• Journal of the Society of Disaster Information
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• v.13 no.3
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• pp.305-312
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• 2017

In our society, the advanced, advanced, and information industries have continued to grow and now live in the era of the fourth industrial revolution. As the industry develops, the load of the users has also increased so much that it is deepened by the energy shortage phenomenon and the construction of additional energy facilities is required. Therefore, energy plant construction work is being actively carried out in the coastal area. In particular, it is common to build a plant in the ground by filling the coast with soil in other regions, reflecting the fact that Korea is lacking in the country when constructing power plants, gas and petrochemical plants. Current domestic grounding designs are designed or constructed to suit only the use of grounding resistors based on the electrical equipment design technical standards. However, in the case of a plant facility constructed in the untested buried soil, when the lightning current and the abnormal current are inputted, the facility operator or the user due to the elevation of the ground potential is seriously exposed to the risk of electric shock disaster. In this paper, we analyze the ground resistivity of the landfilled soil and use a computer program (CDEGS) based on KS C IEC 61936-1, We analyze the contact voltage and stratification voltage and propose a grounding design optimized for plant installation.

• Journal of the Korea Institute of Information and Communication Engineering
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• v.18 no.10
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• pp.2331-2338
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• 2014

The HEMP threat may have acquired new, and urgent, relevance as the proliferation of nuclear weapons and missile technology accelerates of the North Korea, for example, is assessed as already having developed few atomic weapons, and is on the verge of North Korea already has missiles capable of delivering a nuclear warhead against South Korea. ITU K.78, K81 and IEC recommended its counter-measuring for the industrial facilities with navigation and sailing facilities in order to obviate the all of processor equipped system malfunctions from the EMP/HEMP but its simulation must only be done by the computer simulation which had studied on the 1960-1990 years USA/AFWL papers. This result has a significant activities to the South Korea being under the North Korea threat because all of HEMP related products was strongly limited for export. The HEMP cord which was developed newly by the KTI including the HEMP generation & propagation analysis, optimal shelter design tool, essential EM energy attenuation in multi-layered various soils and rocks and HEMP filter design tool. Especially, the least square fitting method was adopted to analysis for the EM energy attenuation in the soils and rocks because it has a various characteristics based on the many times field test reports.

• Journal of Advanced Navigation Technology
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• v.25 no.5
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• pp.397-402
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• 2021

The real-name electric fishing gear system is one of the important policy capable to build 'abundant fishing ground' and to protect marine environment. And, fishing gear automatic-identification system is one of IoT services that can implement above-mentioned policy by using communication such as low power wide area (LPWA) and multi-sensing techniques. Fishing gear automatic -identification system can gather the location data and lost/hold data from electric buoy floated in sea and can provide them to fishermen and monitoring center in land. We have developed the communication modules and electric buoy consisted of fishing gear automatic-identification system. In this paper, we report the test results of communication distance between electric buoy and wireless node installed in fish boat and location error of electric buoy. It is confirmed that line of sight (LOS) distance between electric buoy and wireless node is obtained to be 62 km, which is two times of the desired value, and location error is obtained to be CEP 1 m, which is smaller than the desired value of CEP 5 m. Therefore, it is expected that service area and accuracy of the developed fishing gear automatic-identification system is more extended.

• Journal of Korean Society of Coastal and Ocean Engineers
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• v.32 no.6
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• pp.561-568
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• 2020

Wave measurements using X-band radar have many advantages compared to other wave gauges including wave-rider buoy, P-u-v gauge and Acoustic Doppler Current Profiler (ADCP), etc.. For example, radar system has no risk of loss/damage in bad weather conditions, low maintenance cost, and provides spatial distribution of waves from deep to shallow water. This paper presents new methods for estimating significant wave heights of X-band marine radar images using Artificial Neural Network (ANN). We compared the time series of estimated significant wave heights (Hs) using various estimation methods, such as signal-to-noise ratio (${\sqrt{SNR}}$), both and ${\sqrt{SNR}}$ the peak period (TP), and ANN with 3 parameters (${\sqrt{SNR}}$, TP, and Rval > k). The estimated significant wave heights of the X-band images were compared with wave measurement using ADCP(AWC: Acoustic Wave and Current Profiler) at Hujeong Beach, Uljin, Korea. Estimation of Hs using ANN with 3 parameters (${\sqrt{SNR}}$, TP, and Rval > k) yields best result.

