A Research for China's Corruption Problem and the Government's Counter Measures (중국의 부패상과 정부의 대응에 관한 연구)
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- International Area Studies Review
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- v.12 no.2
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- pp.351-377
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- 2008
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Corruption in China became increasingly serious during the early period of its social transition, resulting in severe economic losses and huge challenges to China's government institution, as well as gradually becoming socially widespread. Recently. China's political corruption is an outcome of the attenuated political control, which has been caused by a systemic change from planned economy to market economy since 1978, and the lack of institutionalization to relieve such transition. Besides, the immature market system and state's intervention in the economy are other factors for the corruption. In short, current China's corruption can be regarded as a structuralized phenomenon. This article identified such circumstance by analyzing the scope, degree, and scale of the corruption. Overall assessment of the some factors suggests that present economic modernization is a principal cause for Chinese corruption while the other factors-monopoly power system in the Chinese Communist Party and the transformation of connection-are important but secondary.
Research on democratic transitions has relatively ignored the question of why some countries experience a regressive form of political pacts, while others do not. This paper develops a simple game-theoretic model to explain the phenomenon of collusive pacts in the process of democratization. Trasformismo is a term that refers to a system of political exchange based on informal clientelistic politics. The existing studies of the politics of trasformismo have emphasized the timing of industrialization and the tradition of strong state as conditions of the politics of trasformismo. However, not every late industrializers and not every strong states experienced some variants of collusive political pacts in their trajectories of democratization. In this paper, I contend that the politics of trasformismo is rather a generalizable pattern of political elites' behavior under particular circumstances. By developing a simple game theoretic model, this paper suggests the conditions under which political actors are likely to collude to a regressive form of political pacts. The model shows that the likelihood of collusion to a regressive form of political pacts is a function of a set of parameters. First, a higher level of incumbency advantage in electoral competition is likely to be associated with a higher probability of collusive political pacts. Second, a higher degree of the monopoly of political representation of political parties without a close link with a variety of societal forces is likely to induce collusive behavior among politicians. Third, the ruling party leader's expectations about the likelihood of a safe extrication are related to collusive political pacts. This paper then engages in a case study of the 1990 three-party merger in South Korea. The 1990 Korean case is interesting in that the ruling party created a new party after having merged with two opposition parties. This case can be considered a result of political maneuver in a context of democratization. The case study suggests the empirical relevance of the game-theoretic model. As the game of trasformismo and the case study of the 1990 three-party merger in South Korea have shown, the collusive political pact was neither determined by a certain stage of economic development nor by a particular cultural systems. Rather, it was a product of the art of trasformismo based on party leaders' rational calculations of the expected likelihood of taking governing power.
This study analyzes the determinants of wage premium, defined as the excess of actual wage rate over opportunity wage, for the average worker in a Korean bargaining unit. Average wage premium of a firm is decomposed into quasi-rent per worker and rent-sharing rule. Per capita quasi-rent, representing a firm's ability to pay, is defined as the difference between sales revenue and the opportunity cost of mobile factors, divided by the number of employees. Rent-sharing rule, a measure of workers' bargaining power, is defined as the average wage premium divided by the per capita quasi-rent. Empirical results show that the differences in wage premium among Korean bargaining units are much better explained by the differences in quasi-rent than by the differences in bargaining power. Also, comparing the results of 1986 with those of 1988 show that the wage settlement mechanism in 1988 was not quite different from that of 1986, in spite of the drastic change in industrial relation system in 1987. It may simply yield higher opportunity wages, by raising the bargaining power of overall workers. The tendency of Korean labor market in 1988 to show a dual structure of high & low wage premium sectors, is not due to the fact that the differences in bargaing powers across firms tend to expand, but to the fact that unions tend to reduce the wage differences among the workers within an enterprise by pursuing more equal distribution of total wage premium. Hence, the policies for reducing the wage differentials across firms should focus on rent-regulating industrial policies, e.g. eliminating monopoly rents by deregulation.
