• Strategy21
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• 통권32호
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• pp.160-191
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• 2013

This article is focused how the maritime strategy between continental powered country(the Soviet, the China) and maritime powered country(the U.S.) interact with attack and defense theory. We will know, what is the maritime strategy that the U.S. of military superiority has pursued with the point of view of attack, on the other hand, relatively what is the maritime strategy that the Soviet-Sino of military inferiority has pursued with the point of view of defense. In cold war, the Soviet has counteracted to 'blue belt defense' in active defense as to the U.S. 'sea strike' and in post cold war, the China counteract to 'A2/AD' as to the U.S. 'Air-Sea Battle'. The difference between the Soviet-Sino maritime strategy is that the China has emerged the second an economic power and their leadership has a strong's will to strengthen their navy's power. although the U.S. declare the pivot to Asia, the influence on Asia of the U.S. tend to decrease because of sequest. therefore, the China will seek to the more active defense beyond the first island chain. Meanwhile, the U.S. has reinforced of 'hub and spoke strategy' to solidify the U.S. formal allies to band together regional powers and to overcome the A2/AD challenge, the U.S. has been developed that the Air-Sea Battle concept meshes with Washington's 'rebalancing' policy toward the Asia-Pacific as its vital missions to safeguard core island or semi-island allies-namely, Korea and Japan-and crucial sea lanes of communication in the region are conducted mostly from or over the sea.

• Strategy21
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• 통권42호
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• pp.83-113
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• 2017

After defeat in World War II, Japan's Peace Constitution committed the country to forego the acquisition of offensive military capabilities. However, in the midst of the post-cold war period, Japan began to change its security posture in line with the so-called 'normal state theory', which called for a more robust defense posture and expanded security activities. The second Abe administration promoted these security policies by issuing a National Security Strategy as well as a new National Defense Program Outline(NDPO) in 2013 and by establishing new security institutions such as the National Security Council. The Abe administration also adopted the new concept of a 'Unified Mobile Defense Force' in the 2013 which replaced the 'Dynamic Defense Force' as a new criteria for the Self-Defense Force's acquisition of military capabilities. In this new concept of military capabilities, the Ground Self-Defense Force is planning to replace existing divisions with mobile divisions and to form 'Amphibious Rapid Deployment Bridge' for the first time in 2018, which has long been taboo in Japan. Japan has experience a Marine Corps in the past. Likewise, an offensive changes in the military strategy can change the spectrum of strategy and 'Amphibious Rapid Deployment Bridge' plays a big role in this. Furthermore, Japan is increasing the Coast Guard's budget and capabilities in preparation for contingencies around the Senkaku islands (called the Diaoyu in Chinese). The South Korea navy should utilize Japan's changing security posture to deter immediate threat such as North Korea's military provocations and potential enemy threat such as China, Japan, Russia.

• Strategy21
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• 통권31호
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• pp.164-189
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• 2013

Last December, the Abe government came back, and it is critical core of Northeast Asia. They visited to Yasukuni Shrine, denied to Korea's invasion and they are denying all of their invasion history. I'm afraid they want to take Dokdo. Dokdo is Korean territory, but Japan politics assert it belongs to them. To make matters worse, they are waiting an opportunity to invade. Ministry of Foreign Affair blue paper and Ministry of Defense white paper have claimed Dokdo as Japanese territory, and many right wing politicians are taking part in the Cabinet. Liberal Democratic Party of Japan is becoming more right wing politicians than before by Japan Restoration Party, and the others also have more right wing ideologies. It can't control Japan right wing political parties. They finally aim to take Dokdo. In this situation, we have to defend Dokdo. Japan must be very important partner for our nation's development. But it is necessary to trust between two countries. Dokdo is effective controlled by Korea. It is the best way how to keep Dokdo. During Dokdo is effective controlled by Korea, the Japanese Government has limited Dokdo's ownership. Now we don't have any way to keep Dokdo except more effective control. We have strategies about Japanese claim of Dokdo's ownership as follows. First, we can overpower Japan right wing politics as Japan conscientious force's ideology. Second, Japan politics say to Dokdo's ownership is based on The San Francisco Treaty. But it is not right. Third, we have to exchange a lot of local government and civic society in Japan. Finally, we must prepare thoroughly to bring the matter to the International Court of Justice.

• Strategy21
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• 통권43호
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• pp.125-174
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• 2018

The purpose of this paper is to analyze the status of naval arms race in Northeast Asia. To this end, the scope of the research was limited to national security strategies, maritime strategies and naval strengthening of the United States, China, Russia and Japan. The major powers' active maritime strategies and naval arms race give some strategic implications to the Republic of Korea Navy as follows. First, China and Japan, unlike the past, are actively using submarines in offshore waters including the Korean Peninsula. Therefore, the ROK Navy must successfully promote the Jangbogo-III-class submarine, which is currently constructed, and get a nuclear-powered submarine and P-8 MPA capable of long-range and long-time operations to enhance ASW capability. Second, North Korea's current building submarines capable of loading SLBMs and SLBMs are a new threat to the ROK Navy. The current building KAMD, which focuses on terminal phase defense, cannot effectively respond to North Korea's SLBMs and should be converted to a multi-layered defense system including SM-3 at a mid-course phase. Third, as China militarizes the South China Sea, the instability of the South China Sea is growing. Therefore, the ROK Navy should strengthen its maritime cooperation with the regional countries such as Japan and ASEAN navies to protect SLOC. In conclusion, the ROK Navy needs to build a strong naval power to keep in mind that the 21st century naval rivalry in Northeast Asia is accelerating. The navy must do one's best to protect national strategic and vital interests by strengthening cooperation with regional countries. South Korea is also accelerating its defense reforms in accordance with the pattern of future warfare and the ROK Navy do one's best to have a balanced naval capability capable of actively operating in the offshore waters.

