기업정보 기반 지능형 밸류체인 네트워크 시스템에 관한 연구 (A Study on Intelligent Value Chain Network System based on Firms' Information)
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- 지능정보연구
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- 제24권3호
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- pp.67-88
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- 2018
최근까지도 중소기업의 지속성장 및 경쟁력 확보에 대한 중요함을 인식함에 따라, 정부 차원에서의 유형 자원(R&D 인력, 자금 등)에 대한 지원이 주로 투입되어 왔다. 그러나 사업지원의 적절성이나 효과성, 효율성 면에서 서로 상충되는 정책부분이 존재하여 과소 지원이나 중복 지원 등 지원체계의 비효율성 문제가 제기되어온 것도 사실이다. 정부나 기업 관점에서는 중소기업의 한정된 자원으로 인해, 외부와의 협력을 통한 기술개발 및 역량강화가 기업의 경쟁우위를 창출하는 근간이라 보고 있으며, 이를 위한 가치창출 활동을 강조하고 있다. 기업 레벨에서의 지식생태계 구축을 통해 일련의 가치사슬로부터 기업거래 관계를 분석하고 결과를 가시화할 수 있는 밸류체인 네트워크 분석이 필요한 것도 이 때문이다. 특허/제품/기업명 검색을 통해 관련 제품의 정보나 특허 보유 기업의 기술(제품) 현황 정보를 제공하는 기술기회발굴시스템(Technology Opportunity Discovery system), 기업(재무)정보와 신용정보을 열람하게 해주는 CRETOP이나 KISLINE 등은 존재하고 있으나 밸류체인 네트워크 분석기반으로 유사(경쟁)기업의 리스트나 향후 거래 가능한 잠재 거래처 정보를 제공해주는 시스템은 부재한 실정이다. 따라서, 본 고에서는 KISTI에서 개발 운영중인 기업 비즈니스 전략수립 지원 파트너인 '밸류체인 네트워크 시스템(Value Chain Network System : VCNS)'을 중심으로, 탑재된 네트워크 기반 분석모듈의 유형, 이를 지원하는 참조정보 및 데이터베이스(D/B)의 구성 로직과 시스템 활용방안을 고찰하며, 산업구조를 이해하고 기업의 신제품 개발을 위한 핵심정보가 되고 있는 지능형 밸류체인 분석 시스템의 네트워크 가시화 기능을 살펴보기로 한다. 한 기업이 다른 기업 대비 경쟁우위를 확보하기 위해서는 보유 특허 또는 현재 생산하고 있는 제품에 대한 경쟁자 식별이 필요하며, 세부 업종별 유사(경쟁)기업을 탐색하는 일은 대상기업의 사업화 경쟁력 확보에 핵심이 된다. 또한 기업간 비즈니스 활동인 거래정보는 유사 분야로 진출할 경우 잠재 거래처 정보를 제공하는 중요한 역할을 수행한다. 이러한 기업간 판매정보를 기반으로 구축된 네트워크 맵을 활용하여 기업 또는 업종 수준의 경쟁자를 식별하는 일은 밸류체인 분석의 핵심모듈로 탑재될 수 있다. 밸류체인 네트워크 시스템(VCNS)은 단순 수집된 종래의 기업정보에 밸류체인(value chain) 및 산업구조 분석개념을 접목하여 개별 기업의 시장경쟁 상황은 물론 특정 산업의 가치사슬 관계를 파악할 수 있다. 