• Proceedings of the KIEE Conference
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• 2002.07a
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• pp.401-403
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• 2002

Transmission and Distribution(T&D) pricing has been one of keystones of ongoing deregulation and privatization process in power industries. The electricity markel has been established based on open access and nondiscriminatory use of the T&D assets. As T&D business remains as a monopoly, it is necessary to provide economic regulation. This paper focuses on the distribution pricing methods and the analysis of pricing structure of distribution-retail sale company under power system deregulation.

• Journal of Distribution Research
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• v.2 no.2
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• pp.153-172
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• 1997

The distribution sector is affected by a wide range of regulations. Many of these are related to health and safety, others are related to urban planning and environmental issues, whereas some mainly have an economic basis. But, regulations many be unduly restrictive, in which case they can drive up costs and ultimately prices, or they may, in some cases, reduce consumer choice. Unduly restrictive regulations could also increase costs indirectly, by reducing competition and thus lead to lower productivity growth. In the past few years, distribution sector has gone through drastic changes due to deregulation and market opening. Implementation of regulatory reforms served as an opportunity to change laws and systems which had been an obstacle to development of distribution sector. Market opening of distribution sector became a turning point to promote competition among domestic and foreign firms. However, for small and medium scale of the typical retail enterprises which were in no position to compete in terms of prices, additional facilities, and services, faced a threat of diminished trading area, and even of their existence. Because, large firms may have greater market power than small firms, as they can more easily extract favorable terms when procuring goods, and may also be able to deter entry by advertising outlays or access to the best sites. In addition, larger chain stores armied with sufficient capital dominated trading area and reduced customer's welfare by abusing their monopoly power when competing with other shops, and are often cited as an example of adverse effects of local monopoly. In order to minimize such adverse effects and to foster competition, regulatory reforms in distribution sector should set its goal to promote sound and stable distribution activities through market principle and restoring competition principle, and ultimately to boost customers welfare. Therefore, deregulation in distribution sector should be implemented in a way to promote customers welfare, eliminate entry barriers, and expand competition principle such as productivity and efficiency competition. However, it should be also recognized that deregulation of system alone is not enough to develop the distribution sector. To compete in a increasingly concentrated industry, small enterprises increasingly engage in co-operative arrangements, such as buying groups, strategic alliances or franchise agreements.

• The Transactions of The Korean Institute of Electrical Engineers
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• v.56 no.6
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• pp.1017-1022
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• 2007

In this paper, we try to analyze the likelihood of exercising the power of market dominance by certain generators in future power industry of Korea. Firstly, we estimated installed generation capacity and sales volume of electricity in Korea, based on 'The 3rd Long Term Power Plan' which was announced in December 2006. Secondly, we calculated HHI, an index showing the degree of concentration of an industry, and RSI, an index showing how adequate the supply of goods or services of an industry is, using Fast-Forward. Thirdly, assuming a major generator employs the strategy of withholding a part of its available capacity at a peak time, we simulated hypothetical movement of SMP over a certain period of time, which is compared with that obtained without assuming such strategy to generate Lerner Index. an index showing the degree of market power of a monopoly. Regulators, home and abroad, have not given much interest in analyzing the effect of market dominance that is likely to be exercised by certain players in the future. That said, this paper provides insight into developing methodologies of analyzing and mitigating such effect by proposing the above indices to gauge it. In addition, this paper also shows the potential impact of employing capacity withholding strategy on the financial account of a dominant generator.

• The Transactions of The Korean Institute of Electrical Engineers
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• v.63 no.7
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• pp.889-895
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• 2014

Korea electric power industry had been under vertical monopoly but is typically getting restructured for free competition. An ideal pricing system under the competitive market system is 'unbundled pricing system' and 'marginal pricing system', but the current pricing system still adheres to the traditional bundled system and the average cost pricing system. Especially, progressive electricity rates for residential use reflect governmental policy-making which is focused on income redistribution & welfare, industrial supports and energy saving. This study proposes new and reasonable residential electricity pricing systems which are Time-Of-Use (TOU) and Real-Time Pricing (RTP) to reflect variations in the wholesale price of electricity. It also presents examples of various tariffs for residential electricity pricing systems.

