• Strategy21
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• s.42
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• pp.5-52
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• 2017

Debates about introducing nuclear submarines have been a main issue in Korea. The highest officials and the government has started to think seriously about the issue. Yet there were no certain decision to this issue or any agreements with US but it is still necessary to review about introducing nuclear submarines, the technologies and about the business. The reason for such issues are the highest officials of Korea to build nuclear submarine, nK's nuclear development and SLBM launching. ROKN's nuclear submarine's necessity will be to attack(capacity to revenge), defend(anti-SSBN Operation) and to respond against neighboring nation's threat(Russia, Japan, China). Among these nations, US, Russia (Soviet Union), Britain, France had built their submarines in a short term of time due to their industrial foundation regarding with nuclear propulsion submarines. However China and India have started their business without their industrial foundation prepared and took a long time to build their submarines. Current technology level of Korea have reached almost up to US, Russia, Britain and France when they first built their nuclear propulsion submarines since we have almost completed the business for the Changbogo-I,II and almost up to complete building the Changbogo-III which Korea have self designed/developed. Furthermore Korea have reached the level where we can self design large nuclear reactors and the integrated SMART reactor which we can call ourselves a nation with worldwide technologies. If introducing the nuclear submarine to the Korea gets decided, first of all we would have to review the technological problems and also introduce the foreign technologies when needed. The methods for the introduction will be developments after loans from the foreign, productions with technological cooperations, and individual production. The most significant thing will be that changes are continuous and new instances are keep showing up so that it is important to only have a simple reference to a current instances and have a review on every methods with many possibilities. Also developing all of the technologies for the nuclear propulsion submarines may be not possible and give financial damages so there may be a need to partially introduce foreign technologies. For the introduction of nuclear propulsion submarines, there must be a resolution of the international regulations together with the international/domestics resistances and the technological problems to work out for. Also there may be problem for the requirement fees to solve for and other tough problems to solve for. However nuclear submarines are powerful weapon system to risk everything above. This is an international/domestically a serious agenda. Therefore rather than having debates based on false facts, there must be a need to have an investigations and debates regarding the nation's benefits and national security.

• Strategy21
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• s.34
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• pp.128-148
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• 2014

In south Korea, the so-called 'conservative-liberal' rivalry over the assessment of the government's North Korean policies is seen to be impeding the road to right policy choices. For example, the liberals accused former President Lee Myung-bak's hardline policy of provoking Pyongyang and leading to a deterioration of inter-Korean relations, while the conservatives appreciated it for helping nurture mutually beneficial inter-Korean relations in the longer term by compelling North Korea to observe international norms. However, such debate over the vices and virtues of Seoul's North Korea policies is hardly meaningful as the measuring sticks used by the liberals and the conservatives are entirely different matters. The two major goals South Korea must pursue with its North Korean policies should be 'peaceful management of division' and 'change in North Korea'. The former is related to maintaining stability within South Korea and promoting co-prosperity with North Korea. For this, the nation needs to engage, encompass and assist the Pyongyang regime. The second goal is also necessary since South Korea, as a divided nation, must seek a unified Korea under the system of democracy and market economies by bringing change in North Korea. For this, South Korea needs powerful leverages with which it can persuade and coerce the North. This means that the nation is destined to simultaneously chase the above-mentioned two goals, while also both recognizing and negating the legitimacy of the North Korean regime. This situation necessitates Seoul to apply flexibility in reconciling with Pyongyang while applying firm principles to sever the vicious circle involving the North's military provocations. The May 25 Measures, which banned trade and economic cooperation with the North except those related to humanitarian assistance, were taken as sanctions against Pyongyang for sinking the South Korean corvette Chonan in March 2010. The Measures were taken by the Seoul government immediately after a multinational investigation team discovered evidence confirming that the South Korean naval ship had been torpedoed by a midget North Korean submarine. Naturally, the May 24 Measures have since then become a major stumbling block in inter-Korean exchange, prompting opposition politicians and concerned entrepreneurs to demand Seoul to unilaterally lift the Measures. Given the significant damages the Measures have inflicted on inter-Korean economic relations, removing them remains as homework for both Koreas. However, the Measures pertains to the 'principles on national security' the Seoul government must adhere to under all circumstances. This is why North Korea's apology and promises not to repeat similar provocations must come first. For now, South Korea has no alternative but to let North Korea solve the problems it has created. South Korea's role is to help the North do so.

