• Korean System Dynamics Review
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• v.6 no.1
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• pp.99-123
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• 2005

Although the generation market is competitive, the power market is easily exercised the market power by one generator due to its special futures such as a limited supplier, large investment cost, transmission constraints and loss. Specially, as Korea Electric industry restructuring is similar US competitive wholesale electricity market structure which discovered the several evidences of market power abuse, when restructuring is completed the possibility that market power will be exercised is big. Market power interferes with market competitions and efficiency of system. The goal of this study is to investigate the market price effects of the potential market power and the proposed market power mitigation strategy in Korean market using the forecasting wholesale electricity market model. This modeling is developed based on the system dynamics approach. it can analyze the dynamic behaviors of wholesale prices in Korean market. And then it is expanded to include the effect of market condition changed by 'strategic behavior' and 'real time pricing.' This model can generate the overall insights regarding the dynamic impact of output withholding by old gas fire power plant bon as a marginal plant in Korean market at the macro level. Also it will give the energy planner the opportunity to create different scenarios for the future for deregulated wholesales market in Korea.

• Journal of Korea Trade
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• v.23 no.6
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• pp.131-144
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• 2019

Purpose - The purpose of this study was to investigate market power of soybeans exported by the United States to Korea. Particularly, this paper considered dichotomous characteristics of genetically modified (GM) soybeans and non-GM soybeans and conducted empirical analysis of these two segregated soybean markets to understand key tenets of market power in international soybean trade. Design/methodology - The difference in market power between GM and non-GM soybeans was analyzed using Residual Demand Elasticity (RDE) and Residual Supply Elasticity (RSE) models over the period of 2008~2018. RDE and RSE models under an imperfect competition condition were used to estimate market margins and determine whether GM and non-GM exporters or importers exercised market power in the destination market. Findings - Empirical results suggested that the U.S. had a market power on both GM and non-GM soybean exports. GM exports had greater market power than non-GM exports (14% vs. 9%). By contrast, Korea showed an inability to grab market margin or exert market power in soybean imports. Both export supply by the U.S. and import demand by Korea were found to be more responsive to price changes of GM soybeans than to prices changes of non-GM soybeans. This might be due to a self-interested, profit-seeking strategy by the exporter and many concerned consumers regarding potential adverse effects of GMOs in the importing country. Originality/value - This paper fills the literature gap by exploiting market power in both GM and non-GM markets with explicit consideration of price correlations between GM and non-GM soybeans in Korea. A number of existing studies have provided evidence for market power broadly embedded in international commodity trade. However, studies focusing on Korean markets are limited. No study has explored the country's soybean trade. Furthermore, the majority of prior studies have almost exclusively focused on the market power from a standpoint of exporting countries without discussing importers' market structure. This paper also sought to understand potentially distinguished patterns of market power between GM and non-GM markets.

• New & Renewable Energy
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• v.18 no.3
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• pp.32-42
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• 2022

Rapid spread of intermittent renewable energy has amplified the instability and uncertainty of power systems. The Korea Power Exchange (KPX) promoted efficient management by opening the power brokerage market in 2019. By combining small-scale intermittent renewable energy with a flexible facility through the power brokerage market, the KPX aims to develop a virtual power plant system that will allow the conversion of existing intermittent renewable energy into collective power plants. However, the participation rate of renewable power owners in the power brokerage market is relatively low because other markets such as the small solar power contract market or the Korea Electric Power Corporation power purchase agreement are more profitable. In this study, we used a choice experiment to determine the attributes affecting the participation rate in the power brokerage market for 113 renewable power owners and estimate the value of the power brokerage market. According to the estimation results, a low smart meter installation cost, low profit variations, long contract periods, and few clearances increased the probability of participation. Moreover, the average value of the power brokerage market was estimated to be 2.63 million KRW per power owner.

