• Journal of Arbitration Studies
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• v.30 no.2
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• pp.91-120
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• 2020

The Scope of Application of North Korea's Foreign Economic Arbitration Act and Foreign Investment Act This article examines whether the Foreign Economic Arbitration Act and the Foreign Investment Act of North Korea apply to South Korean parties or companies. This article analyzes laws and agreements related to economic cooperation between South Korea and North Korea. Furthermore, this article compares and evaluates laws related to foreign investment and enacted in North Korea. Now, North Korea's door is closed due to economic sanctions against it, but it will be opened soon. Thus, this article prepares for the future opening of North Korea's markets. Is there a rule of laws in North Korea or just a ruler? Are there laws in North Korea? North Korea has enacted a number of legislation to attract foreign investors, referring to those Chinese laws. For example, North Korea enacted the Foreigner Investment Act, the Foreigner Company Act, the Foreign Investment Bank Act, the Foreign Economic Arbitration Act, the Foreign Economic Contract Act, the International Trade Act, and the Free Economy and Trade Zone Act, among others. Article 2 (2) of the Foreign Investment Law of North Korea states, "Foreign investors are corporations and individuals from other countries investing in our country." It is interpreted that South Korea is not included in the "other countries" of this definition. According to many mutual agreements signed by South Korea and North Korea, the relationship between the two Koreas is a special relation inside the Korean ethnic group. An arbitration between a South Korean party and a North Korean party has the characteristics of both domestic arbitrations and international arbitrations. If the South Korea and North Korea Commercial Arbitration Commission or the Kaesong Industrial Complex Arbitration Commission is not established, the possibility of arbitration by the Chosun International Trade Arbitration Commission, established under North Korea's Foreign Economic Arbitration Act, should be examined. There have been no cases where the Foreign Economic Arbitration Act is applied to disputes between parties of South Korea and North Korea. It might be possible to apply the Foreign Economic Arbitration Act by recognizing the "foreign factor" of a dispute between the South Korean party and North Korean party. It is necessary to raise legislative clarifications by revising the North Korea's Foreign Economic Arbitration Act as to whether Korean parties or companies are included in the scope of this Act's application. Even if it is interpreted that South Korean parties or companies are not included in the scope of North Korea's Foreign Economic Arbitration Act, disputes between South Korean companies and North Korean companies can be resolved by foreign arbitration institutes such as CIETAC in China, HKIAC in Hong Kong, or SIAC in Singapore. Such arbitration awards could be enforced in North Korea pursuant to Article 64 of North Korea's Foreign Economic Arbitration Act. This is because the arbitration awards of foreign arbitration institutes are included in the scope of North Korea's Foreign Economic Arbitration Act. The matter is how to enforce the North Korean laws when a North Korean party or North Korean government does not abide by the laws or their contracts. It is essential for North Korea to join the New York Convention (Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards) and the ICSID Convention (Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and Nationals of Other States).

• Journal of Korea Trade
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• v.25 no.5
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• pp.39-57
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• 2021

Purpose - This research uses ocean marine insurance (OMI) statistics, international emails, focus-group interviews, and surveys to fill the gap between the theory of behavioral insurance, particularly status quo bias (SQB), and the practice of OMI in Korea. The contractual forms of OMI, the oldest and most globalized form of commercial insurance, were developed in the UK as the Institute Cargo Clauses in 1906 and revised in 1963, 1982, and 2009. SQB has been academically explored, mostly in health insurance and the financial services sector, but never in OMI. Thanks to the availability of OMI statistics in Korea, we can conduct SQB research here for the first time in this field. Design/methodology - We show the existence of SQB in the OMI of Korea through Korean statistics between 2009 and 2018, email correspondence with experts in the UK, Germany, and Japan, focus-group interviews with Korean OMI underwriters, an in-depth interview with one underwriter, and a survey of 15 OMI insureds (company representatives). Findings - We find that Korean foreign traders rely on the old-type OMI contracts developed in 1963, whereas other industrialized countries use the newest type of OMI contract developed in 2009. With a simple loss ratio analysis during 2009-2018, we show that the behavior of insurers has little to do with rational profit maximization and is instead driven by irrational bias, as they forgo the more profitable contracts provided by the new clauses by keeping the old clauses. The consistent addiction to old types of contracts in the OMI market suggests strong SQB among Korean exporters, importers, bankers, or insurers, which we confirmed in our interviews and survey. Originality/value - This research has significant originality and academic value because it reports new findings with crucial implications for the development of efficient trade practices and policy. First, this research is based on actual statistics that have not been used in previous Korean research on OMI. Second, this research shows that all-risk OMI policies provide more value to insureds, in terms of coverage given premium, than partial coverage policies, which differs from arguments previously made in Korea. Third, this research reveals strong SQB in Korea, where foreign trade plays a pivotal role in economic growth. That bias could be attributable to uninformed traders, informed but idle insurers, or conservative bankers. Fourth, to further develop foreign trade, policy initiatives are needed to review the current practices of OMI contracts and move forward with the new contract forms. All of these findings and arguments are both new and important.

