YI SEONG-GYE had led to the creation of ensuing YI Dynasty. All systems of the YI Dynasty were substantially adopted from those of the KORYO Dynasty and thereby KWA JEON System was enforced under the principle of land-nationalization, while the occupancy or the forest land was strictly prohibited, except the national or royal uses, by the forbidden item in KYEONG JE YUK JEON SOK JEON, one of codes provided by the successive kings in the YI Dynasty. Thus the basis of the forest land system through the YI Dynasty had been established, while the private forest area possessed by influential persons since the previous KORYO Dynasty was preserved continuously under the influence of their authorities. Therefore, this principle of the prohibition was nothing but a legal fiction for the security of sovereign powers. Consequently the private occupancy of the forest area was gradually enlarged and finally toward the end of YI Dynasty the privately possessed forest lands were to be officially authorized. The forest administration systems in the YI Dynasty are summarized as follows: a) KEUM SAN and BONG SAN. Under the principle of land-nationalization by a powerful centralism KWA JEON System was established at the beginning of the YI Dynasty and its government expropriated all the forests and prohibited strictly the private occupation. In order to maintain the dignity of the royal capital, the forests surounding capital areas were instituted as KEUM SAN (the reserved forests) and the well-stocked natural forest lands were chosen throughout the nation by the government as BONG SAN(national forests for timber production), where the government nominated SAN JIK(forest rangers) and gave them duties to protect and afforest the forests. This forest reservation system exacted statute labors from the people of mountainious districts and yet their commons of the forest were restricted rigidly. This consequently aroused their strong aversion against such forest reservation, therefore those forest lands were radically spoiled by them. To settle this difficult problem successive kings emphasized the preservation of the forests repeatedly, and in KYEONG KUK DAI JOEN, the written constitution of the YI Dynasty, a regulation for the forest preservation was provided but the desired results could not be obtained. Subsequently the split of bureaucrats with incessant feuds among politicians and scholars weakened the centralism and moreover, the foreign invasions since 1592 made the national land devasted and the rural communities impoverished. It happned that many wandering peasants from rural areas moved into the deep forest lands, where they cultivated burnt fields recklessly in the reserved forest resulting in the severe damage of the national forests. And it was inevitable for the government to increase the number of BONG SAN in order to solve the problem of the timber shortage. The increase of its number accelerated illegal and reckless cutting inevitably by the people living mountainuos districts and so the government issued excessive laws and ordinances to reserve the forests. In the middle of the 18th century the severe feuds among the politicians being brought under control, the excessive laws and ordinances were put in good order and the political situation became temporarily stabilized. But in spite of those endeavors evil habitudes of forest devastation, which had been inveterate since the KORYO Dynasty, continued to become greater in degree. After the conclusion of "the Treaty of KANG WHA with Japan" in 1876 western administration system began to be adopted, and thereafter through the promulgation of the Forest Law in 1908 the Imperial Forests were separated from the National Forests and the modern forest ownership system was fixed. b) KANG MU JANG. After the reorganization of the military system, attaching importance to the Royal Guard Corps, the founder of the YI Dynasty, TAI JO (1392 to 1398 A.D.) instituted the royal preserves-KANG MU JANG-to attain the purposes for military training and royal hunting, prohibiting strictly private hunting, felling and clearing by the rural inhabitants. Moreover, the tyrant, YEON SAN (1495 to 1506 A.D.), expanded widely the preserves at random and strengthened its prohibition, so KANG MU JANG had become the focus of the public antipathy. Since the invasion of Japanese in 1592, however, the innovation of military training methods had to be made because of the changes of arms and tactics, and the royal preserves were laid aside consequently and finally they had become the private forests of influential persons since 17th century. c) Forests for official use. All the forests for official use occupied by government officies since the KORYO Dynasty were expropriated by the YI Dynasty in 1392, and afterwards the forests were allotted on a fixed standard area to the government officies in need of firewoods, and as the forest resources became exhausted due to the depredated forest yield, each office gradually enlarged the allotted area. In the 17th century the national land had been almost devastated by the Japanese invasion and therefore each office was in the difficulty with severe deficit in revenue, thereafter waste lands and forest lands were allotted to government offices inorder to promote the land clearing and the increase in the collections of taxes. And an abuse of wide occupation of the forests by them was derived and there appeared a cause of disorder in the forest land system. So a provision prohibiting to allot the forests newly official use was enacted in 1672, nevertheless the government offices were trying to enlarge their occupied area by encroaching the boundary and this abuse continued up to the end of the YI Dynasty. d) Private forests. The government, at the bigninning of the YI Dynasty, expropriated the forests all over the country under the principle of prohibition of private occupancy of forest lands except for the national uses, while it could not expropriate completely all of