• KIEE International Transactions on Power Engineering
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• v.5A no.4
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• pp.416-424
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• 2005

At present, the Korean electricity industry is undergoing restructuring and the Cost Based-generation Pool (CBP) market is being operated in preparation of a Two Way Bidding Pool (TWBP) market. In deregulated electricity industries, an integrated power market simulator is one of the tools that can be used by market participants and market operators analyzing market behaviors and studying market structures and market codes. In this regard, it is very important to develop an electricity market simulator that reflects market code providing a market operation mechanism. This paper presents the development of an integrated market simulator, called the Power Exchange Simulator (PEXSIM), which is designed to imitate the Korean electricity market considering the various features of the market operating mechanism such as uniform price and constrained on/off payment. The PEXSIM is developed in VB.NET and composed of five modules whose titles are M-SIM, P-SIM, O-SIM, T-SIM and G-SIM interfacing the Access database program. To verify the features and the performance of the PEXSIM, a small Two Way bidding market with a 12-bus system and a One Way bidding market for generator competition will be presented for the electricity market simulations using PEXSIM.

• KIEE International Transactions on Power Engineering
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• v.4A no.4
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• pp.262-267
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• 2004

With the advent of electric power systems moving from a vertically integrated structure to a deregulated environment, calculating reactive power service charges has become a new and challenging theme for market operators. This paper examines various methods for reactive power management adopted throughout various deregulated foreign and domestic markets and then proposes an innovative method to calculate reactive power service charges using a reactive power market in a wholesale electricity market. The reactive power market is operated based on bids from the generating sources and it settles on uniform prices by running the reactive OPF programs of the day-ahead electricity market. The proposed method takes into account recovering not only the costs of installed capacity but also the lost opportunity costs incurred by reducing active power output to increase reactive power production. Based on the result of the reactive OPF program, the generators that produce reactive power within the obligatory range do not make payments whereas the generators producing reactive power beyond the obligatory range receive compensation by the price determined in the market. A numerical sample study is carried out to illustrate the processes and appropriateness of the proposed method.

• Proceedings of the KIEE Conference
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• 2005.11b
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• pp.159-161
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• 2005

Transmission congestion is one of the key factors to local market power in competitive electricity markets. Financial transmission rights provide the financial protection to their holders by paying back the congestion cost. However, the market participants who have market power can exacerbate their market power. Due to the exacerbated market power, this paper analyzes the mitigation of local market power using Contingent transmission rights on the market price. Contingent transmission rights provide not only the financial protection but also regulative penalty. The proposed methodology was demonstrated with the Optimal Power Flow(OPF).

• The Transactions of The Korean Institute of Electrical Engineers
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• v.66 no.12
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• pp.1705-1711
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• 2017

This paper analyzes the impact of DRA (Demand Response Aggregator) on market power when competing with power generation companies (Gencos) in the electricity market. If congestion occurs in the transmission line, the strategic choice of the power generation company increases exercise of market power. DRA's strategic reduction of power load impacts the strategy of Gencos, which in turn affects the outcome of the load reduction. As the strategy of Gencos changes according to the location of the congested transmission line, the impact on the market depends on the relative location of the congested line and the DRA.

• Journal of Korea Trade
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• v.27 no.1
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• pp.79-100
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• 2023

Purpose - The purpose of this study is to analyze the market power of the Korea Container Shipping Market (Intra Asia, Korea-Europe, and Korea-U.S.) to verify the existence of collusion empirically, and to answer whether the joint actions of liner market participants in Korea have formed market dominance for each route. Precisely, it will be verified through the Lerner index as to whether the regional market of Asia is a monopoly, oligopoly, or perfect competition. Design/methodology - This study used a Lerner index adjusted with elasticity presented in the New Imperial Organization (NEIO) studies. NEIO refers to a series of empirical studies that estimate parameters to judge market power from industrial data. This study uses B-L empirical models by Bresnahan (1982) and Lau (1982). In addition, NEIO research data statistically contain self-regression and stability problems as price and time series data. A dynamic model following Steen and Salvanes' Error Correction Model was used to solve this problem. Findings - The empirical results are as follows. First, λ, representing market power, is nearly zero in all three markets. Second, the Korean shipping market shows low demand elasticity on average. Nevertheless, the markup is low, a characteristic that is difficult to see in other industries. Third, the Korean shipping market generally remains close to perfect competition from 2014 to 2022, but extreme market power appears in a specific period, such as COVID-19. Fourth, there was no market power in the Intra Asia market from 2008 to 2014. Originality/value - Doubts about perfect competition in the liner market continued, but there were few empirical cases. This paper confirmed that the Korea liner market is a perfect competition market. This paper is the first to implement dynamics using ECM and recursive regression to demonstrate market power in the Korean liner market by dividing the shipping market into Deep Sea and Intra Asia separately. It is also the first to prove the most controversial problems in the current shipping industry numerically and academically.

