Actual Results on the Control of Illegal Fishing in Adjacent Sea Area of Korea (한국 연근해 불법어업의 지도 단속 실태)
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- Journal of Fisheries and Marine Sciences Education
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- v.10 no.2
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- pp.139-161
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- 1998
This thesis includes a study on the legal regulation, the system and formalities on the control of illegal fishing. And the author analyzed the details of the lists of illegal fishing controlled by fishing patrol vessels of Ministry of Maritime Affairs and Fisheries from 1994 to 1996 in adjacent sea area of Korea. The results are summarized as follows ; 1. The fishing patrol vessels controlled total 826 cases in 2,726 days of 292 voyages by 17 vessels in 1994, total 1,086 cases in 3,060 days of 333 voyages by 18 vessels in 1995 and total 933 cases in 3,126 days of 330 voyages by 19 vessels in 1996. 2. The fishing period of illegal fishing was generally concentrated from April to September. But year after year, illegal fishing was scattered throughout the year. 3. The most controlled sea area of illegal fishing was the south central sea area in the sea near Port of Tongyeong. The sea area occupied about 36~51% of totality and the controlled cases were gradually increased every year. The second was the south western sea area in the sea near Port of Yosu. The sea area occupied about 18-27% and the controlled cases were a little bit increased every year. The third was the south eastern sea area in the sea near Pusan. The sea area occupied about 13~23% and the controlled cases were gradually decreased year by year. 4. The most controlled kind of illegal fishing was the small size bottom trawl. This occupied about 81-95% of totality and the controlled cases were gradually increased year by year. The second was the medium size bottom trawl. This occupied about 4-7% and the controlled cases were gradually decreased year by year. The third was the trawl of the coastal sea, this occupied about 2~4% and the controlled cases were a little bit decreased every year. 5. The most controlled address of illegal fishing manager was Pusan city which occupied about 33-51% of totality. The second was Cheonnam which occupied about 24-29%. The third was Kyungnam which occupied about 16~35%. 6. The most controlled violation of regulations was Article 57 of the Fisheries Act which occupied about 56-64% of totality. The second was Article 23 of Protectorate for Fisheries Resources which occupied about 21-36%. And the controlled cases by it were gradually increased every year.
The wooden fence(木柵), which began to appear in the Bronze Age and is presumed to be the oldest defense facility in human history, was used as a fortress for the purpose of further strengthening military defense functions until after the Japanese Invasion of Korea in 1592 in the Joseon Dynasty(壬辰倭亂). As it was established as the concept of a fortress or a fence installed outside a fence castle(城柵) or barracks fence(營柵), its importance as an essential facility for defense was further highlighted. This study is the result of exploring wooden fence that were used as official facilities during the Joseon Dynasty, focusing on literature surveys such as 『Annals of the Joseon Dynasty』 and 『New Jeungdonggukyeojiseungram』 In this study, in particular, the conclusion of this study is as follows, focusing on the use and function of Nokgakseong(鹿角城), underwater wooden fence, installation methods, and materials of wooden fences, is as follows. The conclusions of this study, which focused on the materials of the wooden fence, are as follows. First, as invasions by foreign enemies became more frequent in the late Goryeo and early Joseon Dynasty, wooden fences played a major role as a major out-of-castle defense facility((防禦施設). In addition, wooden fences were modified and installed into various types such as wooden fences(木柵城), Nokgakseong, a fence made up of large branches in the shape of a deer antler, and underwater wooden fences(水中木柵) according to the circumstances of the times, government policy, and location environment. Second, wooden fences were installed in strategic locations in defense facilities for military purposes, such as mountain fortress(山城), fortresses(營), camps(鎭), forts(堡), and castles(邑城) in strategic locations, and were used for defense in case of emergency. According to the urgency of farming, it was installed in accordance with the non-farming season, when it is easy to mobilize manpower to avoid the busy farming season. The size of the wooden fence of the Joseon Dynasty, which are confirmed through literature records, was converted into Pobaekchuk(布帛尺), and the circumference was very diverse from 4,428chuk(2,066m) to 55chuk(25m). Third, Nokgakseong is an efficient combat support facility that is more aggressive than a general wooden fence, and the records of Nokgakseong in the Annals of the Joseon Dynasty appeared during the King Sejong period the record was 20 times, the most. By region, it was found that it was mainly installed in coastal rugged areas such as Pyeongan and Hamgildo(12), which are the 6-jin areas of the 4th Army. Fourth, in the early 15th century, as the royal court established a maritime defense strategy for the coastal area of the southern coast, after the Sampo Invasion(三浦倭亂), riots by Japanese settlers in Sampo in 1510, major military posts including eupseong(邑城), camps, and forts were established. The installation of underwater barriers around various government facilities rapidly increased as a defense facility to block the warships of Japanese pirates around various government facilities. Fifth, between the 15th and 17th centuries before and after the Japanese Invasion of Korea in Sampo, underwater fences were installed in the Southern coast and Ganghwa Island. In particular, in the 15th century, underwater fences were intensively installed in coastal areas of Gyeongsangnam-do, such as Jepo. Pine trees and Oaks are the main materials used for underwater fences, but other materials such as Oldham's meliosma, Loose-flower hornbeam and The vines of arrowroots were also used as materials for wooden fences.