특히 업종구조 파악, 경쟁사 동향 파악, 경쟁사 분석, 판매처 및 구매처 발굴, 품목별 산업동향, 유망 품목 발굴, 신규 진입기업 발굴, VC별 핵심기업 및 품목 도출, 해당 기업별 보유 특허 파악 등 기업 레벨에서의 유용한 정보분석 툴로 활용 가능하다. 또한, 거래처 정보 및 재무데이터로부터 분석된 결과의 객관성 및 신뢰성을 기반으로, 현재 국내에서 이용 중인 15,000여개 회원기업과 연구개발서비스업 종사자, 출연(연) 및 공공기관 등에서 사업평가 정보지원, R&D 의사결정 지원 및 중 단기 수요예측 전망 등 다양한 목적(용도)에 밸류체인 네트워크 시스템을 활용할 수 있을 것으로 기대된다. 기업의 사업경쟁력 강화를 위해 정부기관 및 민간 연구개발서비스 기업을 중심으로 기술(특허) 및 시장정보가 제공되어 왔으며, 이는 특허분석(등급, 계량분석 위주) 또는 시장분석(시장보고서 기반 시장규모 및 수요예측 위주)의 형태로 지원되어 왔다. 그러나 기업이 사업화진출 단계에서 겪게 되는 애로요인의 하나인 정보부족을 해결하는데 한계가 있었으며, 특히 경쟁기업 및 거래가능 기업 후보군에 대한 탐색정보는 입수하기 어려웠다. 본 연구를 통해 제안된 네트워크맵 및 보유 데이터 기반의 실시간 밸류체인 가시화 서비스모듈이 중견 중소기업이 당면한 신규시장 진출시 경쟁기업 대비 예상점유율, (예상)매출액 수준, 어느 기업을 컨택하여 유통망(원자재/부품에 대한 공급처, 완제품/모듈에 대한 수요처)을 확보할 지에 대한 핵심정보를 제공할 수 있을 것으로 기대된다. 향후 연구에서는 대체기업(또는 대체품목) 경쟁지표의 개발과 연구주체의 참여를 통한 경쟁요인별 지표의 고도화 연구, VCNS의 성능향상을 위한 데이터마이닝 기술 및 알고리즘을 추가 반영하도록 수행하고자 한다.
본 연구는 가전제품 소매채널에 관한 소비자의 선호 및 이용행태를 조사하고 가전제품 구매 채널 현황과 소비자들의 점포선택과 만족도를 분석하여 소비자가 특정 채널에 대하여 가지고 있는 소위 channel equity에 대하여 탐색적으로 접근 하고자 한다. 분석결과 가전제품 멀티채널 쇼핑환경은 소비자로 하여금 채널별로 차별화된 구매 패턴과 쇼핑동기를 만들어 주고 있었다. 백화점이나 대리점은 품질의 우수성과 A/S 측면에서 우세하며 대형할인점, 양판점, TV홈쇼핑, 인터넷쇼핑몰, 전자제품 판매 상가는 가격적인 측면이 경쟁 우위로 조사되었다. 채널별 소비자 만족도에 있어서는 애프터서비스가 잘되고 있는 백화점이나 대리점 등이 만족도가 상대적으로 높은 소매 채널임을 알 수 있다. 채널 에퀴티의 구성요인은 가격 경쟁력과 비교구매, 이용편리성, A/S, 판매원의 전문성, 배송의 신속성, 제품 검색용이, 판매원의 친절성, 매장의 쾌적성, 교통 편리성 등을 들 수 있다. 백화점의 경우 거의 모든 요소에서 가장 높은 만족도를 가지고 있어 채널 에퀴티가 높게 평가되었다. 인터넷 쇼핑몰은 제품을 쉽게 검색할 수 있다는 점에서 우위에 있으며 TV홈쇼핑의 경우는 비교구매와 가격경쟁력에서 우위가 있음을 알 수 있었고 채널별로 채널 에퀴티를 구성하는 요인들의 상대적 비중은 매우 달랐다. 본 연구에서는 채널 만족도를 평가한 후 에퀴티 포트폴리오와 채널별 에퀴티 구성 결과를 제시하고 있으나 향후 채널 에퀴티의 개념과 관리 툴에 대한 본격적인 연구가 요망된다.