• The Transactions of the Korean Institute of Electrical Engineers A
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• v.54 no.1
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• pp.43-50
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• 2005

The presence of transmission congestion may reduce the market size and split the bulk power system into smaller systems. Consequently, this can be a key factor to the increase in market price. This paper analyzes the effect of exercising local market power on the market price, and derives a range of indices which quantify the degree and incentive of local market power through statistical analysis in an electricity market with uniform pricing scheme. The applicability and effectiveness of the derived indices on competitive electricity markets are demonstrated on the Korea electricity market.

• Korean System Dynamics Review
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• v.2 no.2
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• pp.25-40
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• 2001

This paper describes the forecast of power plant construction in a competitive korean electricity market. In Korea, KEPCO (Korea Electric Power Corporation, fully controlled by government) was responsible for from the production of the electricity to the sale of electricity to customer. However, the generation part is separated from KEPCO and six generation companies were established for whole sale competition from April 1st, 2001. The generation companies consist of five fossil power companies and one nuclear power company in Korea at present time. Fossil power companies are scheduled to be sold to private companies including foreign investors. Nuclear power company is owned and controlled by government. The competition in generation market will start from 2003. ISO (Independence System Operator will purchase the electricity from the power exchange market. The market price is determined by the SMP(System Marginal Price) which is decided by the balance between demand and supply of electricity in power exchange market. Under this uncertain circumstance, the energy policy planners such as government are interested to the construction of the power plant in the future. These interests are accelerated due to the recent shortage of electricity supply in California. In the competitive market, investors are no longer interested in the investment for the capital intensive, long lead time generating technologies such as nuclear and coal plants. Large unclear and coal plants were no longer the top choices. Instead, investors in the competitive market are interested in smaller, more efficient, cheaper, cleaner technologies such as CCGT(Combined Cycle Gas Turbine). Electricity is treated as commodity in the competitive market. The investors behavior in the commodity market shows that the new investment decision is made when the market price exceeds the sum of capital cost and variable cost of the new facility and the existing facility utilization depends on the marginal cost of the facility. This investors behavior can be applied to the new investments for the power plant. Under these postulations, there is the potential for power plant construction to appear in waves causing alternating periods of over and under supply of electricity like commodity production or real estate production. A computer model was developed to sturdy the possibility that construction will appear in waves of boom and bust in Korean electricity market. This model was constructed using System Dynamics method pioneered by Forrester(MIT, 1961) and explained in recent text by Sternman (Business Dynamics, MIT, 2000) and the recent work by Andrew Ford(Energy Policy, 1999). This model was designed based on the Energy Policy results(Ford, 1999) with parameters for loads and resources in Korea. This Korea Market Model was developed and tested in a small scale project to demonstrate the usefulness of the System Dynamics approach. Korea electricity market is isolated and not allowed to import electricity from outsides. In this model, the base load such as unclear and large coal power plant are assumed to be user specified investment and only CCGT is selected for new investment by investors in the market. This model may be used to learn if government investment in new unclear plants could compensate for the unstable actions of private developers. This model can be used to test the policy focused on the role of unclear investments over time. This model also can be used to test whether the future power plant construction can meet the government targets for the mix of generating resources and to test whether to maintain stable price in the spot market.