This paper performs a historical analysis on the various factors contributing to the current carbon lock-in of Korean electricity industry by using techo-institutional complex. The possibilities of the industry's carbon lock-out toward more sustainable development are also investigated. It turns out that market, firm, consumer, and government factors are all responsible for the development of the carbon lock-in of Korean power industry; the Korean government consistently favoring large power plants based on the economy of scale; below-cost electricity tariff; inflation policy to suppress increases in power price; rapid demand growth in summer and winter seasons; rigidities of electricity tariff; and expansion of gas-fired and imported coal-fired large power plants. On the other hand, except for nuclear power generation and smart grid, environment laws and new and renewable energy laws are the other remaining factors contributing to the carbon lock-out. Considering three key points that Korea is an export-oriented economy, the generation mix is the most critical factor to decide the amounts of carbon emission in the power industry, and the share of industry and commercial power consumption is over 85%, it is unlikely that Korea will achieve the carbon lock-out of power industry in the near future. Therefore, there are needs for more integrated approaches from market, firm, consumer, and government all together in order to achieve the carbon lock-out in the electricity industry. Firstly, from the market perspective, it is necessary to persue more active new and renewable energy penetration and to guarantee consumer choices by mitigating the incumbent's monopoly power as in the OECD countries. Secondly, from the firm perspective, the promotion of distributed energy system is urgent, which includes new and renewable resources and demand resources. Thirdly, from the consumer perspective, more green choices in the power tariff and customer awareness on the carbon lock-out are needed. Lastly, the government shall urgently improve power planning frameworks to include the various externalities that were not properly reflected in the past such as environmental and social conflict costs.
Internet commerce has been growing at a rapid pace for the last decade. Many firms try to reach wider consumer markets by adding the Internet channel to the existing traditional channels. Despite the various benefits of the Internet channel, a significant number of firms failed in managing the new type of channel. Previous studies could not cleary explain these conflicting results associated with the Internet channel. One of the major reasons is most of the previous studies conducted analyses under a specific market condition and claimed that as the impact of Internet channel introduction. Therefore, their results are strongly influenced by the specific market settings. However, firms face various market conditions in the real worlddensity and disutility of using the Internet. The purpose of this study is to investigate the impact of various market environments on a firm's optimal channel strategy by employing a flexible game theory model. We capture various market conditions with consumer density and disutility of using the Internet.
The Census Bureau of the Department of Commerce announced in May 2008 that U.S. retail e-commerce sales for 2006 reached $ 107 billion, up from $ 87 billion in 2005 - an increase of 22 percent. From 2001 to 2006, retail e-sales increased at an average annual growth rate of 25.4 percent. The explosive growth of E-Commerce has caused profound changes in marketing channel relationships and structures in many industries. Despite the great potential implications for both academicians and practitioners, there still exists a great deal of uncertainty about the impact of the Internet channel introduction on distribution channel management. The purpose of this study is to investigate how the ownership of the new Internet channel affects the existing channel members and consumers. To explore the above research questions, this study conducts well-controlled mathematical experiments to isolate the impact of the Internet channel by comparing before and after the Internet channel entry. The model consists of a monopolist manufacturer selling its product through a channel system including one independent physical store before the entry of an Internet store. The addition of the Internet store to this channel system results in a mixed channel comprised of two different types of channels. The new Internet store can be launched by the independent physical store such as Bestbuy. In this case, the physical retailer coordinates the two types of stores to maximize the joint profits from the two stores. The Internet store also can be introduced by an independent Internet retailer such as Amazon. In this case, a retail level competition occurs between the two types of stores. Although the manufacturer sells only one product, consumers view each product-outlet pair as a unique offering. Thus, the introduction of the Internet channel provides two product offerings for consumers. The channel structures analyzed in this study are illustrated in Fig.1. It is assumed that the manufacturer plays as a Stackelberg leader maximizing its own profits with the foresight of the independent retailer's optimal responses as typically assumed in previous analytical channel studies. As a Stackelberg follower, the independent physical retailer or independent Internet retailer maximizes its own profits, conditional on the manufacturer's wholesale price. The price competition between two the independent retailers is assumed to be a Bertrand Nash game. For simplicity, the marginal cost is set at zero, as typically assumed in this type of study. In order to explore the research questions above, this study develops a game theoretic model that possesses the following three key characteristics. First, the model explicitly