• Strategy21
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• 통권44호
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• pp.5-27
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• 2018

The purpose of this paper is to look at USN's efforts to rebuild its combat power in the face of a reemergence of great powers competition, and to propose some recommendations for the ROKN. In addition to the plan to augment its fleet towards a 355-ships capacity, the USN is pursuing to improve exponentially combat lethality(quality) of its existing fleet by means of innovative science and technology. In other words, the USN is putting its utmost efforts to improve readiness of current forces, to modernize maintenance facilities such as naval shipyards, and simultaneously to invest in innovative weapons system R&D for the future. After all, the USN seems to pursue innovations in advanced military Science & Technology as the best way to ensure continued supremacy in the coming strategic competition between great powers. However, it is to be seen whether the USN can smoothly continue these efforts to rebuild combat strength vis-a-vis its new competition peers, namely China and Russian navy, due to the stringent fiscal constraints, originating, among others, from the 2011 Budget Control Act effective yet. Then, it seems to be China's unilateral and assertive behaviors to expand its maritime jurisdiction in the South China Sea that drives the USN's rebuild-up efforts of the future. Now, some changes began to be perceived in the basic framework of the hitherto regional maritime security, in the name of declining sea control of the USN as well as withering maritime order based on international law and norms. However, the ROK-US alliance system is the most excellent security mechanism upon which the ROK, as a trading power, depends for its survival and prosperity. In addition, as denuclearization of North Korea seems to take significant time and efforts to accomplish in the years to come, nuclear umbrella and extended deterrence by the US is still noting but indispensible for the security of the ROK. In this connection, the naval cooperation between ROKN and USN should be seen and strengthened as the most important deterrents to North Korean nuclear and missile threats, as well as to potential maritime provocation by neighboring countries. Based on these observations, this paper argues that the ROK Navy should try to expand its own deterrent capability by pursuing selective technological innovation in order to prevent this country's destiny from being dictated by other powers. In doing so, however, it may be too risky for the ROK to pursue the emerging, disruptive innovative technologies such as rail gun, hypersonic weapon... etc., due to enormous budget, time, and very thin chance of success. This paper recommends, therefore, to carefully select and extensively invest on the most cost-effective technological innovations, suitable in the operational environments of the ROK. In particular, this paper stresses the following six areas as most potential naval innovations for the ROK Navy: long range precision strike; air and missile defense at sea; ASW with various unmanned maritime system (UMS) such as USV, UUV based on advanced hydraulic acoustic sensor (Sonar) technology; network; digitalization for the use of AI and big data; and nuclear-powered attack submarines as a strategic deterrent.

• Strategy21
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• 통권42호
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• pp.318-346
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• 2017

Currently, security environmental instability is getting worse than ever in the East Asia including to Republic of Korea(ROK). Unlike several conventional issues such as maritime dispute -sometimes with islands- and competitions for getting natural resources, contemporary security dilemma issues followed by arms races among states deepens the power gap between strong and weak state within the region. It is notable that the arms races is the East Asia are mainly focused on naval power. As navy is the very possible force that influences neighboring states, submarine power is usually valued for its nature of stealth, mobile and aggression. Moreover, the submarine power is believed to be one of the highest valued weapon system since it shows actual effectiveness for influencing the other states while avoiding direct military conflicts compared to surface power. As a result, all states within the region are accelerating for getting such power these days. Japan, Most of all, is one of the leading state that aims to ensure self-survival and enlarge military influences under the US-Japan alliance by decisively supporting its power to the American containment strategy against China. In this regard, such movement surely sill influence on ROK both directly and indirectly as we sue the common field, the sea. Though, it has lots of restrictions for us to confront them with military forces as such confrontations within US-led alliances is not desirable upon considering current China and nK threats. As a result, ROK needs to limit the realm of alliance within the region while maintaining ROK-US alliance for getting national interests with both legal and justice superiority against Japan. This paper, as a result, is focused on suggesting the way to utilize submarines as a mean of naval power for both current security environments and the rising maritime threats in the East Asia. I concluded to participate ROK submarines in US-led military strategy against China by dispatching them into the East-China Sea and the North-East area of the Korean peninsula to protect both national interests and justice at the same tome. It should be one of the preemptive measure for confronting with neighboring states by utilizing strategic benefits of submarines while strengthening ROK-US alliances upon participating American Containment Strategy against China.

