• Journal of Distribution Science
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• v.14 no.5
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• pp.27-37
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• 2016

Purpose - Prior theories expect a lower marginal value of cash for weak governance firms. To test this hypothesis, we examine the relationship between corporate governance structures and marginal cash values in Korean retail firms. Research design, data, and methodology - We estimate marginal cash values based on the model of Faulkender & Wang (2006). The retail firms listed in Korean Stock Exchange from 2005 to 2013 are analyzed. Corporate governance scores are provided by Korean Corporate Governance Services. Results - We show a higher marginal value of cash for the weak governance retail firms in terms of total governance score. Our analysis on a detailed set of governance scores generally confirms this tendency. Yet, a higher marginal cash value is obtained for the firms with better board structures and dividend policies. Conclusions - Our findings argue against the agency view of cash policy predicting a negative relationship between corporate governance scores and marginal cash values. A low marginal value of cash, widely observed in the sample firms, also supports severe resource diversion problem in Korean corporations.

• Journal of Distribution Science
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• v.14 no.2
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• pp.13-22
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• 2016

Purpose - We examine the marginal value of cash in Korean retail firms, largely unexamined in literature. The marginal value of cash plays pivotal role in cash management policy; especially, a significantly low marginal cash value indicates substantial manager-shareholder conflicts. Research design, data, and methodology - We estimate marginal cash values by adopting the approach of Faulkender & Wang (2006). The sample of retail firms traded in Korean Stock Exchange from 1991 to 2013 is analyzed. Results - We estimate the marginal value of cash for the retail firms as 0.75, implying significant manager-shareholder conflicts. We find a lower marginal value of cash for financially constrained retail firms, contradicting existing theories. The marginal value of cash increases substantially after 2000s, suggesting severe agency conflicts in 1990s as a key reason behind our findings. Conclusions - Our findings support the substantial resource diversion problem in Korean firms and the agency theory of cash management policy. Our results argue against the widely accepted view focusing on implications of financial constraints, which highlights a need of new cash management theory.

• The Journal of Asian Finance, Economics and Business
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• v.3 no.4
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• pp.5-16
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• 2016

Prior literature expects a lower marginal cash value for weaker governance firms. We test this empirical hypothesis by using the sample of publicly traded Korean firms from 2005 to 2013. To measure the quality of governance structures, we employ the corporate governance scores provided by Korean Corporate Governance Services. The empirical model of Faulkender and Wang (2006) is adopted to estimate the marginal value of cash. Our empirical analysis shows a higher marginal value of cash for the good governance firms in the examination of the total governance score. This finding is consistent to the agency view of cash policy predicting a larger marginal value of cash for the firms with higher governance scores. However, this positive relationship is not robust for a subset of detailed governance scores; a lower marginal cash value is observed for the firms with better qualities of board structure, auditing, dividend policies. Moreover, our empirical analysis verifies a quite low level of marginal cash value for Korean firms, which supports the existence of severe agency conflicts in Korean corporations. Our results verify the significant role of agency conflicts between a manager and shareholders in the determination of marginal cash values in the Korean firms.

• The Journal of Asian Finance, Economics and Business
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• v.3 no.4
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• pp.67-79
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• 2016

Prior literature expects a lower marginal cash value for weaker governance firms. We test this empirical hypothesis by using the sample of publicly traded Korean firms from 2005 to 2013. To measure the quality of governance structures, we employ the corporate governance scores provided by Korean Corporate Governance Services. The empirical model of Faulkender and Wang (2006) is adopted to estimate the marginal value of cash. Our empirical analysis shows a higher marginal value of cash for the good governance firms in the examination of the total governance score. This finding is consistent to the agency view of cash policy predicting a larger marginal value of cash for the firms with higher governance scores. However, this positive relationship is not robust for a subset of detailed governance scores; a lower marginal cash value is observed for the firms with better qualities of board structure, auditing, dividend policies. Moreover, our empirical analysis verifies a quite low level of marginal cash value for Korean firms, which supports the existence of severe agency conflicts in Korean corporations. Our results verify the significant role of agency conflicts between a manager and shareholders in the determination of marginal cash values in the Korean firms.

• Journal of the Korean Data and Information Science Society
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• v.28 no.5
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• pp.1109-1123
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• 2017

This paper examines there is any differences among determinants of cash holdings and marginal value of cash depending on the life-cycle of firm. To accomplish these objective, we collect financial and market data of KRX listing firms for a period of 2001-2013. We present evidence of significant effect of life-cycle on the cash holdings determinants and marginal value of cash. Specially, the effect of investment opportunity related variable are varies through life-cycle. The results also suggest that marginal values of cash in the introduction stage and exit stage is higher than those in other stages. Overall, this means that the motive of cash holdings in Korean firms is weak. and shareholders place different value on a firm's cash holdings depending on the life-cycle.