• Journal of National Security and Military Science
• /
• s.13
• /
• pp.687-738
• /
• 2016

To prepare for the complicated international relationship regarding Korean Peninsula after reunification, this thesis started off with the awareness that Unified Korea should build its international posture and national security at an early stage by determining its appropriate military strength for independent defense and military strategies that Unified Korea should aim. The main theme of this thesis is 'The research on appropriate military strength of the Unified Korean military'. To derive appropriate military strength of Unified Korea, this research focuses on conflict scenario and relative balance strategy based on potential threats posed by neighboring countries, and this is the part that differentiates this research from other researches. First of all, the main objective of the research is to decide appropriate military strength for Unified Korea to secure defense sufficiency. For this, this research will decide efficient military strategy that Unified Korea should aim. Than by presuming the most possible military conflict scenario, this research will judge the most appropriate military strength for Unified Korea to overcome the dispute. Second, after deciding appropriate military strength, this research will suggest how to operate presumed military strength in each armed force. The result of this thesis is as in the following. First, Unified Korea should aim 'relative balance strategy'. 'Relative balance strategy' is a military strategy which Unified Korea can independently secure defense sufficiency by maintaining relative balance when conflicts occur between neighboring countries. This strategy deters conflicts in advance by relative balance of power in certain time and place. Even if conflict occurs inevitably, this strategy secures initiative. Second, when analyzing neighboring countries interest and strategic environment after unification, the possibility of all-out war will be low in the Korean Peninsula because no other nation wants the Korean Peninsula to be subordinated to one single country. Therefore appropriate military strength of the Unified Korean military would be enough when Unified Korea can achieve relative balance in regional war or limited war. Third, Northeast Asia is a region where economic power and military strength is concentrated. Despite increasing mutual cooperation in the region, conflicts and competition to expand each countries influence is inherent. Japan is constantly enhancing their military strength as they aim for normal statehood. China is modernizing their military strength as they aspire to become global central nation. Russia is also enhancing their military strength in order to hold on to their past glory of Soviet Union as a world power. As a result, both in quality and quantity, the gap between military strength of Unified Korea and each neighboring countries is enlarged at an alarming rate. Especially in the field of air-sea power, arms race is occurring between each nation. Therefore Unified Korea should be equipped with appropriate military strength in order to achieve relative balance with each threats posed by neighboring countries. Fourth, the most possible conflicts between Unified Korea and neighboring countries could be summarized into four, which are Dokdo territorial dispute with Japan, Leodo jurisdictional dispute with China, territorial dispute concerning northern part of the Korea Peninsula with China and disputes regarding marine resources and sea routes with Russia. Based on those conflict scenarios, appropriate military strength for Unified Korea is as in the following. When conflict occurs with Japan regarding Dokdo, Japan is expected to put JMSDF Escort Flotilla 3, one out of four of its Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force Escort Fleet, which is based in Maizuru and JMSDF Maizuru District. To counterbalance this military strength, Unified Korea needs one task fleet, comprised with three task flotilla. In case of jurisdictional conflict with China concerning Leodo, China is expected to dispatch its North Sea fleet, one out of three of its naval fleet, which is in charge of the Yellow Sea. To response to this military action, Unified Korea needs one task fleet, comprised with three task flotilla. In case of territorial dispute concerning northern part of the Korean Peninsula with China, it is estimated that out of seven Military Region troops, China will dispatch two Military Region troops, including three Army Groups from Shenyang Military Region, where it faces boarder with the Korean Peninsula. To handle with this military strength, Unified Korea needs six corps size ground force strength, including three corps of ground forces, two operational reserve corps(maneuver corps), and one strategic reserve corps(maneuver corps). When conflict occurs with Russia regarding marine resources and sea routes, Russia is expected to send a warfare group of a size that includes two destroyers, which is part of the Pacific Fleet. In order to balance this strength, Unified Korea naval power requires one warfare group including two destroyers. Fifth, management direction for the Unified Korean military is as in the following. Regarding the ground force management, it would be most efficient to deploy troops in the border area with china for regional and counter-amphibious defense. For the defense except the border line with china, the most efficient form of force management would be maintaining strategic reserve corps. The naval force should achieve relative balance with neighboring countries when there is maritime dispute and build 'task fleet' which can independently handle long-range maritime mission. Of the three 'task fleet', one task fleet should be deployed at Jeju base to prepare for Dokdo territorial dispute and Leodo jurisdictional dispute. Also in case of regional conflict with china, one task fleet should be positioned at Yellow Sea and for regional conflict with Japan and Russia, one task fleet should be deployed at East Sea. Realistically, Unified Korea cannot possess an air force equal to neither Japan nor China in quantity. Therefore, although Unified Korea's air force might be inferior in quantity, they should possess the systematic level which Japan or China has. For this Unified Korea should build air base in island areas like Jeju Island or Ullenong Island to increase combat radius. Also to block off infiltration of enemy attack plane, air force needs to build and manage air bases near coastal areas. For landing operation forces, Marine Corps should be managed in the size of two divisions. For island defense force, which is in charge of Jeju Island, Ulleung Island, Dokdo Island and five northwestern boarder island defenses, it should be in the size of one brigade. Also for standing international peace keeping operation, it requires one brigade. Therefore Marine Corps should be organized into three divisions. The result of the research yields a few policy implications when building appropriate military strength for Unified Korea. First, Unified Korea requires lower number of ground troops compared to that of current ROK(Republic of Korea) force. Second, air-sea forces should be drastically reinforced. Third, appropriate military strength of the Unified Korean military should be based on current ROK military system. Forth, building appropriate military strength for Unified Korea should start from today, not after reunification. Because of this, South Korea should build a military power that can simultaneously prepare for current North Korea's provocations and future threats from neighboring countries after reunification. The core of this research is to decide appropriate military strength for Unified Korea to realize relative balance that will ensure defense sufficiency from neighboring countries threats. In other words, this research should precisely be aware of threats posed by neighboring countries and decide minimum level of military strength that could realize relative balance in conflict situation. Moreover this research will show the path for building appropriate military strength in each armed force.

