• 분석과 대안
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• 제5권1호
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• pp.59-85
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• 2021

中国的公共外交在与韩国和台湾等周边国家地区发展关係方面有着很大的贡献。但当东北亚地区发生巨大的秩序变动或与台湾和韩国发生政治安保矛盾时,中国的公共外交却无法发挥缓解紧张关係并提供解决方案的角色。为什么中国公共外交无法在缓解与周边国家的政治安保矛盾中充分发挥其作用？本研究着重于中国的体制特性会对公共外交的目标,战略以及行为人和行为所带来的影响。具体来说,嚮往着与西方国家相反的政治价值与体制的中国通过公共外交所追求的目标以及战略的确与众不同。台湾和韩国以及其他东北亚的周边国家都有着迥然不同的体制。因此,为了在这些国家地区推动公共外交,通常都会利用彼此共有的歷史文化议题。这些特征可以视为说明中国公共外交在政治安保矛盾方面弱点的主要关键。不仅如此,以中国权威主义的政治以及国家-社会关係为由,也可说明中国一丝不乱并具系统性的中国公共外交推进体制以及成果。但另一方面,本论文也会提出为什么中国公共外交在与周边国家发生的政治安保矛盾方面无法有效地起缓衝作用的原因。本研究以此分析框架为基础,并探讨上文所提研究问题的答案。

• 수산경영론집
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• 제26권2호
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• pp.53-74
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• 1995

The purpose of this paper is to compare China's and Korea's marine fisheries industries in order to present the main features of China's marine fisheries and show the comparative advantages they have in production. The results indicate that China's marine fisheries have the following features. (1) The marine proportion of the fisheries industry economic activity is less than 60%. Fishing is 71.3% of that marine activity. (2) The production trends of marine fisheries history in China can be classified as follows: 1) an early growth period, 2) a deliberation/consolidation period, 3) a second growth period, 4) a third growth period, and 5) a fourth growth period. The growth rate has rapidly increased recently. (3) Fish production is over 70% of marine fishing fisheries, the next major product is crustacea. The production of shellfish occupies over 70% of marine aquaculture, seaweed production however, is only 22% of total marine aquaculture. (4) The licensed area for marine aquaculture in China is 586.3 ha and that area is 5.4 times larger than that of Korea. The allotted area for shellfish aquaculture is 60% of marine aquaculture, production areas of crustaceans occupy 27.3%, fish has 7 1%, and seaweed production only 5.7% of allocated marine aquaculture areas. (5) The proportion of power vessels for marine fisheries of China's total power vessel fleet is around 65%, and the marine fisheries portion of non - powered vessels constitutes only 12%. The highest proportion of power vessels engaged in marine fisheries activities is between 10 tonnes to 100 tonnes. (6) The portion of marine fishery workers of all fishery industry employees is 22%, and 70% of them are full - time workers. Of marine fishery workers, 64% are in the fishing sector, 22%, aquaculture workers, and the number of employees in marine fisheries is increasing every year. The analysis of China's fishery industry in the production competitiveness indicates as follows : (1) The licensed areas in marine aquaculture, number of fishing vessels, number of marine fishing workers in China's fishery industry are much more than those of Korea's. Therefore China is much more competitive than Korea in the quantity of production side. However, licensed areas for seaweed aquaculture are more extensive in Korea than China. In China, the number of power vessels of between 10 tonnes and 100 tonnes, the licensed shellfish aquaculture areas, and the number of fishing workers within the fisheries industry are much more than those of Korea. (2) It is estimated that the licensed areas in marine aquaculture, number of medium sized power vessels, number of marine fishery workers will be increased as the quantity of production factors grow in China. (3) At present, yield per Ha. in marine cultures is very low in China. Therefore it is estimated that aquaculture techniques have only been diffused recently in China. Yield of fish per Ha especially is much lower than that of Korea. So the level of aquaculture techniques seems much lower than that of Korea. (4) China is behind Korea in production technique, however the number of HP per boat in China is lower than that of Korea. Therefore, China is much more competitive than Korea in Costs. (5) Average fish catches per marine fishery worker in China is only 1/3 that of Korea's, and average marine aquaculture production in China is only 1/2 that of Korea. Therefore we can say Korea is more competitive than China in efficiency. The average income of marine fishery workers in China is higher that that of other Chinese industries. However, the competitiveness of the fisheries industry in China will be increased as more capital is invested and advanced techniques are developed.

