Influence of Cathepsin D Expression on Prognosis in Non-Small Cell Lung Cancer (Cathepsin D의 발현이 비소세포 폐암의 예후에 미치는 영향)
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- Tuberculosis and Respiratory Diseases
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- v.49 no.1
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- pp.60-71
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- 2000
Backgrounds : Cathepsin D, an aspartic lysosomal proteinase, is believed to be involved in local invasion and metastasis of tumor cells by its proteolytic activity and has been described to be associated with tumor progression and prognosis in some human malignancies including breast cancer. But, its prognostic value for human lung cancer remains to be determined. The purpose of this study is to determine clinicopathological and prognostic significance of cathepsin D expression in non-small cell lung cancer. Method : Using a polyclonal antibody, immunohistochemical analysis of cathepsin D was performed on paraffin embedded sections of tumors obtained surgically from 54 patients with non-small cell lung cancer (37 squamous cell carcinoma, 14 adenocarcinoma, 2 large cell carcinoma, and 1 undifferentiated carcinoma). Results : Eighteen patients (33.3%) showed positive immunoreactivities of cathepsin D in tumor cells. No significant correlation of cathepsin D expression in tumor cells was found in p-stage (surgical-pathologic stage), tumor size, tumor factor, nodal involvement, and differentiation. Of 54 patients, 29 (53.7%) patients showed moderate to massive cathepsin D-positive stromal cells within the tumor tissues, while the rest (46.3%) showed few cathepsin D-positive stromal cells within the tumor tissues. Cathepsin D expression in stromal cells was significantly associated with p-stage in non-small cell lung canær (p=0.031). No significant correlation of the degree of cathepsin D-positive stromal cells was found in tumor size, T -factor, nodal involvement, differentiation Cathepsin D expression status in tumor cells and stromal cells was not significantly associated with prognosis expressed by survival rate. The results of multivariate analyses of variables possibly associated with prognosis showed that nodal involvement was the only independent prognostic factor in all patients. Conclusion : Cathepsin D expression in stromal cells was significantly associated with p-stage in non-small cell lung cancer. However, it was not related to other clinicopathologic features and prognosis, and Cathepsin D expression in tumor was not related to p-stage and prognosis.
Purpose: The purpose of this study is to compare general survival rate and survival rate according to expectable prognostic factors by analyzing the result of treating a patient of squamous cell carcinoma. Materials and Methods: From Mar. 1999 to Feb. 2011, 151 patients were pathologically confirmed as squamous cell carcinoma of limbs and body in our hospital, and among those patients, 51 patients underwent the surgical treatment. This study included 41 patients who underwent the surgical treatment and were followed-up for more than 12 months. The mean age of population was 64.4 years. 31 males and 10 females were included. Wide excision with following skin grafts or flaps for reconstruction (29 cases) was mostly performed, but amputation (12 cases) was also performed for cases with extremities where resection margin was difficult to obtain and cases with neural or vascular invasion. 8 patients underwent chemotherapy or radiotherapy after resection, and 33 underwent the operation only. Stages were classified by AJCC Classification, survival rate was calculated by Kaplan-Meier method and survival rate of groups was compared by Log-rank test. For the expectable prognostic factors related to survival rate, location of primary lesion, cause of disease, pathologic grade, staging, surgical method, additional anticancer therapy were examined and each survival rate was compared. Results: The average follow-up period was 65.2 (12-132) months. Thirty patients survived out of 41 patients till last follow up. The overall survival rate in 5 years was 77%. Three cases (7.3%) had local recurrence, and 7 cases (17.0%) had metastasis. The average period of recurrence from operation was 27 (18-43) months. Possible prognostic factors such as location of primary lesion, cause of disease, pathologic grade, staging, additional anticancer therapy showed no significant difference in survival rates. However, patients with amputation showed significantly lower survival rate than those with wide excision. Conclusion: In analysis the results of treating 41 cases of squamous cell carcinoma, the overall 5-year survival rate was 77%. And, among the several prognostic factors, only the surgical method was significant statistically.