Just before the Korean War, the total number of the North Korean troops was 198,380, while that of the ROK(Republic of Korea) army troops 105,752. That is, the total number of the ROK army troops at that time was 53.3% of the total number of the North Korean army. As of December 2008, the total number of the North Korean troops is estimated to be 1,190,000, while that of the ROK troops is 655,000, so the ROK army maintains 55.04% of the total number of the North Korean troops. If the ROK army continues to reduce its troops according to [Military Reform Plan 2020], the total number of its troops will be 517,000 m 2020. If North Korea maintains the current status(l,190,000 troops), the number of the ROK troops will be 43.4% of the North Korean army. In terms of units, just before the Korean War, the number of the ROK army divisions and regiments was 80% and 44.8% of North Korean army. As of December 2008, North Korea maintains 86 divisions and 69 regiments. Compared to the North Korean army, the ROK army maintains 46 Divisions (53.4% of North Korean army) and 15 regiments (21.3% of North Korean army). If the ROK army continue to reduce the military units according to [Military Reform Plan 2020], the number of ROK army divisions will be 28(13 Active Division, 4 Mobilization Divisions and 11 Local Reserve Divisions), while that of the North Korean army will be 86 in 2020. In that case, the number of divisions of the ROK army will be 32.5% of North Korean army. During the Korean war, North Korea suddenly invaded the Republic of Korea and occupied its capital 3 days after the war began. At that time, the ROK army maintained 80% of army divisions, compared to the North Korean army. The lesson to be learned from this is that, if the ROK army is forced to disperse its divisions because of the simultaneous invasion of North Korea and attack of guerrillas in home front areas, the Republic of Korea can be in a serious military danger, even though it maintains 80% of military divisions of North Korea. If the ROK army promotes the plans in [Military Reform Plan 2020], the number of military units of the ROK army will be 32.5% of that of the North Korean army. This ratio is 2.4 times lower than that of the time when the Korean war began, and in this case, 90% of total military power should be placed in the DMZ area. If 90% of military power is placed in the DMZ area, few troops will be left for the defense of home front. In addition, if the ROK army continues to reduce the troops, it can allow North Korea to have asymmetrical superiority in military force and it will eventually exert negative influence on the stability and peace of the Korean peninsular. On the other hand, it should be reminded that, during the Korean War, the Republic of Korea was attacked by North Korea, though it kept 53.3% of troops, compared to North Korea. It should also be reminded that, as of 2008, the ROK army is defending its territory with the troops 55.04% of North Korea. Moreover, the national defense is assisted by 25,120 troops of the US Forces in Korea. In case the total number of the ROK troops falls below 43.4% of the North Korean army, it may cause social unrest about the national security and may lead North Korea's misjudgement. Besides, according to Lanchester strategy, the party with weaker military power (60% compared to the party with stronger military power) has the 4.1% of winning possibility. Therefore, if we consider the fact that the total number of the ROK army troops is 55.04% of that of the North Korean army, the winning possibility of the ROK army is not higher than 4.1%. If the total number of ROK troops is reduced to 43.4% of that of North Korea, the winning possibility will be lower and the military operations will be in critically difficult situation. [Military Reform Plan 2020] rums at the reduction of troops and units of the ground forces under the policy of 'select few'. However, the problem is that the financial support to achieve this goal is not secured. Therefore, the promotion of [Military Reform Plan 2020] may cause the weakening of military defence power in 2020. Some advanced countries such as Japan, UK, Germany, and France have promoted the policy of 'select few'. However, what is to be noted is that the national security situation of those countries is much different from that of Korea. With the collapse of the Soviet Unions and European communist countries, the military threat of those European advanced countries has almost disappeared. In addition, the threats those advanced countries are facing are not wars in national level, but terrorism in international level. To cope with the threats like terrorism, large scaled army trops would not be necessary. So those advanced European countries can promote the policy of 'select few'. In line with this, those European countries put their focuses on the development of military sections that deal with non-military operations and protection from unspecified enemies. That is, those countries are promoting the policy of 'select few', because they found that the policy is suitable for their national security environment. Moreover, since they are pursuing common interest under the European Union(EU) and they can form an allied force under NATO, it is natural that they are pursing the 'select few' policy. At present, NATO maintains the larger number of troops(2,446,000) than Russia(l,027,000) to prepare for the potential threat of Russia. The situation of japan is also much different from that of Korea. As a country composed of islands, its prime military focus is put on the maritime defense. Accordingly, the development of ground force is given secondary focus. The japanese government promotes the policy to develop technology-concentrated small size navy and air-forces, instead of maintaining large-scaled ground force. In addition, because of the 'Peace Constitution' that was enacted just after the end of World War II, japan cannot maintain troops more than 240,000. With the limited number of troops (240,000), japan has no choice but to promote the policy of 'select few'. However, the situation of Korea is much different from the situations of those countries. The Republic of Korea is facing the threat of the North Korean Army that aims at keeping a large-scale military force. In addition, the countries surrounding Korea are also super powers containing