The International Atomic Energy Agency's Statute in Article III.A.5 allows it“to establish and administer safeguards designed to ensure that special fissionable and other materials, services, equipment, facilities and information made available by the Agency or at its request or under its supervision or control are not used in such a way as to further any military purpose; and to apply safeguards, at the request of the parties, to any bilateral or multilateral arrangement, or at the request of a State, to any of that State's activities in the field of atomic energy”. Safeguards are essentially a technical means of verifying the fulfilment of political obligations undertaken by States and given a legal force in international agreements relating to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The main political objectives are: to assure the international community that States are complying with their non-proliferation and other peaceful undertakings; and to deter (a) the diversion of afeguarded nuclear materials to the production of nuclear explosives or for military purposes and (b) the misuse of safeguarded facilities with the aim of producing unsafeguarded nuclear material. It is clear that no international safeguards system can physically prevent diversion. The IAEA safeguards system is basically a verification measure designed to provide assurance in those cases in which diversion has not occurred. Verification is accomplished by two basic means: material accountancy and containment and surveillance measures. Nuclear material accountancy is the fundamental IAEA safeguards mechanism, while containment and surveillance serve as important complementary measures. Material accountancy refers to a collection of measurements and other determinations which enable the State and the Agency to maintain a current picture of the location and movement of nuclear material into and out of material balance areas, i. e. areas where all material entering or leaving is measurab e. A containment measure is one that is designed by taking advantage of structural characteristics, such as containers, tanks or pipes, etc. To establish the physical integrity of an area or item by preventing the undetected movement of nuclear material or equipment. Such measures involve the application of tamper-indicating or surveillance devices. Surveillance refers to both human and instrumental observation aimed at indicating the movement of nuclear material. The verification process consists of three over-lapping elements: (a) Provision by the State of information such as - design information describing nuclear installations; - accounting reports listing nuclear material inventories, receipts and shipments; - documents amplifying and clarifying reports, as applicable; - notification of international transfers of nuclear material. (b) Collection by the IAEA of information through inspection activities such as - verification of design information - examination of records and repo ts - measurement of nuclear material - examination of containment and surveillance measures - follow-up activities in case of unusual findings. (c) Evaluation of the information provided by the State and of that collected by inspectors to determine the completeness, accuracy and validity of the information provided by the State and to resolve any anomalies and discrepancies. To design an effective verification system, one must identify possible ways and means by which nuclear material could be diverted from peaceful uses, including means to conceal such diversions. These theoretical ways and means, which have become known as diversion strategies, are used as one of the basic inputs for the development of safeguards procedures, equipment and instrumentation. For analysis of implementation strategy purposes, it is assumed that non-compliance cannot be excluded a priori and that consequently there is a low but non-zero probability that a diversion could be attempted in all safeguards ituations. An important element of diversion strategies is the identification of various possible diversion paths; the amount, type and location of nuclear material involved, the physical route and conversion of the material that may take place, rate of removal and concealment methods, as appropriate. With regard to the physical route and conversion of nuclear material the following main categories may be considered: - unreported removal of nuclear material from an installation or during transit - unreported introduction of nuclear material into an installation - unreported transfer of nuclear material from one material balance area to another - unreported production of nuclear material, e. g. enrichment of uranium or production of plutonium - undeclared uses of the material within the installation. With respect to the amount of nuclear material that might be diverted in a given time (the diversion rate), the continuum between the following two limiting cases is cons dered: - one significant quantity or more in a short time, often known as abrupt diversion; and - one significant quantity or more per year, for example, by accumulation of smaller amounts each time to add up to a significant quantity over a period of one year, often called protracted diversion. Concealment methods may include: - restriction of access of inspectors - falsification of records, reports and other material balance areas - replacement of nuclear material, e. g. use of dummy objects - falsification of measurements or of their evaluation - interference with IAEA installed equipment.As a result of diversion and its concealment or other actions, anomalies will occur. All reasonable diversion routes, scenarios/strategies and concealment methods have to be taken into account in designing safeguards implementation strategies so as to provide sufficient opportunities for the IAEA to observe such anomalies. The safeguards approach for each facility will make a different use of these procedures, equipment and instrumentation according to the various diversion strategies which could be applicable to that facility and according to the detection and inspection goals which are applied. Postulated pathways sets of scenarios comprise those elements of diversion strategies which might be carried out at a facility or across a State's fuel cycle with declared or undeclared activities. All such factors, however, contain a degree of fuzziness that need a human judgment to make the ultimate conclusion that all material is being used for peaceful purposes. Safeguards has been traditionally based on verification of declared material and facilities using material accountancy as a fundamental measure. The strength of material accountancy is based on the fact that it allows to detect any diversion independent of the diversion route taken. Material accountancy detects a diversion after it actually happened and thus is powerless to physically prevent it and can only deter by the risk of early detection any contemplation by State authorities to carry out a diversion. Recently the IAEA has been faced with new challenges. To deal with these, various measures are being reconsidered to strengthen the safeguards system such as enhanced assessment of the completeness of the State's initial declaration of nuclear material and installations under its jurisdiction enhanced monitoring and analysis of open information and analysis of open information that may indicate inconsistencies with the State's safeguards obligations. Precise information vital for such enhanced assessments and analyses is normally not available or, if available, difficult and expensive collection of information would be necessary. Above all, realistic appraisal of truth needs sound human judgment.