Background: The cyclin D1 gene is one of the most frequently amplified chromosomal regions(11q13) in human carcinomas. In laryngeal and head and neck carcinomas, its overexpression has been shown to be associated with advanced local invasion and presence of lymph node metastases. Cyclin D1 may therefore playa key role in cell growth regulation and tumorigenesis. Lung cancer is a worldwide problem and in many contries it is the most lethal malignancy. As relapse is frequent after resection of early stage non-small cell lung cancer, there is an urgent need to define prognostic factors. Purpose: This study was undertaken to evaluate the prognostic value of the cyclin D1, that is one the G1 cyclins which control cell cycle progression by allowing G1 to S phase transition, on the patients in radically resected non-small cell lung cancer. Method: Total 81 cases of formalin-fixed paraffin-embedded blocks from resected primary non-small cell lung cancer from January 1, 1983 to July 31, 1995 at Hanyang University Hospital were available for both clinical follow-up and immunohistochemical staining using monoclonal antibodies for cyclin D1. Results : The histologic classification of the tumor was based on WHO criteria, and the specimens included 45 squamous cell carcinomas, 25 adenocarcinomas and 11 large cell carcinomas. Cyclin D1 overexpression was noted in 26 cases of 81 cases tested (30.9%). Cyclin D1 expression was not significantly associated with cell types of the tumor, pathological staging and the size of the tumor. But cyclin D1 overexpression was significantly correlated with positive lymph node metastasis(p=0.035). The mean survival duration was
In the late Koryo period, until 14th century, there had been at least two groups of Manchurians who were conferred citizenships; one group was living as an original inhabitant in the coastal area of northeastern part of Korean peninsular, long time ago, and they were over one thousand households. The other was coming down from inland, eastern part of Yoha River, to the area of Tuman River to settle down and they were at least around one hundred and sixty households, including such tribes as Al-tha-ry, Ol-lyang-hap, Ol-jok-hap and others. They were treated courteously, from the early days of Choson dynasty, with governmental policies in an economic, political, and social ways. They were given, for instance, a house, a land, household furniture, and clothes. They were allowed to get marry with a native Korean to settle down. They were educated how to cultivate their lands. It was also possible for them to be given an official position politically or allowed to take a National Civil Official Examination. The fact they could take such an Examination, in particular, means they were treated fairly and equally, because they also had a privilege to improve their social positions through the formal system as much as common people. Two typical families were scrutinized, in this paper, family Chong-hae Lee and family Chon-ju Ju. All of them were successful to settle down with different backgrounds each other. The former were from a headman, Lee Jee-ran, who controlled his tribe, over five hundred households. He was given three titles of a meritorious retainer at the founding of Chosun dynasty, at the retrieval of armies, and an enshrined retainer. His son, Lee Wha-yong, was also given a vassal of merit who kept a close tie successfully with the king's family through a marriage. Upon the foundation of their ancestors, their grandsons, family Lee Hyo-yang and family Lee Hyo-gang, each, had taken solid root as an aristocratic Yang-ban class. The former became a high officer family, generation by generation, while the latter changed into a civil official family through Civil Official Examinations. They lived mainly around Seoul, Kyong-gi Province and some lived in their original places, Ham-kyong Province. Chu-man, the first ancestor, was given a meritorious retainer at the founding of the dynasty and Chu-in was also given a high officer position from the government. They kept living at the original place, Ham-heung, Ham-kyong Province, and then became an outstanding local family there. They began to pass the Civil Official Examinations. After 17th century on the passers were 17 in Civil Official Examinations and 40 were passed in lower civil examinations. The positions in government they attained usually were remonstrance which position was prohibited particularly to NorthWestern people at that time. The Chosun dynasty was open to Machurians widely through the system of envoy, convoy, and naturalization. It was intended to build up an enclosure policy through a friendly diplomatic relation with them against any possible invasion from outside. This is one reason why they were supported fully that much in a various way.