• Maritime Security
• /
• v.8 no.1
• /
• pp.103-128
• /
• 2024

The Nord Stream explosion and the damage to submarine cables in the Baltic Sea and Red Sea have raised interest in seabed warfare all the world. And each country is preparing response plans and strategy. However, although South Korea relies on submarine cables for most of its internet network and is vulnerable to threats from North Korea and neighboring countries, even the term Seabed Warfare is unfamiliar. This paper is the first domestic study to analyze the definition and characteristics of seabed warfare, the current status of each country, and suggest countermeasures. In order to respond to seabed warfare, I propose establishing a cooperative system based on Mini-multilateralism between countries that share an international rules-based order, and establishing governance with related domestic organizations and companies. And I propose a military response plan based on deterrence by denial and deterrence by retaliation

• Strategy21
• /
• s.31
• /
• pp.57-84
• /
• 2013

North Korea's continuous threats and provocative behaviors have aggravated tension on the Korean peninsula particularly with the recent nuclear weapons test. South Korea's best way to cope with this situation is to maintain the balance among three policy directions: dialogue, sanctions, and deterrence. Among the three, I argue that deterrence should be prioritized. There are different sources of deterrence such as military power, economic power, and diplomatic clouts. States can build deterrence capability independently. Alternatively, they may do so through relations with other states including alliances, bilateral relations, or multilateral relations in the international community. What South Korea needs most urgently is to maintain deterrence against North Korea's local provocations through the enhancement of independent military capability particularly by addressing the asymmetric vulnerability between militaries of the South and the North. Most of all, the South Korean government should recognize the seriousness of the negative consequences that North Korea's 'Nuclear shadow strategy' would bring about for the inter-Korea relations and security situations in Northeast Asia. Based on this understanding, it should develop an 'assertive deterrence strategy' that emphasizes 'multi-purpose, multi-stage, and tailored deterrence whose main idea lies in punitive retaliation.' This deterrence strategy requires a flexible targeting policy and a variety of retaliatory measures capable of taking out all targets in North Korea. At the same time, the force structures of the army, the air force, and the navy should be improved in a way that maximizes their deterrence capability. For example, the army should work on expanding the guided missile command and the special forces command and reforming the reserve forces. The navy and the air force should increase striking capabilities including air-to-ground, ship-to-ground, and submarine-to-ground strikes to a great extent. The marine corps can enhance its deterrence capability by changing the force structure from the stationary defense-oriented one that would have to suffer some degree of troop attrition at the early stage of hostilities to the one that focuses on 'counteroffensive landing operations.' The government should continue efforts for defense reform in order to obtain these capabilities while building the 'Korean-style triad system' that consists of advanced air, ground, and surface/ subsurface weapon systems. Besides these measures, South Korea should start to acquire a minimum level of nuclear potential within the legal boundary that the international law defines. For this, South Korea should withdraw from the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty. Moreover, it should obtain the right to process and enrich uranium through changing the U.S.-South Korea nuclear cooperation treaty. Whether or not we should be armed with nuclear weapons should not be understood in terms of "all or nothing." We should consider an 'in-between' option as the Japanese case proves. With regard to the wartime OPCON transition, we need to re-consider the timing of the transition as an effort to demonstrate the costliness of North Korea's provocative behaviors. If impossible, South Korea should take measures to make the Strategic Alliance 2015 serve as a persisting deterrence system against North Korea. As the last point, all the following governments of South Korea should keep in mind that continuing reconciliatory efforts should always be pursued along with other security policies toward North Korea.