• Korean Business Review
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• v.11
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• pp.439-464
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• 1998

Global electronic commerce, driven by the development of the Internet and computer, premises to be an important engine for growth for the world economy in the 21st century. Electronic commerce offers considerable new opportunities for businesses and citizens in all regions of the world by enhancing productivity across all sectors 6f our economies and encouraging trade in both goods and services. Specially in relation to contract, electronic commerce requires a coherent, coordinated approach internationally on key issues such as a validity, a legality, consumer protection. In order to ensure the stable growth of electronic commerce in Korea, the government needs to construct a predictable legal and commercial environment, suitable to the situation in Korea, for business conduct on the Internet and other electronic method. Electronic commerce, which breaks down national boundaries and widens the gap between the place where services are performed and the place where they are consumed, requires a new paradigm when making an agreement between contracting parties.

• The Korean Journal of Air & Space Law and Policy
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• v.1
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• pp.147-162
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• 1989

The current status of the application and interpretation of the Warsaw Convention and its subsequent Protocols in Asian countries is in its fredgling stages compared to the developed countries of Europe and North America, and there is thus little published information about the various Asian governments' treatment and courts' views of the Warsaw System. Due to that limitation, the accent of this paper will be on Korea and Japan. As one will be aware, the so-called 'Warsaw System' is made up of the Warsaw Convention of 1929, the Hague Protocol of 1955, the Guadalajara Convention of 1961, the Guatemala City Protocol of 1971 and the Montreal Additional Protocols Nos. 1,2,3 and 4 of 1975. Among these instruments, most of the countries in Asia are parties to both the Warsaw Convention and the Hague Protocol. However, the Republic of Korea and Mongolia are parties only to the Hague Protocol, while Burma, Indonesia and Sri Lanka are parties only to the Warsaw Convention. Thailand and Taiwan are not parties only to the convention or protocol. Among Asian states, Indonesia, the Phillipines and Pakistan are also parties to the Guadalajara Convention, but no country in Asia has signed the Guatemala City Protocol of 1971 or the Montreal Additional Protocols, which Protocols have not yet been put into force. The People's Republic of China has declared that the Warsaw Convention shall apply to the entire Chinese territory, including Taiwan. 'The application of the Warsaw Convention to one-way air carriage between a state which is a party only to the Warsaw Convention and a state which is a party only to the Hague Protocol' is of particular importance in Korea as it is a signatory only to the Hague Protocol, but it is involved in a great deal of air transportation to and from the united states, which in turn is a party only to the Warsaw Convention. The opinion of the Supreme Court of Korea appears to be, that parties to the Warsaw Convention were intended to be parties to the Hague Protocol, whether they actually signed it or not. The effect of this decision is that in Korea the United States and Korea will be considered by the courts to be in a treaty relationship, though neither State is a signatory to the same instrument as the other State. The first wrongful death claim in Korea related to international carriage by air under the Convention was made in Hyun-Mo Bang, et al v. Korean Air Lines Co., Ltd. case. In this case, the plaintiffs claimed for damages based upon breach of contract as well as upon tort under the Korean Civil Code. The issue in the case was whether the time limitation provisions of the Convention should be applicable to a claim based in tort as well as to a claim based in contract. The Appellate Court ruled on 29 August 1983 that 'however founded' in Article 24(1) of the Convention should be construed to mean that the Convention should be applicable to the claim regardless of whether the cause of action was based in tort or breach of contract, and that the plaintiffs' rights to damages had therefore extinguished because of the time limitation as set forth in Article 29(1) of the Convention. The difficult and often debated question of what exactly is meant by the words 'such default equivalent to wilful misconduct' in Article 25(1) of the Warsaw Convention, has also been litigated. The Supreme Court of Japan dealt with this issue in the Suzuki Shinjuten Co. v. Northwest Airlines Inc. case. The Supreme Court upheld the Appellate Court's ruling, and decided that 'such default equivalent to wilful misconduct' under Article 25(1) of the Convention was within the meaning of 'gross negligence' under the Japanese Commercial Code. The issue of the convention of the 'franc' into national currencies as provided in Article 22 of the Warsaw Convention as amended by the Hague Protocol has been raised in a court case in Korea, which is now before the District Court of Seoul. In this case, the plaintiff argues that the gold franc equivalent must be converted in Korean Won in accordance with the free market price of gold in Korea, as Korea has not enacted any law, order or regulation prescribing the proper method of calculating the equivalent in its national currency. while it is unclear if the court will accept this position, the last official price of gold of the United States as in the famous Franklin Mint case, Special Drawing Right(SDR) or the current French franc, Korean Air Lines has argued in favor of the last official price of gold of the United States by which the air lines converted such francs into us Dollars in their General Conditions of Carriage. It is my understanding that in India, an appellate court adopted the free market price valuation. There is a report as well saying that if a lawsuit concerning this issue were brought in Pakistan, the free market cost of gold would be applied there too. Speaking specifically about the future of the Warsaw System in Asia though I have been informed that Thailand is actively considering acceding to the Warsaw Convention, the attitudes of most Asian countries' governments towards the Warsaw System are still wnot ell known. There is little evidence that Asian countries are moving to deal concretely with the conversion of the franc into their own local currencies. So too it cannot be said that they are on the move to adhere to the Montreal Additional Protocols Nos. 3 & 4 which attempt to basically solve many of the current problems with the Warsaw System, by adopting the SDR as the unit of currency, by establishing the carrier's absolute liability and an unbreakable limit and by increasing the carrier's passenger limit of liability to SDR 100,000, as well as permiting the domestic introduction of supplemental compensation. To summarize my own sentiments regarding the future, I would say that given the fact that Asian air lines are now world leaders both in overall size and rate of growth, and the fact that both Asian individuals and governments are becoming more and more reliant on the global civil aviation networks as their economies become ever stronger, I am hopeful that Asian nations will henceforth play a bigger role in ensuring the orderly and hasty development of a workable unified system of rules governing international commercial air carriage.