• Journal of Advanced Marine Engineering and Technology
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• 제40권10호
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• pp.906-915
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• 2016

In this study, a network monitoring system, including a secure 460-Network and a 460-Gateway, is designed and developed according with the requirements of the IEC (International Electro-Technical Commission) 61162-460 network standard for the safety and security of networks on board ships. At present, internal or external unauthorized access to or malicious attack on a ship's on board systems are possible threats to the safe operation of a ship's network. To secure the ship's network, a 460-Network was designed and implemented by using a 460-Switch, 460-Nodes, and a 460-Gateway that contains firewalls and a DMZ (Demilitarized Zone) with various application servers. In addition, a 460-firewall was used to block all traffic from unauthorized networks. 460-NMS (Network Monitoring System) is a network-monitoring software application that was developed by using an simple network management protocol (SNMP) SharpNet library with the .Net 4.5 framework and a backhand SQLite database management system, which is used to manage network information. 460-NMS receives network information from a 460-Switch by utilizing SNMP, SNMP Trap, and Syslog. 460-NMS monitors the 460-Network load, traffic flow, current network status, network failure, and unknown devices connected to the network. It notifies the network administrator via alarms, notifications, or warnings in case any network problem occurs. Once developed, 460-NMS was tested both in a laboratory environment and for a real ship network that had been installed by the manufacturer and was confirmed to comply with the IEC 61162-460 requirements. Network safety and security issues onboard ships could be solved by designing a secure 460-Network along with a 460-Gateway and by constantly monitoring the 460-Network according to the requirements of the IEC 61162-460 network standard.

• Strategy21
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• 통권33호
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• pp.113-147
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• 2014

While China's military rise is an issue of growing importance to regional security, it is worthwhile to note that it is not China's military modernization per se, but its capacity to project and sustain power along and beyond its borders--in particular, the possibility to resolve forcefully its outstanding maritime disputes and various contingencies. This essay argues that China's "anti-access capability"--a U.S.-coined term originally developed for a Taiwan contingency--is equally applicable to other major regional cases such as the Spratly disputes and a North Korean contingency. Furthermore, notwithstanding China's continuos efforts to develop and deploy various types and classes of weapons/platforms, it is the Russian systems and technologies that are most capable and thus likely assigned to the highest mission-critical areas. In assessing China's current and likely future military capability as well as their implications for the region, it is necessary to take note of the following: • There exists asymmetry of military capability between China and its weaker neighbors. While the PLAN is weak in several important aspects, for instance, many of its neighbors' navies are weaker still. • Some have argued that China's foreign policy behavior apparently became more "assertive" in 2009-2013, but it is wiser to keep in mind that China has almost always been assertive and aggressive when it comes to what China defines as "sovereignty and territorial issues" as well as its newest "core interests." • On the South China Sea disputes it is the function of U.S. presence in the theater--in the form of overseas bases and the freedom of navigation--and the PLA's own limitations to project and sustain power for an extended period of time that have largely prevented armed. • While Taiwan remains the idee fixe of China's diplomacy and military, it is and will be a tough nut to crack. China's recent creeping attempts for economic integration with Taiwan should be seen in this context. • China and Japan, the two regional heavyweights and traditional rivals, will likely have a bilateral relationship that is replete with difficulties and tension. China's unilateral announcement of its ADIZ in November 2013 as well as the occasional yet persistent disputes with Japan over the Senkaku/Diaoyudao/Diaoyutai islands are only the latest manifestation of this deeper and difficult relationship. • For Korean security it is imperative to take into account the geostrategic and historical factors. On top of the existing military threats from North Korea, the ROK should be able to employ a) hedging strategy, b) "limited defense sufficiency" strategy, and c) rock-solid relations with the United States.

• 한국콘텐츠학회논문지
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• 제9권12호
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• pp.777-786
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• 2009