strong military forces. Therefore, to cope with the actual threat of present and unspecified threat of future, the importance of maintaining a carefully calculated large-scale military force cannot be denied. Furthermore, when considering the fact that Korea is in a peninsular, the Republic of Korea must take it into consideration the tradition of continental countries' to maintain large-scale military powers. Since the Korean War, the ROK army has developed the technology-force combined military system, maintaining proper number of troops and units and pursuing 'select few' policy at the same time. This has been promoted with the consideration of military situation in the Koran peninsular and the cooperation of ROK-US combined forces. This kind of unique military system that cannot be found in other countries can be said to be an insightful one for the preparation for the actual threat of North Korea and the conflicts between continental countries and maritime countries. In addition, this kind of technology-force combined military system has enabled us to keep peace in Korea. Therefore, it would be desirable to maintain this technology-force combined military system until the reunification of the Korean peninsular. Furthermore, it is to be pointed out that blindly following the 'select few' policy of advanced countries is not a good option, because it is ignoring the military strategic situation of the Korean peninsular. If the Republic of Korea pursues the reduction of troops and units radically without consideration of the threat of North Korea and surrounding countries, it could be a significant strategic mistake. In addition, the ROK army should keep an eye on the fact the European advanced countries and Japan that are not facing direct military threats are spending more defense expenditures than Korea. If the ROK army reduces military power without proper alternatives, it would exert a negative effect on the stable economic development of Korea and peaceful reunification of the Korean peninsular. Therefore, the desirable option would be to focus on the development of quality of forces, maintaining proper size and number of troops and units under the technology-force combined military system. The tableau above shows that the advanced countries like the UK, Germany, Italy, and Austria spend more defense expenditure per person than the Republic of Korea, although they do not face actual military threats, and that they keep achieving better economic progress than the countries that spend less defense expenditure. Therefore, it would be necessary to adopt the merits of the defense systems of those advanced countries. As we have examined, it would be desirable to maintain the current size and number of troops and units, to promote 'select few' policy with increased defense expenditure, and to strengthen the technology-force combined military system. On the basis of firm national security, the Republic of Korea can develop efficient policies for reunification and prosperity, and jump into the status of advanced countries. Therefore, the plans to reduce troops and units in [Military Reform Plan 2020] should be reexamined. If it is difficult for the ROK army to maintain its size of 655,000 troops because of low birth rate, the plans to establish the prompt mobilization force or to adopt drafting system should be considered for the maintenance of proper number of troops and units. From now on, the Republic of Korean government should develop plans to keep peace as well as to prepare unexpected changes in the Korean peninsular. For the achievement of these missions, some options can be considered. The first one is to maintain the same size of military troops and units as North Korea. The second one is to maintain the same level of military power as North Korea in terms of military force index. The third one is to maintain the same level of military power as North Korea, with the combination of the prompt mobilization force and the troops in active service under the system of technology-force combined military system. At present, it would be not possible for the ROK army to maintain such a large-size military force as North Korea (1,190,000 troops and 86 units). So it would be rational to maintain almost the same level of military force as North Korea with the combination of the troops on the active list and the prompt mobilization forces. In other words, with the combination of the troops in active service (60%) and the prompt mobilization force (40%), the ROK army should develop the strategies to harmonize technology and forces. The Korean government should also be prepared for the strategic flexibility of USFK, the possibility of American policy change about the location of foreign army, radical unexpected changes in North Korea, the emergence of potential threat, surrounding countries' demand for Korean force for the maintenance of regional stability, and demand for international cooperation against terrorism. For this, it is necessary to develop new approaches toward the proper number and size of troops and units. For instance, to prepare for radical unexpected political or military changes in North Korea, the Republic of Korea should have plans to protect a large number of refugees, to control arms and people, to maintain social security, and to keep orders in North Korea. From the experiences of other countries, it is estimated that 115,000 to 230,000 troops, plus ten thousands of police are required to stabilize the North Korean society, in the case radical unexpected military or political change happens in North Korea. In addition, if the Republic of Korea should perform the release of hostages, control of mass destruction weapons, and suppress the internal wars in North Korea, it should send 460,000 troops to North Korea. Moreover, if the Republic of Korea wants to stop the attack of North Korea and flow of refugees in DMZ area, at least 600,000 troops would be required. In sum, even if the ROK army maintains 600,000 troops, it may need additional 460,000 troops to prepare for unexpected radical changes in North Korea. For this, it is necessary to establish the prompt mobilization force whose size and number are almost the same as the troops in active service. In case the ROK army keeps 650,000 troops, the proper number of the prompt mobilization force would be 460,000 to 500,000.