This article focuses on changes in the ginseng industry in the 1930s in areas other than the Government Contract Cultivation (GCC) zones. A major characteristic of the ginseng industry in the 1930s was the rapid increase in the area covered by ginseng gardens: the area was about 212 ha in 1929 and 252 ha in 1930 and 1931 but soared to around 441 ha in 1938. This occurred because the non-GCC areas increased significantly during this period. Until the early 1930s, the ratio of GCC to non-GCC areas was 70:30. By the late 1930s, however, the ratio had changed to 53:47. The reason for this change was that the area of the newly established ginseng gardens in the GCC zones had decreased, while that of the non-GCC ginseng gardens had steadily increased. Due to the Japanese invasion of China, China boycotted red ginseng, and exports were sluggish, so the GCC areas were reduced. On the other hand, the non-GCC ginseng gardens were not affected, and the area they covered steadily increased. As a result, in the 1930s, the ginseng industry outside of the GCC areas grew rapidly. The region that led the growth of the ginseng industry outside of the GCC zone was Jeonbuk. By the late 1930s, Jeonbuk dominated the other provinces and accounted for more than 50% of the non-GCC farming zone. Gyeongbuk and Gangwon-do followed Jeonbuk in terms of ginseng cultivation areas. While Gyeonggi-do, Gyeongnam, and Chungbuk were also active in ginseng cultivation, Jeonnam and Chungnam were not active. In the 1930s, the growth of the ginseng industry outside of the GCC zones was driven by the efforts of ginseng farmers and the support of local governments. An examination of Yecheon-gun in Gyeongbuk, Ganghwa-gun in Gyeonggi, and Jecheon-gun in Chungcheongbuk-do showed that ginseng farmers organized cooperatives as the ginseng industry steadily developed in these regions, and these cooperatives worked systematically to cultivate and sell ginseng. In the case of Ganghwa-gun, activities were carried out to incorporate the GCC zone. The Deoksan Ginseng Association in Jecheon-gun determined that financing for cultivation was key and requested subsidies from the provincial government. Administrative authorities also supported the activities of the ginseng farmers. The activities of the farmers and the support of the administrative authorities together led to the growth of the ginseng industry during this period.
Purpose : Although local recurrence rates of stomach cancer after radiocal surgery have been reported in the range of
Land was originally communized by a community in the primitive society of Korea, and in the age of the ancient society SAM KUK-SILLA, KOKURYOE and PAEK JE-it was distributed under the principle of land-nationalization. But by the occupation of the lands which were permitted to transmit from generation to generation as Royal Grant Lands and newly cleared lands, the private occupation had already begun to be formed. Thus the private ownership of land originated by chiefs of the tribes had a trend to be gradually pervaded to the communal members. After the, SILLA Kingdom unified SAM KUK in 668 A.D., JEONG JEON System and KWAN RYO JEON System, which were the distribution systems of farmlands originated from the TANG Dynasty in China, were enforced to established the basis of an absolute monarchy. Even in this age the forest area was jointly controlled and commonly used by village communities because of the abundance of area and stocked volume, and the private ownership of the forest land was prohibited by law under the influence of the TANG Dynasty system. Toward the end of the SILLA Dynasty, however, as its centralism become weak, the tendency of the private occupancy of farmland by influential persons was expanded, and at the same time the occupancy of the forest land by the aristocrats and Buddhist temples began to come out. In the ensuing KORYO Dynasty (519 to 1391 A.D.) JEON SI KWA System under the principle of land-nationalization was strengthened and the privilege of tax collection was transferred to the bureaucrats and the aristocrats as a means of material compensation for them. Taking this opportunity the influential persons began to expand their lands for the tax collection on a large scale. Therefore, about in the middle of 11th century the farmlands and the forest lands were annexed not only around the vicinity of the capital but also in the border area by influential persons. Toward the end of the KORYO Dynasty the royal families, the bureaucrats and the local lords all possessed manors and occupied the forest lands on a large scale as a part of their farmlands. In the KORYO Dynasty, where national economic foundation was based upon the lands, the disorder of the land system threatened the fall of the Dynasty and so the land reform carried out by General YI SEONG-GYE had led to the creation of ensuing YI Dynasty. All systems of the YI Dynasty were substantially adopted