• Journal of National Security and Military Science
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• s.15
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• pp.57-86
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• 2018

The ROKAF has been training for a number of exercise for victory in the war, but the lack of aviation ammunition has become a big issue every year. However, due to the limitation of defense resources, there are many difficulties in securing and stockpiling ammunition for the war readiness. Therefore, there is a need to find a way to secure aviation ammunition for war readiness in a more economical way, so In this study, we analyze the precedent research case and the case of the reduction of the purchase cost of weapon system of other countries, and then I have suggested a plan that is appropriate for our situation. As a result of examining previous research cases for this study, there were data that KIDA studied in 2012, Precision-guided weapons acquisition cost reduction measures pursued by US Air Force And the use of procurement agencies that are being implemented by NATO member countries. Based on this study, the following four measures were proposed to reduce the purchase cost of aviation ammunition. First, the mutual aid support agreement was developed to sign the ammunition joint operation agreement. Second, join the NATO Support & Procurement Agency (NSPA) Third, it builds a purchasing community centered on the countries operating the same ammunition Fourth, participating in the US Air Force's new purchase plan for ammunition and purchase it jointly. The main contents of these four measures are as follows. 1. the mutual aid support agreement was developed to sign the ammunition joint operation agreement. Korea has signed agreements on mutual logistics support with 14 countries including the United States, Israel, Indonesia, Singapore, Australia, and Taiwan. The main purpose of these agreements is mutual support of munitions and materials, also supporting the training of the peace time and promoting exchange and cooperation. However, it is expected that there will be many difficulties in requesting or supporting mutual support in actual situation because the target or scope of mutual aid of ammunition is not clearly specified. Thus, a separate agreement on the mutual co-operation of more specific and expanded concepts of aviation ammunition is needed based on the current mutual aid support agreements 2. join the NATO Support & Procurement Agency (NSPA) In the case of NATO, there is a system in which member countries purchase munitions at a low cost using munitions purchase agencies. It is the NATO Purchasing Agency (NSPA) whose mission is to receive the purchasing requirements of the Member Nations and to purchase them quickly and efficiently and effectively to the Member Nations. NSPA's business includes the Ammunition Support Partnership (ASP), which provides ammunition purchase and disarming services. Although Korea is not a member of NATO, NSPA is gradually expanding the scope of joint procurement of munitions, and it is expected that Korea will be able to join as a member. 3. it builds a purchasing community centered on the countries operating the same ammunition By benchmarking the NSPA system, this study suggested ways to build a purchasing community with countries such as Southeast Asia, Australia, and the Middle East. First, it is necessary to review prospectively how to purchase ammunition by constructing ammunition purchasing community centered on countries using same kind of ammunition. 4. participating in the US Air Force's new purchase plan for ammunition When developing or purchasing weapons systems, joint participation by several countries can reduce acquisition costs. Therefore, if the US Air Force is planning to acquire aviation ammunition by applying it to the purchase of aviation ammunition, we will be able to significantly reduce the purchase cost by participating in this plan. Finally, there are some limitations to the method presented in this study, but starting from this study, I hope that the research on these methods will be actively pursued in the future.

• Analytical Science and Technology
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• v.19 no.6
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• pp.535-543
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• 2006

Being used widely in semiconductor and display manufacturing, $NF_3$ is internationally considered as one of the regulated compounds in emission. Numerous companies have been continuously trying to reduce the emissions of $NF_3$ to comply with the global environmental regulation. This work is made to report the destruction and removal efficiency (DRE) of electrically heated scrubbers and the use rate in process chambers installed in three main LCD manufacturing companies in Korea. As the measurement techniques for $NF_3$ emission, mass flow controlled helium gas was continuously supplied into the equipment by which scrubber efficiency is being measured. The partial pressures of $NF_3$ and helium were accurately measured for each sample using a mass spectrometer, as it is emitted from inlet and outlet of the scrubber system. The results show that the DRE value for electrically heated scrubbers installed before 2004 is less than 52 %, while that for the new scrubbers modified based on measurement by scrubber manufacturer has been sigificentely improved upto more than 95 %. In additon, we have confirmed the efficiency depends on such variables as the inlet gas flow rate, water content, heater temperature, and preventative management period. The use rates of $NF_3$ in process chambers were also affected by the process type. The use rate of radio frequency source chambers, built in the $1^{st}$ and $2^{nd}$ generation process lines, was determined to be less than 75 %. In addition, that of remote plasma source chambers for the $3^{rd}$ generation was measured to be aboove 95 %. Therefore, the combined application of improved scrubber and the RPSC process chamber to the semiconductor and display process can reduce $NF_3$ emmision by 99.95 %. It is optimistic that the mission for the reduction of greenhouse gas emission can be realized in these LCD manufacturing companies in Korea.

