• Strategy21
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• s.36
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• pp.215-240
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• 2015

Jeong YagYong, who are the SilHak Scholar during 18^th to 19^th century, wrote the Sadaegore with his pupil Lee Cheong. This work is the guide of diplomacy, which are asked to write from King Jeongjo. Although this book was completed after King Jeongjo's death, it harbors the King's thoughts about diplomacy or the relationship with China. Haebanggo, one chapter of the book, is about marine policy and how to treat the castaways. In this chapter, Jeong YagYong provides various ways to deal with these problems in marine area and sea refugee I will examine the Jeong YagYong's thought about the problems and ways to address these problems. Futhermore, I will inquire Jeong's opinion on the boundary in marine area. He recognized that many border transgressions happened in marine area at that time and considered that as urgent political affairs. Haebanggo consists of two parts. First part of the book is about protect own island from other countries. The rest part is about cases of dealing with castaways and their transgression. I argue that Jeong YagYong intended to make distinct borderlines in marine area and empathized the necessity of protecting Joseon's islands from other countries.

• Strategy21
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• s.44
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• pp.103-141
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• 2018

As the South China Sea maritime dispute illustrates, when considering the place where maritime claims occur, states do not have many choices to respond to maritime claims in which disputed areas are located far away from the land and are surrounded by the sea. As Mearsheimer (2014) points out, the sea stops power projection. Therefore, in order to adopt coercive as well as peaceful settlement policies to deal with maritime claims, states need to overcome obstacles (the sea) to project power. It means that if states want to conduct a specific foreign policy action, such as negotiating maritime borderlines or arguing sovereignty on islands, they need a tool (naval power) to coerce or to persuade the opponent. However, there are lack of research that studies maritime claims from the perspective of naval power. This research project fills this gap based on naval power. How do relative levels of naval power and (dis) parities of naval power influence the occurrence of MIDs over maritime claims? Naval power is a constitutive element during maritime claims. If disputants over maritime claims have required naval power to project their capability, it means that they have the capability to apply various ways, such as aggressive options including MIDs, to accomplish their goals. So, I argue that when two claimants have enough naval power to project their capabilities, the likelihood of MIDs over maritime claims increases. Given that one or both states have a certain level of naval power, how does relative naval power between two claimants influence the management of maritime claims? Based on the power transition theory, I argue that when the disparities of relative naval power between claimants becomes distinctive, militarized conflicts surrounding maritime territory are less probable. Based on the ICOW project which codes maritime claims from 1900 to 2001, the empirical results of the Poisson models show if both claimants have projectable naval power, the occurrence of MIDs over maritime claims increases. In addition, the result shows that when disputants maintain similar relative naval powers, they are more likely to initiate MIDs over maritime claims. To put it differently, if naval capabilities' gap between two claimants becomes larger, the probability of the occurrence of MIDs decreases.