The objectives of the 1963 Tokyo Convention cover a variety of subjects, with the intention of providing safety in aircraft, protection of life and property on board, and promoting the security of civil aviation. These objectives will be treated as follows: first, the unification of rules on jurisdiction; second, the question of filling the gap in jurisdiction; third, the scheme of maintaining law and order on board aircraft; fourth, the protection of persons acting in accordance with the Convention; fifth, the protection of the interests of disembarked persons; sixth, the question of hijacking of aircraft; and finally some general remarks on the objectives of the Convention. The Tokyo Convention mainly deals with general crimes such as murder, violence, robbery on board aircraft rather than aviation terrorism. The Article 11 of the Convention deals with hijacking in a simple way. As far as aviation terrorism is concerned 1970 Hague Convention and 1971 Montreal Convention cover the hijacking and sabotage respectively. The Problem of national jurisdiction over the offence and the offender was as tangled at the Hague and Montreal Convention, as under the Tokyo Convention. Under the Tokyo Convention the prime base of jurisdiction is the law of the flag (Article 3), but concurrent jurisdiction is also allowed on grounds of: territorial principle, active nationality and passive personality principle, security of the state, breach of flight rules, and exercise of jurisdiction necessary for the performance of obligations under multilateral agreements (Article 4). No Criminal jurisdiction exercised in accordance with national law is excluded [Article 3(2)]. However, Article 4 of the Hague Convention(hereafter Hague Article 4) and Article 5 of the Montreal Convention(hereafter Montreal Article 5), dealing with jurisdiction have moved a step further, inasmuch as the opening part of both paragraphs 1 and 2 of the Hague Article 4 and the Montreal Article 5 impose an obligation on all contracting states to take measures to establish jurisdiction over the offence (i.e., to ensure that their law is such that their courts will have jurisdiction to try offender in all the circumstances covered by Hague Article 4 and Montreal Article 5). The state of registration and the state where the aircraft lands with the hijacker still on board will have the most interest, and would be in the best position to prosecute him; the paragraphs 1(a) and (b) of the Hague Article 4 and paragraphs 1(b) and (c) of the Montreal Article 5 deal with it, respectively. However, paragraph 1(b) of the Hague Article 4 and paragraph 1(c) of the Montreal Article 5 do not specify if the aircraft is still under the control of the hijacker or if the hijacker has been overpowered by the aircraft commander, or if the offence has at all occurred in the airspace of the state of landing. The language of the paragraph would probably cover all these cases. The weaknesses of Hague Article 4 and Montreal Article 5 are however, patent. The Jurisdictions of the state of registration, the state of landing, the state of the lessee and the state where the offender is present, are concurrent. No priorities have been fixed despite a proposal to this effect in the Legal Committee and the Diplomatic Conference, and despite the fact that it was pointed out that the difficulty in accepting the Tokyo Convention has been the question of multiple jurisdiction, for the reason that it would be too difficult to determine the priorities. Disputes over the exercise of jurisdiction can be endemic, more so when Article 8(4) of the Hague Convention and the Montreal Convention give every state mentioned in Hague Article 4(1) and Montreal Article 5(1) the right to seek extradition of the offender. A solution to the problem should not have been given up only because it was difficult. Hague Article 4(3) and Montreal Article 5(3) provide that they do not exclude any criminal jurisdiction exercised in accordance with national law. Thus the provisions of the two Conventions create additional obligations on the state, and do not exclude those already existing under national laws. Although the two Conventions do not require a state to establish jurisdiction over, for example, hijacking or sabotage committed by its own nationals in a foreign aircraft anywhere in the world, they do not preclude any contracting state from doing so. However, it has be noted that any jurisdiction established merely under the national law would not make the offence an extraditable one under Article 8 of the Hague and Montreal Convention. As far as international aviation terrorism is concerned 1988 Montreal Protocol and 1991 Convention on Marking of Plastic Explosives for the Purpose of Detention are added. The former deals with airport terrorism and the latter plastic explosives. Compared to the other International Terrorism Conventions, the International Aviation Terrorism Conventions do not have clauses of the passive personality principle. If the International Aviation Terrorism Conventions need to be revised in the future, those clauses containing the passive personality principle have to be inserted for the suppression of the international aviation terrorism more effectively. Article 3 of the 1973 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Internationally Protected Persons, Including Diplomatic Agents, Article 5 of the 1979 International Convention against the Taking of Hostages and Article 6 of the 1988 Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation would be models that the revised International Aviation Terrorism Conventions could follow in the future.
