• Journal of the Korea Society of Computer and Information
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• v.25 no.7
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• pp.159-165
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• 2020

With respect to the cause of asymmetric cost behavior, there are two streams of the literature. One stream focused on effect of managerial expectation and the other explained using agency system. In this study, we aim to investigate the determinants of asymmetric cost behavior in these streams. We first examine the impact of managerial overconfidence and optimistic bias on asymmetric cost. We also examine ownership ratio as a proxy of the quality of corporate governance effects on asymmetric cost. The results are as follows. First, firms have the anti-sticky asymmetric cost behavior. Second, we find that the firms with managerial optimistic bias mitigate the degree of asymmetric cost. This finding implies that managerial optimism is a factor that alters asymmetric cost behavior. Third, the degree of asymmetric cost is weaker in case of firms with higher manager's ownership. This result provides an important empirical evidence for understanding the role of corporate governance in cost behavior.

• The Korean Journal of Financial Management
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• v.20 no.1
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• pp.191-212
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• 2003

Recently, there is a growing body of literature that suggests that information inefficiency is one of the causes of the asymmetric volatility. If this explanation for the asymmetric volatility is appropriate, then innovations, such as the introduction of futures, may be expected to impact the asymmetric volatility of stock market. As transaction costs and margin requirements in the futures market are lower than those in the spot market, new information is transmitted to futures prices more quickly and affects spot prices through arbitrage trading with spots. Also, the merit of the futures market may attract noise traders away from the spot market to the futures market. This study examines the impact of futures on the asymmetry of stock market volatility. If the asymmetric volatility is significant lower post-futures and exist in the futures market, it has validity that the asymmetric volatility is caused by information inefficiency in the spot market. The data examined are daily logarithmic returns on KOSPI 200 stock price index from January 4, 1993 to December 26, 2000. To examine the existence of the asymmetric volatility in the futures market, logarithmic returns on KOSPI 200 futures are used from May 4, 1996 to December 26, 2000. We used a conditional mode of TGARCH(threshold GARCH) of Glosten, Jagannathan and Runkel(1993). Pre-futures the spot market exhibits significant asymmetric responses of volatility to news and post-futures asymmetries are significantly lower, irrespective of bear market and bull market. The results suggest that the introduction of stock index futures has an effect on the asymmetric volatility of the spot market and are inconsistent with leverage being the sole explanation of asymmetry. However, it is found that the volatility of futures is not so asymmetric as expected.

• Journal of the Institute of Electronics Engineers of Korea CI
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• v.40 no.3
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• pp.164-170
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• 2003

This paper proposes a novel method to detect Furon's asymmetric watermark by using a correlation detector that is mathematically tractable and simple. The performance of the proposed method is tested under various conditions. The experimental results matched the theoretical results well, showing that the correlation detector can indeed be used for the detection of asymmetric watermark. The proposed detector is aplied to both single and multiple bit embedded watermark. Bit error rate (BER), obtained from the experiment, was compared to the one obtained from the theory. As the embedded information increases, the BER of the Furon's asymmetric watermarking method also increases rapidly.

• Industrial Engineering and Management Systems
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• v.12 no.3
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• pp.264-273
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• 2013

Credit option is a policy that has been studied by many researchers in the area of supply chain management. This policy has been applied in practice to improve the profits of supply chain members. Usually, a credit option policy is proposed by the seller, and often under a symmetric information environment where members have complete information on each others' operations. In this paper, we investigate two scenarios: firstly, the seller offers a credit option to the buyer, and secondly, the buyer attempts to stretch the length of the credit period offered by the seller. The proposed model in both scenarios will be investigated under an asymmetric information structure where some information are private and are only known to the individual who has knowledge of this information. The interactions between buyer and seller will be modeled by non-cooperative Stackelberg games where the buyer and seller take turn as leader and follower. Among some of the numerical results obtained, the seller and buyer's profits obtained from symmetric information games are larger than those obtained from an asymmetric information game in both scenarios. Furthermore, both buyer and seller's profit in the second scenario are better than in the first scenario.

• Journal of the Korean Data and Information Science Society
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• v.22 no.5
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• pp.999-1005
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• 2011

This paper proposes a weighted least squares support vector machine for asymmetric least squares regression. This method achieves nonlinear prediction power, while making no assumption on the underlying probability distributions. The cross validation function is introduced to choose optimal hyperparameters in the procedure. Experimental results are then presented which indicate the performance of the proposed model.

• Journal of the Korean Data and Information Science Society
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• v.22 no.2
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• pp.353-360
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• 2011

We consider an asymmetric power transformed threshold GARCH(1.1) process and find sufficient conditions for the existence of a strictly stationary solution, geometric ergodicity and ${\beta}$-mixing property. Moments conditions are given. Box-Cox transformed threshold GARCH(1.1) is also considered as a special case.

• Journal of the Korean Data and Information Science Society
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• v.21 no.6
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• pp.1311-1317
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• 2010

A continuous time asymmetric power GARCH(1,1) model is suggested, based on a single background driving L$\'{e}$vy process. The stochastic differential equation for the given process is derived and the strict stationarity and kth order moment conditions are examined.

• Journal of the Korean Data and Information Science Society
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• v.22 no.6
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• pp.1233-1240
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• 2011

An augmented asymmetric power GARCH(p, q) process is considered and conditions for stationarity, geometric ergodicity and ${\beta}$-mixing property with exponential decay rate are obtained.

• Journal of Korea Multimedia Society
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• v.25 no.7
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• pp.922-931
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• 2022

Recently, the need for health information management platforms has been increasing for efficient medical and IT technology research. However, health information is requiring security management by law. When permissioned blockchain technology is used to manage health information, the integrity is provided because only the authenticated users participate in bock generation. However, if the blockchain server is attacked, it is difficult to provide security because user authentication, block generation, and block verification are all performed on the blockchain server. In this paper, therefore, we propose a Health Information Management Server, which uses a permissioned blockchain algorithm and asymmetric cryptography. Health information is managed as a blockchain transaction to maintain the integrity, and the actual data are encrypted with an asymmetric key. Since using a private key kept in the institute local environment, the data confidentiality is maintained, even if the server is attacked. 1,000 transactions were requested, as a result, it was found that the server's average response time was 6,140ms, and the average turnaround time of bock generation was 368ms, which were excellent compared to those of conventional technology. This paper is that a model was proposed to overcome the limitations of permissioned blockchains.

• International Area Studies Review
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• v.15 no.1
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• pp.59-86
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• 2011

This paper examines a country's strategic optimal tariff policy against a foreign firm with market power. That is, the purpose of the paper is, under asymmetric information, to reexamine the problem of optimal tariff policy against a foreign monopolist from another country's welfare standpoint. This is to extend the analysis of Brander and Spencer(1984) which is both analytic and elaborate. The incentive compatible tariff schedule is derived, and then policy implications are investigated. The main result is that, under incomplete information, the optimal tariff is elevated above its full-information counterpart in order to capture foreign rents. Moreover, it suggests that trade policies motivated by rent extraction are unlikely to be robust to the introduction of incomplete information. This research complements an existing literature on the strategic trade policy in terms of asymmetric information.