• Journal of Positioning, Navigation, and Timing
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• v.7 no.4
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• pp.227-233
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• 2018

The purpose of satellite navigation meaconing jamming is to make the target GPS receiver calculate false navigation by meaconing the received satellite signals. At this time, since the received and transmitted signals have the same frequency, the back-lobe reduction level of antenna should be -160 dB when the Effective Radiated Power (ERP) is 1 Watt (30 dBm). Therefore, meaconing jamming is impossible by merely reducing the back-lobe level of antenna when the transmitter and receiver are in proximity to each other. In general, the transmitter and receiver are isolated by the time division method to eliminate such transmission/reception interference. This paper studied the optimal switching timing between transmitting and receiving when isolating the time division transmission and reception for GPS meaconing jamming.

• Journal of Satellite, Information and Communications
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• v.11 no.4
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• pp.15-20
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• 2016

In this paper, we developed the hardware GPS signal generator for generating a GPS L1 meaconing signal with Live GPS signal signals and analyzed the performance of meaconing signal generator thorough the experiment. Deception of the signal, such as a re-broadcast, it is an object of the user to provide false information so as not to receive location information and accurate time. The signal just rebroadcast has the features that can be easily deceive the receiver via a delay of no received signal to the signal processing through an antenna. In this paper, the hardware for generating a signal only these rebroadcast designed and manufactured, by re-sending the received Live GPS signals, to confirm the effect of the receiver. The maximum delay time is possible up to about 2.6msec, also, has been successfully tested to be moved to the position of re-broadcasting based on maturity antenna the position of the receiver through a spaced antenna.

• The Journal of Korean Institute of Communications and Information Sciences
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• v.41 no.12
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• pp.1756-1758
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• 2016

Pseudorange is the pseudo distance between a GPS satellite and a GPS receiver to determine the receiver's position. The closer the distance between jammer and victim receiver is, the more effective a repeat-back jamming is. In this letter, we analyze the pseudorange difference between adjacent GPS receivers using real GPS pseudorange data to understand the effects by the repeat-back jamming.

• The Journal of Korean Institute of Communications and Information Sciences
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• v.41 no.12
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• pp.1759-1761
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• 2016

In this letter, we propose a GPS repeat-back jamming signal detection scheme based on the sample variance of the horizontal location of a receiver and evaluate the detection performance using real positioning data of the GPS receiver.

• Journal of Institute of Control, Robotics and Systems
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• v.22 no.8
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• pp.665-670
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• 2016

This paper proposes a repeat-back jamming signal detection scheme using a correlation ratio test metric of a combined pseudo-random noise signal for global navigation satellite systems. The correlation ratio test metric allows for the monitoring of possible distortions in the signal correlation. The proposed scheme is a modified version of the correlation ratio test metric to detect a repeat-back jamming signal in a multipath environment. Through a Monte-Carlo simulation, it is confirmed that the proposed scheme detects almost the whole case, which is received a repeat-back jamming signal under the 6 dB jamming to signal power ratio.

• Journal of Positioning, Navigation, and Timing
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• v.7 no.3
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• pp.127-138
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• 2018

Spoofing attacks including meaconing can provide a bogus position to a victim GPS receiver, and those attacks are notably difficult to detect at the point of view on the receiver. Several countermeasure techniques have been studied to detect, classify, and cancel the spoofing signals. Based on the countermeasure techniques, we have developed an anti-spoofing equipment that detects and mitigates or eliminates the spoofing signal based on raw measurements. Although many anti-spoofing techniques have been studied in the literatures, the evaluation test system is not deeply studied to evaluate the anti-spoofing equipment, which includes detection, mitigation, and elimination of spoofing signals. Each study only has a specific test method to verify its anti-spoofing technique. In this paper, we propose the performance evaluation test system that includes both spoofing signal injection system and its injection scenario with the constraints of stand-alone anti-spoofing techniques. The spoofing signal injection scenario is designed to drive a victim GPS receiver that moves to a designed position, where the mitigation and elimination based anti-spoofing algorithms can be successively evaluated. We evaluate the developed anti-spoofing equipment and a commercial GPS receiver using our proposed performance evaluation test system. Although the commercial one is affected by the test system and moves to the designed position, the anti-spoofing equipment mitigates and eliminates the injected spoofing signals as planned. We evaluate the performance of anti-spoofing equipment on the position error of the circular error probability, while injecting spoofing signals.

• Journal of Positioning, Navigation, and Timing
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• v.12 no.2
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• pp.101-111
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• 2023

Many spoofing detection studies have been conducted to cope with the most difficult types of deception among various disturbances of GPS, such as jamming, spoofing, and meaconing. In this paper, we propose a spoofing detection scheme based on elevation masked-relative received power between GPS L1 and L2 signals in a system using a multi-band array antenna. The proposed scheme focuses on enabling spoofing to be normally detected and minimizes the possibility of false detection in an environment where false alarms may occur due to pattern distortion among elements of an array antenna. The pattern distortion weakens the GPS signal strength at low elevation. It becomes confusing to detect a spoofing signal based on the relative power difference between GPS L1 and L2, especially when GPS L2 has weak signal strength. We propose design parameters for the relative power threshold including beamforming gain, the minimum received power difference between L1 and L2, and the patch antenna gain difference between L1 and L2. In addition, in order to eliminate the weak signal strength of GPS L2 in the spoofing detection process, we propose a rotation matrix that sets the elevation mask based on platform coordinates. Array antennas generally do not have high usefulness in commercial areas where receivers are operated alone, but are considered essential in military areas where GPS receivers are used together with signal processing for beamforming in the direction of GPS satellites. Through laboratory and live sky tests using the device under test, the proposed scheme with an elevation mask detects spoofing signals well and reduces the probability of false detection relative to that without the elevation mask.