유럽연합(European Union: EU)이 2012년 6월 유엔의 우주의평화적이용위원회(COPUOS) 제 55차 회기에서 공식 제기한 우주활동의 국제 행동규범안(Draft International Code of Conduct for Outer Space Activities)은 그간 우주에서의 국가 활동 규범에 대한 미비한 요소들을 제시한 내용으로서 국제사회의 관심을 끌기에 충분한 내용이다. 현재 우주에서의 미비한 질서는 군비경쟁 금지, 우주쓰레기 경감 등을 통한 우주의 안전과 안보를 위한 지침, 그리고 우주활동의 정보를 참여 국가 간 교환하는 것이라고 할 수 있는 바, EU의 상기 제안은 여사한 문제들에 대한 행동 강령을 정한 것으로서 주목되는 내용이다. 2008년 말부터 시작된 EU의 제안 활동은 그간 일부 우주활동 국가들, 특히 미국과의 비공식 접촉을 통하여 접촉대상국들의 의견도 반영한 가운데 2013년 채택을 목표로 하는 자발적 이행 규범으로서 강제력을 가지고 있지는 않지만 미국은 우주에서의 군축 관련 규범 제정의 필요성에 탄력을 제공하는 계기가 될 가능성에 우려하는 가운데 현재는 방관하고 있는 입장으로 보인다. 이러한 미국의 입장은 우주에서 전략적 우위를 점하고 있다는 자국의 이익이 군축에 관한 규범의 제정으로 손상될 수 있다는 판단을 근거로 하고 있다. 이에 따라 미국은 유엔 총회에서 우주에서의 군비경쟁 방지(PAROS)에 관한 결의에 반대하고 군축회의(Conference on Disarmament: CD)에서 오랫동안 논의되어 왔던 우주에서의 군축을 촉구하는 논의의 장을 마련하는 것에 반대하여 왔다. 중국과 러시아는 2008년 우주에서의 군축에 관한 PPWT (Treaty on Prevention of the Placement of Weapons in Outer Space and of the Threat or Use of Force against Outer Space Objects)채택을 제안하였는 바, EU의 제안은 자신들이 제안한 PPWT의 추력을 저상시키는 내용이 되기 때문에 불편한 심정으로서 역시 소극적인 입장이다. 한편, 미국이 상기 입장의 연장선 상에서 PPWT에 반대 입장을 취하는 것은 이해하기 어렵지 않다. EU의 행동규범안은 주요 우주대국의 군사전략적 측면에서의 이해관계 때문에 그 장래가 명확치 않으나 우주쓰레기의 경감을 위하여 노력하고 우주활동의 정보를 상호교환하면서 우주에서의 안전과 안보를 보장을 통하여 가능한 우주의 평화적 이용과 탐사라는 기본 명제를 극대화 시키는 효과를 가져오는 것으로서 매우 바람직한 조치로 간주된다. 단, 동 규범안은 참여 국가들간의 협조와 연락업무를 수행하기 위하여 상설기구를 설치하도록 되어있지만 이는 기존 조직인 유엔외기권사무소(UN Office for Outer Space Affairs)가 담당하도록 할 경우 효율과 경제를 도모할 수 있을 것이다. 동 규범안에 대한 추후 구체 협상 시 여사한 내용도 논의될 것으로 보지만 EU의 우주활동의 안전과 안보에 관한 조치는 환경문제에서와 같이 국제사회를 이끌어가는 또 하나의 의미있는 기여로 평가받아야 한다.