from those of the KORYO Dynasty and thereby KWA JEON System was enforced under the principle of land-nationalization, while the occupancy or the forest land was strictly prohibited, except the national or royal uses, by the forbidden item in KYEONG JE YUK JEON SOK JEON, one of codes provided by the successive kings in the YI Dynasty. Thus the basis of the forest land system through the YI Dynasty had been established, while the private forest area possessed by influential persons since the previous KORYO Dynasty was preserved continuously under the influence of their authorities. Therefore, this principle of the prohibition was nothing but a legal fiction for the security of sovereign powers. Consequently the private occupancy of the forest area was gradually enlarged and finally toward the end of YI Dynasty the privately possessed forest lands were to be officially authorized. The forest administration systems in the YI Dynasty are summarized as follows: a) KEUM SAN and BONG SAN. Under the principle of land-nationalization by a powerful centralism KWA JEON System was established at the beginning of the YI Dynasty and its government expropriated all the forests and prohibited strictly the private occupation. In order to maintain the dignity of the royal capital, the forests surounding capital areas were instituted as KEUM SAN (the reserved forests) and the well-stocked natural forest lands were chosen throughout the nation by the government as BONG SAN(national forests for timber production), where the government nominated SAN JIK(forest rangers) and gave them duties to protect and afforest the forests. This forest reservation system exacted statute labors from the people of mountainious districts and yet their commons of the forest were restricted rigidly. This consequently aroused their strong aversion against such forest reservation, therefore those forest lands were radically spoiled by them. To settle this difficult problem successive kings emphasized the preservation of the forests repeatedly, and in KYEONG KUK DAI JOEN, the written constitution of the YI Dynasty, a regulation for the forest preservation was provided but the desired results could not be obtained. Subsequently the split of bureaucrats with incessant feuds among politicians and scholars weakened the centralism and moreover, the foreign invasions since 1592 made the national land devasted and the rural communities impoverished. It happned that many wandering peasants from rural areas moved into the deep forest lands, where they cultivated burnt fields recklessly in the reserved forest resulting in the severe damage of the national forests. And it was inevitable for the government to increase the number of BONG SAN in order to solve the problem of the timber shortage. The increase of its number accelerated illegal and reckless cutting inevitably by the people living mountainuos districts and so the government issued excessive laws and ordinances to reserve the forests. In the middle of the 18th century the severe feuds among the politicians being brought under control, the excessive laws and ordinances were put in good order and the political situation became temporarily stabilized. But in spite of those endeavors evil habitudes of forest devastation, which had been inveterate since the KORYO Dynasty, continued to become greater in degree. After the conclusion of "the Treaty of KANG WHA with Japan" in 1876 western administration system began to be adopted, and thereafter through the promulgation of the Forest Law in 1908 the Imperial Forests were separated from the National Forests and the modern forest ownership system was fixed. b) KANG MU JANG. After the reorganization of the military system, attaching importance to the Royal Guard Corps, the founder of the YI Dynasty, TAI JO (1392 to 1398 A.D.) instituted the royal preserves-KANG MU JANG-to attain the purposes for military training and royal hunting, prohibiting strictly private hunting, felling and clearing by the rural inhabitants. Moreover, the tyrant, YEON SAN (1495 to 1506 A.D.), expanded widely the preserves at random and strengthened its prohibition, so KANG MU JANG had become the focus of the public antipathy. Since the invasion of Japanese in 1592, however, the innovation of military training methods had to be made because of the changes of arms and tactics, and the royal preserves were laid aside consequently and finally they had become the private forests of influential persons since 17th century. c) Forests for official use. All the forests for official use occupied by government officies since the KORYO Dynasty were expropriated by the YI Dynasty in 1392, and afterwards the forests were allotted on a fixed standard area to the government officies in need of firewoods, and as the forest resources became exhausted due to the depredated forest yield, each office gradually enlarged the allotted area. In the 17th century the