• Analyses & Alternatives
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• v.4 no.1
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• pp.63-87
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• 2020

This article not only theoretically explores the necessity and effect of constructive minilateralism and subregionalism in Northeast Asia, but also delves into a series of practical solutions from viewpoint of seeking common ground while reserving differences in this region. The main contents are as follows: First, the various obstacles that hinder the formation of regionalism, subregionalism and minilateralism in the Northeast Asia are discussed. That is to say, geopolitical realism, My Country First ideology, exclusive nationalism in the socio-historical context, and North Korea's latest provocations, etc. Second, this article explores the philosophy and basic principles of realizing Northeast Asia regionalism and minilateralism. Third, in the 21st century, Northeast Asia becomes the center of the world. It examines the core points, controversial focus and platform for building sub regionalism in the region. Finally, based on the institutional platform such as minilateralism and sub regionalism, the various ideas and practical plans of cross-border cooperation among major countries in Northeast Asia were discussed. Because there are a lot of obstacles, so first of all it is more appropriate to promote economic or functional minilateralism or sub regionalism than multilateral cooperation. In order to promote the formation of regionalism and minilateralism in Northeast Asia, the issues to be considered are as follows: First, for the sake of leading regional solidarity and minilateral economic cooperation, it is advisable for China, as a regional economic power, to implement a stable and responsible diplomacy. Secondly, regional solidarity based on credible politics and security should be promoted for a long time beyond the level of economic cooperation. Third, the primary prerequisite for the realization of Northeast Asian regionalism is that in the process of denuclearization of North Korea, the stability and peace mechanism of the Korean Peninsula should be established. Fourth, with the continued hegemonic competition between the United States and China in Northeast Asia, under the circumstance that countries in the region are pushed into so-called "East Asian Paradox", it is profoundly important for them to consider transition from the hostile relationship as the "Thucydides trap" to the order of "coexistence" in which competition and cooperation run side by side, and the two countries should explore a conversion plan for the foreign policy line. This mutual cooperation and peaceful coexistence of the US-China relationship will create a friendly atmosphere for the formation of regionalism in Northeast Asia. In the future, the cooperation of minilateralism in Northeast Asia will break the existing conflict between the maritime forces and the continental forces in order to promote peace. And along with the philosophy that "peace is economy", recent policies of common prosperity as the framework, such as China's "Belt and Road Initiative", North Korea's "Special Zone and Development Zone Policy", Russia's "New Eastern Policy", Japan's participation in the Belt and Road Initiative and South Korea's The "Korean Peninsula New Economy Map" are organically linked and it should promote the so-called "networked regionalism".

• Journal of Environmental Impact Assessment
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• v.32 no.4
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• pp.230-241
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• 2023

At a time when it is urgent to establish a management system for landscape quality assessment of offshore wind farms in Korea, we analyzed foreign cases to draw implications for improving the landscape quality assessment of offshore wind farms in Korea and to explore the direction of efficient landscape assessment. The main contents derived from the analysis of overseas cases and systems are as follows. First, offshore wind farms are large-scale projects, and it is necessary to consider the landscape from the pre-planning stage, as in overseas cases. Second, the evaluation items for marine landscape quality should be expanded and systematized. Third, a flexible evaluation system that can consider new landscape impacts is required. In order to identify the landscape impacts of offshore wind farm projects, we refer to the landscape assessment items and procedures derived from overseas cases, but reflect them appropriately to the domestic maritime conditions, and specifically introduce a plan to minimize the landscape impacts that may occur during offshore wind farm projects to contribute to the sustainable use of offshore wind power.

