• Title/Summary/Keyword: Multilateral Maritime Confidence Building

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Chinese Naval Power Build-up and Measures for Regional Maritime Cooperation (중국의 해군력 발전과 지역 해양안보 협력 방안)

  • Park, Chang-Hee
    • Strategy21
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    • s.40
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    • pp.162-189
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    • 2016
  • This research deals with the PLAN's capabilities and its implication for regional security, and suggests some measures for maritime security cooperation among regional states. China has began to focus its national strategy more on 'rising as a new maritime power' since the 18th Party Convention in November 2012. Chinese new strategy aims at building a strong navy, contributing economic prosperity and national security, and thus elevating its prestige in international society. Most of all, building a strong navy is the foremost task at this time, and that is why the PLAN has the priority for military modernization. Chinese new maritime strategy could cause naval arms race in East Asia and aggravate maritime territorial disputes among concerned parties. It is the time for regional states to discuss some measures to build confidence, such as arms control of naval weapons, establishment of multilateral maritime security mechanism, and foundation of regional security regime, thus enhancing regional maritime cooperation.

ROK Navy's Role for a Confidence Building and Mutual Cooperation on the East Asian Sea (역내 해양협력 및 신뢰증진을 위한 한국 해군의 기여방안)

  • Park, Young-June
    • Strategy21
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    • s.30
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    • pp.143-176
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    • 2012
  • We are witnessing the growing maritime tension on the East Asian sea these days. Each naval powers in the region are competing each other to acquire more advanced naval capabilities. Based upon the rapid economic development, China is actively beefing up its naval capabilities and expand its boundary of naval activities all over the East Asian region. Chinese Navy already unveiled its expansive naval strategy replacing the traditional concept of 'Near-Sea Defense' with the new concept of 'Far-Sea Defense' strategy. In response to potential rival's naval build up, the U.S. is redeploying its naval forces focusing on the Asia-Pacific region. The U.S. enhances its joint naval exercises with the countries in the region, such as Japan, India, Australia and so on. In addition, Washington is devising new naval strategy under the concept of 'Air-Sea Battle' to deter Peking's so-called 'Anti-Access/ Area Denial(A2AD)' strategy. As a close ally of the U.S., Japan also disclosed its clear intention to strengthen the Maritime Self Defense Force(MSDF)'s capabilities by introducing the new concept of 'Dynamic Defense Force' in 2011. Under the new concept, JMSDF is pursuing the additional acquisition of submarines, quasi-aircraft carriers, Aegis-equipped destroyers, etc. Under the new president's strong leadership, Russia is also invigorating the naval build-up. Especially, Russia is fortifying the Pacific Fleet's naval assets by deploying new-type of naval ships such as the Mistral which was imported from France. In the midst of competitive naval build-up among the major naval powers in the region, we are observing the growing maritime conflicts on the East China Sea as well as South China Sea. Those naval conflicts can pose severe threats to our national interests. Maritime conflicts on the East or South China Sea can imperil our sea lanes which will be indispensible for national economic development. Neighboring countries' maritime conflicts also will cast an uncertainty on the path to mobilize international cooperation to resolve the North Korean issues. We should contribute to ease the maritime tension in the region by various ways. First, we should actively galvanize the bilateral maritime dialogue among the major naval powers in the region. Second, we also should take the lead to form a multilateral maritime cooperation mechanism in the region. Above all, we should set the aim to be a peaceful maritime power who can contribute to a building of stable maritime order in the region with a considerable naval power.

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Code for Unplanned Encounters at Sea(CUES): Its Limitation and Recommendations for Improvement (해상에서의 우발적 조우 시 신호 규칙(CUES)의 제한점과 개선을 위한 제언)

  • Oh, Dongkeon
    • Strategy21
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    • s.44
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    • pp.323-351
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    • 2018
  • Adopted in Western Pacific Naval Symposium(WPNS) 2014, Code for Unplanned Encounters at Sea(CUES) has been the most valuable output of WPNS history. Written and suggested by Australian Navy in 1999, the goal of CUES is to decrease the possibility of the naval conflict by establishing the code among international navies in the Western Pacific region. Facing many oppositions and requirement of People's Liberation Army Navy(PLAN) in WPNS 2012 and 2013, but it finally adopted in WPNS 2014, with many changes in detailed provisions. From then, navies in the Western Pacific region have followed CUES to prevent maritime conflicts in the region, CUES, however, sometimes does not work correctly. Contents of CUES is the mixture of the parts of Multinational Maritime Tactical Signal and Maneuvering Book(MTP) and International Regulations for Preventing Collision at Sea 1972(CORLEGs). There are means of radio communications such as frequency and signals, instructions for maneuvering and so on. Thus, it is not a new document for the U.S. Navy and its allies, but it requires training to implicate at sea for navies other than U.S. allies, like PLAN. Lots of provisions in CUES were changed because of the opposition of PLAN, and CUES has many shortcomings and practical limitations. First, since CUES is non-legally binding, and there are no methods to force the naval assets on the sea to follow. Second, CUES is only applied to naval assets; naval ships - warships, naval auxiliaries, and submarines - and naval aircraft. Third, the geographical scope in CUES is not clear. Fourth, there is no provision for submerged submarines. Finally, CUES has no time-based framework or roadmap for training. In this regard, there would be six recommendations for improvement. First, CUES should be reviewed by WPNS or other international institutions, while keeping non-binding status so that WPNS could send signals to the navies which do not answer CUES on the sea. Second, the participation of Maritime Law Enforcements(MLEs) such as coast guard is inevitable. Third, navies would use full text of MTP rather than current CUES, which extracts some parts of MTP. Fourth, CUES needs provisions with respect to submerged submarines, which recognizes as offensive weapons themselves. Fifth, the geographic scope of CUES should be clear. Since there are some countries in which claim that a rock with a concrete structure is their territory, CUES should be applied on every sea including EEZ and territorial seas. Finally, the detailed training plan is required to implicate CUES at sea. Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC) is a good exercise to train CUES, because almost all WPNS member countries except six countries are participating in RIMPAC. CUES is a meaningful document not only for navies but also for nation-states in the region. To prevent escalation of conflict in the region, potentially caused by an unplanned collision at sea, CUES should be applied more strictly. CUES will continue to be in subsequent WPNS and therefore continue to improve in the effectiveness as both an operational and diplomatic agreement.