national land had been almost devastated by the Japanese invasion and therefore each office was in the difficulty with severe deficit in revenue, thereafter waste lands and forest lands were allotted to government offices inorder to promote the land clearing and the increase in the collections of taxes. And an abuse of wide occupation of the forests by them was derived and there appeared a cause of disorder in the forest land system. So a provision prohibiting to allot the forests newly official use was enacted in 1672, nevertheless the government offices were trying to enlarge their occupied area by encroaching the boundary and this abuse continued up to the end of the YI Dynasty. d) Private forests. The government, at the bigninning of the YI Dynasty, expropriated the forests all over the country under the principle of prohibition of private occupancy of forest lands except for the national uses, while it could not expropriate completely all of the forest lands privately occupied and inherited successively by bureaucrats, and even local governors could not control them because of their strong influences. Accordingly the King, TAI JONG (1401 to 1418 A.D.), legislated the prohibition of private forest occupancy in his code, KYEONG JE YUK JEON (1413), and furthermore he repeatedly emphasized to observe the law. But The private occupancy of forest lands was not yet ceased up at the age of the King, SE JO (1455 to 1468 A.D.), so he prescribed the provision in KYEONG KUK DAI JEON (1474), an immutable law as a written constitution in the YI Dynasty: "Anyone who privately occupy the forest land shall be inflicted 80 floggings" and he prohibited the private possession of forest area even by princes and princesses. But, it seemed to be almost impossible for only one provsion in a code to obstruct the historical growing tendecy of private forest occupancy, for example, the King, SEONG JONG (1470 to 1494 A.D.), himself granted the forests to his royal families in defiance of the prohibition and thereafter such precedents were successively expanded, and besides, taking advantage of these facts, the influential persons openly acquired their private forest lands. After tyrannical rule of the King, YEON SAN (1945 to 1506 A.D.), the political disorder due to the splits to bureaucrats with successional feuds and the usurpations of thrones accelerated the private forest occupancy in all parts of the country, thus the forbidden clause on the private forest occupancy in the law had become merely a legal fiction since the establishment of the Dynasty. As above mentioned, after the invasion of Japanese in 1592, the courts of princes (KUNG BANGG) fell into the financial difficulties, and successive kings transferred the right of tax collection from fisherys and saltfarms to each KUNG BANG and at the same time they allotted the forest areas in attempt to promote the clearing. Availing themselves of this opportunity, royal families and bureaucrats intended to occupy the forests on large scale. Besides a privilege of free selection of grave yard, which had been conventionalized from the era of the KORYO Dynasty, created an abuse of occuping too wide area for grave yards in any forest at their random, so the King, TAI JONG, restricted the area of grave yard and homestead of each family. Under the policy of suppresion of Buddhism in the YI Dynasty a privilege of taxexemption for Buddhist temples was deprived and temple forests had to follow the same course as private forests did. In the middle of 18th century the King, YEONG JO (1725 to 1776 A.D.), took an impartial policy for political parties and promoted the spirit of observing laws by putting royal orders and regulations in good order excessively issued before, thus the confused political situation was saved, meanwhile the government officially permittd the private forest ownership which substantially had already been permitted tacitly and at the same time the private afforestation areas around the grave yards was authorized as private forests at least within YONG HO (a boundary of grave yard). Consequently by the enforcement of above mentioned policies the forbidden clause of private forest ownership which had been a basic principle of forest system in the YI Dynasty entireely remained as only a historical document. Under the rule of the King, SUN JO (1801 to 1834 A.D.), the political situation again got into confusion and as the result of the exploitation from farmers by bureaucrats, the extremely impoverished rural communities created successively wandering peasants who cleared burnt fields and deforested recklessly. In this way the devastation of forests come to the peak regardless of being private forests or national forests, moreover, the influential persons extorted private forests or reserved forests and their expansion of grave yards became also excessive. In 1894 a regulation was issued that the extorted private forests