현대에 있어 동질적인 품질과 편익을 제공하는 제품을 가지고 다수의 기업들이 시장점유율 증대와 고객확보를 위하여 치열한 경쟁을 벌이고 있는 가운데 가격할인은 기업이 즐겨 사용하는 촉진수단이다. 가격할인은 단기적 매출향상, 소비자의 브랜드전환, 신제품의 시장침투 등의 목적을 달성하기 위하여 사용된다. 실제로 과거의 실증연구에 의하면 다양한 형태의 가격할인이 판매증대에 효과적이며 가격할인은 소비자의 지각가치를 증가시킨다고 하였다. 하지만 할인된 가격은 제품의 품질을 의심하게 하거나 낮게 평가하는 부정적인 효과가 있다는 사실이 밝혀졌으며, 모든 제품카테고리와 모든 구매상황에 대하여 가격할인이 소비자의 지각가치를 향상시킨다고 볼 수 없다. 이에 따라 본 연구에서는 브랜드애호도의 차이가 있는 제품을 대상으로 가격할인율에 따라 소비자의 지각가치에 어떠한 영향을 미치는지를 연구함으로서 브랜드애호도의 조절효과를 분석하였다. 브랜드애호도가 강한 제품에 대한 지각획득가치와 지각거래가치는 가격할인율이 낮을 때 보다 큰 경우에 증가할 것으로 예측하였으나 분석결과 유의적인 차이가 없는 것으로 나타났는데, 이것은 브랜드애호도가 강한 경우에는 가격할인에 의한 지각희생의 감소량이 크지 않았고 브랜드 자체에 대한 신뢰도와 속성에 대한 만족도가 높기 때문에 가격인하가 브랜드선택에 큰 영향을 미치지 않았다는 것을 의미한다고 할 수 있다. 반면 브랜드애호도가 약한 제품에 대한 지각획득가치와 지각거래가치는 가격할인율이 낮을 때 보다 큰 경우에 감소한 것으로 나타났다. 이는 브랜드애호도가 약한 경우에는 제품으로부터 획득하게 되는 편익에 대한 만족도와 신뢰도가 낮은데 이러한 특성을 고려해보면 가격할인이 클 때에 제품의 품질과 편익을 더욱 평가절하하거나 심리적으로 지각희생의 크기가 증가됨에 따라 지각가치가 감소되었음을 의미한다고 할 수 있다.
Just before the Korean War, the total number of the North Korean troops was 198,380, while that of the ROK(Republic of Korea) army troops 105,752. That is, the total number of the ROK army troops at that time was 53.3% of the total number of the North Korean army. As of December 2008, the total number of the North Korean troops is estimated to be 1,190,000, while that of the ROK troops is 655,000, so the ROK army maintains 55.04% of the total number of the North Korean troops. If the ROK army continues to reduce its troops according to [Military Reform Plan 2020], the total number of its troops will be 517,000 m 2020. If North Korea maintains the current status(l,190,000 troops), the number of the ROK troops will be 43.4% of the North Korean army. In terms of units, just before the Korean War, the number of the ROK army divisions and regiments was 80% and 44.8% of North Korean army. As of December 2008, North Korea maintains 86 divisions and 69 regiments. Compared to the North Korean army, the ROK army maintains 46 Divisions (53.4% of North Korean army) and 15 regiments (21.3% of North Korean army). If the ROK army continue to reduce the military units according to [Military Reform Plan 2020], the number of ROK army divisions will be 28(13 Active Division, 4 Mobilization Divisions and 11 Local Reserve Divisions), while that of the North Korean army will be 86 in 2020. In that case, the number of divisions of the ROK army will be 32.5% of North Korean army. During the Korean war, North Korea suddenly invaded the Republic of Korea and occupied its capital 3 days after the war began. At that time, the ROK army maintained 80% of army divisions, compared to the North Korean army. The lesson to be learned from this is that, if the ROK army is forced to disperse its divisions because of the simultaneous invasion of North Korea and attack of guerrillas in home front areas, the Republic of Korea can be in a serious military danger, even though it maintains 80% of military divisions of North Korea. If the ROK army promotes the plans in [Military Reform Plan 2020], the number of military units of the ROK army will be 32.5% of that of the North Korean army. This ratio is 2.4 times lower than that of the time when the Korean war began, and in this case, 90% of total military power should be placed in the DMZ area. If 90% of military power is placed in the DMZ area, few troops will be left for the defense of home front. In addition, if the ROK army continues to reduce the troops, it can allow North Korea to have asymmetrical superiority in military force and it will eventually exert negative influence on the stability and peace of the Korean peninsular. On the other hand, it should be reminded that, during the Korean War, the Republic of Korea was attacked by North Korea, though it kept 53.3% of troops, compared to North Korea. It should also be reminded that, as of 2008, the ROK army is defending its territory with the troops 55.04% of North Korea. Moreover, the national defense is assisted by 25,120 troops of the US Forces in Korea. In case the total number of the ROK troops falls below 43.4% of the North Korean army, it may cause social unrest about the national security and may lead North Korea's misjudgement. Besides, according to Lanchester strategy, the party with weaker military power (60% compared to the party with stronger military power) has the 4.1% of winning possibility. Therefore, if we consider the fact that the total number of the ROK army troops is 55.04% of that of the North Korean army, the winning possibility of the ROK army is not higher than 4.1%. If the total number of ROK troops is reduced