• Journal of Distribution Science
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• v.20 no.3
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• pp.53-58
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• 2022

Purpose: Controlling and minority shareholders sometimes have conflicting interests. Controlling shareholders who do not have adequate monitoring can exhibit a strong tendency to maximize their personal wealth. In this case, cash holdings can be the easiest means for them to pursue their personal interests. This study examined whether the largest shareholder's ownership proportion affected the speed at which firms adjust their cash holdings to target levels in Korean distribution and service companies. Research design, data, and methodology: The study uses regression analysis to examine 834 firm-year samples listed on the KOSPI between 2013 and 2018 in the distribution and service sectors. Results: The largest shareholder's ownership is positively related to a firm's cash holdings adjustment speed. That is, the larger the largest shareholder's ownership, the faster the firm adjusts its cash holdings to achieve the target level. Conclusions: This study contributes to the literature by providing evidence that the cash holdings adjustment speed in Korean service and distribution companies is affected by the largest shareholder's ownership. As the agency problem between controlling and minority shareholders in Korea is a major issue, minority owners' sensitivity to agency costs may help restrict controlling owners' ability to maximize their personal wealth.

• The Korean Journal of Financial Management
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• v.27 no.1
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• pp.89-120
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• 2010

In this paper, we analyse empirically the relations between ownership structure and cash holdings of firms listed on Korea Securities Market and Kosdaq Market of Korea Exchange. The main results of this study can be summarized as follows. Cash holdings increase as large shareholder's equity holdings increase. Cash holdings increase as the difference between first largest shareholder's and second largest shareholder's equity holdings increase, and cash holdings increase as the ownership concentration increase. Managerial ownership exert a non-linear effects on cash holdings. So to speak, at lower level of managerial ownership, managers hold more cash to pursue their own interests at the expense of minority shareholders, but at higher level of managerial ownership, the interests of managers and shareholders are aligned, and also at highest level of managerial ownership, managers hold more cash to pursue their own interests at the expense of minority shareholders. Cash holdings increase larger in owner-controlled firm than in management-controlled firm. These results support the expropriation of minority shareholders hypothesis that large shareholders can extract private benefits from corporate resources under their control at the expense of minority shareholders. This paper contributes to defining information value of large shareholder's equity holdings on cash holdings for a firms' other stakeholders such as investors and creditors, and to strengthening a legal and institutional safeguard for external minority shareholders. Ownership concentration might have negatively affected the evolution of the legal and institutional frameworks for corporate governance and the manner in which economic activity is conducted. It could be a formidable barrier to future policy reform.

• Journal of Digital Convergence
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• v.20 no.1
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• pp.41-46
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• 2022

Chinese stock market often rises and falls sharply. The impact of the stock price crash risk has become a hot research field to maintain financial stability. This study starts from the perspective of the proportion of largest shareholders holding shares, and studies whether largest shareholders have more incentive to supervise management and reduce self-interest behavior of management. We use the data of Chinese listed companies from 2009 to 2019 as a sample, and study the relationship between largest shareholders and share price crash risk. Empirical research shows that the higher the proportion of largest shareholders of state-owned enterprise, the company's stock price crash risk can be significantly reduced. This study suggests that the higher the share of the largest shareholder, the lower the opportunistic behavior of managers and that information asymmetry between the company and the shareholders can be alleviated.

• Asia-Pacific Journal of Business Venturing and Entrepreneurship
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• v.16 no.3
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• pp.145-158
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• 2021

The purpose of this study is to examine the influence of the ownership structure of unlisted firms on KOSDAQ listing. There are few studies analyzing the characteristics of listing success based on ownership structure. For startup executives, there is not enough data to refer to the ownership structure that can increase the possibility of listing. This paper examines the effects of ownership structure on IPO success through comparison between listed successful and failed companies among the companies in application for KOSDAQ listing eligibility review. The major findings are as follows; (1) Venture capital investment and shareholding have a statistically positive effect on the success of KOSDAQ listing. This results indicate that the venture capital's investment alleviate the problem of information asymmetry, and it is a valid signal for market participants. The result means the role of venture capital seems to be important when companies are listed on the KOSDAQ. (2) The largest shareholder's stake has an inverted-U shape relationship with listing success. In other words, the ownership concentration mitigates moral hazard problem, which leads to listing success. However, if the ownership concentration exceeds a certain level, the chances of success in listing will decrease due to concerns over the pursuit of private interests. The result suggests that the largest shareholder's stake reduce agency problem. This study academically contributes to the existing literature by demonstrating the ownership structure affects IPOs, and explaining the results based on agent theory and signal theory. Our results provide practical implications for companies preparing for an IPO on the KOSDAQ.

