• Strategy21
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• s.39
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• pp.198-241
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• 2016

Aircraft carriers: are they national platforms to maximize national interest or just simply paper tigers to be little useful for states' development? To some states such as U.S., U.K, and France, aircraft carriers functioned as national assets which is indispensable to their interest. By contrast, Thailand's aircraft carrier was a dead platform which is useless to its national interest and India's ones were little used on the mission field. What is the mechanism leading to this difference? The key is whether states make aircraft carriers connected to overall national evolution when it comes to establishing military strategy and planning a long-term force structure. Put it another way, conditions to acquire them need to be analyzed regarding two variables-national status(prestige and economic power) and threat(mission)-for the future as well as in the present. The former acquired carriers under the condition of making them becoming national platforms which is balanced with their overall development. However, the latter simply bought them without carefully taking account of economic obstacles, e.g., the poverty rate, when it comes to force planning. At the same time, we should not neglect to identify that states of the former cases might have a hard time in maximizing their key interests if they did not have carriers. Accordingly, conditions on carriers' acquisition need to be carefully examined and a typological theory suggested here could shed light on this process. This theory shows that South Korea's status is eligible to have a necessary and sufficient condition to acquire carriers.

• Asian Journal of Innovation and Policy
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• v.9 no.1
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• pp.56-78
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• 2020

Changes in our lives due to Artificial Intelligence (AI) are currently ongoing, and there is little refutation of the effectiveness of AI. However, there have been active discussions to minimize the side effects of AI and use it responsibly, and publishing the AI Charter of Ethics (AICE) is one result of it. This study examines how our society is responding to threats from AI that may emerge in the future by examining various AIECs in the Republic of Korea. First, we summarize seven AI threats and classify these into three categories: AI's value judgment, malicious use of AI, and human alienation. Second, from Korea's seven AICEs, we draw fourteen topics based on three categories: protection of social values, AI control, and fostering digital citizenship. Finally, we review them based on the seven AI threats to evaluate any gaps between the threats and our responses. The analysis indicates that Korea has not yet been able to properly respond to the threat of AI's usurpation of human occupations (jobs). In addition, although Korea's AICEs present appropriate responses to lethal AI weapons, these provisions will be difficult to realize because the competition for AI weapons among military powers is intensifying.

• Journal of the Korean Society of Environmental Restoration Technology
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• v.24 no.3
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• pp.99-114
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• 2021

We examined a current status of damage in biodiversity and its causing factors in Hasidong Anin coastal dune, Gangneung-si, Gangwon province which is designated as ecological and landscape conservation area. In this study, we found that ecosystem and biodiversity have been primarily damaged by anthropogenic factors such as the construction of surrounding area, military facilities illegally dumped garbage and the expansion of windbreak forest. These factors occur to damage the landscape, ecosystem and biodiversity etc. There is a significant lack of basic data needed for preservation and restoration due to the lack of prior research and value assessment. In order to establish solutions for preservation and restoration, it is critical to collect fundamental data and implement value assessments. Therefore, further studies such as ecosystem services assessment, increasing biodiversity, spatial analysis and monitoring of various items related to coastal dunes are needed.

• Journal of National Security and Military Science
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• s.1
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• pp.71-111
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• 2003

The key lessons of the very complex modern war can be dangerously misleading to the outsiders. The efforts trying to draw lessons learned from the Iraq War (OIF : Operation Iraqi Freedom) may be biased by the view of point by Americans, because most of war episodes have been come from the Western media coverage. More serious bias can be committed thanks to the differences of warfighting doctrines and military technology between US forces and ROK forces. However, OIF-fought allied commanders and outside military experts said this campaign exemplified 21st-century warfare: swift, agile and decisive, employing overpowering technology to bring relentless violence to bear in many places at once. Even though the campaign evolved differently than anticipated, allied forces regrouped and regained the initiative remarkably quickly, thanks in large part to a new command flexibility, tied to new technology that made possible the more rapid sharing of data. These factors permitted "new air-land dynamic". The things that compel that are good sensors networked with good intelligence disseminated through a robust networking system, which then yields speed. Speed turns out to be a very important factor for conducting "Rapid Decisive Operations" relied on joint "Mass of Effects". ROK forces facing the heaviest ground threat in the world may learn more from Cold War era-typed US Army 3rd Infantry Division (3ID), which operating considerably beyond existing doctrine. 3ID flew its personnel into Kuwait to meet up with equipment already located in the region as pre-positioned stock. During OIF, the division conducted continuous offensive operations over 230km deep battlespace for 21 days. The lessons learned for ROK army to prepare tomorrow's war may be found from 3ID in its training, command and control, task organization, firepower and battlespace management, and logistics.

