• The Journal of the Korea Contents Association
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• v.19 no.4
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• pp.394-402
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• 2019

This study examines the effect of managerial ownership on the value of firms' cash holdings. According to the management entrenchment hypothesis, managers have incentives to make decisions that can undermine shareholders' value for their own private interests. In this situation, as the managerial ownership increases, investors may evaluate that the cash held by the company may be utilized inefficiently and the value of the cash holdings may decrease. On the other hand, based on the incentive alignment hypothesis, the value of cash holdings may increase as investors perceive cash holdings to be effectively used to increase corporate value as managers' interests are in agreement with shareholders. Empirical results show that the value of cash holdings decreased as managerial ownership increased. This study finds a contribution in that it presents empirical evidence on whether the cash held by the company is differentially evaluated according to the level of the managerial ownership.

• The Journal of Asian Finance, Economics and Business
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• v.6 no.3
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• pp.67-79
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• 2019

This study examines the impact of corporate governance on capital structure decisions based on a large panel of Chinese listed firms. Using the system Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) estimator to control for unobserved heterogeneity, endogeneity, and persistency in capital structure decisions, we document that the ownership structure plays a significant role in determining leverage ratios. More specially, we find that managerial ownership has a positive and significant impact on firms' leverage, consistent with the incentive alignment hypothesis. We also find that managerial ownership only affects the leverage decisions of private firms in the post-2005 split share reform period. State ownership negatively influence leverage decisions implying that SOEs may face fewer restrictions in equity issuance and may receive favourable treatments when applying for seasoned equity ¿nancing, thus use less debt. Furthermore, our results show that while foreign ownership negatively influences leverage decisions, legal person shareholding positively influences firms' leverage decisions only for state controlled firms. We also find that the board structure variables (board size and the proportion of independent directors) do not influence firms' capital structure decisions. Our findings suggest that recent ownership reforms have been successful in terms of providing incentive to managers through managerial shareholdings to take risky financial choices.

• Journal of Korea Port Economic Association
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• v.31 no.3
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• pp.41-60
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• 2015

This paper investigates whether managerial ownership and foreign ownership have impacts on firm value, using a sample of logistics firms listed on the Korea Stock Exchange between 2008 and 2014. In the Korean economy, family-controlled business groups, known as chaebol, constitute a unique governance system. To acquire investments from controlling shareholders, a logistics firm is likely to be included in family-controlled business groups. Since reform of the governance structure of logistics firms in the South Korea enables shareholder value to be maximized, we analyzed ownership effects on firm value using pooled ordinary least squares. Empirical results showed that there was a significant positive relation between managerial ownership and firm value. This study also found that there was a significant positive relation between foreign ownership and firm value. We thus show that both managerial ownership and foreign ownership can protect shareholders by positively affecting firm values.

• The Journal of Asian Finance, Economics and Business
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• v.7 no.11
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• pp.647-656
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• 2020

This study empirically examines the effect of ownership structure on bank diversification and risk-taking behavior. The population of this study is based on all commercial banks listed in Bangladesh. Thirty-two conventional commercial banks were randomly selected from thirty-three conventional banks for this study. Data was collected from the annual reports of the concerned banks from 2000 to 2017. To analyze the data, we had applied the two-stage least squares (2SLS) estimator. The results of the analysis show that ownership structure i.e. managerial ownership, institutional ownership, general public ownership, and ownership concentration have a significant negative impact on bank diversification. On the other hand, institutional ownership, managerial ownership, and general public ownership have a significant positive impact on Z-score, and ownership concentration has an insignificant but positive impact on the Z-score of banks in Bangladesh. Therefore, the study opposes the benefits of diversification and promotes ownership structure which is capable of ensuring better financial stability by reducing the probability of risk. The policy-makers especially, Bangladesh banks should evaluate the fact of this study to issue guidelines on corporate governance, bank diversification, and risk-taking behavior of commercial banks.

• The Journal of Asian Finance, Economics and Business
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• v.4 no.3
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• pp.35-43
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• 2017

This paper explores the impact of corporate control, measured by ownership structure, on top-executives' compensation in Japan. According to agency theory, the pay-performance link is expected to be affected by the firm's ownership structure. Using a sample of 4,411 firm-year observations (401 firms for the 11-years period from 2001 to 2011) for Japanese non-financial firms publicly traded on the first section and second section of the Tokyo Stock Exchange (TSE), this study demonstrates that institutional ownership (both financial and corporate) is negatively related to the level of executives' compensation. Such finding is in line with efficient monitoring hypothesis which claims that the presence of institutional shareholders provides direct monitoring over managers, limits managerial self-dealing and curves the increase in top-executives pay. On the other hand, the results also show that managerial ownership is positively related to their compensation which supports managerial power theory hypothesis, i.e. management-controlled firms are more likely to extract more compensation from the business than other firms. Overall, this study confirms that corporate control has significant impact on cash compensation paid to Japanese top-executives after controlling the conventional pay-performance relationship.