• Maritime Security
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• v.7 no.1
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• pp.61-96
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• 2023

Amidst the ongoing instability and military tensions between North and South Korea, it is essential for us to comprehend and assess North Korea's military capabilities, while preparing for potential contingencies through military reinforcement. However, to conduct a comprehensive analysis of the military balance on the Korean Peninsula, it is imperative to move beyond simplistic quantitative comparisons of combat capabilities and embrace a broader perspective, which includes qualitative comparisons of military strength, operational capabilities, and a nation's ability to wage war. To address this need, this study employs the method of "Net Assessment" to evaluate the relative combat power of South and North Korean conventional naval forces, with a particular focus on surface combatants. This evaluation involves both quantitative and qualitative comparisons of military assets (personnel and equipment) and intangible factors (naval strategies, geography, etc.). By conducting a holistic assessment, the research aims to identify and analyze strategic asymmetries that may exist between the two navies.

• Strategy21
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• s.41
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• pp.52-84
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• 2017

After finishing Cold War, the U.S. Navy's ability to Sea control has been gradually eroded last 15-20 years. The global security environment demands that the surface Navy rededicate itself to sea control, as a new group of potential adversaries is working to deny U.S. navy command of the sea. China has been increasing their sea denial capability, such as extended anti-surface cruise missile and anti-surface ballistic missile. To cope with this situation, the U.S. Naval Surface Forces Command has announced Surface Forces Strategy: Return to Sea Control. It is a new operating and organizing concept for the U.S. surface fleet called 'distributed lethality'. Under distributed lethality, offensive weapons such as new ASCMs are to be distributed more widely across all types of Navy surface ships, and new operational concept for Navy surface fleet's capability for attacking enemy ships and make it less possible for an enemy to cripple the U.S. fleet by concentrating its attack on a few very high-value Navy surface ships. By increasing the lethality of the surface ships and distributing them across wide areas, the Navy forces potential adversaries to not only consider the threat from our carrier-based aircraft and submarines, but they now consider the threat form all of those surface ships. This idea of using the distributed lethality template to generate surface action groups and adaptive force package and to start thinking about to increase the lethal efficacy of these ships. The U.S. Navy believes distributed lethality increases the Navy's sea control capability and expands U.S. conventional deterrence. Funding new weapons and renovated operating concept to field a more lethal and distributed force will enable us to establish sea control, even in contested area. The U.S. Navy's Surface Forces Strategy provides some useful implications for The ROK Navy. First the ROK Navy need to reconsider sea control mission. securing sea control and exploiting sea control are in a close connection. However, recently the ROK Navy only focuses on exploiting sea control, for instance land attack mission. the ROK Navy is required to reinvigorate sea control mission, such as anti-surface warfare and anti-air warfare. Second, the ROK Navy must seek the way to improve its warfighting capability. It can be achieved by developing high-edge weapons and designing renewed operating concept and embraced new weapon's extended capabilities.

• Ocean and Polar Research
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• v.45 no.1
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• pp.23-31
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• 2023

The core of the foreign policy of the Yoon Suk-yeol government is the promotion of active economic and security diplomacy as indicated in Policy Tasks No. 98. To this end, economic consultative bodies such as Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement(RCEP), Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP), and Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF) are taking the initiative to respond to the formation of supply chain, human rights, environment, and digital-related norms, and actively support Korean companies' overseas expansion. Due to the nature of the Ministry of Oceans and Fisheries (MOF) as an organization established centered on the space of the ocean, the MOF faces difficulties in bringing the functions of other ministries into the space of the ocean. Considering the vision, objectives, and detailed plans of the MOF, the contribution of the MOF in the field of active economic security, one of the main foreign policies of the Yoon Suk-yeol government, is perhaps too obvious. However, since the re-launch of the MOF, the ODA budget for the oceans and fisheries sector is too small compared to other ministries, so even if new policy demands are discovered, there are many difficulties in implementing these policies in practice. Recognizing these problems, this paper examines the background and contents of foreign policies that have been promoted for the efficient promotion of RCEP, CPTPP and IPEF and introduces the areas of cooperation in the oceans and fisheries sector in these foreign policies.