• Journal of Korea Technology Innovation Society
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• v.20 no.1
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• pp.239-270
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• 2017

This paper examines the relationship between ownership structure and the intensity of R&D expenditures of a firm by analyzing the panel data composed of 553 manufacturing firms in KSE(Korea Stock Exchange) and KOSDAQ listed firms for the period of 2007-2014. The major findings are as follows; (1) Regarding the relationship between CEO stockholding and R&D intensity, we find the inverted-U shape relationship in KOSDAQ firms, consistent with the theoretical discussion and empirical studies on U.S. firms. The result suggests that management stockholding reduces agency problem at the R&D margin. On the contrary, the insignificant result in KSE firms seems to be due to the scant stockholding of most 'non-owner' CEOs. (2) Regarding the relationship between the largest shareholder's portion and R&D intensity, KSE firms exhibit negatively significant relationship, suggesting the existence of serious agency problem between the largest shareholder and the minor shareholders. This agency problem seems to be alleviated in KOSDAQ firms mainly because the founders with technology expertise are still in charge of the business. (3) Foreign investors seem to fail in effectively encouraging R&D expenditures in either KSE or KOSDAQ listed firms. This study contributes to the existing literature by showing for the first time that ownership structure affects R&D activities in different ways between KSE and KOSDAQ firms.

• Journal of Technology Innovation
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• v.22 no.2
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• pp.157-183
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• 2014

This paper examines how the concentration of ownership in firms influences the R&D investment decision and whether the type of a firm's management (i.e, the owner-manager or professional manger) differentiates the relationship between the ownership concentration and R&D investments by using data of Korean pharmaceutical companies between 2004 and 2008. The results show that the share of the largest shareholder and R&D investment have an inverted U-shaped relationship, and whether a CEO is an owner or a professional manager affects the curvature of the inverted U-shaped relationship. Specifically, when a firm's CEO is a professional manager and the share of his stock is small, increase in the CEO's share increases the R&D investment in the larger amount than when a firm's CEO is an owner. This is because the increase in ownership reduces agency cost; However, when the share of his stock is large, the increase in CEO's share decreases R&D investment in the larger amount than when a firm's CEO is an owner. This is because a professional manager gets concerned over excessive risk exposure more than an owner-manager does.

• Korea Trade Review
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• v.46 no.3
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• pp.65-79
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• 2021

This paper investigates how corporate governance characteristics are related to long-term corporate survival in an emerging economy. We used the data of 311 companies listed on the Korean Stock Exchange (KSE) in 1979 and examined the survival chances of those companies through the IMF crisis in 1998, upon governance characteristics that are expected to increase long-term strategic orientations. We utilized Cox regression model for the analysis. The results indicate that firms with particular governance characteristics that may be tied to CEO's long-term orientations show higher long-term survivability. Specifically, the probability of a firm's long-term survival is increased when founding family ownership is sustained, the company ownership is concentrated, and the CEO is the largest shareholder. This study has significance in that it is one of initial tries to examine the impact of corporate governance on long-term corporate survival with large scale statistical analysis. Also, the study findings provide some clues as to why the portion of family firms in emerging economies is continuously increased, thus providing meaningful insights to corporate governance literature.

• Asia-Pacific Journal of Business
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• v.14 no.1
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• pp.131-148
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• 2023

Purpose - Since the 2020s, the management philosophy of Chinese firms' ESG has been rapidly established under the leadership of the Chinese government. We empirically analyze the ESG characteristics and effects on corporate value of Chinese firms. Design/methodology/approach - Using OLS and random effect panel regression analysis, we identify ESG determinants. In analyzing the impact on corporate value, likewise a large number of literatures, we adopt a 2SLS methodology using instrumental variables in the reason of endogeneity between ESG and firm value. We analyze using the G2SLS methodology, which is improving the efficiency of the estimation coefficients along with 2SLS. Findings - We find that ESG ratings are high in state-owned and foreign capital invested companies, ESG ratings are low in companies with a high proportion of non-floating stocks which implies information asymmetry. However, there are no significance in the institutional investor's, the major 10 largest shareholders' and manager's ownership. Furthermore, we can support most of the hypotheses that ESG ratings will be high in companies with high management performance. ESG ratings are significantly higher in companies with high ROA, rich in cash asset, low debt ratio, and large size. we strongly support the hypothesis that the higher the ESG rating, the higher the firm value, and ESG has a moderating effect on state-owned companies, non-floating shares, the ownership of institutional investors, manager, and the 10 major shareholder. In particular, state-owned companies, the proportion of non-floating shares, and the ownership of the 10 major shareholders have a negative impact on firm value, however, ESG attenuates this negative effect. Research implications or Originality - This study looks forward to enhancing our understanding of ESG characteristics in East Asia.

• The Journal of the Korea Contents Association
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• v.22 no.4
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• pp.314-323
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• 2022

This study examines the effecs of National Pension Service blockholders on accounting conservatism. The sample consists of 10,117 non-banking firm-years listed in Korea Stock Exchange(KOSPI) during the period 2011 to 2018. The results of this study are as follows. First, it was found that companies in which the National Pension Service as a major shareholder hold more than 5% of the shares are less prone to conservative accounting treatment than those that do not. Second, such a negative relationship between investment by the National Pension Service and conservative accounting was consistently found even when the investment period of the National Pension Service was divided into short-term (less than 1 year) and long-term (more than 3 years). It is expected that the National Pension Service, the largest institutional investor in Korea, will be able to carry out meaningful management control activities on investment companies. As the monitoring function of the National Pension Service works effectively in the capital market, agency costs are reduced, and investors' demands for corporate conservative accounting have decreased.