• Journal of Ocean Engineering and Technology
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• v.37 no.2
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• pp.58-67
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• 2023

While extensive research is being conducted to reduce greenhouse gases in industrial fields, the International Maritime Organization (IMO) has implemented regulations to actively reduce CO₂ emissions from ships, such as energy efficiency design index (EEDI), energy efficiency existing ship index (EEXI), energy efficiency operational indicator (EEOI), and carbon intensity indicator (CII). These regulations play an important role for the design and operation of ships. However, the calculation of the index and indicator might be complex depending on the types and size of the ship. Here, to calculate the EEDI of two target vessels, first, the ships were set as Deadweight (DWT) 50K container and 300K very large crude-oil carrier (VLCC) considering the type and size of those ships along with the engine types and power. Equations and parameters from the marine pollution treaty (MARPOL) Annex VI, IMO marine environment protection committee (MEPC) resolution were used to estimate the EEDI and their changes. Technical measures were subsequently applied to satisfy the IMO regulations, such as reducing speed, energy saving devices (ESD), and onboard CO₂ capture system. Process simulation model using Aspen Plus v10 was developed for the onboard CO₂ capture system. The obtained results suggested that the fuel change from Marine diesel oil (MDO) to liquefied natural gas (LNG) was the most effective way to reduce EEDI, considering the limited supply of the alternative clean fuels. Decreasing ship speed was the next effective option to meet the regulation until Phase 4. In case of container, the attained EEDI while converting fuel from Diesel oil (DO) to LNG was reduced by 27.35%. With speed reduction, the EEDI was improved by 21.76% of the EEDI based on DO. Pertaining to VLCC, 27.31% and 22.10% improvements were observed, which were comparable to those for the container. However, for both vessels, additional measure is required to meet Phase 5, demanding the reduction of 70%. Therefore, onboard CO₂ capture system was designed for both KCS (Korea Research Institute of Ships & Ocean Engineering (KRISO) container ship) and KVLCC2 (KRISO VLCC) to meet the Phase 5 standard in the process simulation. The absorber column was designed with a diameter of 1.2-3.5 m and height of 11.3 m. The stripper column was 0.6-1.5 m in diameter and 8.8-9.6 m in height. The obtained results suggested that a combination of ESD, speed reduction, and fuel change was effective for reducing the EEDI; and onboard CO₂ capture system may be required for Phase 5.

• Strategy21
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• s.34
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• pp.58-92
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• 2014