to 43.4% of that of North Korea, the winning possibility will be lower and the military operations will be in critically difficult situation. [Military Reform Plan 2020] rums at the reduction of troops and units of the ground forces under the policy of 'select few'. However, the problem is that the financial support to achieve this goal is not secured. Therefore, the promotion of [Military Reform Plan 2020] may cause the weakening of military defence power in 2020. Some advanced countries such as Japan, UK, Germany, and France have promoted the policy of 'select few'. However, what is to be noted is that the national security situation of those countries is much different from that of Korea. With the collapse of the Soviet Unions and European communist countries, the military threat of those European advanced countries has almost disappeared. In addition, the threats those advanced countries are facing are not wars in national level, but terrorism in international level. To cope with the threats like terrorism, large scaled army trops would not be necessary. So those advanced European countries can promote the policy of 'select few'. In line with this, those European countries put their focuses on the development of military sections that deal with non-military operations and protection from unspecified enemies. That is, those countries are promoting the policy of 'select few', because they found that the policy is suitable for their national security environment. Moreover, since they are pursuing common interest under the European Union(EU) and they can form an allied force under NATO, it is natural that they are pursing the 'select few' policy. At present, NATO maintains the larger number of troops(2,446,000) than Russia(l,027,000) to prepare for the potential threat of Russia. The situation of japan is also much different from that of Korea. As a country composed of islands, its prime military focus is put on the maritime defense. Accordingly, the development of ground force is given secondary focus. The japanese government promotes the policy to develop technology-concentrated small size navy and air-forces, instead of maintaining large-scaled ground force. In addition, because of the 'Peace Constitution' that was enacted just after the end of World War II, japan cannot maintain troops more than 240,000. With the limited number of troops (240,000), japan has no choice but to promote the policy of 'select few'. However, the situation of Korea is much different from the situations of those countries. The Republic of Korea is facing the threat of the North Korean Army that aims at keeping a large-scale military force. In addition, the countries surrounding Korea are also super powers containing strong military forces. Therefore, to cope with the actual threat of present and unspecified threat of future, the importance of maintaining a carefully calculated large-scale military force cannot be denied. Furthermore, when considering the fact that Korea is in a peninsular, the Republic of Korea must take it into consideration the tradition of continental countries' to maintain large-scale military powers. Since the Korean War, the ROK army has developed the technology-force combined military system, maintaining proper number of troops and units and pursuing 'select few' policy at the same time. This has been promoted with the consideration of military situation in the Koran peninsular and the cooperation of ROK-US combined forces. This kind of unique military system that cannot be found in other countries can be said to be an insightful one for the preparation for the actual threat of North Korea and the conflicts between continental countries and maritime countries. In addition, this kind of technology-force combined military system has enabled us to keep peace in Korea. Therefore, it would be desirable to maintain this technology-force combined military system until the reunification of the Korean peninsular. Furthermore, it is to be pointed out that blindly following the 'select few' policy of advanced countries is not a good option, because it is ignoring the military strategic situation of the Korean peninsular. If the Republic of Korea pursues the reduction of troops and units radically without consideration of the threat of North Korea and surrounding countries, it could be a significant strategic mistake. In addition, the ROK army should keep an eye on the fact the European advanced countries and Japan that are not facing direct military threats are spending more defense expenditures