• Title/Summary/Keyword: Liberalization theory

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The Change of Market Competition After Import Liberalization of Petroleum Products (석유제품 수입자유화 이후 시장경쟁의 변화)

  • Kim, Jin Hyung
    • Environmental and Resource Economics Review
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    • v.12 no.4
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    • pp.637-661
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    • 2003
  • This paper analyzes the impact of import liberalization of petroleum product market in 1997 on the behavior of a domestic industry, regarded as a typical oligopoly. Based on the theory of implicit cartel, two regression equations were formulated and estimated for domestic production and refinery margin using monthly data for the period from Jan. 1994 to June 2003. Estimation results show that not only did domestic production rise sharply but also the refining cost fell substantially throughout 1996 before the actual liberalization of imports, Such a response is clearly consistent with the implicit cartel theory, which suggests that once the difficulty of maintaining a cartel in the future is recognized, the cartel immediately collapses and anticipation of import liberalization can cause immediately lowering market price as well as an immediate expansion of the supply by a domestic industry. However, the significant reduction of refinery cost accompanied by a large contraction in domestic output after the actual implementation of import liberalization can be explained by the collapse of implicit cartel caused by the anticipated liberalization of imports. Thus, import liberalization in the sense of allowing entry of foreign producers into domestic market has seemed to be an effective means to weaken market power and induce more competitive conduct of domestic firms.

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Southern Cone Liberalization: Experiences and Lessons (남미(南美)의 경제자유화(經濟自由化) : 경험(經驗)과 교훈(敎訓))

  • Park, Won-am
    • KDI Journal of Economic Policy
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    • v.12 no.3
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    • pp.125-151
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    • 1990
  • This paper reviews the economic liberalization experiences of the Southern Cone countries and draws some lessons from their experiences. The Southern Cone countries-Chile, Argentina and Uruguay-followed the different sequences in liberalization. Chile implemented the fiscal reform and the following comprehensive trade reform in the beginning of liberalization, but capital controls were maintained until 1979. Argentina and Uruguay placed more emphasis on the financial reform with the goods market reformed afterwards, but the fiscal sector was never reformed in Argentina. Since the serious inflation plagued the Southern Cone countries, they combined the economic liberalization scheme with the economic stabilization programmes which are based on the monetarist model. Although economic situations in the Southern Cone countries are quite different from those of Korea, we can learn many lessons from their experiences. First, the monetary and fiscal policies should consist of strict financial discipline to bring in the stable domestic inflation. Without the domestic stabilization, the financial liberalization could disturb the domestic economy as the capital inflows in particular generate a real exchange rate appreciation. Second, the monetary approach which is based on the full purchasing power parity and perfect capital mobility make stabilization as simple as a matter of the appropriate exchange rate policy and the proper rate of domestic credit creation. The unsuccessful experiences with monetarist stabilization in the Southern Cone countries suggest that the monetarist model cannot make real exchange rate and real interest rate stable with the trade and financial reform. Third, both the theory and practice have not yet provided a precise solution on the optimal sequencing and speed of the goods and financial market. Nonetheless, it seems desirable to keep the real exchange rate and the real interest rate stable by gradually opening up the current account and then the capital account.

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A Study on the Utilizing System of Aquaculture Farms in Japan (일본의 양식어장 이용제도에 관한 연구 -구획어업권을 중심으로-)

  • Song, Jung-Hun
    • The Journal of Fisheries Business Administration
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    • v.41 no.1
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    • pp.53-72
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    • 2010
  • The objects of this study are to consider the current features and the development process of the utilizing system of aquaculture farms in Japan, and to suggest the theoretical basis for improvement of aquaculture system of Korea in the future through the analysis of background of the liberalization theory proposed recently. The aquaculture-fishery system of Japan was begun from the Meiji Era Fishery Act and New Fishery Act of the World war II. A small sum of fishery fee is paid to the fishery cooperative having fishing rights for securing fishing area newly, because the aquaculture of Japan belong to fishery cooperative not individual ownership of union membr of cooperative society, the other words, cultivation fisheries household. In case of Korea, there are several differences with Japan as follows; almost cultivation fisheries household has a individual license, the lisence of fishing rights are recognized as an article, the license of fishing lights are able to do sale. Therefore, it is needed to paid a lots of money for securing fishing area newly. On the other hand, advanced countries in the marine aquaculture such as Norway have reached the stage where the managing abilities of marine aquaculture are similar to those in the manufacturing industry. And the number of large scale aquaculture farms with developed technologies and advanced marketing strategies in those countries is increasing. Considering that the marine aquaculture in Japan under the similar fishery systems of Korea has developed the state-of-the-art management skills or lead to large scale management, it is difficult to expect the decrease in the production costs under the small scale family business in Korea and this will lead to the decreasing competitive advantage over the imported seafood. Therefore marine aquaculture in Korea needs to increase the economy of scale to acquire the competitive advantage.