• Convergence Security Journal
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• v.21 no.3
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• pp.93-104
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• 2021

Today, due to the development of the 4th industrial revolution such as artificial intelligence, the security threat of the military organization is increasing. A study that can contribute to complying with military security is needed by studying the effects of influence factors occurring in this changing or newly emerging security environment on information security stress and security compliance behavior intention. In previous studies, task overload, task complexity, task uncertainty, and task conflict were extracted among environmental influencing factors that cause security stress. We empirically analyzed how these influencing factors affect security stress and whether they play a mediating role in security stress. As a result of the analysis, it was analyzed that the security stress was affected in the order of task overload, task conflict, and task uncertainty. Information security stress did not significantly affect security compliance behavior intention, but it was found to mediate the effect of task overload on security compliance behavior intention. This causes information security stress due to heavy security work in the military organization, which ultimately leads to lower security compliance behavior. Therefore, the security policy to manage this situation should be promoted first.

• Journal of the Korea Society for Simulation
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• v.32 no.3
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• pp.9-21
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• 2023

The recent conflict between Russia and Ukraine underscores the significant of military logistics support in modern warfare. Military logistics support is intricate and specialized, and traditionally centered on the mission-level operational analysis and functional models. Nevertheless, there is currently increasing demand for military logistics support even at the engagement level, especially for resupply using unmanned transport assets. In response to the demand, this study proposes a task model of the military logistics support for engagement-level analysis that relies on the logic of ammunition resupply below the battalion level. The model employs a decisions tree to establish the priority of resupply based on variables such as the enemy's level of threat and the remaining ammunition of the supported unit. The model's feasibility is demonstrated through a combat simulation using OneSAF.

• Strategy21
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• s.34
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• pp.58-92
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• 2014