• Maritime Security
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• v.2 no.1
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• pp.151-184
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• 2021

Global warming due to climate change is one of the biggest challenges in the 21st century. Global warming is not only a disaster that threatens the global ecosystem but also an opportunity to reduce logistics costs and develop mineral resources by commercializing Arctic routes. The Arctic paradox, in which ecological and environmental threats and new economic opportunities coexist, is expected to have a profound impact on the global environment. As the glaciers disappear, routes through the Arctic Ocean without passing through the Suez and Panama Canals emerged as the 'third route.' This can reduce the distance of existing routes by 30%. Global warming has also brought about changes in the geopolitical paradigm. As Arctic ice begins to melt, the Arctic is no longer a 'constant' but is emerging as the largest geopolitical 'variable' in the 21st century. Accordingly, the Arctic, which was recognized as a 'space of peace and cooperation' in the post-Cold War era, is now facing a new strategic environment in which military and security aspects are emphasized. After the Cold War, the Arctic used to be a place for cooperation centered on environmental protection, but it is once again changing into a stage of competition and confrontation between superpowers, heralding 'Cold War 2.0.' The purpose of this study is to evaluate the strategic value of the Arctic Ocean from geopolitical and geoeconomic perspectives and derive strategic implications by analyzing the dynamics of the New Cold War taking place in the Arctic region.

• Maritime Security
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• v.4 no.1
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• pp.115-138
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• 2022

The Korean military is preparing for successful manpower reduction using advanced science and technology, in addition to carrying out the initiative of the Defense Innovation 4.0. Accordingly, studies on core technologies related to defense reform have been conducted both internally and externally in the military, and the corresponding results have also been applied. Nevertheless, compared to the development of such technologies, it is considered necessary to have more preparation for the policies related to the operation of the newly introduced equipment. As for the placement of personnel and the organization of time in service (TIS) with respect to the operation of surveillance equipment, there has been a tendency to sustain the conventional practice. Therefore, this study intends to suggest the schemes for facilitating policy improvements in the operation of manpower and security regulations in the field of information for the purpose of introducing a successful next-generation coastal guard system. To do this, the approach of this study was focused on the policies for the operation of the guard system. This is in contrast to previous studies that centered on its equipment and technologies. In addition, how to efficiently operate the guard system was also studied in view of cognitive science by deriving the most efficient time for a person to execute surveillance through the monitor based on the previous studies.

• Strategy21
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• s.32
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• pp.36-70
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• 2013

Waegu(倭寇)'s invasion in the Late Goryeo(高麗) Dynasty was huge damage for Goryeo's local society. And It was shock that Goryeo government's basic foundation of rules. Invasion background of waegu for Kyeong-in-yeon(庚寅年, 1350) was Kyushyu(九州)'s political divide because of Nihon(日本) government's confusion. Waegu was huge damage for Goryeo's Jo-wun(漕運, the shipping system of grain paid as a tax) system. So, government started military response, but it was turn out a failure and had great damage. When execution of military operations failed, Goryeo government sent diplomatic delegation to request the prevent of waegu, but the invasion continued. Since waegu invasion, Goryeo was got nowhere with defence of waegu. So, some people demanded for a new understanding of the ocean defence in the government. Lee-Saek(李穡), Woo-Hyeonbo(禹玄寶), Lee-Hee(李禧) and Jung-Ji(鄭地) were representatives of a new understanding of the ocean defence. Their demands were received attention when all operations had been failed. Therefore, Goryeo government began to reorganization of the naval forces and set up a special committee of gunpowder manufacturing named Hwa-tong-do-gam(火筒都監). This administrative reform was achieved substantial results since then. In 1380, the naval battle at Jin-po(鎭浦) was a big event that first gunpowder attack the waegu. Since Jin-po, Goryeo's naval forces gain confidence. In 1389, Dae-ma-do(對馬島) was attacked by Park-Wi(朴葳). It was meant that Goryeo's naval forces had huge offense power. Goryeo's defence system was focused on a northern race before 14th century waegu's invasion. So they were neglected their ocean defence. But after military operation of waegu's invasion was failure, they focused on the ocean defence. A new understanding of the ocean defence was foundation of that. It means to us to a new understanding of the ocean defence. Now, East Asia has maritime disputes. And we have high exposure to potential threats. So, we have a new understanding of importance of the ocean defence. And we fight for 21th century's ocean threats as foundation of sense of national security.