A Two-level Game Theoretic Approach to the Successful Korea-China FTA Negotiations (2단계 게임이론에 의한 우려나라의 한.중 FTA협상 성공전략)

  • Park, Seung-Lak
    • International Commerce and Information Review
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    • v.13 no.3
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    • pp.511-541
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    • 2011
  • The study analyzes the optimum Korea-China FTA negotiations by utilizing the Putnam's two- level game theoretic approach. According to the Putnam's theory, the size of the win-set depends on the strategies of the Level 1 negotiators. The size of the win-set depends also on the level 2 political institutions and the distribution of power, preferences, and possible conditions among Level 2 constituents. The basic principles for the successful future Korea-China FTA negotiations should be based on comprehensiveness, substantial liberalization and gradual liberalization with consideration of sensitive sectors. This study concludes that mid-level FTA strategy with comprehensive but low tariff reduction would be of best strategy for Korea. This study also suggests the utilization of the EHP(Early Harvest Program) for the successful Korea-China FTA negotiations.

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The Impact of Competition on Universal Service in Korea (경쟁도입이 한국의 보편적 서비스에 미친 영향)

  • Kim, Sung Wook
    • Informatization Policy
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    • v.17 no.4
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    • pp.80-99
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    • 2010
  • A substantial body of theoretical and case study literature exists about the relationship between competition and universal service in developing countries. On the one hand, many scholars have argued that state-owned monopolies in developing countries are not able to mobilize the capital needed for network expansion: the resulting unmet demand for services becomes a motivator for liberalization. On the other hand, the introduction of competition jeopardizes the internal and external subsidies through which the state-owned monopoly kept subscription rates low: the heightened concern about loss of subscribership incentivizes the creation of explicit universal service statutes and funding mechanisms concurrently with or soon after competition is introduced. This paper shows that universal service in Korea had a unique evolutionary path, which did not conform to either of these expectations. From this finding, it reaches the conclusion that the outcomes predicted by theory and observed in the case study literature are not intrinsic to the monopoly condition per se, but derive from the strategic choices made by telecommunications managers, regulators and lawmakers in developing countries.

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The Reorganization of Global Value Chains in East Asia before and after COVID-19

  • Miroudot, Sebastien
    • East Asian Economic Review
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    • v.24 no.4
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    • pp.389-416
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    • 2020
  • This paper provides empirical evidence on the reorganization of GVCs in East Asia, highlighting that structural trends explain a decrease in the fragmentation of production after 2011 but that it is not the result of rising trade costs along the value chain. Using harmonized inter-country input-output tables, the paper first analyzes the global import intensity of production to document changes in the structure of GVCs. It then calculates theory-consistent bilateral trade costs for intermediate and final products using an approach derived from the gravity literature and introduces a new index of cumulative trade costs along the value chain. These data are used to discuss whether the decrease in global imports is the consequence of shifts in demand, efficiency-enhancing strategies of firms or rising trade costs. Between 2011 and 2016, cumulative trade costs have decreased in East Asian GVCs. However, as COVID-19 is likely to intensify trade and investment uncertainties, trade costs could increase in the future. Policies aimed at reducing uncertainties and preserving the gains from trade and investment liberalization will be key in this new environment.

Economic Effects of Eliminating Trade Barriers under Imperfect Competition (불완전경쟁하(不完全競爭下)에서의 무역장벽(貿易障壁) 완화효과(緩和效果))

  • Lee, Hong-gue
    • KDI Journal of Economic Policy
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    • v.14 no.2
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    • pp.29-54
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    • 1992
  • Recent studies on the economic effects of trade liberalization and economic integration have emphasized the significant gains associated with product differentiation and scale economies. Securing access to markets in other countries will make it possible to increase product variety and capture scale economies, thus, expanding the gains from trade. Liberalization is also expected to introduce foreign competition into the previously closed market. Concurrently, the liberalization will improve the competitive market environment for firms selling in the domestic market. Firms will be pressed to either exit or reduce cost. The output per firm, then, will increase due to the exit of rival firms, and the average total cost will decline due to the economies of scale. 'Rationalization' of the production process will eventually follow. This paper addresses the economic effects of (counterfactual) bilateral tariff elimination between Korea and Japan. It computationally assesses the gains from liberalization as well as the resource allocations and welfare effects associated with the tariff reduction. The endogenous determination of the key parameters distinguishes this paper from others. The firm's perceived elasticity of demand and elasticity of substitution in the present model are calibrated to be consistent with the base year data. Korea, Japan, and the rest of the world are modeled explicitly. The sectoral coverage of the model includes twenty-three tradable product categories based on three-digit SITC industries and seven nontradable categories based on one-digit SITC industries. Product categories are also classified into perfectly competitive and imperfectly competitive ones. In the imperfectly competitive industries, product differentiation exists at the firm level, while the perfectly competitive industries are characterized by national product differentiation. The simulation results of bilateral tariff reduction are reported. Tariff elimination tends to increase intra-industry trade flows so that the total amount of exports and imports of both countries expand. Yet, Japan is expected to increase the bilateral trade surplus in the wake of the mutual tariff reduction. Terms-of-trade for Korea will not change, while for Japan it will deteriorate. Equivalent variations reflecting the change in consumer surplus (welfare) will favor Korean consumers. Total output, however, will not change substantially, recording 0.5 and 0.6% for Japan and Korea, respectively. An interesting finding in the analysis is that the gains from increased competition and scale efficiency are not as prevailing as expected in theory.