Even after S. Korea took 5.24 Measure(24 May 2014), N. Korea has not stopped raising provocations such as the shelling of Yeonpyeong Island, electronic and cyber attacks. To make matters worse, the communist country lunched long-range missiles(twice) and conducted 3rd nuclear test, escalating tensions which could possibly lead to an all-out war. Korean Government failed to respond properly. However, escalation into an all-out war was deterred by the CFC immediately carrying out its peacetime duty(CODA). The US made a rapid dispatch of its augmentation forces(Aircraft carrier, nuclear-powered submarine, strategic bomber, F-22) to the Korean Peninsula. In recognition of the importance of the Combined Forces Command, since May 2013 the Park Geun-Hye Administration has been pushing ahead with re-postponement of Wartime Operational Control Transfer(which initially meant the disassembling of the CFC as of 1 December 2015) More recently, there has been a series of unusual indicators from the North. Judging from its inventory of 20 nuclear weapons, 1,000 ballistic missiles and biochemical weapons, it is safe to say that N. Korea has gained at least war deterrence against S. Korea. Normally a nation with nuclear weapons shrink its size of conventional forces, but the North is pursuing the opposite, rather increasing them. In addition, there was a change of war plan by N. Korea in 2010, changing 'Conquering the Korean Peninsula' to 'Negotiation after the seizure of the Greater Seoul Metropolitan Area(GSMA)' and establishing detailed plans for wartime projects. The change reflects the chain reaction in which requests from pro-north groups within the South will lead to the proclamation of war. Kim, Jeong-Un, leader of N. Korean regime, sent threatening messages using words such as 'exercising a nuclear preemptive strike right' and 'burning of Seoul'. Nam, Jae-June, Director of National Intelligence Service, stated that Kim, Jung-Un is throwing big talks, saying communization of the entire Korean Peninsula will come within the time frame of 3 years. Kim, Gwan-Jin, Defense Minister, shared an alarming message that there is a high possibility that the North will raise local provocations or a full-fledged war whenever while putting much emphasis on defense posture. As for the response concept of the Korean Government, it has been decided that 'ROK·US Combined Local Provocation Counter-Measure' will be adopted to act against local provocations from the North. Major provocation types include ▲ violation of the Northern Limit Line(NLL) with mobilization of military ships ▲ artillery provocations on Northwestern Islands ▲ low altitude airborne intrusion ▲ rear infiltration of SOF ▲ local conflicts within the Military Demarcation Line(MDL) ▲ attacking friendly ships by submarines. Counter-measures currently established by the US involves the support from USFK and USFJ. In order to keep the sworn promise, the US is reinforcing both USFK and USFJ. An all-out war situation will be met by 'CFC OPLAN5027' and 'Tailored Expansion Deterrence Forces' with the CFC playing a central role. The US augmentation forces stands at 690,000 troops, some 160 ships, 2,000 aircraft and this comprise 50% of US total forces, which is estimated to be ninefold of Korean forces. The CFC needs to be in center in handling both local provocations and an all-out war situation. However, the combat power of S. Korean conventional forces is approximately around 80% of that of N. Korea, which has been confirmed from comments made by Kim, Gwan-Jin, Defense Minister, during an interpellation session at the National Assembly. This means that S. Korean forces are not much growing. In particular, asymmetric capabilities of the North is posing a serious threat to the South including WMD, cyber warfare forces, SOF, forces targeting 5 Northwestern Islands, sub-surface and amphibious assault forces. The presence of such threats urgently requires immediate complementary efforts. For complementary efforts, the Korean Government should consider ① reinforcement of Korean forces; putting a stoppage to shrinking military, acquisition of adequate defense budget, building a missile defense and military leadership structure validity review, ② implementation of military tasks against the North; disciplinary measures on the sinking of ROKS Cheon-an/shelling of Yeonpyeong Islands, arrangement of inter-Korean military agreements, drawing lessons from studies on the correlation between aid for N. Korea, execution of inter-Korean Summit and provocations from the North, and ③ bolstering the ROK·US alliance; disregarding wartime operational control transfer plan(disassembling of CFC) and creation of a combined division.

• Journal of the Society of Disaster Information
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• v.1 no.1
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• pp.3-26
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• 2005

In recent years, there is growing concern about the potential use of biological agents in war or acts of terrorism accompanied an increased realization that rapid preparedness and response are needed to prevent or treat the human damage that can be caused by these agents. The threat is indeed serious, and the potential for devastating numbers of casualties is high. The use of agents as weapons, even on a small scale, has the potential for huge social and economic disruption and massive diversion of regional and national resources to combat the threat, to treat primary disease, and to clean up environmental contamination. Biological weapons are one of weapons of mass destruction (or mass casualty weapons, to be precise. since they do not damage non-living entities) that are based on bacteria, viruses, rickettsia, fungi or toxins produced by these organisms. Biological weapons are known to be easy and cheap to produce and can be used to selectively target humans, animals, or plants. Theses agents can cause large numbers of casualties with minimal logistical requirements (in wide area). The spread of disease cannot be controlled until there is awareness of the signs of infection followed by identification of agents; and if the organism is easily spread from person to person, as in the case of smallpox, the number of casualties could run into the tens of thousands. Biological weapons could be used covertly, there can be a lot of different deployment scenarios. A lot of different agents could be used in biological weapons. And, there are a lot of different techniques to manufacture biological weapons. Terrorist acts that make use of Biological Agents differ in a number of ways from those involving chemicals. The distinction between terrorist and military use of Biological Weapon is increasingly problematic. The stealthy qualities of biological weapons further complicate the distinction between terrorism and war. In reality, all biological attacks are likely to require an integrated response involving both military and civilian communities. The basic considerations when public health agencies establish national defence plan against bioterrorism must be 1) arraying various laws and regulations to meet the realistic needs, 2)education for public health personnels and support of concerned academic society, 3)information collection and cooperative project with other countries, 4)Detection and surveillance(Early detection is essential for ensuring a prompt response to biological or chemical attack, including the provision of prophylactic medicines, chemical antidotes, or vaccines) and 5) Response(A comprehensive public health response to a biological or chemical terrorist event involves epidemiologic investigation, medical treatment and prophylaxis for affacted persons, and the initiation of disease prevention or environmental decontamination measures). The purpose of this paper is providing basic material of preparedness and response for biological terrorism in modern society.

