• The Journal of Korean Philosophical History
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• no.23
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• pp.181-216
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• 2008

This thesis is based on two points in Min-yisheng's idea: 1, knowing, consciousness, and differentiation of mind, according to which 2, Zheng-jidou's dividually observe to the same and different points of liangzhi and consciousness. Min-yisheng and the scholar on Yangming Theory named Zheng-jidou are arguing about the rights and wrongs of the Yangming Theory, the key concept of which is the same and different points of liangzhi and consciousness. At the extension of this argument, Min-yisheng also argues with Jin-chagnxie about the same and different points of knowing and consciousness. When argue with Zheng-jidou about Yangming Theory, Min-yisheng disproves the saying of "mind is principle" and "syncretism of consciousness and behavior" as well as defines liangzhi, which is the key concept of Yangming Theory, as a consciousness different from the natural principle. While disputing with Zheng-jidou about the relation between liangzhi and consciousness, Min-yisheng begins to pay attention to the relation between knowing and consciousness focused in the academy at that time. And as a result of that he also has a dispute with Jin-chagnxie about the same and different points of knowing and consciousness. The dispute between Min-yisheng and Jin-chagnxie is actually about how to look at the relation of knowing and consciousness, from the point of "non-mixed" or the point of "inseparable". Jin-chagnxie emphasizes on the un-mixed of knowing and consciousness while Min-yisheng, from the point of "inseparable", sees the consistency of the two. This thesis focuses on the argumentation of "the same and different points of liangzhi and consciousness" and "the same and different points of knowing and consciousness", the difference of the two positions and the historical meaning of this argument in ideologies.