captures the fact that an Internet channel and a physical store exist in two independent dimensions (one in physical space and the other in cyber space). This enables this model to demonstrate that the effect of adding an Internet store is different from that of adding another physical store. Second, the model reflects the fact that consumers are heterogeneous in their preferences for using a physical store and for using an Internet channel. Third, the model captures the vertical strategic interactions between an upstream manufacturer and a downstream retailer, making it possible to analyze the channel structure issues discussed in this paper. Although numerous previous models capture this vertical dimension of marketing channels, none simultaneously incorporates the three characteristics reflected in this model. The analysis results are summarized in Table 1. When the new Internet channel is introduced by the existing physical retailer and the retailer coordinates both types of stores to maximize the joint profits from the both stores, retail prices increase due to a combination of the coordination of the retail prices and the wider market coverage. The quantity sold does not significantly increase despite the wider market coverage, because the excessively high retail prices alleviate the market coverage effect to a degree. Interestingly, the coordinated total retail profits are lower than the combined retail profits of two competing independent retailers. This implies that when a physical retailer opens an Internet channel, the retailers could be better off managing the two channels separately rather than coordinating them, unless they have the foresight of the manufacturer's pricing behavior. It is also found that the introduction of an Internet channel affects the power balance of the channel. The retail competition is strong when an independent Internet store joins a channel with an independent physical retailer. This implies that each retailer in this structure has weak channel power. Due to intense retail competition, the manufacturer uses its channel power to increase its wholesale price to extract more profits from the total channel profit. However, the retailers cannot increase retail prices accordingly because of the intense retail level competition, leading to lower channel power. In this case, consumer welfare increases due to the wider market coverage and lower retail prices caused by the retail competition. The model employed for this study is not designed to capture all the characteristics of the Internet channel. The theoretical model in this study can also be applied for any stores that are not geographically constrained such as TV home shopping or catalog sales via mail. The reasons the model in this study is names as "Internet" are as follows: first, the most representative example of the stores that are not geographically constrained is the Internet. Second, catalog sales usually determine the target markets using the pre-specified mailing lists. In this aspect, the model used in this study is closer to the Internet than catalog sales. However, it would be a desirable future research direction to mathematically and theoretically distinguish the core differences among the stores that are not geographically constrained. The model is simplified by a set of assumptions to obtain mathematical traceability. First, this study assumes the price is the only strategic tool for competition. In the real world, however, various marketing variables can be used for competition. Therefore, a more realistic model can be designed if a model incorporates other various marketing variables such as service levels or operation costs. Second, this study assumes the market with one monopoly manufacturer. Therefore, the results from this study should be carefully interpreted considering this limitation. Future research could extend this limitation by introducing manufacturer level competition. Finally, some of the results are drawn from the assumption that the monopoly manufacturer is the Stackelberg leader. Although this is a standard assumption among game theoretic studies of this kind, we could gain deeper understanding and generalize our findings beyond this assumption if the model is analyzed by different game rules.
Department Stores have been in place as typical large-scale retailer in Korean retail market. After Asian financial crisis in 1997, the market share of major three department stores has been increased and they have had a dominant position in relationship with vendors or manufacturers. Thus, they are able to control sales commission. Sales commission is defined as things that department stores which contribute to products sales instead of manufacturers take some portion of price as their revenue. In other words, vendors or manufacturers pay some amount of money from their sales by contracted ratio to department stores. The problem is that vendors or manufacturers think that sales commission is high. However, department stores have a different opinion that sales commission is not high because they generate new value from gathering customers and doing marketing activity on behalf of vendors or manufacturers. Because department stores have operated with business model of renting sales space to vendors or manufacturers instead of buying goods directly from them, this situation has been taken place. The revenue of department stores depend on sales commission. Thus, they want to get a dominant power to control sales commission in relationship with vendors or manufacturers. So, they have tried to increase their size and brand power. The considered policies related in sales commission of department stores are as following: preventing monopoly or oligopoly of department store, being strength of monitoring for department stores' unfair trade, strict enforcement of law for large-scale retailer's unfair trade, and inducing win-win strategy doing voluntarily by department stores.