• Maritime Security
• /
• v.3 no.1
• /
• pp.73-114
• /
• 2021

This study examines the distribution of power in Northeast Asia based on the balance of power theory, a representative theory of realism, assuming military capabilities as the core power of states. The results of previous studies on the balance of power and military forces are reviewed and used to analyze changes in the strength of the US, China, Russia, Japan, South Korea, and North Korea through 2020 to predict the security environment in 2030. In the balance of power theory, if the balance of power between a nation or a group of powers collapses, the possibility of war is high, and to survive in the international community with high uncertainty and distrust, the theory predicts that states must increase their powers in a self-help world and strengthen cooperation and alliance. Countries in Northeast Asia are also continuing to strengthen their military capabilities, and countries neighboring China are paying keen attention and remaining vigilant due to the rapid changes in the international security environment after the rapid rise of China. To mark the future 100th anniversary of the Chinese armed forces in the 2030s, China aims to realize 'defense and military modernization' and build a 'world-class military force' by the nation's 100th anniversary in the 2050s. The US is busy checking China's rise by strengthening international cooperation and alliances. The security environment and power dynamics in Northeast Asia are slowly changing as the US and China continue to compete for global hegemony. The changes and implications of the distribution of power in Northeast Asia after 2030 are examined based on the balance of power theory.

• Strategy21
• /
• s.43
• /
• pp.5-28
• /
• 2018

The tensions between the U.S and China, which form the two pillars of the G2 era, seem to have persisted even after the Trump administration inaugurated. The strong confrontation between the two in recent foreign security issues may drive to develop an inadvertent military conflict, and it is high likely to occur in the maritime are. The purpose of this study is not only to analyze the balance of modernized naval forces in the PLAN through naval strategy changes and weapons system modernization trend, but also to predict the impact of the geographical proximity difference on the balance of naval forces in the disputed areas. It examined the impact of distance and geography on naval power by assessing the modernization pattern of the PLAN and capabilities in the context of two scenarios at different distances from China by 2020: one centered on Taiwan and the other on the Spratly Islands. The PLAN's strategy had impact on operational concept and forces construction. First, from the viewpoint of operation operational concept, it can be seen that the passive defense is changing into active defense. Second, in terms of power construction, it can threaten the surface and submarines of U.S power from a distance. And they generated follow three features; The ocean is not the focus of Chinese submarines, Horizontal and vertical expansion of Chinese naval vessels, The improvement of the suppression ability as the Chinese naval modernization ratio increases. The strength of the PLAN is dominant over the U.S in terms of reserves, and it can complement the qualitative deterioration by utilizing nearby bases in the vicinity of the mainland, such as the Taiwan Strait. However, due to the shortage of aircraft carriers, there is a possibility that it will take some time to secure the advantage of air and ocean in the amphibious operation. Therefore, as the dispute is prolonged, China may fail to achieve its original goal. In addition, the lack of cutting edge Commanding Ships may bring to weaken the C2 capabilities. At results, it is expected that PLAN will not be able to have a superiority in the short term due to lagging behind U.S advanced technology. Nevertheless, PLAN has strengthened its naval power through modernization sufficiently and it is highly likely to use force. Especially, it is more likely in the region where the naval power operation like the Taiwan Strait is possible with the almost equality to that of the United States. China will continue to use its naval forces to achieve a rapid and decisive victory over U.S in the close area from the land.