• International Journal of Computer Science & Network Security
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• v.23 no.8
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• pp.177-189
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• 2023

Malware detection is an increasingly important operational focus in cyber security, particularly given the fast pace of such threats (e.g., new malware variants introduced every day). There has been great interest in exploring the use of machine learning techniques in automating and enhancing the effectiveness of malware detection and analysis. In this paper, we present a deep recurrent neural network solution as a stacked Long Short-Term Memory (LSTM) with a pre-training as a regularization method to avoid random network initialization. In our proposal, we use global and short dependencies of the inputs. With pre-training, we avoid random initialization and are able to improve the accuracy and robustness of malware threat hunting. The proposed method speeds up the convergence (in comparison to stacked LSTM) by reducing the length of malware OpCode or bytecode sequences. Hence, the complexity of our final method is reduced. This leads to better accuracy, higher Mattews Correlation Coefficients (MCC), and Area Under the Curve (AUC) in comparison to a standard LSTM with similar detection time. Our proposed method can be applied in real-time malware threat hunting, particularly for safety critical systems such as eHealth or Internet of Military of Things where poor convergence of the model could lead to catastrophic consequences. We evaluate the effectiveness of our proposed method on Windows, Ransomware, Internet of Things (IoT), and Android malware datasets using both static and dynamic analysis. For the IoT malware detection, we also present a comparative summary of the performance on an IoT-specific dataset of our proposed method and the standard stacked LSTM method. More specifically, of our proposed method achieves an accuracy of 99.1% in detecting IoT malware samples, with AUC of 0.985, and MCC of 0.95; thus, outperforming standard LSTM based methods in these key metrics.

• Journal of National Security and Military Science
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• s.13
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• pp.687-738
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• 2016