• Strategy21
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• 통권30호
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• pp.143-176
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• 2012

We are witnessing the growing maritime tension on the East Asian sea these days. Each naval powers in the region are competing each other to acquire more advanced naval capabilities. Based upon the rapid economic development, China is actively beefing up its naval capabilities and expand its boundary of naval activities all over the East Asian region. Chinese Navy already unveiled its expansive naval strategy replacing the traditional concept of 'Near-Sea Defense' with the new concept of 'Far-Sea Defense' strategy. In response to potential rival's naval build up, the U.S. is redeploying its naval forces focusing on the Asia-Pacific region. The U.S. enhances its joint naval exercises with the countries in the region, such as Japan, India, Australia and so on. In addition, Washington is devising new naval strategy under the concept of 'Air-Sea Battle' to deter Peking's so-called 'Anti-Access/ Area Denial(A2AD)' strategy. As a close ally of the U.S., Japan also disclosed its clear intention to strengthen the Maritime Self Defense Force(MSDF)'s capabilities by introducing the new concept of 'Dynamic Defense Force' in 2011. Under the new concept, JMSDF is pursuing the additional acquisition of submarines, quasi-aircraft carriers, Aegis-equipped destroyers, etc. Under the new president's strong leadership, Russia is also invigorating the naval build-up. Especially, Russia is fortifying the Pacific Fleet's naval assets by deploying new-type of naval ships such as the Mistral which was imported from France. In the midst of competitive naval build-up among the major naval powers in the region, we are observing the growing maritime conflicts on the East China Sea as well as South China Sea. Those naval conflicts can pose severe threats to our national interests. Maritime conflicts on the East or South China Sea can imperil our sea lanes which will be indispensible for national economic development. Neighboring countries' maritime conflicts also will cast an uncertainty on the path to mobilize international cooperation to resolve the North Korean issues. We should contribute to ease the maritime tension in the region by various ways. First, we should actively galvanize the bilateral maritime dialogue among the major naval powers in the region. Second, we also should take the lead to form a multilateral maritime cooperation mechanism in the region. Above all, we should set the aim to be a peaceful maritime power who can contribute to a building of stable maritime order in the region with a considerable naval power.

• Strategy21
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• 통권34호
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• pp.149-177
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• 2014

Today distant oceans around the world are regarded as a major 'global commons' for international trade and transportation. Korea is not an exception, because Korea hugely depends on sea lines of communication (SLOC) for supplying vital commodities such as food and energy resource. As a result, assuring a free and safe use of distant ocean beyond territory is also an important agenda for Korea's maritime security. However there are a number of challenges for Korea to enjoy a free and safe use of distant ocean; dangers of regional maritime conflict in East Asia, naval arms race of China and Japan, and concerns on possible decline of U.S naval presence and power projection capabilities. These factors provide a reasonable basis for Republic of Korea Navy (ROKN) to pursue capabilities for major naval operations at distant ocean in a long-term perspective toward the year 2030. The introduction of aircraft carrier and nuclear-powered submarine is a key requirement for achieving this goal. ROKN needs to acquire a 'multi-role strategic landing platform' type of light aircraft carrier, which takes a role to escort naval task force by providing air superiority at distant ocean. Additionally nuclear-powered submarine will offer ROKN a formidable power to carry out offensive missions effectively at distant ocean.

• Strategy21
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• 통권38호
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• pp.250-286
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• 2015

The main purpose of this article is to provide an understanding on current maritime issues in the Northeast Asia, and thereby help formulating the right strategy for our national security. The article summarizes core arguments in the recently published 『The 21^st Century Maritime Strategies in the Northeast Asia: Dilemma between Competition and Cooperation』. It will help readers to comprehend historical backgrounds as well as recent updates related to maritime issues and strategies in the region. Also, readers may find guidance to conceive their own maritime strategies for the Republic of Korea. Currently, the U.S. is shifting its focus from Atlantic to Pacific, and increasing its naval presence in Asia-Pacific region. Meanwhile, the 21^st century China views the maritime interests as the top priority in its national security and prosperity. PLA Navy's offensive maritime strategies and naval building such as aircraft carriers and nuclear submarines are unprecedented. Japan is another naval power in the region. During the Cold War JMSDF faithfully fulfilled the mission of deterring Soviet navy, and now it is doing its job against China. Lastly, Putin has been emphasizing to build the strong Russia since 2000, and putting further efforts to reinforce current naval capabilities of Pacific Fleet. The keyword in the naval and maritime relations among these powers can be summarized with "competition and cooperation." The recent security developments in the South China Sea(SCS) clearly represent each state's strategic motivations and movements. China shows clear and strong intention to nationalize the islands in SCS by building artificial facilities - possibly military purpose. Obviously, the U.S. strongly opposes China by insisting the freedom of navigation(FON) in international waters as recent USS-Lassen's FON operation indicate. The conflict between China and the U.S. surrounding the SCS seems to be heading towards climax as Russia and Japan are searching for their own national interests within the conflict. Also, the neighboring small and middle powers are calculating their own economic and security interests. This is no exception for us in establishing timely strategies to maximize our own national security. Hopefully, this article leads the readers to the right direction.