• Korean Security Journal
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• no.39
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• pp.319-353
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• 2014

Cyber-based technologies are now ubiquitous around the glob and are emerging as an "instrument of power" in societies, and are becoming more available to a country's opponents, who may use it to attack, degrade, and disrupt communications and the flow of information. The globe-spanning range of cyberspace and no national borders will challenge legal systems and complicate a nation's ability to deter threats and respond to contingencies. Through cyberspace, competitive powers will target industry, academia, government, as well as the military in the air, land, maritime, and space domains of our nations. Enemies in cyberspace will include both states and non-states and will range from the unsophisticated amateur to highly trained professional hackers. In much the same way that airpower transformed the battlefield of World War II, cyberspace has fractured the physical barriers that shield a nation from attacks on its commerce and communication. Cyberthreats to the infrastructure and other assets are a growing concern to policymakers. In 2013 Cyberwarfare was, for the first time, considered a larger threat than Al Qaeda or terrorism, by many U.S. intelligence officials. The new United States military strategy makes explicit that a cyberattack is casus belli just as a traditional act of war. The Economist describes cyberspace as "the fifth domain of warfare and writes that China, Russia, Israel and North Korea. Iran are boasting of having the world's second-largest cyber-army. Entities posing a significant threat to the cybersecurity of critical infrastructure assets include cyberterrorists, cyberspies, cyberthieves, cyberwarriors, and cyberhacktivists. These malefactors may access cyber-based technologies in order to deny service, steal or manipulate data, or use a device to launch an attack against itself or another piece of equipment. However because the Internet offers near-total anonymity, it is difficult to discern the identity, the motives, and the location of an intruder. The scope and enormity of the threats are not just focused to private industry but also to the country's heavily networked critical infrastructure. There are many ongoing efforts in government and industry that focus on making computers, the Internet, and related technologies more secure. As the national intelligence institution's effort, cyber counter-intelligence is measures to identify, penetrate, or neutralize foreign operations that use cyber means as the primary tradecraft methodology, as well as foreign intelligence service collection efforts that use traditional methods to gauge cyber capabilities and intentions. However one of the hardest issues in cyber counterintelligence is the problem of "Attribution". Unlike conventional warfare, figuring out who is behind an attack can be very difficult, even though the Defense Secretary Leon Panetta has claimed that the United States has the capability to trace attacks back to their sources and hold the attackers "accountable". Considering all these cyber security problems, this paper examines closely cyber security issues through the lessons from that of U.S experience. For that purpose I review the arising cyber security issues considering changing global security environments in the 21st century and their implications to the reshaping the government system. For that purpose this study mainly deals with and emphasis the cyber security issues as one of the growing national security threats. This article also reviews what our intelligence and security Agencies should do among the transforming cyber space. At any rate, despite of all hot debates about the various legality and human rights issues derived from the cyber space and intelligence service activity, the national security should be secured. Therefore, this paper suggests that one of the most important and immediate step is to understanding the legal ideology of national security and national intelligence.