Even after S. Korea took 5.24 Measure(24 May 2014), N. Korea has not stopped raising provocations such as the shelling of Yeonpyeong Island, electronic and cyber attacks. To make matters worse, the communist country lunched long-range missiles(twice) and conducted 3rd nuclear test, escalating tensions which could possibly lead to an all-out war. Korean Government failed to respond properly. However, escalation into an all-out war was deterred by the CFC immediately carrying out its peacetime duty(CODA). The US made a rapid dispatch of its augmentation forces(Aircraft carrier, nuclear-powered submarine, strategic bomber, F-22) to the Korean Peninsula. In recognition of the importance of the Combined Forces Command, since May 2013 the Park Geun-Hye Administration has been pushing ahead with re-postponement of Wartime Operational Control Transfer(which initially meant the disassembling of the CFC as of 1 December 2015) More recently, there has been a series of unusual indicators from the North. Judging from its inventory of 20 nuclear weapons, 1,000 ballistic missiles and biochemical weapons, it is safe to say that N. Korea has gained at least war deterrence against S. Korea. Normally a nation with nuclear weapons shrink its size of conventional forces, but the North is pursuing the opposite, rather increasing them. In addition, there was a change of war plan by N. Korea in 2010, changing 'Conquering the Korean Peninsula' to 'Negotiation after the seizure of the Greater Seoul Metropolitan Area(GSMA)' and establishing detailed plans for wartime projects. The change reflects the chain reaction in which requests from pro-north groups within the South will lead to the proclamation of war. Kim, Jeong-Un, leader of N. Korean regime, sent threatening messages using words such as 'exercising a nuclear preemptive strike right' and 'burning of Seoul'. Nam, Jae-June, Director of National Intelligence Service, stated that Kim, Jung-Un is throwing big talks, saying communization of the entire Korean Peninsula will come within the time frame of 3 years. Kim, Gwan-Jin, Defense Minister, shared an alarming message that there is a high possibility that the North will raise local provocations or a full-fledged war whenever while putting much emphasis on defense posture. As for the response concept of the Korean Government, it has been decided that 'ROK·US Combined Local Provocation Counter-Measure' will be adopted to act against local provocations from the North. Major provocation types include ▲ violation of the Northern Limit Line(NLL) with mobilization of military ships ▲ artillery provocations on Northwestern Islands ▲ low altitude airborne intrusion ▲ rear infiltration of SOF ▲ local conflicts within the Military Demarcation Line(MDL) ▲ attacking friendly ships by submarines. Counter-measures currently established by the US involves the support from USFK and USFJ. In order to keep the sworn promise, the US is reinforcing both USFK and USFJ. An all-out war situation will be met by 'CFC OPLAN5027' and 'Tailored Expansion Deterrence Forces' with the CFC playing a central role. The US augmentation forces stands at 690,000 troops, some 160 ships, 2,000 aircraft and this comprise 50% of US total forces, which is estimated to be ninefold of Korean forces. The CFC needs to be in center in handling both local provocations and an all-out war situation. However, the combat power of S. Korean conventional forces is approximately around 80% of that of N. Korea, which has been confirmed from comments made by Kim, Gwan-Jin, Defense Minister, during an interpellation session at the National Assembly. This means that S. Korean forces are not much growing. In particular, asymmetric capabilities of the North is posing a serious threat to the South including WMD, cyber warfare forces, SOF, forces targeting 5 Northwestern Islands, sub-surface and amphibious assault forces. The presence of such threats urgently requires immediate complementary efforts. For complementary efforts, the Korean Government should consider ① reinforcement of Korean forces; putting a stoppage to shrinking military, acquisition of adequate defense budget, building a missile defense and military leadership structure validity review, ② implementation of military tasks against the North; disciplinary measures on the sinking of ROKS Cheon-an/shelling of Yeonpyeong Islands, arrangement of inter-Korean military agreements, drawing lessons from studies on the correlation between aid for N. Korea, execution of inter-Korean Summit and provocations from the North, and ③ bolstering the ROK·US alliance; disregarding wartime operational control transfer plan(disassembling of CFC) and creation of a combined division.

• Strategy21
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• s.32
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• pp.222-270
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• 2013