shall be returned to the initial propriators and besides taking wide area of the grave yards was prohibited. And after a reform of the administrative structure following western style, a modern forest possession system was prepared in 1908 by the forest law including a regulation of the return system of forest land ownership. At this point a forbidden clause of private occupancy of forest land got abolished which had been kept even in fictitious state since the foundation of the YI Dynasty. e) Common forests. As above mentioned, the forest system in the YI Dynasty was on the ground of public ownership principle but there was a high restriction to the forest profits of farmers according to the progressive private possession of forest area. And the farmers realized the necessity of possessing common forest. They organized village associations, SONGE or KEUM SONGE, to take the ownerless forests remained around the village as the common forest in opposition to influential persons and on the other hand, they prepared the self-punishment system for the common management of their forests. They made a contribution to the forest protection by preserving the common forests in the late YI Dynasty. It is generally known that the absolute monarchy expr opriates the widespread common forests all over the country in the process of chainging from thefeudal society to the capitalistic one. At this turning point in Korea, Japanese colonialists made public that the ratio of national and private forest lands was 8 to 2 in the late YI Dynasty, but this was merely a distorted statistics with the intention of rationalizing of their dispossession of forests from Korean owners, and they took advantage of dead forbidden clause on the private occupancy of forests for their colonization. They were pretending as if all forests had been in ownerless state, but, in truth, almost all the forest lands in the late YI Dynasty except national forests were in the state of private ownership or private occupancy regardless of their lawfulness.
Just before the Korean War, the total number of the North Korean troops was 198,380, while that of the ROK(Republic of Korea) army troops 105,752. That is, the total number of the ROK army troops at that time was 53.3% of the total number of the North Korean army. As of December 2008, the total number of the North Korean troops is estimated to be 1,190,000, while that of the ROK troops is 655,000, so the ROK army maintains 55.04% of the total number of the North Korean troops. If the ROK army continues to reduce its troops according to [Military Reform Plan 2020], the total number of its troops will be 517,000 m 2020. If North Korea maintains the current status(l,190,000 troops), the number of the ROK troops will be 43.4% of the North Korean army. In terms of units, just before the Korean War, the number of the ROK army divisions and regiments was 80% and 44.8% of North Korean army. As of December 2008, North Korea maintains 86 divisions and 69 regiments. Compared to the North Korean army, the ROK army maintains 46 Divisions (53.4% of North Korean army) and 15 regiments (21.3% of North Korean army). If the ROK army continue to reduce the military units according to [Military Reform Plan 2020], the number of ROK army divisions will be 28(13 Active Division, 4 Mobilization Divisions and 11 Local Reserve Divisions), while that of the North Korean army will be 86 in 2020. In that case, the number of divisions of the ROK army will be 32.5% of North Korean army. During the Korean war, North Korea suddenly invaded the Republic of Korea and occupied its capital 3 days after the war began. At that time, the ROK army maintained 80% of army divisions, compared to the North Korean army. The lesson to be learned from this is that, if the ROK army is forced to disperse its divisions because of the simultaneous invasion of North Korea and attack of guerrillas in home front areas, the Republic of Korea can be in a serious military danger, even though it maintains 80% of military divisions of North Korea. If the ROK army promotes the plans in [Military Reform Plan 2020], the number of military units of the ROK army will be 32.5% of that of the North Korean army. This ratio is 2.4 times lower than that of the time when the Korean war began, and in this case, 90% of total military power should be placed in the DMZ area. If 90% of military power is placed in the DMZ area, few troops will be left for the defense of home front. In addition, if the ROK army continues to reduce the troops, it can allow North Korea to have asymmetrical superiority in military force and it will eventually exert negative influence on the stability and peace of the Korean peninsular. On the other hand, it should be reminded that, during the Korean War, the Republic of Korea was attacked by North Korea, though it kept 53.3% of troops, compared to North Korea. It should also be reminded that, as of 2008, the