the forest lands privately occupied and inherited successively by bureaucrats, and even local governors could not control them because of their strong influences. Accordingly the King, TAI JONG (1401 to 1418 A.D.), legislated the prohibition of private forest occupancy in his code, KYEONG JE YUK JEON (1413), and furthermore he repeatedly emphasized to observe the law. But The private occupancy of forest lands was not yet ceased up at the age of the King, SE JO (1455 to 1468 A.D.), so he prescribed the provision in KYEONG KUK DAI JEON (1474), an immutable law as a written constitution in the YI Dynasty: "Anyone who privately occupy the forest land shall be inflicted 80 floggings" and he prohibited the private possession of forest area even by princes and princesses. But, it seemed to be almost impossible for only one provsion in a code to obstruct the historical growing tendecy of private forest occupancy, for example, the King, SEONG JONG (1470 to 1494 A.D.), himself granted the forests to his royal families in defiance of the prohibition and thereafter such precedents were successively expanded, and besides, taking advantage of these facts, the influential persons openly acquired their private forest lands. After tyrannical rule of the King, YEON SAN (1945 to 1506 A.D.), the political disorder due to the splits to bureaucrats with successional feuds and the usurpations of thrones accelerated the private forest occupancy in all parts of the country, thus the forbidden clause on the private forest occupancy in the law had become merely a legal fiction since the establishment of the Dynasty. As above mentioned, after the invasion of Japanese in 1592, the courts of princes (KUNG BANGG) fell into the financial difficulties, and successive kings transferred the right of tax collection from fisherys and saltfarms to each KUNG BANG and at the same time they allotted the forest areas in attempt to promote the clearing. Availing themselves of this opportunity, royal families and bureaucrats intended to occupy the forests on large scale. Besides a privilege of free selection of grave yard, which had been conventionalized from the era of the KORYO Dynasty, created an abuse of occuping too wide area for grave yards in any forest at their random, so the King, TAI JONG, restricted the area of grave yard and homestead of each family. Under the policy of suppresion of Buddhism in the YI Dynasty a privilege of taxexemption for Buddhist temples was deprived and temple forests had to follow the same course as private forests did. In the middle of 18th century the King, YEONG JO (1725 to 1776 A.D.), took an impartial policy for political parties and promoted the spirit of observing laws by putting royal orders and regulations in good order excessively issued before, thus the confused political situation was saved, meanwhile the government officially permittd the private forest ownership which substantially had already been permitted tacitly and at the same time the private afforestation areas around the grave yards was authorized as private forests at least within YONG HO (a boundary of grave yard). Consequently by the enforcement of above mentioned policies the forbidden clause of private forest ownership which had been a basic principle of forest system in the YI Dynasty entireely remained as only a historical document. Under the rule of the King, SUN JO (1801 to 1834 A.D.), the political situation again got into confusion and as the result of the exploitation from farmers by bureaucrats, the extremely impoverished rural communities created successively wandering peasants who cleared burnt fields and deforested recklessly. In this way the devastation of forests come to the peak regardless of being private forests or national forests, moreover, the influential persons extorted private forests or reserved forests and their expansion of grave yards became also excessive. In 1894 a regulation was issued that the extorted private forests shall be returned to the initial propriators and besides taking wide area of the grave yards was prohibited. And after a reform of the administrative structure following western style, a modern forest possession system was prepared in 1908 by the forest law including a regulation of the return system of forest land ownership. At this point a forbidden clause of private occupancy of forest land got abolished which had been kept even in fictitious state since the foundation of the YI Dynasty. e) Common forests. As above mentioned, the forest system in the YI Dynasty was on the ground of public ownership principle but there was a high restriction to the forest profits of farmers according to the progressive private possession of forest area. And the farmers realized the necessity of possessing common forest. They organized village associations, SONGE or KEUM SONGE, to take the ownerless forests remained around the village as the common forest in opposition to influential persons and on the other hand, they prepared the self-punishment system for the common management of their forests. They made a contribution to the forest protection by preserving the common forests in the late YI Dynasty. It is generally known that the absolute monarchy expr opriates the widespread common forests all over the country in the process of chainging from thefeudal society to the capitalistic one. At this turning point in Korea, Japanese colonialists made public that the ratio of national and private forest lands was 8 to 2 in the late YI Dynasty, but this was merely a distorted statistics with the intention of rationalizing of their dispossession of forests from Korean owners, and they took advantage of dead forbidden clause on the private occupancy of forests for their colonization. They were pretending as if all forests had been in ownerless state, but, in truth, almost all the forest lands in the late YI Dynasty except national forests were in the state of private ownership or private occupancy regardless of their lawfulness.