• Title/Summary/Keyword: Interference field strength

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Study on EMI Elimination and PLN Application in ELF Band for Romote Sensing with Electric Potentiometer (전위계차 센서를 이용한 원격센싱을 위한 ELF 대역 EMI 제거 및 PLN 응용 연구)

  • Jang, Jin Soo;Kim, Young Chul
    • Smart Media Journal
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    • v.4 no.1
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    • pp.33-38
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    • 2015
  • In this paper, we propose the methods not only to eliminate ELF(Extremely Low Frequency) EMI(Electro-Magnetic Interference) noice for extending recognition distance, but also to utilize the the PLN for detecting starting instance of a hand gesture using electric potential sensor. First, we measure strength of electric field generated in the smart devices such as TV and phone, and minimize EMI through efficient arrangement of the sensors. Meanwhile, we utilize the 60 Hz PLN to extract the starting point of hand gesture. Thereafter, we eliminate the PLN generated in the smart device and circuit of sensors. And then, we shield the sensors from an electric noise generated from devices. Finally, through analyzing the frequency components according to the gesture of target, we use the low pass filter and the Kalman filter for elimination of remaining electric noise. We analyze and evaluate the proposed ELF-band EMI eliminating method for non-contact remote sensing of the EPS(Electric Potential Sensor). Combined with a detecting technique of gesture starting point, the recognition distance for gestures has been proven to be extended to more than 3m, which is critical for real application.

A Study on the Effects of Various Portable Wireless Communication Equipments on the Medical Equipments (각종 휴대용 무선 통신기기가 의료기기에 미치는 영향에 관한 연구)

  • 배한길;김종헌
    • The Journal of Korean Institute of Electromagnetic Engineering and Science
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    • v.10 no.3
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    • pp.392-400
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    • 1999
  • In this paper, the electromagnetic immunity of electronic medical equipments was tested by employing a standard test method for medical equipments. In addition, the electromagnetic interference to the medical equipments caused by four different types of mobile phones such as portable transceiver, analog, digital, and PCS cellular phones, have been studied. In this study, 16 medical equipments of 11 different types were investigated. There are a patient monitor, an infusion pump, a neonatal incubator and so on. In the case of the EMS test, the interferences were detected for seven medical equipments of four different types(53.3%) such as the patient monitor. For the two portable transceivers, 12 medical equipments of eight different models (75%) were affected. All medical equipments were satisfied with electromagnetic immunity by analog, digital and PCS cellular phones. The experiment results show that the malfunction of the electronic medical equipments is dependent on the frequency range and the electric field strength of the mobile phones.

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Effect Analysis of Offshore Wind Farms on VHF band Communications (VHF 대역 통신에 대한 해상풍력 발전단지의 영향성 분석)

  • Oh, Seongwon;Park, Taeyong
    • Journal of the Korean Society of Marine Environment & Safety
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    • v.28 no.2
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    • pp.307-313
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    • 2022
  • As the development of renewable energy expands internationally to cope with global warming and climate change, the share of wind power generation has been gradually increasing. Although wind farms can produce electric power for 24 h a day compared to solar power plants, Their interfere with the operation of nearby radars or communication equipment must be analyzed because large-scale wind power turbines are installed. This study analyzed whether a land radio station can receive sufficient signals when a ship sailing outside the offshore wind farm transmits distress signals on the VHF band. Based on the geographic information system digital map around the target area, wind turbine CAD model, and wind farm layout, the area of interest and wind farm were modeled to enable numerical analysis. Among the high frequency analysis techniques suitable for radio wave analysis in a wide area, a dedicated program applying physical optics (PO) and shooting and bouncing ray (SBR) techniques were used. Consequently, the land radio station could receive the electromagnetic field above the threshold of the VHF receiver when a ship outside the offshore wind farm transmitted a distress communication signal. When the line of sight between the ships and the land station are completely blocked, the strength of the received field decreases, but it is still above the threshold. Hence, although a wind farm is a huge complex, a land station can receive the electromagnetic field from the ship's VHF transmitter because the wave length of the VHF band is sufficiently long to have effects such as diffraction or reflection.

A study on Actual Condition and Interfererence of Electromagnetic Fields inside of The Hospital (I) (의료기관내 전자파환경 실태와 그 영향 (I))

  • Lee, Jun-Ha;Shin, Hyun-Jin;Yoo, Heum
    • Progress in Medical Physics
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    • v.8 no.1
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    • pp.53-67
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    • 1997
  • General hospitals have being under the influence of various and specific environment of electromagnetic field. The factors are development of medical electric equipment and device with enlarged functional demands, in high power and multi-frequency. It has all of both faces, EMI(electromagnetic interference) and EMS(electromagnetic susceptibility). In additional, expansion of personal communication system(cellular phone) has many unreliable factor of using time and area, making noise of electromagnetic fields. We studied actual conditions of EMI in the medical site, where is numerous medical equipment, especially central operation room and ICU(intensive care unit), AKR(artificial kidney room : hemo-dialysis unit), etc. The influence, most of medical equipments made electromagnetic nosie has various factors in its band of frequency, harmonics and strength. In the experimental use of electro-surgical unit and cellular phone, noticeable and considerable noise of eletromagnetic fields were measured. All of that can make trouble and errors on the steadiness of bioelectrical devices. In conclusion, It is necessary to reconsiderations of reallocating EMI source vs. EMS factor, and set to definite forbiding area of using cellular phone. For maintenance of steady normal conditions, in spite of existing any other legal standards of safty level, it need considering all of alternative electromagnetic situations on a case-by-case basis.