ROK army is defending its territory with the troops 55.04% of North Korea. Moreover, the national defense is assisted by 25,120 troops of the US Forces in Korea. In case the total number of the ROK troops falls below 43.4% of the North Korean army, it may cause social unrest about the national security and may lead North Korea's misjudgement. Besides, according to Lanchester strategy, the party with weaker military power (60% compared to the party with stronger military power) has the 4.1% of winning possibility. Therefore, if we consider the fact that the total number of the ROK army troops is 55.04% of that of the North Korean army, the winning possibility of the ROK army is not higher than 4.1%. If the total number of ROK troops is reduced to 43.4% of that of North Korea, the winning possibility will be lower and the military operations will be in critically difficult situation. [Military Reform Plan 2020] rums at the reduction of troops and units of the ground forces under the policy of 'select few'. However, the problem is that the financial support to achieve this goal is not secured. Therefore, the promotion of [Military Reform Plan 2020] may cause the weakening of military defence power in 2020. Some advanced countries such as Japan, UK, Germany, and France have promoted the policy of 'select few'. However, what is to be noted is that the national security situation of those countries is much different from that of Korea. With the collapse of the Soviet Unions and European communist countries, the military threat of those European advanced countries has almost disappeared. In addition, the threats those advanced countries are facing are not wars in national level, but terrorism in international level. To cope with the threats like terrorism, large scaled army trops would not be necessary. So those advanced European countries can promote the policy of 'select few'. In line with this, those European countries put their focuses on the development of military sections that deal with non-military operations and protection from unspecified enemies. That is, those countries are promoting the policy of 'select few', because they found that the policy is suitable for their national security environment. Moreover, since they are pursuing common interest under the European Union(EU) and they can form an allied force under NATO, it is natural that they are pursing the 'select few' policy. At present, NATO maintains the larger number of troops(2,446,000) than Russia(l,027,000) to prepare for the potential threat of Russia. The situation of japan is also much different from that of Korea. As a country composed of islands, its prime military focus is put on the maritime defense. Accordingly, the development of ground force is given secondary focus. The japanese government promotes the policy to develop technology-concentrated small size navy and air-forces, instead of maintaining large-scaled ground force. In addition, because of the 'Peace Constitution' that was enacted just after the end of World War II, japan cannot maintain troops more than 240,000. With the limited number of troops (240,000), japan has no choice but to promote the policy of 'select few'. However, the situation of Korea is much different from the situations of those countries. The Republic of Korea is facing the threat of the North Korean Army that aims at keeping a large-scale military force. In addition, the countries surrounding Korea are also super powers containing strong military forces. Therefore, to cope with the actual threat of present and unspecified threat of future, the importance of maintaining a carefully calculated large-scale military force cannot be denied. Furthermore, when considering the fact that Korea is in a peninsular, the Republic of Korea must take it into consideration the tradition of continental countries' to maintain large-scale military powers. Since the Korean War, the ROK army has developed the technology-force combined military system, maintaining proper number of troops and units and pursuing 'select few' policy at the same time. This has been promoted with the consideration of military situation in the Koran peninsular and the cooperation of ROK-US combined forces. This kind of unique military system that cannot be found in other countries can be said to be an insightful one for the preparation for the actual threat of North Korea and the conflicts between continental countries and maritime countries. In addition, this kind of technology-force combined military system has enabled us to keep peace in Korea. Therefore, it would be desirable to maintain this technology-force combined military system until the reunification of the Korean peninsular. Furthermore, it is to be pointed out that blindly following the 'select few' policy of advanced countries is not a good option, because it is ignoring the military strategic situation of the Korean peninsular. If the