• 한국지진공학회:학술대회논문집
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• 한국지진공학회 1998년도 추계 학술발표회 논문집 Proceedings of EESK Conference-Spring 1998
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• pp.222-227
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• 1998

• Journal of Korea Trade
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• 제27권2호
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• pp.61-76
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• 2023

Purpose - The digital service trade has become an important driver of the global service trade. The main purpose of this study is to explore the influencing factors of digital service exports from China and Korea to RCEP sample countries respectively, and to comprehensively study the export potential of China and Korea to RCEP countries, so as to provide theoretical guidance and a decision-making reference to promote digital service trade exports and digital economy development in China and Korea. Design/methodology - First, the stochastic frontier gravity model was improved by introducing nonefficiency factors affecting digital services trade, extending the gravity model of traditional services trade exports to digital services trade exports. Secondly, the panel data of China and Korea for the eight sample countries of RCEP from 2011 to 2021 were adopted for the empirical analysis of digital service export potential by a stochastic frontier model. Findings - China's economic growth plays a role in increasing China's digital service trade exports, while Korea's economic growth does not play a significant role in increasing Korea's digital service trade exports. However, the economic growth of trading partner countries can play a significant role in boosting the digital service trade in both China and Korea, and comparison shows that Korea has higher resilience in the digital services trade than China. In addition, the market size of target countries plays a positive role in promoting the digital service trade exports of both China and Korea, and the increase in the value-added share of services in target countries will lead to a decrease in the digital service trade exports of both China and Korea. Originality/value - This study is innovative in terms of research perspective and method. Academic research on the export potential of international trade has been extensive, but most studies are based on the perspective of the goods trade, fewer studies are based on the perspective of the service trade, and there are almost no studies based on the perspective of digital service trade. There is a gap based on the comparative analysis of the export potential of the digital service trade between China and Korea. This study extends the gravitational model of traditional service trade exports to digital service trade exports to comparatively analyze the export potential of China and Korea to RCEP countries. This study addresses this limitation by analyzing a comparative analysis of the digital service trade export potential of China and Korea.

• Strategy21
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• 통권31호
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• pp.120-141
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• 2013

Korea, China, and Japan forms triangle structure which mixed complicatedly on the history and maritime territorial disputes. Nationalism lies on the basis of triangle structure, and it is a main factor which increase tension and conflicts among three countries. Considering dynamics of changing nationalism circumstance, Ieodo issue needs to prepare active countermeasures which considers cope with nationalism confrontations. The aim of this article is suggests preparations of active countermeasures cope with nationalism provocative actions. First, I will specify nationalism as a factor of territorial dispute, and review characters of Ieodo issue. Second, I will analyse China's nationalism to Ieodo through analysis of China's media contents and coverage trend of Ieodo issue (2006~2008). I will suggest necessity of active defense measures coup with China's nationalism, basis of these analysis. As a result, China's nationalism might be a criterion which measures of China's desire for Ieodo. Stimulating Ieodo coverage of China's state media can be a criterion which predicts China governments's for Jurisdiction of Ieodo. We need active measures coup with China's nationalism Which evolves into a much more bold and assertive.

• 한국과학교육학회지
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• 제21권5호
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• pp.924-943
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• 2001

The purpose of the study is to analyze and compare the primary science curricula of Korea, China, and Japan. Science textbooks for Korea and China and national science curriculum guides for Korea and Japan were analyzed in terms of the scope and sequence of the topics. The number of primary science topics dealt with is greatest in China, followed by Korea, then Japan. In addition to the wide range of topics, the Chinese curriculum also shows more in-depth coverage of topics. On the contrary, the Japanese curriculum has the least number of topics and shallowest depth of coverage. Korea seems to be in the middle between China and Japan. The similarities of the curricula in these East Asian countries is greatest between Korea and China. and the least between China and Japan. The similarities between Korea and Japan is somewhere in the middle. Korean primary science curriculum shows a comparatively even distribution of topics across grades. A relatively smaller number of sub-topics are introduced at each grade level, especially in the area of earth science and physics. On the contrary, in the Chinese curriculum, sub-topics tend to be concentrated at a certain grade level, thus major topics are dealt with in a grade or two. The Japanese science curriculum has fewer topics than those of the other countries, and generally one or two sub-topics appeared in a grade or two.

