• 제목/요약/키워드: Low Altitude Threat

검색결과 12건 처리시간 0.018초

천안함 폭침 이후 북한의 군사도발 양상과 전망 (Trends and Prospects of N. Korea Military Provocations After the Sinking of ROKS Cheon-an)

  • 김성만
    • Strategy21
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    • 통권34호
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    • pp.58-92
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    • 2014
  • Even after S. Korea took 5.24 Measure(24 May 2014), N. Korea has not stopped raising provocations such as the shelling of Yeonpyeong Island, electronic and cyber attacks. To make matters worse, the communist country lunched long-range missiles(twice) and conducted 3rd nuclear test, escalating tensions which could possibly lead to an all-out war. Korean Government failed to respond properly. However, escalation into an all-out war was deterred by the CFC immediately carrying out its peacetime duty(CODA). The US made a rapid dispatch of its augmentation forces(Aircraft carrier, nuclear-powered submarine, strategic bomber, F-22) to the Korean Peninsula. In recognition of the importance of the Combined Forces Command, since May 2013 the Park Geun-Hye Administration has been pushing ahead with re-postponement of Wartime Operational Control Transfer(which initially meant the disassembling of the CFC as of 1 December 2015) More recently, there has been a series of unusual indicators from the North. Judging from its inventory of 20 nuclear weapons, 1,000 ballistic missiles and biochemical weapons, it is safe to say that N. Korea has gained at least war deterrence against S. Korea. Normally a nation with nuclear weapons shrink its size of conventional forces, but the North is pursuing the opposite, rather increasing them. In addition, there was a change of war plan by N. Korea in 2010, changing 'Conquering the Korean Peninsula' to 'Negotiation after the seizure of the Greater Seoul Metropolitan Area(GSMA)' and establishing detailed plans for wartime projects. The change reflects the chain reaction in which requests from pro-north groups within the South will lead to the proclamation of war. Kim, Jeong-Un, leader of N. Korean regime, sent threatening messages using words such as 'exercising a nuclear preemptive strike right' and 'burning of Seoul'. Nam, Jae-June, Director of National Intelligence Service, stated that Kim, Jung-Un is throwing big talks, saying communization of the entire Korean Peninsula will come within the time frame of 3 years. Kim, Gwan-Jin, Defense Minister, shared an alarming message that there is a high possibility that the North will raise local provocations or a full-fledged war whenever while putting much emphasis on defense posture. As for the response concept of the Korean Government, it has been decided that 'ROK·US Combined Local Provocation Counter-Measure' will be adopted to act against local provocations from the North. Major provocation types include ▲ violation of the Northern Limit Line(NLL) with mobilization of military ships ▲ artillery provocations on Northwestern Islands ▲ low altitude airborne intrusion ▲ rear infiltration of SOF ▲ local conflicts within the Military Demarcation Line(MDL) ▲ attacking friendly ships by submarines. Counter-measures currently established by the US involves the support from USFK and USFJ. In order to keep the sworn promise, the US is reinforcing both USFK and USFJ. An all-out war situation will be met by 'CFC OPLAN5027' and 'Tailored Expansion Deterrence Forces' with the CFC playing a central role. The US augmentation forces stands at 690,000 troops, some 160 ships, 2,000 aircraft and this comprise 50% of US total forces, which is estimated to be ninefold of Korean forces. The CFC needs to be in center in handling both local provocations and an all-out war situation. However, the combat power of S. Korean conventional forces is approximately around 80% of that of N. Korea, which has been confirmed from comments made by Kim, Gwan-Jin, Defense Minister, during an interpellation session at the National Assembly. This means that S. Korean forces are not much growing. In particular, asymmetric capabilities of the North is posing a serious threat to the South including WMD, cyber warfare forces, SOF, forces targeting 5 Northwestern Islands, sub-surface and amphibious assault forces. The presence of such threats urgently requires immediate complementary efforts. For complementary efforts, the Korean Government should consider ① reinforcement of Korean forces; putting a stoppage to shrinking military, acquisition of adequate defense budget, building a missile defense and military leadership structure validity review, ② implementation of military tasks against the North; disciplinary measures on the sinking of ROKS Cheon-an/shelling of Yeonpyeong Islands, arrangement of inter-Korean military agreements, drawing lessons from studies on the correlation between aid for N. Korea, execution of inter-Korean Summit and provocations from the North, and ③ bolstering the ROK·US alliance; disregarding wartime operational control transfer plan(disassembling of CFC) and creation of a combined division.

한반도 풍혈지의 관속식물상과 보전관리 방안 (Floristic study and conservation management strategies of algific talus slopes on the Korean peninsula)

  • 김진석;정재민;김중현;이웅;이병윤;박재홍
    • 식물분류학회지
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    • 제46권2호
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    • pp.213-246
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    • 2016
  • 풍혈지는 여름철에 너덜지대 사면의 암괴 틈에서 찬 공기가 스며 나오며, 또한 결빙현상을 보이는 국소적 저온환경을 형성하는 지역이다. 풍혈지의 국소적인 저온환경은 빙하기에 남하했던 북방계 식물들의 잔존집단이 온대 지역의 해발고도가 낮은 지대에서도 분포하는 것을 가능하게 한다. 본 연구는 한반도에 분포하는 15개소의 주요 풍혈지에 대한 식물상과 식물 종조성, 위협요인 등의 조사를 통하여 풍혈지 식생에 대한 안정적인 보전 계획 수립을 위한 기초자료를 제시하고자 한다. 15개소의 풍혈지에 대한 식물상 조사결과, 풍혈지의 관속식물은 109과 323속 531종 7아종 47변종 1품종 1교잡종, 총 587분류군으로 확인되었다. 이중에서 멸종우려 식물이 8분류군, 한반도 고유종은 26분류군이었고, 식물구계학적 특정식물인 IV-V등급 식물이 31분류군이었다. 기후온난화에 취약한 북방계 식물이 32분류군으로 조사되었고 특히, 한반도내 식물의 수직적 분포 상에서, 주로 아고산대에서 발견되는 애기가물고사리(Woodsia hancockii), 월귤(Vaccinium vitis-idaea), 좀다람쥐꼬리(Huperzia selago), 토끼고사리(Gymnocarpium dryopteris), 한들고사리(Cystopteris fragilis), 흰인가목(Rosa koreana) 등이 해발고도 100-600 m의 풍혈지에서 생육하고 있었다. 풍혈지는 인위적인 교란과 훼손행위에 대해 어떠한 보호조치 없기 때문에 풍혈지의 주요 식물 종들이 지속적으로 소실되어 가고 있다. 풍혈지에 분포하는 생물종 파악을 위해 모든 분류군을 포함한 생물다양성 조사가 실시되어야 한다. 그리고 풍혈지의 안정적인 관리와 생물다양성 보전을 위해 국가차원의 보존계획 수립과 체계적이고 합리적인 관리 방안이 논의되었다.