• Strategy21
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• s.44
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• pp.323-351
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• 2018

Adopted in Western Pacific Naval Symposium(WPNS) 2014, Code for Unplanned Encounters at Sea(CUES) has been the most valuable output of WPNS history. Written and suggested by Australian Navy in 1999, the goal of CUES is to decrease the possibility of the naval conflict by establishing the code among international navies in the Western Pacific region. Facing many oppositions and requirement of People's Liberation Army Navy(PLAN) in WPNS 2012 and 2013, but it finally adopted in WPNS 2014, with many changes in detailed provisions. From then, navies in the Western Pacific region have followed CUES to prevent maritime conflicts in the region, CUES, however, sometimes does not work correctly. Contents of CUES is the mixture of the parts of Multinational Maritime Tactical Signal and Maneuvering Book(MTP) and International Regulations for Preventing Collision at Sea 1972(CORLEGs). There are means of radio communications such as frequency and signals, instructions for maneuvering and so on. Thus, it is not a new document for the U.S. Navy and its allies, but it requires training to implicate at sea for navies other than U.S. allies, like PLAN. Lots of provisions in CUES were changed because of the opposition of PLAN, and CUES has many shortcomings and practical limitations. First, since CUES is non-legally binding, and there are no methods to force the naval assets on the sea to follow. Second, CUES is only applied to naval assets; naval ships - warships, naval auxiliaries, and submarines - and naval aircraft. Third, the geographical scope in CUES is not clear. Fourth, there is no provision for submerged submarines. Finally, CUES has no time-based framework or roadmap for training. In this regard, there would be six recommendations for improvement. First, CUES should be reviewed by WPNS or other international institutions, while keeping non-binding status so that WPNS could send signals to the navies which do not answer CUES on the sea. Second, the participation of Maritime Law Enforcements(MLEs) such as coast guard is inevitable. Third, navies would use full text of MTP rather than current CUES, which extracts some parts of MTP. Fourth, CUES needs provisions with respect to submerged submarines, which recognizes as offensive weapons themselves. Fifth, the geographic scope of CUES should be clear. Since there are some countries in which claim that a rock with a concrete structure is their territory, CUES should be applied on every sea including EEZ and territorial seas. Finally, the detailed training plan is required to implicate CUES at sea. Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC) is a good exercise to train CUES, because almost all WPNS member countries except six countries are participating in RIMPAC. CUES is a meaningful document not only for navies but also for nation-states in the region. To prevent escalation of conflict in the region, potentially caused by an unplanned collision at sea, CUES should be applied more strictly. CUES will continue to be in subsequent WPNS and therefore continue to improve in the effectiveness as both an operational and diplomatic agreement.

• Ocean and Polar Research
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• v.36 no.3
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• pp.255-276
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• 2014

The dispute between China and Japan regarding $Di\grave{a}oy\acute{u}t\acute{a}i$ is believed to be quite similar to the controversy surrounding Dokdo in terms of historical and post-war processes except for the point that the phenomena of occupation is different with regard to Dokdo. China's claim to $Di\grave{a}oy\acute{u}t\acute{a}i$ is based on historical title and continuous use while the basis of Japan's claim is summarized as preoccupancy of ownerless land. Even though Japan acknowledges that China discovered $Di\grave{a}oy\acute{u}t\acute{a}i$, Japan claims that the act to establish sovereignty over the island from the standpoint of International Law was not taken by China. However, at that time, effective occupation was not an essential prerequisite for the acquisition of a territory. That is to say, from a legal perspective, the legal right for an area could be established based on the discovery of the land, and so it is thought that Japan is applying the current criteria of International Law in a manner that is inappropriate. When we review the post-war process, the San Francisco Peace Treaty does not directly mention $Di\grave{a}oy\acute{u}t\acute{a}i$. But based on the said treaty, we can note that Japan gave up all rights for the southern area that is north of the boundary line that equates to latitude $29^{\circ}$ and that includes the Ryuku Islands and $Di\grave{a}oy\acute{u}t\acute{a}i$. Of course, the provisions for the territory in the San Francisco Peace Treaty and its disposal are not the final factor for the judgment regarding dominium of $Di\grave{a}oy\acute{u}t\acute{a}i$. However, it seems clear that Japan's attitude and interpretation regarding the issues of $Di\grave{a}oy\acute{u}t\acute{a}i$, the Kuril Islands and Dokdo is problematic.

• Korean Security Journal
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• no.41
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• pp.293-326
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• 2014

Piracy is a worldwide issue, but the deteriorating security situation in the seas off Somalia, the Gulf of Aden and the wider Western Indian Ocean between 2005 and 2012 and in the increasing number of attacks in the Gulf of Guinea are a major problem. The depth of concern for the problem internationally is amply demonstrated by the levels of co-operation and coordination among naval and other forces from several countries that have assembled in the west Indian Ocean region and the Gulf of Aden to escort ships carrying humanitarian aid to Somalia and to protect vulnerable shipping. Notwithstanding this unprecedented effort, the vast sea area in which the pirates now operate makes it difficult to patrol and monitor effectively, particularly with the limited resources available. More resources, in the form of naval vessels and aircraft, are needed and at every opportunity the IMO encourages Member Governments to make greater efforts to provide the additional naval, aerial surveillance and other resources needed through every means possible. IMO provide interim guidance and recommendations to be taken into account when considering the use of PCASP(privately contracted armed security personnel) if and when a flag State determines that such a measure would be lawful and, following a full risk assessment, appropriate. The interim guidance and recommendations of IMO are not intended to endorse or institutionalize the use of armed guards. Therefore, they do not represent any fundamental change of policy by the Organization in this regard. It is for each flag State, individually, to decide whether or not PCASP should be authorized for use on board ships flying their flag. If a flag State decides to permit this practice, it is up to that State to determine the conditions under which authorization will be granted. Therefore, Korea should be introduced rationally PCASP for safe shipping. PCASP on board ships is much the same to special guard personnel of security services industry act. Act plan of Oceans and fisheries ministry on PCASP collides with special guard personnel system of National Police Agency. Rather than new law making, PCASP regukations have to be included in security services industry act. Management Agency of PCASP is to not Oceans and fisheries ministry, but Central Headquarters Korea Coast Guard of Public Safety and Security Ministry because of specialty and closely connection.