To prepare for the complicated international relationship regarding Korean Peninsula after reunification, this thesis started off with the awareness that Unified Korea should build its international posture and national security at an early stage by determining its appropriate military strength for independent defense and military strategies that Unified Korea should aim. The main theme of this thesis is 'The research on appropriate military strength of the Unified Korean military'. To derive appropriate military strength of Unified Korea, this research focuses on conflict scenario and relative balance strategy based on potential threats posed by neighboring countries, and this is the part that differentiates this research from other researches. First of all, the main objective of the research is to decide appropriate military strength for Unified Korea to secure defense sufficiency. For this, this research will decide efficient military strategy that Unified Korea should aim. Than by presuming the most possible military conflict scenario, this research will judge the most appropriate military strength for Unified Korea to overcome the dispute. Second, after deciding appropriate military strength, this research will suggest how to operate presumed military strength in each armed force. The result of this thesis is as in the following. First, Unified Korea should aim 'relative balance strategy'. 'Relative balance strategy' is a military strategy which Unified Korea can independently secure defense sufficiency by maintaining relative balance when conflicts occur between neighboring countries. This strategy deters conflicts in advance by relative balance of power in certain time and place. Even if conflict occurs inevitably, this strategy secures initiative. Second, when analyzing neighboring countries interest and strategic environment after unification, the possibility of all-out war will be low in the Korean Peninsula because no other nation wants the Korean Peninsula to be subordinated to one single country. Therefore appropriate military strength of the Unified Korean military would be enough when Unified Korea can achieve relative balance in regional war or limited war. Third, Northeast Asia is a region where economic power and military strength is concentrated. Despite increasing mutual cooperation in the region, conflicts and competition to expand each countries influence is inherent. Japan is constantly enhancing their military strength as they aim for normal statehood. China is modernizing their military strength as they aspire to become global central nation. Russia is also enhancing their military strength in order to hold on to their past glory of Soviet Union as a world power. As a result, both in quality and quantity, the gap between military strength of Unified Korea and each neighboring countries is enlarged at an alarming rate. Especially in the field of air-sea power, arms race is occurring between each nation. Therefore Unified Korea should be equipped with appropriate military strength in order to achieve relative balance with each threats posed by neighboring countries. Fourth, the most possible conflicts between Unified Korea and neighboring countries could be summarized into four, which are Dokdo territorial dispute with Japan, Leodo jurisdictional dispute with China, territorial dispute concerning northern part of the Korea Peninsula with China and disputes regarding marine resources and sea routes with Russia. Based on those conflict scenarios, appropriate military strength for Unified Korea is as in the following. When conflict occurs with Japan regarding Dokdo, Japan is expected to put JMSDF Escort Flotilla 3, one out of four of its Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force Escort Fleet, which is based in Maizuru and JMSDF Maizuru District. To counterbalance this military strength, Unified Korea needs one task fleet, comprised with three task flotilla. In case of jurisdictional conflict with China concerning Leodo, China is expected to dispatch its North Sea fleet, one out of three of its naval fleet, which is in charge of the Yellow Sea. To response to this military action, Unified Korea needs one task fleet, comprised with three task flotilla. In case of territorial dispute concerning northern part of the Korean Peninsula with China, it is estimated that out of seven Military Region troops, China will dispatch two Military Region troops, including three Army Groups from Shenyang Military Region, where it faces boarder with the Korean Peninsula. To handle with this military strength, Unified Korea needs six corps size ground force strength, including three corps of ground forces, two operational reserve corps(maneuver corps), and one strategic reserve corps(maneuver corps). When conflict occurs with Russia regarding marine resources and sea routes, Russia is expected to send a warfare group of a size that includes two destroyers, which is part of the Pacific Fleet. In order to balance this strength, Unified Korea naval power requires one warfare group including two destroyers. Fifth, management direction for the Unified Korean military is as in the following. Regarding the ground force management, it would be most efficient to deploy troops in the border area with china for regional and counter-amphibious defense. For the defense except the border line with china, the most efficient form of force management would be maintaining strategic reserve corps. The naval force should achieve relative balance with neighboring countries when there is maritime dispute and build 'task fleet' which can independently handle long-range maritime mission. Of the three 'task fleet', one task fleet should be deployed at Jeju base to prepare for Dokdo territorial dispute and Leodo jurisdictional dispute. Also in case of regional conflict with china, one task fleet should be positioned at Yellow Sea and for regional conflict with Japan and Russia, one task fleet should be deployed at East Sea. Realistically, Unified Korea cannot possess an air force equal to neither Japan nor China in quantity. Therefore, although Unified Korea's air force might be inferior in quantity, they should possess the systematic level which Japan or China has. For this Unified Korea should build air base in island areas like Jeju Island or Ullenong Island to increase combat radius. Also to block off infiltration of enemy attack plane, air force needs to build and manage air bases near coastal areas. For landing operation forces, Marine Corps should be managed in the size of two divisions. For island defense force, which is in charge of Jeju Island, Ulleung Island, Dokdo Island and five northwestern boarder island defenses, it should be in the size of one brigade. Also for standing international peace keeping operation, it requires one brigade. Therefore Marine Corps should be organized into three divisions. The result of the research yields a few policy implications when building appropriate military strength for Unified Korea. First, Unified Korea requires lower number of ground troops compared to that of current ROK(Republic of Korea) force. Second, air-sea forces should be drastically reinforced. Third, appropriate military strength of the Unified Korean military should be based on current ROK military system. Forth, building appropriate military strength for Unified Korea should start from today, not after reunification. Because of this, South Korea should build a military power that can simultaneously prepare for current North Korea's provocations and future threats from neighboring countries after reunification. The core of this research is to decide appropriate military strength for Unified Korea to realize relative balance that will ensure defense sufficiency from neighboring countries threats. In other words, this research should precisely be aware of threats posed by neighboring countries and decide minimum level of military strength that could realize relative balance in conflict situation. Moreover this research will show the path for building appropriate military strength in each armed force.