• Journal of Korean Philosophical Society
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• v.126
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• pp.53-78
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• 2013

It is generally accepted that the political philosophy of Merleau-Ponty is called western Marxism or existential phenomenological humanism. I would like to examine and orientate his political theory in detail in terms of embodiment. In what follows, I criticize its own conception of subjectivity as a philosophical basis of traditional politics from perspective of Merleau-Ponty's bodily phenomenology. In turn, alternatively I discuss Merleau-Ponty's basic idea of subjectivity. By drawing on his unique clarification of it, I approach and appreciate politics through the flesh. With the result of it, the embodiment of violence which is the permanent problem of politics is explained and disclosed distinctively. In conclusion, I might suggest what could be implicit in Merleau-Ponty's politics of flesh for Korean contemporary political issue i. I hope you relearn how to see political life in this paper.

• Journal of Korean Philosophical Society
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• v.105
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• pp.193-214
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• 2008

This paper is about to analyse Merleau-Ponty's notion of flesh on textual evidences through the structure of perception and to apply this result to his theory of the others. In the first place, we study what he thinks of philosophical investigation and thus of the essence of philosophy. With this process, we find out that perception is more important than reflection in philosophical investigation. Differently from the objective or objectivistic viewpoint, the truth of perception is revealed to go beyond distinction between consciousness and object. This truth refers to reversibility which Merleau-Ponty thinks to be the ultimate truth. The reversibility of perception leads to chiasms which reveal and unreveal the beings. In the final analysis, the flesh as reversibility is the Being in the beings. When it comes to the problem of other minds, we are confirmed through the movement of flesh that self-presence is the presence to the differentiated world, namely the others.

• Journal of the Daesoon Academy of Sciences
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• v.33
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• pp.63-90
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• 2019

In pluralistic political realities that have been exposed as antagonistic relationships between self and others, the principle of 'Coincidentia Oppositorum' in Daesoon Thought emphasizes the complementarity between self and others and presents us with a new form of cognition and attitude which can overcome pluralistic political realities. Though solipsism that objectificates others on the basis of the self, the principle of 'Coincidentia Oppositorum' presents us a new form of cognition and attitude with which we can approach others. The principle of 'Coincidentia Oppositorum' is based on the logic that we can secure and extend ourselves only in relation between self and others. Self is not fully formed or perfected without others. Previous discussions on the principle of 'Coincidentia Oppositorum' as it is exists within Daesoon Thought have been limited to Eastern Philosophy. On one hand, this inclination may be due to a narrow understanding of Western Philosophy. The flow of Modern Western Philosophy can at times be a self-reflective output for solipsism. On the other hand, the understanding of the principle of 'Coincidentia Oppositorum in context of a dualistic contrast between Eastern Philosophy and Western Philosophy is not concordant with the principle of 'Coincidentia Oppositorum' which emphasizes the creation of harmony between self and others. This paper aims to investigate avenues to create harmony between Eastern Philosophy and Western Philosophy regarding the principle of 'Coincidentia Oppositorum' in Daesoon Thought. Specifically, attention will be paid to 'flesh' as used by Merleau-Ponty. In his writings, flesh is the matrix which activates the fundamental involvement between self and others. Self is a being of flesh and an ambiguous being which is formed in a double position (seeing and being seen). Flesh can secure and extend the self only through its relationship to an other or multiple others. Restoring the other that has been excluded from modern Western Philosophy, Merleau-Ponty's flesh call for contemplation into the meaning of the other and of otherness.

• Journal of Korean Philosophical Society
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• v.142
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• pp.75-97
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• 2017

This study purpose is to discuss critically the conception of history in Hegel and Marx by drawing on Merleau-Ponty's existential theory of history, finishing with concluding remarks. Merleau-Ponty insists that history is always history experienced. This thesis is his own principle in investigating human history. From this perspective, he begins to flesh out problems with history which Hegel and Marx had understood idealistically and materialistically respectively. He criticised that if Hegel grasps history in terms of teleology, he failed to explain the source and origin of historical meaning from which history makes sense. He failed to think that what gives history meaning comes from embodied consciousness. This means that history is not made of dialectical thinking. The thing is different from such an imaginative construal. History as it stands is not like that. It is not running around like Hegelian dialectical thinking. Marx understood historical behavior wrongly when he explained class struggle in terms of productive relations. He disregarded how class was sedimented or embodied in the minds of proletarians. Owing to this, Marx could not suppose that class consciousness is determined not causally or externally but by incarnated experience. It is affected in so far as it is affected by somebody, that is, the worker. At that moment only Class consciousness begins to work. Marx did not catch sight of this hidden fact.

• Journal of the Daesoon Academy of Sciences
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• v.28
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• pp.103-131
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• 2017

As the establishment of self-identity is based on 'Relationships of Mutual Beneficence,' the formation of 'Relationships of Mutual Beneficence' is the only road to the security and confirmation of self-existence. But given that our ordinary life almost entirely consists of actions objectifying others, the formation of 'Relationships of Mutual Beneficence' is by no means easy. The formation of 'Relationships of Mutual Beneficence' should be based on morality, controlling self-desire, and not objectifying others. Philosophy based on a priori reasoning describes self-control over selfdesire as the domination of the body through a priori reasoning. But this practical philosophy cannot present a self-evidential internal motivation behind moral actions. Due to this, the application of moral order given by a priori reasoning in response to reality is likely to be reinterpreted on basis of self-interest. With regards to this, the 'propensity towards sympathy' is given as new moral norm. The 'propensity towards sympathy' as emotion is direct and consistent given that feeling occurs prior to thinking. The 'propensity towards sympathy' is intuitive in the sense that it is an instinctual response preceeding a reasoned judgment. The 'propensity towards sympathy,' as a natural moral emotion, is self-validating given that all human beings know it and practice it. But previous studies on the 'propensity towards sympathy' have an obvious limitation because they adopt phenomenological approaches to the 'propensity towards sympathy' which eschew the investigation of morality. Though they present the 'propensity towards sympathy' as a natural emotion based on body rather than reason, they do not philosophically explain the 'propensity towards sympathy.' Thus the 'propensity towards sympathy' as a natural moral emotion is likely to be interpreted as a subjective and relative moral norm. This paper philosophically explains that the 'propensity towards sympathy' is a universal moral norm on the basis of Merleau-Ponty's 'flesh.' 'Flesh' is formed as the entanglement between oneself and others and presents the 'propensity towards sympathy' as its philosophical basis. In other words, 'flesh' formed as the mixture or entanglement between oneself and others is the material foundation upon which one can activate the 'propensity towards sympathy.' This paper's approach to the 'propensity of sympathy' can be desribed as a phenomenological approach to the 'propensity towards sympathy' as a universal moral norm.