than Korea. If the ROK army reduces military power without proper alternatives, it would exert a negative effect on the stable economic development of Korea and peaceful reunification of the Korean peninsular. Therefore, the desirable option would be to focus on the development of quality of forces, maintaining proper size and number of troops and units under the technology-force combined military system. The tableau above shows that the advanced countries like the UK, Germany, Italy, and Austria spend more defense expenditure per person than the Republic of Korea, although they do not face actual military threats, and that they keep achieving better economic progress than the countries that spend less defense expenditure. Therefore, it would be necessary to adopt the merits of the defense systems of those advanced countries. As we have examined, it would be desirable to maintain the current size and number of troops and units, to promote 'select few' policy with increased defense expenditure, and to strengthen the technology-force combined military system. On the basis of firm national security, the Republic of Korea can develop efficient policies for reunification and prosperity, and jump into the status of advanced countries. Therefore, the plans to reduce troops and units in [Military Reform Plan 2020] should be reexamined. If it is difficult for the ROK army to maintain its size of 655,000 troops because of low birth rate, the plans to establish the prompt mobilization force or to adopt drafting system should be considered for the maintenance of proper number of troops and units. From now on, the Republic of Korean government should develop plans to keep peace as well as to prepare unexpected changes in the Korean peninsular. For the achievement of these missions, some options can be considered. The first one is to maintain the same size of military troops and units as North Korea. The second one is to maintain the same level of military power as North Korea in terms of military force index. The third one is to maintain the same level of military power as North Korea, with the combination of the prompt mobilization force and the troops in active service under the system of technology-force combined military system. At present, it would be not possible for the ROK army to maintain such a large-size military force as North Korea (1,190,000 troops and 86 units). So it would be rational to maintain almost the same level of military force as North Korea with the combination of the troops on the active list and the prompt mobilization forces. In other words, with the combination of the troops in active service (60%) and the prompt mobilization force (40%), the ROK army should develop the strategies to harmonize technology and forces. The Korean government should also be prepared for the strategic flexibility of USFK, the possibility of American policy change about the location of foreign army, radical unexpected changes in North Korea, the emergence of potential threat, surrounding countries' demand for Korean force for the maintenance of regional stability, and demand for international cooperation against terrorism. For this, it is necessary to develop new approaches toward the proper number and size of troops and units. For instance, to prepare for radical unexpected political or military changes in North Korea, the Republic of Korea should have plans to protect a large number of refugees, to control arms and people, to maintain social security, and to keep orders in North Korea. From the experiences of other countries, it is estimated that 115,000 to 230,000 troops, plus ten thousands of police are required to stabilize the North Korean society, in the case radical unexpected military or political change happens in North Korea. In addition, if the Republic of Korea should perform the release of hostages, control of mass destruction weapons, and suppress the internal wars in North Korea, it should send 460,000 troops to North Korea. Moreover, if the Republic of Korea wants to stop the attack of North Korea and flow of refugees in DMZ area, at least 600,000 troops would be required. In sum, even if the ROK army maintains 600,000 troops, it may need additional 460,000 troops to prepare for unexpected radical changes in North Korea. For this, it is necessary to establish the prompt mobilization force whose size and number are almost the same as the troops in active service. In case the ROK army keeps 650,000 troops, the proper number of the prompt mobilization force would be 460,000 to 500,000.