• THE INTERNATIONAL COMMERCE & LAW REVIEW
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• v.20
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• pp.129-150
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• 2003

Software license agreements, to be useful in the mass market, could not be individually negotiated, and had to be standardized and concise. The software license agreement needs to be presented to the licensee-users in a fashion that would allow for mass distribution of software, also for it to enforceable, that would draw the users' attention to the terms and conditions under which the publisher allowed the use of the software. These needs have been accomplished, with or without fail, through so called the "shrink-wrap licenses" Shrink-wrap licenses purpose to transfer computer softwares to their users by defining the terms and conditions of use of the software without implicating the "first sale doctrine" of the Copyright Act. These shrink-wrap licenses have become essential to the software industry. However, in USA, the law applicable to these licenses has been unclear and unsettled. Courts have struggled to develop a coherent framework governing their enforceability. Meanwhile, the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws ("NCCUSL") in USA promulgated the Uniform Computer Information Transaction Act ("UCITA") governing contracts for computer information transaction on July 29, 1999. One clear objective of UCITA was to settle the law governing the enforceability of shrink-wrap licenses. In these respects, this paper first introduces the various forms that shrink-wrap licenses take(at Part II. Section 1.), and explains the main advantages of them(at Part II. Section 2.) Here it shows how shrink-wrap licenses value themselves for both software publishers and users, including that shrink-wrap licenses are a valuable contracting tool because they provide vital information and rights to software users and because they permit the contracting flexibility that is essential for today's software products. Next, this paper describes the current legal framework applicable to shrink-wrap licenses in USA(at Part III). Here it shows that in USA the development of case law governing shrink-wrap licenses occurred in two distinct stages. At first stage, judicial hostility toward shrink-wrap licenses marked such that they were not enforced pursuant to Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code. At second stage, courts began to recognize the pervasiveness of shrink-wrap licenses, their indispensability to the rapidly expanding information technology industry, and the urgent need to enforce such licenses in order to maintain low prices for consumers of computer hardware or software, resulting in the recognition of shrink-wrap licenses. Finally, in view of the importance of UCITA, this paper examines how it will affect the enforceability of shrink-wrap licenses(at Part IV). The drafters of UCITA, as well as the scholars and practitioners who have criticized it, agree that it validates shrink-wrap licenses, provided certain procedural protections are afforded to purchasers. These procedural protections include the licensee end-user must (i) manifest his assent to the shrink-wrap license, (ii) have an opportunity to review the shrink-wrap license, (iii) have a right to return the product without costs.

