• Journal of Korean Institute of Industrial Engineers
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• v.22 no.2
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• pp.189-207
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• 1996

In this paper, a market share competition model for two firms with asymmetric conditions is considered with. In the model, the asymmetry between two firms is given by the difference of market shares In the existing market and the change of market share is supposed to be occurred only through pioneering a new market. Since the timing decision of market pioneering is based on the continuous time domain, a super game structure which has infinitely many numbers of subgames is employed for the modeling. In the course of equilibrium finding, we show that there exists no subgame-perfect pure strategy equilibrium In this game. So, we apply a mixed strategy concept and find a unique subgame-perfect equilibrium behavior strategy. As a result of equilibrium analysis, we know that the relative sizes of pioneering Incentives between two firms are varying with parameter conditions. However, the global speed of market pioneering is proven to be independent with the level of asymmetry between two firms.

• Journal of the Korean Operations Research and Management Science Society
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• v.22 no.4
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• pp.71-80
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• 1997

In this paper, we consider with a market pioneering game among symmetric firms in highly competitive situation. To describe the puzzling situation of timing competition, we construct a dynamic game model and explore the equilibrium solution. As a result, we find a subgame perfect mixed strategy Nash equilibrium conceptually defined by 't$_{0}$ + .elsilon. equilibrium'. Our major finding s include : i) market entry will be occurred in sequential manner even though the condition of each firm is symmetric ii) the optimal timing of market pioneering will be advanced until almost all of the monopolist's profit is dissipated, iii) as the market position of the pioneer is stronger, the timings of the pioneer and the follower are separated, iv) and as the slope of the profit flow is steeper, the entry timing of the two players will be pooled together.

• Proceedings of the Korean Operations and Management Science Society Conference
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• 1994.04a
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• pp.741-741
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• 1994

• Journal of the Economic Geographical Society of Korea
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• v.24 no.3
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• pp.313-329
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• 2021

This study analyzed the characteristics of the management crisis, the level of resilience, and the alternatives based on the companies' self-evaluation of the game industry in Daegu. The Daegu game industry, which started spontaneously in the late 1990s, grew rapidly until the late 2000s with the support of the government and supporting organizations. However, from the mid-2010s, it has entered a period of recession due to the number of companies that failed to respond to the saturation of the mobile game market and fierce competition at home and abroad. In response, some game companies turned the crisis into an opportunity to strengthen their competitiveness by pursuing challenging strategies for product differentiation and pioneering new markets. On the other hand, companies that were passive in responding to the crisis have not get out of the management crisis. In addition, in terms of the resilience level of game companies in Daegu, the level of immediate response to shock(rapidity) and replacement of the damaged part(redundancy) was low, but the level of mobilizing sufficient resources internally(resourcefulness) was high. However, as the Daegu game industry is facing more complex multi-spatial-scale environmental changes than in the past, its resilience should be strengthened through strategies that can compensate for weaknesses in terms of the game industry ecosystem beyond individual company-level efforts.