• The Transactions of the Korean Institute of Electrical Engineers A
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• v.50 no.6
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• pp.259-264
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• 2001

The electric utility industry around the world is undergoing a revolutionary transition from vertically integrated monopoly structures to a competitive structures. Competition in an open transmission access(OTA) makes the market participants access easily the transmission system in a non-discriminatory and equitable manner. The competitions of suppliers and customers make the electric market price change every hour. This paper presents a web program in the internet environment with a function of optimal power flow(OPF) calculation. The Web program gives the nodal marginal cost and the congestion charge using the shadow prices resulted from OPF. This web program is realized by a Perl and JAVA languages, and using the common gateway interface(CGI).

• The Transactions of the Korean Institute of Electrical Engineers A
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• v.54 no.10
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• pp.500-506
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• 2005

With the advent of electric power systems moving to a deregulated retail electricity market environment, calculating distribution service tariffs has become a challenging theme for distribution industries and tariff regulators. As distribution business remains as a monopoly, it is necessary to be regulated. And as multiple distribution companies compete with each other, it would be efficient to adopt competition to the determination of distribution service tariffs. This paper proposes a method to calculate distribution service tariffs using yardstick regulation, which can lead to competition among multiple distribution companies. The proposed method takes into account not only recovering revenue requirements but also the advantages of the yardstick regulation based on long-term marginal costs of distribution network expansion algorithms. A computer simulation is carried out to illustrate effectiveness of the proposed method and it is estimated that the algorithm can be applied to compute the distribution service tariffs under retail electricity markets.

• Proceedings of the KIEE Conference
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• 1997.07c
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• pp.1153-1155
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• 1997

Electric business all over the world is dramatically changed from vertically integrated monopoly to competition systems. Also, independent power producers(IPPs) will start their commercial operation from the year 2001 in Korea. In this regard, determination of the transaction cost between IPPs and electric utilities will be a hot issue, and electric utilities requires a new framework to support their decision-making. This paper presents the concept of the avoided cost which can be used for economic studies. This paper also describes a novel algorithm to evaluate the avoided cost of a IPP. The case studies are performed on the basis of the official generation expansion plan of Korea by using the Wien Automatic System Planning Package(WASP).

• Korean journal of communication and information
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• v.80
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• pp.7-39
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• 2016

This essay deals with the bulk of problems of media raised by social inequality. I attempted to examine the relationship between inequality and media/information. In adopting the method of political economy based on dialectical viewpoint, I argue that collaboration among Chaebol, media, power result in the media capitalism. This mode of production has brought about the decline of public service and democracy. It led the Korean industrial capitalism to media capitalism. This mechanism is a dominant but unfair system with grasping of wealth, power, information. The media capitalism, based on profit, privatizations, power monopoly, remains democracy and public service in retreat. Chaebol-media-power complex plays an important role in cementing the establishment. We are reminded how much the dominant system has deteriorated the public interests of the media market and information.

• Journal of the Korean Society for Library and Information Science
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• v.35 no.2
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• pp.151-170
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• 2001

Pricing for e-journals has become more complex than before-certainly much more complex than print pricing has ever been. E-journals charge either a fiat fee based on print, user, library size, usage, and combination. A survey of publisher's pricing structure found that print based model is popular followed by user based model. The current pricing situation is far from equitable and can be improved if publishers can be coerced to change their pricing practices. This study focus on a number of possible pricing models that may supplement and/or possibly replace the current print based model. With the possibility that its pricing will eventually be based strictly according to usage, may lead to the most equitable pricing model as well as the most efficient use of society's resources. Libraries can alleviate the pricing problem by encouraging library organizations and university consortia to exploit their potential monopoly power into a bilateral monopoly situation.

• Review of Culture and Economy
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• v.21 no.1
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• pp.3-20
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• 2018

This study investigates a comprehensive context between the vertical integration and concentration of Korean film market. The concentration of distribution and screening markets are result of industrial strategy to defend demand uncertainty and to pursue economies of scale. Major distributors are increasingly inclined to defend industrial risk by concentrating resources on blockbusters and bargaining power of the multiplex is getting strengthened by distribution competition to secure as many screens as possible. Vertically integrated multiplexes operate discriminatory preferential treatment to their affiliates, however, there is a difference in degree of discrimination between vertically integrated groups. Furthermore, it is difficult to exclude each other from the distribution competition in which the largest screen number has to be secured. It is difficult for multiplex only to pursue the interests of affiliates and make negative choices in screening performance. As the number of screening screens increases, the seat occupancy also increases. As a result, the polarization of the distribution and screening markets, including the screen monopoly, is a phenomenon that occurs commercial films centered markets and the unfair behavior of the vertically affiliated multiplex has a limited effect on the movie market.