• Journal of National Security and Military Science
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• s.13
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• pp.687-738
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• 2016

To prepare for the complicated international relationship regarding Korean Peninsula after reunification, this thesis started off with the awareness that Unified Korea should build its international posture and national security at an early stage by determining its appropriate military strength for independent defense and military strategies that Unified Korea should aim. The main theme of this thesis is 'The research on appropriate military strength of the Unified Korean military'. To derive appropriate military strength of Unified Korea, this research focuses on conflict scenario and relative balance strategy based on potential threats posed by neighboring countries, and this is the part that differentiates this research from other researches. First of all, the main objective of the research is to decide appropriate military strength for Unified Korea to secure defense sufficiency. For this, this research will decide efficient military strategy that Unified Korea should aim. Than by presuming the most possible military conflict scenario, this research will judge the most appropriate military strength for Unified Korea to overcome the dispute. Second, after deciding appropriate military strength, this research will suggest how to operate presumed military strength in each armed force. The result of this thesis is as in the following. First, Unified Korea should aim 'relative balance strategy'. 'Relative balance strategy' is a military strategy which Unified Korea can independently secure defense sufficiency by maintaining relative balance when conflicts occur between neighboring countries. This strategy deters conflicts in advance by relative balance of power in certain time and place. Even if conflict occurs inevitably, this strategy secures initiative. Second, when analyzing neighboring countries interest and strategic environment after unification, the possibility of all-out war will be low in the Korean Peninsula because no other nation wants the Korean Peninsula to be subordinated to one single country. Therefore appropriate military strength of the Unified Korean military would be enough when Unified Korea can achieve relative balance in regional war or limited war. Third, Northeast Asia is a region where economic power and military strength is concentrated. Despite increasing mutual cooperation in the region, conflicts and competition to expand each countries influence is inherent. Japan is constantly enhancing their military strength as they aim for normal statehood. China is modernizing their military strength as they aspire to become global central nation. Russia is also enhancing their military strength in order to hold on to their past glory of Soviet Union as a world power. As a result, both in quality and quantity, the gap between military strength of Unified Korea and each neighboring countries is enlarged at an alarming rate. Especially in the field of air-sea power, arms race is occurring between each nation. Therefore Unified Korea should be equipped with appropriate military strength in order to achieve relative balance with each threats posed by neighboring countries. Fourth, the most possible conflicts between Unified Korea and neighboring countries could be summarized into four, which are Dokdo territorial dispute with Japan, Leodo jurisdictional dispute with China, territorial dispute concerning northern part of the Korea Peninsula with China and disputes regarding marine resources and sea routes with Russia. Based on those conflict scenarios, appropriate military strength for Unified Korea is as in the following. When conflict occurs with Japan regarding Dokdo, Japan is expected to put JMSDF Escort Flotilla 3, one out of four of its Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force Escort Fleet, which is based in Maizuru and JMSDF Maizuru District. To counterbalance this military strength, Unified Korea needs one task fleet, comprised with three task flotilla. In case of jurisdictional conflict with China concerning Leodo, China is expected to dispatch its North Sea fleet, one out of three of its naval fleet, which is in charge of the Yellow Sea. To response to this military action, Unified Korea needs one task fleet, comprised with three task flotilla. In case of territorial dispute concerning northern part of the Korean Peninsula with China, it is estimated that out of seven Military Region troops, China will dispatch two Military Region troops, including three Army Groups from Shenyang Military Region, where it faces boarder with the Korean Peninsula. To handle with this military strength, Unified Korea needs six corps size ground force strength, including three corps of ground forces, two operational reserve corps(maneuver corps), and one strategic reserve corps(maneuver corps). When conflict occurs with Russia regarding marine resources and sea routes, Russia is expected to send a warfare group of a size that includes two destroyers, which is part of the Pacific Fleet. In order to balance this strength, Unified Korea naval power requires one warfare group including two destroyers. Fifth, management direction for the Unified Korean military is as in the following. Regarding the ground force management, it would be most efficient to deploy troops in the border area with china for regional and counter-amphibious defense. For the defense except the border line with china, the most efficient form of force management would be maintaining strategic reserve corps. The naval force should achieve relative balance with neighboring countries when there is maritime dispute and build 'task fleet' which can independently handle long-range maritime mission. Of the three 'task fleet', one task fleet should be deployed at Jeju base to prepare for Dokdo territorial dispute and Leodo jurisdictional dispute. Also in case of regional conflict with china, one task fleet should be positioned at Yellow Sea and for regional conflict with Japan and Russia, one task fleet should be deployed at East Sea. Realistically, Unified Korea cannot possess an air force equal to neither Japan nor China in quantity. Therefore, although Unified Korea's air force might be inferior in quantity, they should possess the systematic level which Japan or China has. For this Unified Korea should build air base in island areas like Jeju Island or Ullenong Island to increase combat radius. Also to block off infiltration of enemy attack plane, air force needs to build and manage air bases near coastal areas. For landing operation forces, Marine Corps should be managed in the size of two divisions. For island defense force, which is in charge of Jeju Island, Ulleung Island, Dokdo Island and five northwestern boarder island defenses, it should be in the size of one brigade. Also for standing international peace keeping operation, it requires one brigade. Therefore Marine Corps should be organized into three divisions. The result of the research yields a few policy implications when building appropriate military strength for Unified Korea. First, Unified Korea requires lower number of ground troops compared to that of current ROK(Republic of Korea) force. Second, air-sea forces should be drastically reinforced. Third, appropriate military strength of the Unified Korean military should be based on current ROK military system. Forth, building appropriate military strength for Unified Korea should start from today, not after reunification. Because of this, South Korea should build a military power that can simultaneously prepare for current North Korea's provocations and future threats from neighboring countries after reunification. The core of this research is to decide appropriate military strength for Unified Korea to realize relative balance that will ensure defense sufficiency from neighboring countries threats. In other words, this research should precisely be aware of threats posed by neighboring countries and decide minimum level of military strength that could realize relative balance in conflict situation. Moreover this research will show the path for building appropriate military strength in each armed force.