• KDI Journal of Economic Policy
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• v.13 no.1
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• pp.3-33
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• 1991

Since the early 1980's, the Korean government has gradually been widening the Korean market to foreign consumer goods. This, combined with the increased purchasing power of the Korean consumers resulting from the continued economic growth of the country, has sparked a spectacular influx of foreign consumer goods into Korea, ranging from BMW's to chopsticks. Import of foreign consumer goods amounted to more than 6 billion dollars in 1989 and is continuing to grow at a rapid rate. The increased import of foreign consumer goods doubtlessly improved the overall welfare of the Korean consumers by providing them with a wider range of options to choose from, by lowering the prices of some of the consumer goods domestically produced, and also by forcing the producers of some Korean goods to face competition with better foreign goods, thus giving them an incentive to raise the quality of their products. However, it is agreed by most economists that this increase in general welfare has been much smaller than what they had expected at the outset. Consumer prices of most imported consumer goods are easily double the import price, and in some cases, more than treble the import prices. Further, there has not been a noticeable drop in the prices of domestically produced consumer goods. Much of the blame has been attributed to the distribution sector of Korea. The objective of this paper is to analyze the imported consumer goods distribution sector of Korea, focusing on the possible sources of the poor performance of that sector, and to make policy suggestions that could potentially increase the welfare. This paper differs from all the previous research by others on this subject in that it analyzes the imported consumer goods distribution sector of Korea as a vertical structure. The distribution sector of an imported consumer good is a vertical structure since it consists of an international market, an import stage, and domestic wholesale and retail markets, in that order vertically. Our study naturally includes the analysis of the vertical restraints as well as the analysis of the industrial organization of each horizontal stage in the vertical structure. Each horizontal component of the imported consumer goods distribution sector is basically a monopolistically competitive market differentiated by characteristics of goods and by the locations and the services of firms. Further, restrictive dealership and resale price maintenance are found to be widely in use. Our main findings are the follwing; First, most consumer goods are imported monopolistically or oligopolistically through restrictive dealership contracts between foreign producers and domestic importers. Such restrictive dealership gives importers market power in the domestic market and explains many of the large discrepancies betwen the consumer prices and the import prices of many goods. Korean anti - trust law does not cover the issues arising from the market power of an importer resulting from a restrictive dealership contract. Second, some major producers of Korean goods are also importers of foreign goods that are substitutes of their products. The import of substitutes by major domestic producers is anti - competitive because it tends to raise the prices of both domestic goods and foreign goods, and also because it reduces the incentive of the domestic producers to raise the quality of their products. Third, wholesalers and retailers widely use resale price maintenance as a price fixing mechanism, and while this is against the anti- trust law, it seldom gets noticed. Fourth, the high level of rents of real estate for commercial use works as an entry barrier to the distribution sector and results in reduced competition by the firms in that sector. Finally, there are information problems. Consumers have inferior information to firms about the quality of a foreign consumer good that they have not tried before. Such information asymmetry often enables firms to raise prices. In addition, information asymmetry between importers frequently delays the import of cheaper substitutes. In order to alleviate the problems indentified above, we suggest the following policy changes. The government should strengthen the anti - trust law and its enforcement to regulate restrictive import contracts, import of competing goods by major domestic producers, and RPM by wholesalers and retailers that is aimed at price fixing. In addition, the government should loosen its tight real estate policy to encourage investment in the distribution sector. Finally, we suggest that the import price revelation policy that has been in use for some items since 1990 be expanded to most imported consumer goods that are introduced for the first time to give consumer better information and be used only for the period of time needed to inform sufficient number of consumers.