The expansion of the Changjiang Diluted Water (CDW) plume during summer is known to be a major factor influencing phytoplankton diversity, community structure, and the regional marine environment of the northern East China Sea (ECS). The discharge of the CDW plume was very high in the summer of 2020, and cruise surveys and stationary monitoring were conducted to understand the dynamics of changes in environmental characteristics and the impact on phytoplankton diversity and community structure. A cruise survey was conducted from August 16 to 17, 2020, using R/V Eardo, and a stay survey at the Ieodo Ocean Research Station (IORS) from August 15 to 21, 2020, to analyze phytoplankton diversity and community structure. The southwestern part of the survey area exhibited low salinity and high chlorophyll a fluorescence under the influence of the CDW plume, whereas the southeastern part of the survey area presented high salinity and low chlorophyll a fluorescence under the influence of the Tsushima Warm Current (TWC). The total chlorophyll a concentrations of surface water samples from 12 sampling stations indicated that nano-phytoplankton (20-3 ㎛) and micro-phytoplankton (> 20 ㎛) were the dominant groups during the survey period. Only stations strongly influenced by the TWC presented approximately 50% of the biomass contributed by pico-phytoplankton (< 3 ㎛). The size distribution of phytoplankton in the surface water samples is related to nutrient supplies, and areas where high nutrient (nitrate) supplies were provided by the CDW plume displayed higher biomass contribution by micro-phytoplankton groups. A total of 45 genera of nano- and micro-phytoplankton groups were classified using morphological analysis. Among them, the dominant taxa were the diatoms Guinardia flaccida and Nitzschia spp. and the dinoflagellates Gonyaulax monacantha, Noctiluca scintillans, Gymnodinium spirale, Heterocapsa spp., Prorocentrum micans, and Tripos furca. The sampling stations affected by the TWC and low in nitrate concentrations presented high concentrations of photosynthetic pico-eukaryotes (PPE) and photosynthetic pico-prokaryotes (PPP). Most sampling stations had phosphate-limited conditions. Higher Synechococcus concentrations were enumerated for the sampling stations influenced by low-nutrient water of the TWC using flow cytometry. The NGS analysis revealed 29 clades of Synechococcus among PPP, and 11 clades displayed a dominance rate of 1% or more at least once in one sample. Clade II was the dominant group in the surface water, whereas various clades (Clades I, IV, etc.) were found to be the next dominant groups in the SCM layers. The Prochlorococcus group, belonging to the PPP, observed in the warm water region, presented a high-light-adapted ecotype and did not appear in the northern part of the survey region. PPE analysis resulted in 163 operational taxonomic units (OTUs), indicating very high diversity. Among them, 11 major taxa showed dominant OTUs with more than 5% in at least one sample, while Amphidinium testudo was the dominant taxon in the surface water in the low-salinity region affected by the CDW plume, and the chlorophyta was dominant in the SCM layer. In the warm water region affected by the TWC, various groups of haptophytes were dominant. Observations from the IORS also presented similar results to the cruise survey results for biomass, size distribution, and diversity of phytoplankton. The results revealed the various dynamic responses of phytoplankton influenced by the CDW plume. By comparing the results from the IORS and research cruise studies, the study confirmed that the IORS is an important observational station to monitor the dynamic impact of the CDW plume. In future research, it is necessary to establish an effective use of IORS in preparation for changes in the ECS summer environment and ecosystem due to climate change.