The concentration of economic power takes the form of one or a few firms controlling a substantial portion of the economic resources and means in a certain economic area. At the same time, to the extent that these firms are owned by a few individuals, resource allocation can be manipulated by them rather than by the impersonal market mechanism. This will impair allocative efficiency, run counter to a decentralized market system and hamper the equitable distribution of wealth. Viewed from the historical evolution of Western capitalism in general, the concentration of economic power is a paradox in that it is a product of the free market system itself. The economic principle of natural discrimination works so that a few big firms preempt scarce resources and market opportunities. Prominent historical examples include trusts in America, Konzern in Germany and Zaibatsu in Japan in the early twentieth century. In other words, the concentration of economic power is the outcome as well as the antithesis of free competition. As long as judgment of the economic system at large depends upon the value systems of individuals, therefore, the issue of how to evaluate the concentration of economic power will inevitably be tinged with ideology. We have witnessed several different approaches to this problem such as communism, fascism and revised capitalism, and the last one seems to be the only surviving alternative. The concentration of economic power in Korea can be summarily represented by the "jaebol," namely, the conglomerate business group, the majority of whose member firms are monopolistic or oligopolistic in their respective markets and are owned by particular individuals. The jaebol has many dimensions in its size, but to sketch its magnitude, the share of the jaebol in the manufacturing sector reached 37.3% in shipment and 17.6% in employment as of 1989. The concentration of economic power can be ascribed to a number of causes. In the early stages of economic development, when the market system is immature, entrepreneurship must fill the gap inherent in the market in addition to performing its customary managerial function. Entrepreneurship of this sort is a scarce resource and becomes even more valuable as the target rate of economic growth gets higher. Entrepreneurship can neither be readily obtained in the market nor exhausted despite repeated use. Because of these peculiarities, economic power is bound to be concentrated in the hands of a few entrepreneurs and their business groups. It goes without saying, however, that the issue of whether the full exercise of money-making entrepreneurship is compatible with social mores is a different matter entirely. The rapidity of the concentration of economic power can also be traced to the diversification of business groups. The transplantation of advanced technology oriented toward mass production tends to saturate the small domestic market quite early and allows a firm to expand into new markets by making use of excess capacity and of monopoly profits. One of the reasons why the jaebol issue has become so acute in Korea lies in the nature of the government-business relationship. The Korean government has set economic development as its foremost national goal and, since then, has intervened profoundly in the private sector. Since most strategic industries promoted by the government required a huge capacity in technology, capital and manpower, big firms were favored over smaller firms, and the benefits of industrial policy naturally accrued to large business groups. The concentration of economic power which occured along the way was, therefore, not necessarily a product of the market system. At the same time, the concentration of ownership in business groups has been left largely intact as they have customarily met capital requirements by means of debt. The real advantage enjoyed by large business groups lies in synergy due to multiplant and multiproduct production. Even these effects, however, cannot always be considered socially optimal, as they offer disadvantages to other independent firms-for example, by foreclosing their markets. Moreover their fictitious or artificial advantages only aggravate the popular perception that most business groups have accumulated their wealth at the expense of the general public and under the behest of the government. Since Korea stands now at the threshold of establishing a full-fledged market economy along with political democracy, the phenomenon called the concentration of economic power must be correctly understood and the roles of business groups must be accordingly redefined. In doing so, we would do better to take a closer look at Japan which has experienced a demise of family-controlled Zaibatsu and a success with business groups(Kigyoshudan) whose ownership is dispersed among many firms and ultimately among the general public. The Japanese case cannot be an ideal model, but at least it gives us a good point of departure in that the issue of ownership is at the heart of the matter. In setting the basic direction of public policy aimed at controlling the concentration of economic power, one must harmonize efficiency and equity. Firm size in itself is not a problem, if it is dictated by efficiency considerations and if the firm behaves competitively in the market. As long as entrepreneurship is required for continuous economic growth and there is a discrepancy in entrepreneurial capacity among individuals, a concentration of economic power is bound to take place to some degree. Hence, the most effective way of reducing the inefficiency of business groups may be to impose competitive pressure on their activities. Concurrently, unless the concentration of ownership in business groups is scaled down, the seed of social discontent will still remain. Nevertheless, the dispersion of ownership requires a number of preconditions and, consequently, we must make consistent, long-term efforts on many fronts. We can suggest a long list of policy measures specifically designed to control the concentration of economic power. Whatever the policy may be, however, its intended effects will not be fully realized unless business groups abide by the moral code expected of socially responsible entrepreneurs. This is especially true, since the root of the problem of the excessive concentration of economic power lies outside the issue of efficiency, in problems concerning distribution, equity, and social justice.