• Strategy21
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• s.34
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• pp.58-92
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• 2014

Even after S. Korea took 5.24 Measure(24 May 2014), N. Korea has not stopped raising provocations such as the shelling of Yeonpyeong Island, electronic and cyber attacks. To make matters worse, the communist country lunched long-range missiles(twice) and conducted 3rd nuclear test, escalating tensions which could possibly lead to an all-out war. Korean Government failed to respond properly. However, escalation into an all-out war was deterred by the CFC immediately carrying out its peacetime duty(CODA). The US made a rapid dispatch of its augmentation forces(Aircraft carrier, nuclear-powered submarine, strategic bomber, F-22) to the Korean Peninsula. In recognition of the importance of the Combined Forces Command, since May 2013 the Park Geun-Hye Administration has been pushing ahead with re-postponement of Wartime Operational Control Transfer(which initially meant the disassembling of the CFC as of 1 December 2015) More recently, there has been a series of unusual indicators from the North. Judging from its inventory of 20 nuclear weapons, 1,000 ballistic missiles and biochemical weapons, it is safe to say that N. Korea has gained at least war deterrence against S. Korea. Normally a nation with nuclear weapons shrink its size of conventional forces, but the North is pursuing the opposite, rather increasing them. In addition, there was a change of war plan by N. Korea in 2010, changing 'Conquering the Korean Peninsula' to 'Negotiation after the seizure of the Greater Seoul Metropolitan Area(GSMA)' and establishing detailed plans for wartime projects. The change reflects the chain reaction in which requests from pro-north groups within the South will lead to the proclamation of war. Kim, Jeong-Un, leader of N. Korean regime, sent threatening messages using words such as 'exercising a nuclear preemptive strike right' and 'burning of Seoul'. Nam, Jae-June, Director of National Intelligence Service, stated that Kim, Jung-Un is throwing big talks, saying communization of the entire Korean Peninsula will come within the time frame of 3 years. Kim, Gwan-Jin, Defense Minister, shared an alarming message that there is a high possibility that the North will raise local provocations or a full-fledged war whenever while putting much emphasis on defense posture. As for the response concept of the Korean Government, it has been decided that 'ROK·US Combined Local Provocation Counter-Measure' will be adopted to act against local provocations from the North. Major provocation types include ▲ violation of the Northern Limit Line(NLL) with mobilization of military ships ▲ artillery provocations on Northwestern Islands ▲ low altitude airborne intrusion ▲ rear infiltration of SOF ▲ local conflicts within the Military Demarcation Line(MDL) ▲ attacking friendly ships by submarines. Counter-measures currently established by the US involves the support from USFK and USFJ. In order to keep the sworn promise, the US is reinforcing both USFK and USFJ. An all-out war situation will be met by 'CFC OPLAN5027' and 'Tailored Expansion Deterrence Forces' with the CFC playing a central role. The US augmentation forces stands at 690,000 troops, some 160 ships, 2,000 aircraft and this comprise 50% of US total forces, which is estimated to be ninefold of Korean forces. The CFC needs to be in center in handling both local provocations and an all-out war situation. However, the combat power of S. Korean conventional forces is approximately around 80% of that of N. Korea, which has been confirmed from comments made by Kim, Gwan-Jin, Defense Minister, during an interpellation session at the National Assembly. This means that S. Korean forces are not much growing. In particular, asymmetric capabilities of the North is posing a serious threat to the South including WMD, cyber warfare forces, SOF, forces targeting 5 Northwestern Islands, sub-surface and amphibious assault forces. The presence of such threats urgently requires immediate complementary efforts. For complementary efforts, the Korean Government should consider ① reinforcement of Korean forces; putting a stoppage to shrinking military, acquisition of adequate defense budget, building a missile defense and military leadership structure validity review, ② implementation of military tasks against the North; disciplinary measures on the sinking of ROKS Cheon-an/shelling of Yeonpyeong Islands, arrangement of inter-Korean military agreements, drawing lessons from studies on the correlation between aid for N. Korea, execution of inter-Korean Summit and provocations from the North, and ③ bolstering the ROK·US alliance; disregarding wartime operational control transfer plan(disassembling of CFC) and creation of a combined division.