• Maritime Security
• /
• v.6 no.1
• /
• pp.109-135
• /
• 2023

The North Korean military's maneuver toward Honam was the fastest maneuver the North Korean army had demonstrated during the Korean War, and it was a threatening attack that forced the Korean and Allied forces to fully adjust the defenses of the Nakdong River. However, when this study analyzed the North Korean military's maneuver toward Honam in terms of indirect approach strategy, there were a number of factors that inevitably led to its failure. In terms of implementing the indirect approach strategy, the North Korean military cited a number of failure factors, including the dispersion of combat forces, the inflexibility of changing the line of operation, the maneuvering of ground forces, and the lack of psychological distaction. However, the North Koreans were preparing for a final "surprise attack," in which the 7th Division, which was following the North Korean 6th Division, took another diversion and attempted to attack in the direction of Tongyeong. With this, the North Koreans intended to break through the Nakdong River defenses and head for Pusan. However, the North Korean attack was ultimately thwarted by the Korean Navy and Marine Corps' Tongyeong Amphibious Operation. With a swift maneuver using the sea as a maneuvering space, the Navy and Marine Corps occupied key points first, creating an advantageous situation and fending off an attack by the North Korean 7th Division. The Navy and Marine Corps' Tongyeong Amphibious Operation finally thwarted the North Korean military's maneuver toward Honam, thus maintaining the Nakdong River defenses.

• Maritime Security
• /
• v.5 no.1
• /
• pp.113-136
• /
• 2022

China has been pushing for a systematic strategy for territorialization over a long period of time to invade Korea's West Sea (Yellow Sea) in order to create China's territorial water. China's strategy for territorializing the West Sea is an activity in which China curbs the use of South Korea and enforces the illegal use of China in order to dominate the West Sea exclusively. China aided Chinese fishing boats that engaged in illegal fishing in Korea's jurisdiction as a means to territorialize the West Sea, and is opposed to combined exercise and training of Korea and the United States Naval Forces in the West Sea, while intentionally entering KADIZ(Korea Air Defense Identification Zone). In addition, Beijing used 'scientific exploration and research' measures as a pretext for its strategies in order to encroach on Korea's West Sea. China is carrying out such work to announce to the world that China is a systematic and organized country while consistently attempting to dominate the West Sea. China's activities in the West Sea seriously infringe South Korea's sovereignty. In order to respond to China's strategies of territorialization in the West Sea stated above, I analyzed the rejection effect of the ROK-US combined military training in the West Sea and presented a 'proportional response strategy centered on the ROK-US combined forces'. Korea should be able to respond proportionally to China's activities in the seas around the Korean peninsula, and Korea should be able to neutralize China's attempt to a Fait Accompli. In addition, just as China installs buoys in the Korea-China Provisional Measures Zone, Korea should be able to install and actively utilize some devices in the West Sea and for the use of free and open West Sea. Korea should not just wait for the tragic future to come without preparing for China's gradual and long-term strategy, and Seoul needs to respond to China's maritime policy in the West Sea with a more active attitude than it is now. China has historically taken a bold and aggressive response to neighboring countries that are consistent with a passive attitude, on the other hand, Beijing has taken a cautious approach to neighboring countries that respond with an active attitude. It should not be forgotten that Korea's passive response to the Chinese strategy in the name of a 'realistic approach' such as Korea's economic dependence on China for economy will result in China's success for territorialization of the West Sea.

• Journal of Navigation and Port Research
• /
• v.34 no.2
• /
• pp.91-95
• /
• 2010

Recently IMO and IALA have developed the strategy of e-Navigation and the concepts of VTM to enhance the safety, efficiency and security of vessel traffic and protection of the marine environment. And current technical and functional trends require vessel traffic management systems to be improved so as to control vessel traffic not only in waters of harbour area, but also within EEZ waters. Under the consideration of these circumstances, a three-layered vessel traffic management system was proposed in this paper. The proposed system consists of three sub-systems, called Local VTS, Regional VTS and National VTS, and those sub-systems are designed respectively to be suitable for managing vessel traffic within their own jurisdiction waters.