• Strategy21
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• 통권41호
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• pp.30-51
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• 2017

Neighboring powers in the Korean Peninsula have started to develop and operate aircraft carriers or equivalent forces to cope with rising North Korean nuclear and missile threats and also to show its national might. For example, the United States has added a aircraft carrier from the 3rd fleet to western pacific theater of operation, while Peoples Republic of China is undergoing operational test of Liaoning as well as preparing for christening of its 2nd aircraft carrier. Japan is flexing its muscle as well by deploying Izumo capable of operating F-35B to Southeast Asia to participate in multilateral exercises starting this year. It is a high time to know more about aircraft carriers or similar types in terms of maritime strategy and history. The U.S. has had by far the vast amount of experiences in utilizing aircraft carrier that it would be beneficial for us to examine U.S. perspectives and its application in the Korean Peninsula. It will provide us with insights to understand and predict what it would be like in times of crisis in the Korean Peninsula in the perspective of aircraft carrier's involvement. This paper intends to show some aspects of future conflicts in the Korean Peninsula and how the ROK Navy can best be ready for such situation. For research purpose, U.S. maritime strategy has been developed in stages ; establishment phase, WWI phase, WWII phase, Cold war phase, post Cold war phase. Each phase includes such factors as threats, strategic concept, applications, and ways to improve maritime strategy. Finally, the role of aircraft carrier based on past history as well as future conflict shines the importance to have power projection capabilities for the ROK Navy. The intrinsic nature of the navy in the world is to project power ashore just as history proved it.

• 한국항해항만학회:학술대회논문집
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• 한국항해항만학회 2006년도 춘계학술대회 및 창립 30주년 심포지엄(논문집)
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• pp.273-278
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• 2006

본 연구에서는 동북아 지역에서 협력과 공존을 위한 부가가치 물류 전략방안들을 제시하는 것이 목적이다. 국내산업구조의 변화와 일본슈퍼중추항만계획 및 중국의 대수심 양산항만의 건설 등으로 인해 국내 항만물류산업은 이들과의 경쟁을 피할 수 없게 되었다. 국내산업 구조의 변화로 수출물량의 감소와 양국의 새로운 항만정책과 건설로 인한 환적화물의 감소는 현재 컨테이너 물동량 처리 위주로 운영되고 있는 부산항 항만물류산업에 커다란 영향을 미칠 것으로 사료된다. 이제는 컨테이너 물동량 처리를 통하여 항만의 수익을 얻으려는 것에는 한계가 있으며, 향후 중국의 신항만 증가에 따라 중국으로 직기항하는 선박들이 많아질 경우 동북아 거점항만이 되기 위해 노력했던 국내 물류전략들은 수정이 불가피할 것이다. 그리고 경쟁이 아니 상호 협력과 공존을 위한 전략이 필요하다고 하겠다. 그래서 본 논문은 협력과 공존을 통해 서로가 공생할 수 있는 부가가치 물류 전략방안들을 연구해 보았다.

• 한국항해항만학회:학술대회논문집
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• 한국항해항만학회 2006년도 Asia Navigation Conference
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• pp.203-212
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• 2006

The purpose of this research is to suggest the activation plan of Busan port. In the past years, Busan port enjoyed the golden days because of the China's rapid economic growth. But China's continuous development of ports, the trend of increasing container ship size and increasing direct call to China are coming threats to Busan port. So Korea needs to revise the 'Northeast Logistics Hub' strategy because it is considered that Korea ports continuously will handle China's transshipment cargoes. But now China's transshipment cargo share has decreased by direct call to China ports. It means that China has a lot of its local cargoes, so many ship companies change liner service route to handle China cargoes except Bussan ports although Busan port is included in the main trunk route. In the future, Bussan port will not be able to compete again about throughput with China ports if Busan port's transshipment cargo share decreases. So we must find out and develop Busan port's strength which is the competitive edge. By good luck, Busan port has a few opportunities such as the developed feeder network service and geographical advantages. Busan port has many feeder network service like spider's web in any northeast countries so we can suggest that if Japanese shippers use Busan port to distribute their cargoes to Japanese local areas, its transport costs are cheaper than when they use Japan's main ports. In this paper analyzed side of cost when they use Bussan port like hub to distribute their cargo to their local areas. Because most companies tried to reduce the total cost about logistics. Finally, this paper suggests when northeast shippers(China, Japan) use Bussan port which is more economical than their local main ports.