• 제목/요약/키워드: Law on Maritime Guard

검색결과 23건 처리시간 0.02초

해상에서의 우발적 조우 시 신호 규칙(CUES)의 제한점과 개선을 위한 제언 (Code for Unplanned Encounters at Sea(CUES): Its Limitation and Recommendations for Improvement)

  • 오동건
    • Strategy21
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    • 통권44호
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    • pp.323-351
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    • 2018
  • Adopted in Western Pacific Naval Symposium(WPNS) 2014, Code for Unplanned Encounters at Sea(CUES) has been the most valuable output of WPNS history. Written and suggested by Australian Navy in 1999, the goal of CUES is to decrease the possibility of the naval conflict by establishing the code among international navies in the Western Pacific region. Facing many oppositions and requirement of People's Liberation Army Navy(PLAN) in WPNS 2012 and 2013, but it finally adopted in WPNS 2014, with many changes in detailed provisions. From then, navies in the Western Pacific region have followed CUES to prevent maritime conflicts in the region, CUES, however, sometimes does not work correctly. Contents of CUES is the mixture of the parts of Multinational Maritime Tactical Signal and Maneuvering Book(MTP) and International Regulations for Preventing Collision at Sea 1972(CORLEGs). There are means of radio communications such as frequency and signals, instructions for maneuvering and so on. Thus, it is not a new document for the U.S. Navy and its allies, but it requires training to implicate at sea for navies other than U.S. allies, like PLAN. Lots of provisions in CUES were changed because of the opposition of PLAN, and CUES has many shortcomings and practical limitations. First, since CUES is non-legally binding, and there are no methods to force the naval assets on the sea to follow. Second, CUES is only applied to naval assets; naval ships - warships, naval auxiliaries, and submarines - and naval aircraft. Third, the geographical scope in CUES is not clear. Fourth, there is no provision for submerged submarines. Finally, CUES has no time-based framework or roadmap for training. In this regard, there would be six recommendations for improvement. First, CUES should be reviewed by WPNS or other international institutions, while keeping non-binding status so that WPNS could send signals to the navies which do not answer CUES on the sea. Second, the participation of Maritime Law Enforcements(MLEs) such as coast guard is inevitable. Third, navies would use full text of MTP rather than current CUES, which extracts some parts of MTP. Fourth, CUES needs provisions with respect to submerged submarines, which recognizes as offensive weapons themselves. Fifth, the geographic scope of CUES should be clear. Since there are some countries in which claim that a rock with a concrete structure is their territory, CUES should be applied on every sea including EEZ and territorial seas. Finally, the detailed training plan is required to implicate CUES at sea. Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC) is a good exercise to train CUES, because almost all WPNS member countries except six countries are participating in RIMPAC. CUES is a meaningful document not only for navies but also for nation-states in the region. To prevent escalation of conflict in the region, potentially caused by an unplanned collision at sea, CUES should be applied more strictly. CUES will continue to be in subsequent WPNS and therefore continue to improve in the effectiveness as both an operational and diplomatic agreement.

조어대(센카쿠열도)의 영유권 분쟁과 당사국간 법리에 관한 연구 (Study on the Dispute for the Dominium of Diàoyútái(Senkaku Islands) and Legal Principles between the Countries Concerned)

  • 양희철;김진욱
    • Ocean and Polar Research
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    • 제36권3호
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    • pp.255-276
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    • 2014
  • The dispute between China and Japan regarding $Di\grave{a}oy\acute{u}t\acute{a}i$ is believed to be quite similar to the controversy surrounding Dokdo in terms of historical and post-war processes except for the point that the phenomena of occupation is different with regard to Dokdo. China's claim to $Di\grave{a}oy\acute{u}t\acute{a}i$ is based on historical title and continuous use while the basis of Japan's claim is summarized as preoccupancy of ownerless land. Even though Japan acknowledges that China discovered $Di\grave{a}oy\acute{u}t\acute{a}i$, Japan claims that the act to establish sovereignty over the island from the standpoint of International Law was not taken by China. However, at that time, effective occupation was not an essential prerequisite for the acquisition of a territory. That is to say, from a legal perspective, the legal right for an area could be established based on the discovery of the land, and so it is thought that Japan is applying the current criteria of International Law in a manner that is inappropriate. When we review the post-war process, the San Francisco Peace Treaty does not directly mention $Di\grave{a}oy\acute{u}t\acute{a}i$. But based on the said treaty, we can note that Japan gave up all rights for the southern area that is north of the boundary line that equates to latitude $29^{\circ}$ and that includes the Ryuku Islands and $Di\grave{a}oy\acute{u}t\acute{a}i$. Of course, the provisions for the territory in the San Francisco Peace Treaty and its disposal are not the final factor for the judgment regarding dominium of $Di\grave{a}oy\acute{u}t\acute{a}i$. However, it seems clear that Japan's attitude and interpretation regarding the issues of $Di\grave{a}oy\acute{u}t\acute{a}i$, the Kuril Islands and Dokdo is problematic.

해적사건 대응을 위한 무장경비원제도 도입방안에 관한 연구 (A Study on Piracy Matters and Introduction of the Privately Contracted Armed Security Personnel on Board Ships)

  • 노호래
    • 시큐리티연구
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    • 제41호
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    • pp.293-326
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    • 2014
  • 최근 전세계적으로 해적발생 건수는 꾸준히 증가하고 있을 뿐만 아니라 지역도 점차 확대되고 있다. 생계형 해적활동에서 대규모 조직화 지능화 산업화되면서 해적피해로 인한 손실이 연간 10조원을 상회하고 있다. 선박에 승선하는 무장경비원과 그를 고용한 사설해상보안회사에 대한 제도 및 관리방안에 대한 연구는 매우 부족한 편이다. 이와 같은 무장 경비원에 대한 법적 공백상태를 해소하고, 미비점을 정비하며, 국제 해상안전과 대한민국 국민 및 선박의 안전을 도모하기 위하여 해상무장경비원제도의 도입은 매우 시급한 과제라고 아니할 수 없다. 이에 따라 본 논문에서는 해적의 실태를 분석하고 무장경비원의 활동상을 검토하여 제도적인 도입방안을 모색해 보고자 한다. 선박승선 무장경비원제도 도입방안은 어떠한 방향으로 되어야 합리적인가에 대한 진지한 검토가 필요하다고 생각된다. 우리나라의 선박에 승선하는 무장경비원에 대한 정책은 무엇인가?, 이 무장경비원 사용을 인정한다면 법적 근거는 무엇인가?, 법적 근거가 없다면 신중한 검토를 통하여 마련해야 한다. 특히 선박승선 무장경비원은 총기를 사용할 수 있다는 점에서 하는 특수경비원과 유사한 점이 있다. 해양수산부의 안은 경찰청 소관 법령인 경비업법상의 특수경비원제도와 충돌하므로 이에 대한 새로운 법률을 제정한다기 보다는 경비업법에 선박에 승선하는 무장경비원제도를 신설하는 방안이 합리적인 방안이 아닌가 생각된다. 그리고 그 관리기관은 해양수산부가 아니라 무기관리의 전문성을 가지고 현장에서 활동하는 국민안전처의 해양경비안전본부가 되어야 합리적이고 생각된다.

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