• Maritime Security
• /
• v.5 no.1
• /
• pp.1-53
• /
• 2022

One manifestation of the contemporary era of renewed great power competition has been the deepening relationship between China and Russia. Their strengthening military ties, notwithstanding their lack of a formal defense alliance, have been especially striking. Since China and Russia deploy two of the world's most powerful navies, their growing maritime cooperation has been one of the most significant international security developments of recent years. The Sino-Russian naval exercises, involving varying platforms and locations, have built on years of high-level personnel exchanges, large Russian weapons sales to China, the Sino-Russia Treaty of Friendship, and other forms of cooperation. Though the joint Sino-Russian naval drills began soon after Beijing and Moscow ended their Cold War confrontation, these exercises have become much more important during the last decade, essentially becoming a core pillar of their expanding defense partnership. China and Russia now conduct more naval exercises in more places and with more types of weapons systems than ever before. In the future, Chinese and Russian maritime drills will likely encompass new locations, capabilities, and partners-including possibly the Arctic, hypersonic delivery systems, and novel African, Asian, and Middle East partners-as well as continue such recent innovations as conducting joint naval patrols and combined arms maritime drills. China and Russia pursue several objectives through their bilateral naval cooperation. The Treaty of Good-Neighborliness and Friendly Cooperation Between the People's Republic of China and the Russian Federation lacks a mutual defense clause, but does provide for consultations about common threats. The naval exercises, which rehearse non-traditional along with traditional missions (e.g., counter-piracy and humanitarian relief as well as with high-end warfighting), provide a means to enhance their response to such mutual challenges through coordinated military activities. Though the exercises may not realize substantial interoperability gains regarding combat capabilities, the drills do highlight to foreign audiences the Sino-Russian capacity to project coordinated naval power globally. This messaging is important given the reliance of China and Russia on the world's oceans for trade and the two countries' maritime territorial disputes with other countries. The exercises can also improve their national military capabilities as well as help them learn more about the tactics, techniques, and procedures of each other. The rising Chinese Navy especially benefits from working with the Russian armed forces, which have more experience conducting maritime missions, particularly in combat operations involving multiple combat arms, than the People's Liberation Army (PLA). On the negative side, these exercises, by enhancing their combat capabilities, may make Chinese and Russian policymakers more willing to employ military force or run escalatory risks in confrontations with other states. All these impacts are amplified in Northeast Asia, where the Chinese and Russian navies conduct most of their joint exercises. Northeast Asia has become an area of intensifying maritime confrontations involving China and Russia against the United States and Japan, with South Korea situated uneasily between them. The growing ties between the Chinese and Russian navies have complicated South Korean-U.S. military planning, diverted resources from concentrating against North Korea, and worsened the regional security environment. Naval planners in the United States, South Korea, and Japan will increasingly need to consider scenarios involving both the Chinese and Russian navies. For example, South Korean and U.S. policymakers need to prepare for situations in which coordinated Chinese and Russian military aggression overtaxes the Pentagon, obligating the South Korean Navy to rapidly backfill for any U.S.-allied security gaps that arise on the Korean Peninsula. Potentially reinforcing Chinese and Russian naval support to North Korea in a maritime confrontation with South Korea and its allies would present another serious challenge. Building on the commitment of Japan and South Korea to strengthen security ties, future exercises involving Japan, South Korea, and the United States should expand to consider these potential contingencies.

• KSII Transactions on Internet and Information Systems (TIIS)
• /
• v.15 no.5
• /
• pp.1909-1928
• /
• 2021

At present, the Colombian government shares information on threats or vulnerabilities in the area of cybersecurity and cyberdefense, from other government agencies or departments, on an ad-hoc basis but not in real time, with the surveillance entities of the Government of the Republic of Colombia such as the Joint Command of Cybernetic Operations (CCOCI) and the Cybernetic Emergencies Response Team of Colombia (ColCERT). This research presents the MS-CSIRT (Management System Computer Security Incident Response Teams) methodology, that is used to unify the guidelines of a CSIRT towards a joint communication command in cybersecurity for the surveillance of Information Technology (IT), Technological Operations (TO), Internet Connection Sharing (ICS) or Internet of Things (IoT) infrastructures. This methodology evaluates the level of maturity, by means of a roadmap, to establish a CSIRT as a reference framework for government entities and as a guide for the areas of information security, IT and TO to strengthen the growth of the industry 4.0. This allows the organizations to draw a line of cybersecurity policy with scope, objectives, controls, metrics, procedures and use cases for the correct coordination between ColCERT and CCOCI, as support entities in cybersecurity, and the different companies (ICS, IoT, gas and energy, mining, maritime, agro-industrial, among others) or government agencies that use this methodology.