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Trade Coordination in Free Trade Agreements and Customs Unions

  • Nahm, Sihoon
    • Journal of Korea Trade
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    • v.23 no.3
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    • pp.84-104
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    • 2019
  • Purpose - This paper explains why free trade agreements (FTAs) are more popular than customs unions (CUs) in respect of tariff coordination. Design/methodology - This paper employs an equilibrium theory of trade agreements with tariff coordination. I set up three-country partial equilibrium model with competing exporters. Domestic and exporting firms decide their optimal production under given tariffs and each country levies its tariff under the trade agreements. I found stability of implicit tariff coordination and preference of each country between an FTA and a CU. Findings - I demonstrate that two FTA members can keep their external tariffs higher than separately decided external tariffs by keeping the status-quo. This implicit tariff coordination can benefit each member through trade diversion. In a CU, each member country must have a common optimal external tariff and it must incur costs because each country may seek different external tariffs for their own national welfare. The benefit of implicit coordination in an FTA and the cost of explicit coordination in a CU account for the popularity of the FTA. Originality/value - This paper uses the idea of implicit tariff coordination in trade agreements. In a CU, tariff coordination is explicit and mandatory. All member countries must have a single common external tariff for each good. On the other hand, in an FTA, each country establishes its external tariff with the goal of maximizing its own welfare. However, each country can also coordinate "implicitly" by keeping the status-quo after establishing an FTA.

Change of International Political Order s and International Aviation Orders - From the viewpoint of International Aviation Law and R.O.K- U.S Air Service Agreement - (국제정치와 국제항공의 질서의 변화 - 국제항공법과 한미항공협정을 중심으로 -)

  • Lee, Jong-Sik
    • The Korean Journal of Air & Space Law and Policy
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    • v.20 no.1
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    • pp.109-142
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    • 2005
  • This paper aims to study international political orders and aviational orders since the second World War, to investigate the influences between the two orders, to connect them with the air transportation service agreement between Korea and USA, and to prospect international aviation orders in the future. The first international aviation order after the second World War is built up by international public goods under hegemonic stability theory in the realistic international order. Second order is a kind of cooperation system through the international institutions under the neo-liberalistic international order from the late of 1970s. Third order is the multiple cooperation through the shared epistemology, understanding, and knowledge under the international social constructivism from the 1990s. This paper prospects that international aviation order in the future will be developed through the multiple channels for the civilian users' conveniences and the openness for the users.

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A Comparative Study on the Prohibition of Performance Requirements in International Investment Agreements (국제투자협정에서 「이행요건」 부과금지에 관한 비교연구)

  • Hong, Sung-Kyu
    • Journal of Arbitration Studies
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    • v.29 no.2
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    • pp.35-63
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    • 2019
  • Since imposing Performance Requirements (PRs) on investors have been conducted as a means to protect a host state's domestic industry in the short run, with its effect on improving the international balance of payments, it has been implemented mostly in developing countries. From the viewpoint of investors, however, PRs hinder free competition and investment activities and have the effect of distorting international trade activities; therefore, they are expected to bring detrimental effects on the host state's economic development in the long run. PRs provided by International Investment Agreements (IIAs) and WTO-TRIMs, too, included many abstract regulations which are grounded on the host state's economic efficiency in the past; however, those PRs are gradually being more concretely specified, shifting to a form of prohibition with the goals of increasing the protection on investors and realizing investment liberalization. Accordingly, when Korea freshly concludes IIAs or revises them afterwards, one should focus more on following the points regarding PRs. First, to protect Korean companies' investment activities, it is advantageous to list the contents of prohibited PRs extensively and concretely and create a stipulation. Second, it is necessary to list the contents of the PRs prohibited and add the phrases for prohibiting "any other similar requirements" explicitly, as well so as to cover the PRs that can appear newly. Third, as in the cases associated with PRs, issuable matters are mostly either the range of applying PRs or the conditions of applying them (relevance or detrimental effects); therefore, it is necessary to classify the cases accumulated by issues and analyze them thoroughly. In conclusion, as this study has analyzed the theoretical characteristics of PRs provided in IIAs and related cases and suggests exquisite theory regarding PRs, it not only lays fundamental grounds for follow-up research but also gives useful and practical guidelines for the parties concerned and the arbitrators according to the ISDS procedure.