Republic of Korea pursues the reduction of troops and units radically without consideration of the threat of North Korea and surrounding countries, it could be a significant strategic mistake. In addition, the ROK army should keep an eye on the fact the European advanced countries and Japan that are not facing direct military threats are spending more defense expenditures than Korea. If the ROK army reduces military power without proper alternatives, it would exert a negative effect on the stable economic development of Korea and peaceful reunification of the Korean peninsular. Therefore, the desirable option would be to focus on the development of quality of forces, maintaining proper size and number of troops and units under the technology-force combined military system. The tableau above shows that the advanced countries like the UK, Germany, Italy, and Austria spend more defense expenditure per person than the Republic of Korea, although they do not face actual military threats, and that they keep achieving better economic progress than the countries that spend less defense expenditure. Therefore, it would be necessary to adopt the merits of the defense systems of those advanced countries. As we have examined, it would be desirable to maintain the current size and number of troops and units, to promote 'select few' policy with increased defense expenditure, and to strengthen the technology-force combined military system. On the basis of firm national security, the Republic of Korea can develop efficient policies for reunification and prosperity, and jump into the status of advanced countries. Therefore, the plans to reduce troops and units in [Military Reform Plan 2020] should be reexamined. If it is difficult for the ROK army to maintain its size of 655,000 troops because of low birth rate, the plans to establish the prompt mobilization force or to adopt drafting system should be considered for the maintenance of proper number of troops and units. From now on, the Republic of Korean government should develop plans to keep peace as well as to prepare unexpected changes in the Korean peninsular. For the achievement of these missions, some options can be considered. The first one is to maintain the same size of military troops and units as North Korea. The second one is to maintain the same level of military power as North Korea in terms of military force index. The third one is to maintain the same level of military power as North Korea, with the combination of the prompt mobilization force and the troops in active service under the system of technology-force combined military system. At present, it would be not possible for the ROK army to maintain such a large-size military force as North Korea (1,190,000 troops and 86 units). So it would be rational to maintain almost the same level of military force as North Korea with the combination of the troops on the active list and the prompt mobilization forces. In other words, with the combination of the troops in active service (60%) and the prompt mobilization force (40%), the ROK army should develop the strategies to harmonize technology and forces. The Korean government should also be prepared for the strategic flexibility of USFK, the possibility of American policy change about the location of foreign army, radical unexpected changes in North Korea, the emergence of potential threat, surrounding countries' demand for Korean force for the maintenance of regional stability, and demand for international cooperation against terrorism. For this, it is necessary to develop new approaches toward the proper number and size of troops and units. For instance, to prepare for radical unexpected political or military changes in North Korea, the Republic of Korea should have plans to protect a large number of refugees, to control arms and people, to maintain social security, and to keep orders in North Korea. From the experiences of other countries, it is estimated that 115,000 to 230,000 troops, plus ten thousands of police are required to stabilize the North Korean society, in the case radical unexpected military or political change happens in North Korea. In addition, if the Republic of Korea should perform the release of hostages, control of mass destruction weapons, and suppress the internal wars in North Korea, it should send 460,000 troops to North Korea. Moreover, if the Republic of Korea wants to stop the attack of North Korea and flow of refugees in DMZ area, at least 600,000 troops would be required. In sum, even if the ROK army maintains 600,000 troops, it may need additional 460,000 troops to prepare for unexpected radical changes in North Korea. For this, it is necessary to establish the prompt mobilization force whose size and number are almost the same as the troops in active service. In case the ROK army keeps 650,000 troops, the proper number of the prompt mobilization force would be 460,000 to 500,000.