서구 근대 국제관계학의 태동은 "전쟁의 원인"을 밝혀내려고 했던 유럽 지식인들의 학문적 도전에서부터 비롯되었다고 할 수 있다. 1, 2차 세계대전의 잔혹함을 겪으면서 이들은 전쟁(특히 전쟁의 원인)에 대한 좀 더 과학적인 연구를 통해 어떻게 하면 국가들 간의 전쟁을 예방할 수 있을까에 집중해 왔다. 이러한 학문적 경향을 반영한 것이 잘 알려진 미국 미시간 대학의 "전쟁 상관성 연구 프로젝트(Correlates of War Project)"이다. 이는 나폴레옹 전쟁이 끝나고 비엔나체제가 시작된 1815년 이후 국가들 간 발생한 모든 전쟁 관련 자료를 데이터베이스화하여,국제관계학자들이 전쟁(Interstate War)이나 군사분쟁(Militarized Interstate Disputes)을 정량 또는 정성적으로 연구할 수 있도록 다양한 정보들을 제공하고 있다. 최근 Paul F. Diehl, William R. Thompson과 같은 학자들은 전쟁을 분석단위로 하는 전쟁의 원인(Causes of War)을 연구하는 학풍에서 벗어나, 국가들 간의 분쟁과 전쟁을 연구하기 위해 숙적관계(Rivalry)라는 새로운 분석의 단위를 제시하였다. 숙적관계는 국제관계에 있어서 지속적으로 분쟁 또는 전쟁을 일으키는, 즉 무력분쟁의 긴 역사를 가지고 있는, 두 국가를 일컫는다. 국가들 간의 숙적관계는 학자들에 따라 Interstate Rivalry, Enduring Rivalry, Strategic Rivalry 등 다양한 정의와 성격을 갖고 있다. 이러한 국가들의 사례로는 2차대전 이전까지 프랑스-독일 관계, 2차대전 이후 중동지역 이스라엘과 아랍국가들 간의 관계, 냉전기 미소관계, 인도-파키스탄 및 남북한 관계 등을 예로 들 수 있다. 이렇게 널리 알려진 숙적관계 외에도 남미의 칠레-아르헨티나, 에콰도르-페루와 아프리카의 소말리아-에티오피아 등 학자들에 따라 1815년 이후 약 200개의 숙적관계를 제시하고 있다. 숙적관계에 대한 연구는 기존의 전쟁의 원인 중심이었던 정량적 국제분쟁 연구에 두 국가의 분쟁역사를 포함시키는 정성적 연구를 접합시키고 있다. 본 연구는 1945년 이후 숙적관계 국가들의 관계종식과 관련하여, 거시론적이고 전체론적 접근방법(Macro - level Holistic Approach)을 제시하고 있다. 먼저 1945년 이후 발생한 국가들 간의 숙적관계 종식(Rivalry Termination)을 이해하기 위해, 거시적 관점에서 숙적관계를 발생시키게 된 역사적 원인을 살펴보고 있다. 특히 1945년 이후 숙적관계와 관련된 중요한 요인들 중에서 전쟁, 영토분쟁, 그리고 근대국가 형성에 대해 살펴보고 다음과 같은 두 가지 명제(proposition)를 제시한다. 첫째, 1945년 이후의 숙적관계 형성과 지속에는 2차대전 이후 독립국가 형성, 헌팅턴이 주장한 제3의 물결(민주화), 그리고 냉전기 미소경쟁 등의 역사적 배경이 영향을 주었다는 것이다. 둘째, 이러한 역사적 배경에 더하여 1945년 이후 숙적관계는 전쟁에 의해 시작된 숙적관계와 전쟁 없이 시작된 숙적관계 등 2가지로 나눌 수 있으며, 전쟁에 의해 시작되고 영토분쟁과 근대국가 형성 문제를 내포하고 있는 숙적관계가 그렇지 않은 숙적관계에 비해 오랫동안 지속되며 관계해결이 어렵다는 것이다. 앞서 제시된 2가지 명제들과 관련하여 본문에서는 다양한 학자들이 제시한 숙적관계 정의들에 일치하는 23개의 숙적관계(Consensus Rivalries)를 선정하여 이들에 대한 비교분석(Descriptive Analysis)을 실시하였다. 이들 사례들을 1945년 이전과 이후로 나누어, 숙적관계 형성과 종식에 있어 핵심요소인 국가들 간 힘의 차이(Power Relations), 분쟁의 주요 원인(Primary Conflict Issue), 숙적관계에 있어 다른 국가들과의 연계성(Rivalry Linkage), 전쟁의 횟수와 시기 등을 통해 비교하였다. 숙적관계의 종식과 관련하여 약소국 간의 숙적관계(Minor Dyad)가 오래 지속되고, 영토분쟁(Territorial Disputes)이 숙적관계를 지속시키는 주요인이며, 다른 숙적관계와의 연계성이 적은 숙적들이 오래 지속된다는 비교분석 결과가 나왔다. 또한 전쟁의 횟수는 숙적관계 종식에 큰 영향을 미치지 못하지만 전쟁으로 인해 시작된 숙적관계가 그렇지 않은 경우보다 더욱 오래 지속되는 것으로 확인되었다. 끝으로 2차대전 이전의 숙적관계는 대부분 전쟁을 통해 종식되었지만, 1945년 이후에는 전쟁 없이도 숙적관계가 종식된 경우가 많았음을 보여 주고 있다. 본 연구의 주목적은 "1945년 이후 형성된 숙적관계를 어떻게 종식시킬 수 있을 것인가?"라는 규범적 논제를 통해, 23개의 주요 숙적관계를 발굴하여 거시적, 역사적 관점에서 비교분석함에 있다. 이는 특히 우리나라가 처한 현실과 관련하여 중요한 시사점을 갖는다. 남북관계가 갖는 특수성보다는 1945년 이후 국제정치 역사속에서 발생한 숙적관계 현상이라는 일반성의 틀에서 남북관계를 이해하고자 했다. 남북관계를 베트남, 예멘, 독일 등 분단국가의 사례들과만 비교 연구하는 제한된 시각에서 벗어나, 인도-파키스탄, 그리스-터키, 에콰도르-페루 등 유사한 숙적들 간의 관계들과 비교하는 새로운 연구의 장을 제시하고자 한다. 따라서 앞으로 숙적관계 종식에 대한 더욱 다양화된 사례연구를 통해 한반도 분쟁해결에 필요한 새로운 교훈을 얻을 수 있을 것이다. 예를 들면 2차대전 이후 발생한 국경을 접하고 있는 비강대국들의 평화적인 숙적관계 종식에 대한 사례연구는 남북한이 앞으로 지향해야 할 방향을 제시해 줄 수 있을 것이다. 끝으로 본 연구는 특정한 정책적 함의를 도출하기 보다는 숙적관계와 관련된 하나의 거시적 이론를 제시하고, 주요 숙적관계 국가들에 대한 비교설명을 통해 현존하는 숙적관계 해결을 위한 하나의 분석의 틀을 제시하는 것으로 국제분쟁 연구에 기여하고자 하였다.

