• Title/Summary/Keyword: Irrational Ordering Behavior

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Analytical Effect of Retailers Pull-to-center Behavior on Determining Optimal Buyback Price (소매상의 제한된 합리성이 반품가 결정에 미치는 영향에 대한 분석적 연구)

  • Lee, Jung Min;Seo, Yong Won;Park, Chan-Kyoo
    • Journal of the Korean Operations Research and Management Science Society
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    • v.38 no.3
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    • pp.87-101
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    • 2013
  • The purpose of this paper is to analyze supplier's optimal decision of the buyback price facing irrational retailers. It has been known that retailers show irrational ordering behaviors, such as pull-to-center effect. We model the retailer's pull-to-center behavior and derive the supplier's optimal buyback price considering the retailer's bounded rationality. The result shows that the supplier's profit can be significantly improved exploiting the retailer's irrationality in the ordering behavior.

Designing Revenue Sharing Contract for Irrational Newsvendors (소매상의 비합리성을 고려한 공급사슬의 수익 공유 계약 설계에 대한 연구)

  • Lee, Jung Min;Seo, Yong Won
    • Journal of the Korean Operations Research and Management Science Society
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    • v.41 no.2
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    • pp.101-127
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    • 2016
  • Irrational ordering decisions of supply chain members have been gaining growing importance in the area of supply chain management. Irrational ordering behaviors that deviate from the profit maximizing decisions in the newsvendor settings have observed with human experiments in recent research. These behaviors can be modeled with several typical decision bias elements. This bias in ordering decisions affects the performance of supply chain contracts designed based on the assumption that the supply chain members make optimal decisions, making it necessary to design supply chain contracts by considering the irrationality. The purpose of this research is to derive a method to design the revenue sharing contract that considers human irrationality in ordering decisions. This research considers a simple two-echelon supply chain consisting of one supplier and one retailer, where the supplier is assumed to be perfectly rational while the retailer making newsvendor type ordering decisions displays irrational ordering behaviors. Under this environment, this research analytically models the revenue sharing contract to maximize the total supply chain profit or the supplier's own profits while considering the three decision bias patterns of the retailer, which include the pull-to-center effect, the prospect theory, and the increased subjective sensitivity to the revenue sharing ratio. Irrationality parameters are measured through human experiments based on which and through numerical simulations, we showed that significant improvements in the supply chain performance can be achieved.