최근 한국 선박(동원호 마부노1,2호 등)을 비롯하여 각국의 선박들이 해적의 공격을 받아 선박 및 선적물을 탈취당하고, 승무원의 석방 대가로 거액의 몸값을 지급하는 등 적지 않은 피해를 보고 있다. 안전한 선박의 통항이 보장되지 않고, 해상 폭력의 대상이 되는 원인 중 하나는 강력한 국제공조체제 구축의 어려움과 국제해양법의 미비가 문제로 지적되고 있다. 아울러 대(對)해적 전문보안인력의 부재 등과 같은 선박 자체의 자구책의 부재가 또 다른 원인이 되고 있다는 점을 간과해서는 안 될 것이다. 이러한 문제의식 하에서 본 연구는 그동안 발생한 해적 및 해상 무장 강도 행위에 대한 현황과 문제점을 분석한 후 민간경비 차원에서 적용이 가능한 대응방안을 제시하는 것이 목적이다. 이 연구목적을 달성하기 위하여 국내외 관련 문헌을 조사 분석하여 문제점을 지적하고 그에 따라 민간경비와 관련된 대응방안을 제시하였다. 연구결과 민간군사기업, 특수경비 등과 같은 민간경비제도를 활용할 수 있다는 것이다. 민간군사기업은 현재 많은 국가에서 해당관련 부분에서 광범위하게 활용되고 있다. 해적행위에 대한 대응방안으로 한국도 민간군사기업의 활용을 적극적으로 검토할 필요성이 있다. 그리고 해외무역 거래의 중추적인 역할을 하는 선박들은 국가중요시설로 지정하여 청원경찰법과 경비업법상의 경비대상이 될 수 있도록 특수경비제도가 활용되어져야 할 것이다.

• Strategy21
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• 통권39호
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• pp.114-139
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• 2016

Korea and China are neighboring countries with close contacts in many areas from long time ago, and have shared interests in maintaining peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula, and in deepening economic relationship which has been mutually complementary in their nature. Therefore their bilateral relations has been developed at a remarkable pace to the extent that it can't be better than now. However, the differences in their responses to North Korean nuclear test and ensuing long-range ballistic missile test-fire and the Chinese strong concern on the possible deployment of THAAD (Terminal High Altitude Air Defence) anti-missile system in Korea show that there are some weaknesses in their relations. For example, Korea is not still confident that China would fully implement the sanction measures contained in the UNSC resolution and I argue that Chinese proposal of parallel negotiation of the denuclearization and the replacement of Korean armistice with the Peace Agreement is not much persuasive. In THAAD issue, if Korea comes to conclusion in the future that THAAD is the most effective way to counter North Korean threats, Korea should make every efforts to assure China that Korea-US alliance is not targeting China, and the THAAD is a defensive system, not damaging Chinese security. In the longer-term, deepening strategic distrust and competition between the US and China in this part of East Asia, changing nature of economic cooperation between Korea and China, and the revival of 'great country mentality' by Chinese people together with the rising nationalism in both Korea and China would cast shadow on Korea-China relation in the years ahead, unless properly handled. In this regard, I suggest that the security communications between the two countries be further strengthened, and the tri-lateral dialogue channel be established among the three countries of Korea, the US and China, particularly on North Korean issues. I also suggest the new pattern of economic cooperation be sought, considering the changing economic environment in China, while strengthening the efforts to understand each other through more interactions between the two peoples.

• 한국국방경영분석학회지
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• 제16권1호
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• pp.35-55
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• 1990

This research paper examines the Navy of the Republic of Korea (ROK) and the Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF) to determine if the two navies can cooperate to enhance the security of Northeast Asia. This paper reviews the advantages and limitations of naval cooperation between the ROK and Japan, describes the threats to both, and evaluates domestic, regional and international factors to answer the questions : Is naval cooperation possible? How would might it take? what secunity burdens might the ROK Nayy and the JMSDF be reasonably expected to assume from the United States? Paper conclusions are based on the studies within the framework of today's realities. Consequently, the conclusions may seem undramatic. However, they are based on not what could happen if all parties agreed to accept radical change, but rather upon the assumption that all parties will want to change the least for the greatest benefit.

• 한국항해항만학회지
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• 제47권6호
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• pp.437-447
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• 2023

항만 산업의 동향은 적극적인 4차 산업 기술을 도입하여 자동화 항만, 스마트 항만 등 새로운 항만의 형태로 발전하고 있다. 그러나 항만의 발전 이면에는 항만 및 컨테이너 터미널 내 사이버 보안 사고 및 위협 가능성 또한 높아지고 있다. 이에 항만 내 사이버 보안 강화와 관련된 연구가 필수적이나 국내에서 진행되는 관련 연구는 미비한 실정이다. 이에 본 연구는 국내 대표 항만인 부산항 중 가장 4차 산업 기술을 적극적으로 도입하는 컨테이너 항만을 중심 사이버 보안 강화를 위한 요인을 도출하고 향후 강화 방안을 도출하고자 하였다. 연구결과 부산항 컨테이너 터미널 사이버 보안 강화를 위한 요인은 네트워크 구축 및 정책 지원, 교육 표준화 및 인력 양성, 법·제도적 요인으로 분류되었다. 이후 도출된 요인을 바탕으로 다중회귀 분석을 실시하였으며 분석 결과를 바탕으로 향후 부산항 컨테이너 터미널의 안전성 확보 및 강화, 신뢰성 확보 및 강화, 성과 및 만족도 향상을 위한 세부 요인을 도출하였다. 본 연구는 점차 증가하는 항만 및 컨테이너 터미널 내 사이버 보안 공격에 대응하여 부산항 컨테이너 터미널의 사이버 강화를 위한 방향성을 제시했다는 점에서 의의를 지닌다.