• Korean Security Journal
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• no.39
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• pp.319-353
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• 2014

Cyber-based technologies are now ubiquitous around the glob and are emerging as an "instrument of power" in societies, and are becoming more available to a country's opponents, who may use it to attack, degrade, and disrupt communications and the flow of information. The globe-spanning range of cyberspace and no national borders will challenge legal systems and complicate a nation's ability to deter threats and respond to contingencies. Through cyberspace, competitive powers will target industry, academia, government, as well as the military in the air, land, maritime, and space domains of our nations. Enemies in cyberspace will include both states and non-states and will range from the unsophisticated amateur to highly trained professional hackers. In much the same way that airpower transformed the battlefield of World War II, cyberspace has fractured the physical barriers that shield a nation from attacks on its commerce and communication. Cyberthreats to the infrastructure and other assets are a growing concern to policymakers. In 2013 Cyberwarfare was, for the first time, considered a larger threat than Al Qaeda or terrorism, by many U.S. intelligence officials. The new United States military strategy makes explicit that a cyberattack is casus belli just as a traditional act of war. The Economist describes cyberspace as "the fifth domain of warfare and writes that China, Russia, Israel and North Korea. Iran are boasting of having the world's second-largest cyber-army. Entities posing a significant threat to the cybersecurity of critical infrastructure assets include cyberterrorists, cyberspies, cyberthieves, cyberwarriors, and cyberhacktivists. These malefactors may access cyber-based technologies in order to deny service, steal or manipulate data, or use a device to launch an attack against itself or another piece of equipment. However because the Internet offers near-total anonymity, it is difficult to discern the identity, the motives, and the location of an intruder. The scope and enormity of the threats are not just focused to private industry but also to the country's heavily networked critical infrastructure. There are many ongoing efforts in government and industry that focus on making computers, the Internet, and related technologies more secure. As the national intelligence institution's effort, cyber counter-intelligence is measures to identify, penetrate, or neutralize foreign operations that use cyber means as the primary tradecraft methodology, as well as foreign intelligence service collection efforts that use traditional methods to gauge cyber capabilities and intentions. However one of the hardest issues in cyber counterintelligence is the problem of "Attribution". Unlike conventional warfare, figuring out who is behind an attack can be very difficult, even though the Defense Secretary Leon Panetta has claimed that the United States has the capability to trace attacks back to their sources and hold the attackers "accountable". Considering all these cyber security problems, this paper examines closely cyber security issues through the lessons from that of U.S experience. For that purpose I review the arising cyber security issues considering changing global security environments in the 21st century and their implications to the reshaping the government system. For that purpose this study mainly deals with and emphasis the cyber security issues as one of the growing national security threats. This article also reviews what our intelligence and security Agencies should do among the transforming cyber space. At any rate, despite of all hot debates about the various legality and human rights issues derived from the cyber space and intelligence service activity, the national security should be secured. Therefore, this paper suggests that one of the most important and immediate step is to understanding the legal ideology of national security and national intelligence.