• The Korean Journal of Financial Management
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• v.27 no.1
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• pp.89-120
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• 2010

In this paper, we analyse empirically the relations between ownership structure and cash holdings of firms listed on Korea Securities Market and Kosdaq Market of Korea Exchange. The main results of this study can be summarized as follows. Cash holdings increase as large shareholder's equity holdings increase. Cash holdings increase as the difference between first largest shareholder's and second largest shareholder's equity holdings increase, and cash holdings increase as the ownership concentration increase. Managerial ownership exert a non-linear effects on cash holdings. So to speak, at lower level of managerial ownership, managers hold more cash to pursue their own interests at the expense of minority shareholders, but at higher level of managerial ownership, the interests of managers and shareholders are aligned, and also at highest level of managerial ownership, managers hold more cash to pursue their own interests at the expense of minority shareholders. Cash holdings increase larger in owner-controlled firm than in management-controlled firm. These results support the expropriation of minority shareholders hypothesis that large shareholders can extract private benefits from corporate resources under their control at the expense of minority shareholders. This paper contributes to defining information value of large shareholder's equity holdings on cash holdings for a firms' other stakeholders such as investors and creditors, and to strengthening a legal and institutional safeguard for external minority shareholders. Ownership concentration might have negatively affected the evolution of the legal and institutional frameworks for corporate governance and the manner in which economic activity is conducted. It could be a formidable barrier to future policy reform.

• Journal of the Korea Society of Computer and Information
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• v.25 no.7
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• pp.159-165
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• 2020

With respect to the cause of asymmetric cost behavior, there are two streams of the literature. One stream focused on effect of managerial expectation and the other explained using agency system. In this study, we aim to investigate the determinants of asymmetric cost behavior in these streams. We first examine the impact of managerial overconfidence and optimistic bias on asymmetric cost. We also examine ownership ratio as a proxy of the quality of corporate governance effects on asymmetric cost. The results are as follows. First, firms have the anti-sticky asymmetric cost behavior. Second, we find that the firms with managerial optimistic bias mitigate the degree of asymmetric cost. This finding implies that managerial optimism is a factor that alters asymmetric cost behavior. Third, the degree of asymmetric cost is weaker in case of firms with higher manager's ownership. This result provides an important empirical evidence for understanding the role of corporate governance in cost behavior.

• The Journal of Asian Finance, Economics and Business
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• v.7 no.5
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• pp.249-258
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• 2020

This study examines and analyzes the effect of innovation on the price to book value mediated by managerial ownership in Indonesian companies. In order to achieve the goals and objectives, the company increases its value by increasing shareholders. Improving the welfare of shareholders can be done through investment and financial policies, and is reflected in share prices in the capital market. The higher the share price, the better the owner's welfare, and the company's value will also increase. The population of this study is the manufacturing companies - as many as 162 - listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange in 2012-2017. By using a purposive sampling method, 25 companies met the criteria for the sample. The data comes from the companies' annual report taken from the Indonesia Stock Exchange website. The data is further analyzed using partial least square (PLS). The results of the study showed that innovation has a significant effect on price to book value. The companies with high marketing innovation produce high company performance as well. The companies get a commensurate reward from marketing innovation activities to carry out continuous marketing innovations. In addition, managerial ownership does not mediate the relationship between innovation and price to book value.

• The Journal of Asian Finance, Economics and Business
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• v.7 no.8
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• pp.1-13
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• 2020

This study examines the effect of managerial ownership on firm value in capital markets where outside governance mechanisms to discipline managers are weak or non-existent. We hypothesize that strong market forces in the U.S. confound the effect of managerial ownership on firm value, i.e., the convergence of interest argument. We test the hypothesis using data from 112 firms from Singapore Stock Exchange and 205 firms from the Stock Exchange of Thailand prior to the Asian financial crisis in 1997 when the market forces were weak, yet the investor protection was sufficient to prevent outright appropriation from management. For ease of comparison, we use methodologies from studies done on the U.S. sample firms during the same study period as ours. We find that, both in Singapore and Thailand, firm value is a function of managerial ownership, and the relation is of the famous inverted U-shaped. Moreover, the relation is robust under different model specifications. The results from Thai sample, with weaker market forces than in Singapore, lend support to many agency cost hypotheses advanced in the U.S. Our results provide useful implication for investors in emerging and frontier markets where outside governance mechanisms are yet to be fully developed.

• The Journal of Asian Finance, Economics and Business
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• v.7 no.11
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• pp.769-778
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• 2020

The purpose of this study was to examine the role of profitability as a mediating variable in influencing firm value. This study uses a sample of manufacturing companies listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange from 2016 to 2018. The data used is panel data, with data analysis using multiple regression. Based on the Sobel test, profitability plays a role in mediating the effect of firm size on firm value. The effect of firm size on firm value is indirect, however, through profitability. Therefore, the market price of the shares of large-scale companies will increase if the resulting profitability is high. The capital structure and managerial ownership directly influence firm value. The results showed that managerial ownership and firm size had a positive effect on profitability, while capital structure had no effect on profitability. Capital structure and managerial ownership have a negative effect on firm value, while firm size and profitability have a positive effect on firm value. The main finding of this study is that profitability acts as an intervening variable in mediating the relationship between firm size and firm value.