The bundled discounting which the dominant undertakings engage in is problematic in terms of competition restraint. Bundled discounts generally benefit not only buyers but also sellers. Specifically, bundled discounts usually costs a firm less to sell multiple products. In addition, Bundled discounts always provide some immediate consumer benefit in the form of lower prices. Therefore, competition authorities and courts should not be too quick to condemn bundled discounts and apply the neutral and objective standard in bundled discounting cases. Cascade Health v. Peacehealth decision starts ruling from this prerequisite. This decision pointed out that the dominant undertaking can exclude rivals through bundled discounting without pricing its products below its cost when rivals do not sell as great a number of product lines. So bundled discounting may have the anticompetitive impact by excluding less diversified but more efficient producers. This decision did not adopt Lepage case's standard which does not require the court to consider whether the competitor was at least as efficient of a producer as the bundled discounter. Instead of that, based on cost based approach, this decision said that the exclusionary element can not be satisfied unless the discounts result in prices that are below an appropriate measures of the defendant's costs. By adopting a discount attribution standard, this decision said that the full amount of the discounts should be allocated to the competitive products. As the seller can easily ascertain its own prices and costs of production and calculate whether its discounting practices exclude competitors, not the competitor's costs but the dominant undertaking's costs should be considered in applying discount attribution standard. This case deals with bundled discounting practice of multiple healthcare services by the dominant undertaking in healthcare market. Under the Korean healthcare system and public health insurance system, the price competition primarily exists in non-medical care benefits because public healthcare insurance in Korea is in combination with the compulsory medical care institution system. The cases that Monopoly Regulation and Fair Trade Law deals with, such as cartel and the abuse of monopoly power, also mainly exist in non-medical care benefits. The dominant undertaking's exclusionary bundled discounting in Korean healthcare markets may be practiced in the contracts between the dominant undertaking and private insurance companies with regards to non-medical care benefits.
The purpose of this study is to analyse the state of the energy industry and to determine the efficiency of its functioning on the basis of energy conservation principle and application of innovative technologies aimed at improving the ecological modernisation of agricultural sectors of Kazakhstan. The research methodology is based on an integrated approach of financial and economic evaluation of the effectiveness of the investment project, based on calculation of elasticity, total costs and profitability, as well as on comparative, graphical and system analysis. The current stage is characterised by widely spread restructuring processes of electric power industry in many countries through introduction of new technical installations of energy facilities and increased government regulation in order to enhance the competitive advantage of electricity market. Electric power industry features a considerable value of creating areas. For example, by providing scientific and technical progress, it crucially affects not only the development but also the territorial organisation of productive forces, first of all the industry. In modern life, more than 90% of electricity and heat is obtained by Kazakhstan's economy by consuming non-renewable energy resources: different types of coal, oil shale, oil, natural gas and peat. Therefore, it is significant to ensure energy security, as the country faces a rapid fall back to mono-gas structure of fuel and energy balance. However, energy resources in Kazakhstan are spread very unevenly. Its main supplies are concentrated in northern and central parts of the republic, and the majority of consumers of electrical power live in the southern and western areas of the country. However, energy plays an important role in the economy of industrial production and to a large extent determines the level of competitive advantage, which is a promising condition for implementation of energy-saving and environmentally friendly technologies. In these circumstances, issues of modernisation and reforms of this sector in Kazakhstan gain more and more importance, which can be seen in the example of economically sustainable solutions of a large local monopoly company, significant savings in capital investment and efficiency of implementation of an investment project. A major disadvantage of development of electricity distribution companies is the prevalence of very high moral and physical amortisation of equipment, reaching almost 70-80%, which significantly increases the operating costs. For example, while an investment of 12 billion tenge was planned in 2009 in this branch, in 2012 it is planned to invest more than 17 billion. Obviously, despite the absolute increase, the rate of investment is still quite low, as the total demand in this area is at least more than 250 billion tenge. In addition, industrial infrastructure, including the objects of Kazakhstan electric power industry, have a tangible adverse impact on the environment. Thus, since there is a large number of various power projects that are sources of electromagnetic radiation, the environment is deteriorated. Hence, there is a need to optimise the efficiency of the organisation and management of production activities of energy companies, to create and implement new technologies, to ensure safe production and provide solutions to various environmental aspects. These are key strategic factors to ensure success of the modern energy sector of Kazakhstan. The contribution of authors in developing the scope of this subject is explained by the fact that there was not enough research in the energy sector, especially in the view of ecological modernisation. This work differs from similar works in Kazakhstan in the way that the proposed method of investment project calculation takes into account the time factor, which compares the current and future value of profit from the implementation of innovative equipment that helps to bring it to actual practise. The feasibility of writing this article lies in the need of forming a public policy in the industrial sector, including optimising the structure of energy disbursing rate, which complies with the terms of future modernised development of the domestic energy sector.