• 안보군사학연구
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• 통권8호
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• pp.169-238
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• 2010

The year 2010 is the 60th anniversary commemorating the Korean War. China intervened in the Korean War with the logics such as "To Resist the U.S.'s Aggression and Aid North Korea," "Save Endangered Home & defend Nation," and "If the Lips Are Gone, the Teeth Will Be Exposed to the Cold or If One of Them Falls, the Other is in Danger." However, China had a deep and long connection with North Korea through 1st Chinese Civil War, war against Japan imperialism, and 2nd Chinese Civil War. China has consulted with Kim Il-sung on his invasion of South Korea at the initial stage of development and played a casting vote role in the execution of the invasion plan. During the Korean War, the PLA supported the North Korea's regime by its action, and made the Korea Peninsula divide into two semi-permanently. Even after the war, China continues to maintain relations with North Korea by helping North Korea build the Kim Il-sung's Kingdom. Currently, whenever any issue related to North Korea rises in the international society, China definitely gets involved in those issues and exercises its power. Conditionally 'either armed aggression or, and wartime' in North Korea, China would follow the "Clause of Military Auto Intervention." In addition, China is very likely to establish refugee camps for North Koreans in the Northeastern-Three-Province and to provide rear bases or guerrilla camps for pro-Chinese sects. Furthermore, voluntarily playing a role as spokesman of North Korean Regime in the international society, China will exercise enormous influence on the reunification of the Korean Peninsula.

• 통상정보연구
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• 제6권3호
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• pp.373-384
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• 2004

While the bilateral trade volume between China and U.S. has been growing rapidly, the trade deficits of U.S. to China has also been expanding. This growing trade deficit of U.S. to China has several reasons: the increase of foreign direct investment to China, the transfer of trade deficit origins, the intervention of U.S. domestic politics to China-U.S. trade relations, and U.S. direct control on export to China. However, the increased U.S. trade deficit to China does not mean that U.S. is in a disadvantaged position in its economic relations with China, or its international competitiveness is deteriorating. When U.S. surplus in service trade to China is included, the picture would be very different. Also, as internationalization progresses and China's industrial structure adjusts, the trade deficit of U.S. to China would narrow.

• 한국철도학회:학술대회논문집
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• 한국철도학회 2010년도 춘계학술대회 논문집
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• pp.1589-1595
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• 2010

China has experienced rapid economic growth and burgeoning trade since it began economic reforms and an opening policy. With this the amount of marine cargoes between Korea and China had been increased Recently this increasing rate of cargoes, the development of the Yellow Sea Sub-Region and the change of the Northeast Asian logistics network have acted as important factors of Korea's strategy to be the Northeast Asian logistics hub. This paper analyzes China's inland transport network to offer basic understanding on transport and logistics network in China. Therefore, the outcomes of this paper could be used as basic materials to further transport and logistics cooperation between China and Korea and to developing a more realistic plan to complete Korea's Northeast Asia logistics hub strategy.

• Strategy21
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• 통권37호
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• pp.104-143
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• 2015

China's new grand strategy, the "One Belt, One Road Initiative" (also Belt Road Initiative, or BRI) has two primary components: Chinese President Xi Jinping announced the "Silk Road Economic Belt" in September 2013 during a visit to Kazakhstan, and the "21^st Century Maritime Silk Route Economic Belt" in a speech to the Indonesian parliament the following month. The BRI is intended to supply China with energy and new markets, and also to integrate the countries of Central Asia, the Association of Southeast Asia Nations (ASEAN), and the Indian Ocean Region - though not Northeast Asia - into the "Chinese Dream". The project will be supported by the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), due to open in 2016 with 57 founding members from all around the world, and China has already promised US$ 50 billion in seed funding. China's vision includes networks of energy pipelines, railways, sea port facilities and logistics hubs; these will have obvious commercial benefits, but also huge geopolitical significance. China seems to have two distinct aims: externally, to restore its historical sphere of influence; and internally, to cope with income inequalities by creating middle-class jobs through enhanced trade and the broader development of its economy. In South Korea, opinion on the BRI is sharply polarized. Economic and industrial interests, including Korea Railroad Corporation (KORAIL), support South Korean involvement in the BRI and closer economic interactions with China. They see how the BRI fits nicely with President Park Geun-hye's Eurasia Initiative, and anticipate significant commercial benefits for South Korea from better connections to energy-rich Russia and the consumer markets of Europe and Central Asia. They welcome the prospect of reduced trade barriers between China and South Korea, and of improved transport infrastructure, and perceive the political risks as manageable. But some ardently pro-US pundits worry that the political risks of the BRI are too high. They cast doubt on the feasibility of implementing the BRI, and warn that although it has been portrayed primarily in economic terms, it actually reveals a crucial Chinese geopolitical strategy. They are fearful of China's growing regional dominance, and worried that the BRI is ultimately a means to supplant the prevailing US-led regional security structure and restore the Middle Kingdom order, with China as the only power that matters in the region. According to this view, once China has complete control of the regional logistics hubs and sea ports, this will severely limit the autonomy of China's neighbors, including South Korea, who will have to toe the Chinese line, both economically and politically, or risk their own peace and prosperity.