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APPLICATION OF FUZZY SET THEORY IN SAFEGUARDS

  • Fattah, A.;Nishiwaki, Y.
    • Proceedings of the Korean Institute of Intelligent Systems Conference
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    • 1993.06a
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    • pp.1051-1054
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    • 1993
  • The International Atomic Energy Agency's Statute in Article III.A.5 allows it“to establish and administer safeguards designed to ensure that special fissionable and other materials, services, equipment, facilities and information made available by the Agency or at its request or under its supervision or control are not used in such a way as to further any military purpose; and to apply safeguards, at the request of the parties, to any bilateral or multilateral arrangement, or at the request of a State, to any of that State's activities in the field of atomic energy”. Safeguards are essentially a technical means of verifying the fulfilment of political obligations undertaken by States and given a legal force in international agreements relating to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The main political objectives are: to assure the international community that States are complying with their non-proliferation and other peaceful undertakings; and to deter (a) the diversion of afeguarded nuclear materials to the production of nuclear explosives or for military purposes and (b) the misuse of safeguarded facilities with the aim of producing unsafeguarded nuclear material. It is clear that no international safeguards system can physically prevent diversion. The IAEA safeguards system is basically a verification measure designed to provide assurance in those cases in which diversion has not occurred. Verification is accomplished by two basic means: material accountancy and containment and surveillance measures. Nuclear material accountancy is the fundamental IAEA safeguards mechanism, while containment and surveillance serve as important complementary measures. Material accountancy refers to a collection of measurements and other determinations which enable the State and the Agency to maintain a current picture of the location and movement of nuclear material into and out of material balance areas, i. e. areas where all material entering or leaving is measurab e. A containment measure is one that is designed by taking advantage of structural characteristics, such as containers, tanks or pipes, etc. To establish the physical integrity of an area or item by preventing the undetected movement of nuclear material or equipment. Such measures involve the application of tamper-indicating or surveillance devices. Surveillance refers to both human and instrumental observation aimed at indicating the movement of nuclear material. The verification process consists of three over-lapping elements: (a) Provision by the State of information such as - design information describing nuclear installations; - accounting reports listing nuclear material inventories, receipts and shipments; - documents amplifying and clarifying reports, as applicable; - notification of international transfers of nuclear material. (b) Collection by the IAEA of information through inspection activities such as - verification of design information - examination of records and repo ts - measurement of nuclear material - examination of containment and surveillance measures - follow-up activities in case of unusual findings. (c) Evaluation of the information provided by the State and of that collected by inspectors to determine the completeness, accuracy and validity of the information provided by the State and to resolve any anomalies and discrepancies. To design an effective verification system, one must identify possible ways and means by which nuclear material could be diverted from peaceful uses, including means to conceal such diversions. These theoretical ways and means, which have become known as diversion strategies, are used as one of the basic inputs for the development of safeguards procedures, equipment and instrumentation. For analysis of implementation strategy purposes, it is assumed that non-compliance cannot be excluded a priori and that consequently there is a low but non-zero probability that a diversion could be attempted in all safeguards ituations. An important element of diversion strategies is the identification of various possible diversion paths; the amount, type and location of nuclear material involved, the physical route and conversion of the material that may take place, rate of removal and concealment methods, as appropriate. With regard to the physical route and conversion of nuclear material the following main categories may be considered: - unreported removal of nuclear material from an installation or during transit - unreported introduction of nuclear material into an installation - unreported transfer of nuclear material from one material balance area to another - unreported production of nuclear material, e. g. enrichment of uranium or production of plutonium - undeclared uses of the material within the installation. With respect to the amount of nuclear material that might be diverted in a given time (the diversion rate), the continuum between the following two limiting cases is cons dered: - one significant quantity or more in a short time, often known as abrupt diversion; and - one significant quantity or more per year, for example, by accumulation of smaller amounts each time to add up to a significant quantity over a period of one year, often called protracted diversion. Concealment methods may include: - restriction of access of inspectors - falsification of records, reports and other material balance areas - replacement of nuclear material, e. g. use of dummy objects - falsification of measurements or of their evaluation - interference with IAEA installed equipment.As a result of diversion and its concealment or other actions, anomalies will occur. All reasonable diversion routes, scenarios/strategies and concealment methods have to be taken into account in designing safeguards implementation strategies so as to provide sufficient opportunities for the IAEA to observe such anomalies. The safeguards approach for each facility will make a different use of these procedures, equipment and instrumentation according to the various diversion strategies which could be applicable to that facility and according to the detection and inspection goals which are applied. Postulated pathways sets of scenarios comprise those elements of diversion strategies which might be carried out at a facility or across a State's fuel cycle with declared or undeclared activities. All such factors, however, contain a degree of fuzziness that need a human judgment to make the ultimate conclusion that all material is being used for peaceful purposes. Safeguards has been traditionally based on verification of declared material and facilities using material accountancy as a fundamental measure. The strength of material accountancy is based on the fact that it allows to detect any diversion independent of the diversion route taken. Material accountancy detects a diversion after it actually happened and thus is powerless to physically prevent it and can only deter by the risk of early detection any contemplation by State authorities to carry out a diversion. Recently the IAEA has been faced with new challenges. To deal with these, various measures are being reconsidered to strengthen the safeguards system such as enhanced assessment of the completeness of the State's initial declaration of nuclear material and installations under its jurisdiction enhanced monitoring and analysis of open information and analysis of open information that may indicate inconsistencies with the State's safeguards obligations. Precise information vital for such enhanced assessments and analyses is normally not available or, if available, difficult and expensive collection of information would be necessary. Above all, realistic appraisal of truth needs sound human judgment.

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