shows the channel structures analyzed in this study. Before the Internet channel is introduced, a monopoly manufacturer sells its products through an independent physical store. From this structure, the manufacturer could introduce its own Internet channel (MI). The independent physical store could also introduce its own Internet channel and coordinate it with the existing physical store (RI). An independent Internet retailer such as Amazon could enter this market (II). In this case, two types of independent retailers compete with each other. In this model, consumers are uniformly distributed on the two dimensional space. Consumer heterogeneity is captured by a consumer's geographical location (ci) and his disutility of using the Internet channel ( shows various market conditions captured by the two consumer heterogeneities. (a) illustrates a market with symmetric consumer distributions. The model captures explicitly the asymmetric distributions of consumer disutility in a market as well. In a market like that is represented in (c), the average consumer disutility of using an Internet store is relatively smaller than that of using a physical store. For example, this case represents the market in which 1) the product is suitable for Internet transactions (e.g., books) or 2) the level of E-Commerce readiness is high such as in Denmark or Finland. On the other hand, the average consumer disutility when using an Internet store is relatively greater than that of using a physical store in a market like summarizes the various scenarios of consumer distributions analyzed in this study. The range for disutility of using the Internet (
summarizes the analysis results. As the average travel cost in a market decreases while the average disutility of Internet use remains the same, average retail price, total quantity sold, physical store profit, monopoly manufacturer profit, and thus, total channel profit increase. On the other hand, the quantity sold through the Internet and the profit of the Internet store decrease with a decreasing average travel cost relative to the average disutility of Internet use. We find that a channel that has an advantage over the other kind of channel serves a larger portion of the market. In a market with a high average travel cost, in which the Internet store has a relative advantage over the physical store, for example, the Internet store becomes a mass-retailer serving a larger portion of the market. This result implies that the Internet becomes a more significant distribution channel in those markets characterized by greater geographical dispersion of buyers, or as consumers become more proficient in Internet usage. The results indicate that the degree of price discrimination also varies depending on the distribution of consumer disutility in a market. The manufacturer in a market in which the average travel cost is higher than the average disutility of using the Internet has a stronger incentive for price discrimination than the manufacturer in a market where the average travel cost is relatively lower. We also find that the manufacturer has a stronger incentive to maintain a high price level when the average travel cost in a market is relatively low. Additionally, the retail competition effect due to Internet channel introduction strengthens as average travel cost in a market decreases. This result indicates that a manufacturer's channel power relative to that of the independent physical retailer becomes stronger with a decreasing average travel cost. This implication is counter-intuitive, because it is widely believed that the negative impact of Internet channel introduction on a competing physical retailer is more significant in a market like Russia, where consumers are more geographically dispersed, than in a market like Hong Kong, that has a condensed geographic distribution of consumers.
The Impact of the Internet Channel Introduction Depending on the Ownership of the Internet Channel
(도입주체에 따른 인터넷경로의 도입효과)
Sales Commission of Department Store and Policy Implications
(백화점의 판매수수료 현황 및 정책대응 방안)
The Concentration of Economic Power in Korea
(경제력집중(經濟力集中) : 기본시각(基本視角)과 정책방향(政策方向))
Bundled Discounting of Healthcare Services and Restraint of Competition
(의료서비스의 결합판매와 경쟁제한성의 판단 - Cascade Health 사건을 중심으로 -)
The Contribution of Innovation Activity to the Output Growth of Emerging Economies: The Case of Kazakhstan
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