• 시큐리티연구
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• 제39호
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• pp.319-353
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• 2014

2001년 9/11 테러공격 이후에 미국은 사이버 안보를 가장 위중한 국가안보 문제로 인식한다. 미국 국방부는 2013년 처음으로 사이버 전쟁이 물리적인 테러보다 더 큰 국가안보 위협임을 확인했다. 단적으로 윌리암 린(William J. Lynn) 국방부 차관의 지적처럼 오늘날 사이버 공간은 육지, 바다, 하늘, 우주 다음의 '제5의 전장(the fifth domain of warfare)'이라고 함에 의문이 없다. 인터넷의 활용과 급속한 보급은 사이버 공간에서의 상상하지 못했던 역기능을 창출한 것이다. 이에 사이버 정보와 사이버 네트워크 보호까지를 포괄하지 않으면 국가안보 수호의 목표를 달성할 수 없게 되었다. 그런데 이러한 위험성에도 불구하고 각국은 운영상의 효율성과 편리성, 국제교류 등 외부세계와의 교류확대를 위해 국가기간망의 네트워크화를 더욱 확대해 가고 있고 인터넷에의 의존도는 심화되고 있다. 하지만 그 실천적인 위험성에도 불구하고 우리의 법제도적 장치와 사이버 안전에 대한 인식수준은 현실을 제대로 반영하지 못하고 있는 것으로 판단된다. 오늘날 가장 실천적이고 현실적인 위협을 제기하는 사이버 안보의 핵심은 하나도 둘도 계획의 구체성과 실천력의 배양이다. 대책회의나 교육 등은 부차적이다. 실전적인 사이버 사령부와 사이버 정보기구 그리고 사이버 전사의 창설과 육성에 더 커다란 노력을 경주해야 하고, 우리의 경우에는 가장 많은 경험을 가지고 인력과 장비를 가진 국가정보원의 사이버 수호 역량을 고양하고 더 많은 책무를 부담시키고 합리적인 업무 감독을 다하는 것에 있다고 할 것이다. 이에 본고는 법규범적으로 치안질서와 별개 개념으로서의 국가안보에 대한 무한책임기구인 국가정보기구의 사이버 안보에 대한 책무와 그에 더하여 필요한 사이버 정보활동과 유관활동의 범위를 검토하고자 한다. 사이버 테러와 사이버 공격을 포괄한 사이버 공격(Cyber Attack)에 대한 이해와 전자기장을 물리적으로 장악하는 전자전에 대한 연구도 포함한다.

• KSII Transactions on Internet and Information Systems (TIIS)
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• 제15권5호
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• pp.1909-1928
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• 2021

At present, the Colombian government shares information on threats or vulnerabilities in the area of cybersecurity and cyberdefense, from other government agencies or departments, on an ad-hoc basis but not in real time, with the surveillance entities of the Government of the Republic of Colombia such as the Joint Command of Cybernetic Operations (CCOCI) and the Cybernetic Emergencies Response Team of Colombia (ColCERT). This research presents the MS-CSIRT (Management System Computer Security Incident Response Teams) methodology, that is used to unify the guidelines of a CSIRT towards a joint communication command in cybersecurity for the surveillance of Information Technology (IT), Technological Operations (TO), Internet Connection Sharing (ICS) or Internet of Things (IoT) infrastructures. This methodology evaluates the level of maturity, by means of a roadmap, to establish a CSIRT as a reference framework for government entities and as a guide for the areas of information security, IT and TO to strengthen the growth of the industry 4.0. This allows the organizations to draw a line of cybersecurity policy with scope, objectives, controls, metrics, procedures and use cases for the correct coordination between ColCERT and CCOCI, as support entities in cybersecurity, and the different companies (ICS, IoT, gas and energy, mining, maritime, agro-industrial, among others) or government agencies that use this methodology.