• Journal of Korean Society for Quality Management
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• v.37 no.2
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• pp.22-31
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• 2009

While large companies successfully manage incentive systems, small and medium sized companies have difficulties in successful management of the incentive system. In this article, we propose an incentive model fitted for the small and medium sized companies. To overcome the barriers, which are mainly due to lack of resources, we use the ideas of TOC and BSC. We also provide an application example of an actual company and examine the validity of our model.

• Journal of Korean Society of Industrial and Systems Engineering
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• v.42 no.4
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• pp.39-48
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• 2019

This paper considers the Prisoner's Dilemma Game in which there exists a dilemma that the best response is that both players are to confess, but doing not confess can give a higher gain to the both players in a social perspective. To resolve such a dilemma in the game, an incentive model to encourage to confess and a penalty model for being imposed when not confessing are introduced, respectively. Then, the conditions are characterized under which incentive or penalty involved in the game's payoffs can make the game rational without a dilemma on both the personal and social perspectives, by taking the payoff values as variables with the incentive and penalty factors. Furthermore, it turns out that the resulting values of incentive and penalty are inversely proportional to each other, and thus, obtaining one of these amounts can provide the other. Simple examples are shown to interpret the theoretical verifications of our models, and randomly generated data based simulation results investigate the tendency of incentive and penalty and the resulting game values for a variety of instances. These results can provide a framework on resolving the dilemma by artificially putting incentive or penalty, although it is careful to apply more generalized real world games.

• Journal of the Korea Society of Computer and Information
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• v.16 no.8
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• pp.165-176
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• 2011

In this paper, we develop the cost minimization model to select two incentives and total order quantity with consideration of remanufacture company's return incentive. Return rate is sensitive to the incentive that the manufacture company offers. Using a EOQ(Economic Order Quantity) model of a cost minimization, we show concavities of the model about two incentives and total order quantity respectively. According to the proposed algorithm using the concavities, we find out the optimized incentive prices and total order quantity. Through numerical study, we examine sensitive analysis of the incentive price and order quantity for each parameter when the return rate is sensitive to incentive. Company lessens incentive to reduce total price. However, this makes the total price increase due to a diminution of return quantity. We expect that domestic or overseas remanufacture businesses are able to decide optimal incentive and total order quantity by this research.

• KDI Journal of Economic Policy
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• v.33 no.3
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• pp.121-161
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• 2011

We study incentive structures of public developers and land owners in the process of public expropriations using a sequential game model. In the model, we show that there is an incentive for the public developer to give more compensation than just compensation that are defined by law. Also the model shows that there is an incentive for the land owners to revolt strategically against the public expropriation. Then an ideal authority delegation model is introduced to resolve the problems, where an independent appraiser determines the compensation for the expropriation. In the real world, improving the independence of appraisal process is critical to make the system closer to the ideal authority delegation model. So this paper concludes by making a few policy suggestions to improve the current appraisal system.

• Journal of the Korean Society of Safety
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• v.19 no.4 s.68
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• pp.129-134
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• 2004

Educational programs for promoting occupational safety and health have widely been established in advanced countries, such as United States and Germany, in the area of disaster prevention Focused attentions and investments for safety and health education have been placed especially for small and medium sized companies. Recently, information technologies have also been applied for the development and management of educational programs in those countries. It is also worth noting that a wide variety of incentive systems has been implemented for managers and workers to voluntarily Participate in safety and health education. Based on the brief survey on incentive systems in advanced countries, this study proposes two different incentive models, such as 'Supervision Exemption Model for Participants in Safety and Health Education' and 'Compensation Program fur Educational Expenses and Losses', which may efficiently be employed in Korea. These incentive models may contribute to revitalizing the occupational safety and health education which has recently been dwindled due to the changes in governmental regulations.

• KSII Transactions on Internet and Information Systems (TIIS)
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• v.12 no.1
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• pp.159-177
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• 2018

Participatory sensing is becoming popular and has shown its great potential in data acquisition for ambient assisted living. In this paper, we propose an incentive mechanism in participatory sensing for ambient assisted living, which benefits both the platform and the mobile devices that participated in the sensing task. Firstly, we analyze the profit of participant and platform, and a Stackelberg game model is formulated. The model takes privacy, reputation, power state and quality of data into consideration, and aims at maximizing the profit for both participant and publisher. The discussion of properties of the game show that there exists an unique Stackelberg equilibrium. Secondly, two algorithms are given: one describes how to reach the Stackelberg equilibrium and the other presents the procedures of employing the incentive strategy. Finally, we conduct simulations to evaluate the properties and effectiveness of the proposed mechanism. Simulation results show that the proposed incentive mechanism works well, and the participants and the publisher will be benefitted from it. With the mechanism, the total amount of sensory data can be maximized and the quality of the data can be guaranteed effectively.

• Health Policy and Management
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• v.22 no.2
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• pp.263-274
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• 2012

This study describes the hypertensive patients characteristics associated with the health incentive point program, and develops and analyzes a simple predictive model of participation in the program. Based on the Incheon Chronic Disease Management System(iCDMS), a model program of community partnership for hypertensive or diabetic patients detection and follow-up since 2005 in Incheon metropolitan city, a cross-sectional design was used in this study. An effective 10.844 adults sample was divided into groups according to participation in the health incentive point program and continuing treatment, and individual and health characteristics among groups were compared. Furthermore, the predictors associated with participation in the program were identified by the logistic regression analysis. After the health incentive point program in iCDMS was introduced, the number of hypertensive patients participation in the program increased 23.9 times which is vastly high given the various programs were provided. There were statistically significant differences among the groups: age(p=0.000), treatment compliance(p=0.000), and blood pressure control at the last measurement(p=0.000), in particular, between participation group(GroupI, n=246) and non-participation group(GroupIII, n=10,408). Furthermore, age over 60 years(OR: 0.33), treatment compliance(OR: 3.49~3.78) and blood pressure controls(OR: 2.13~2.30) were statistically significant predictors associated with participation in the program, based on the logistic regression analysis with GroupI and GroupIII. To increase participation in the health incentive point program, variables such as age, treatment compliance and blood pressure controls are more concerned. And, high-risk patients and family members need targeted health incentive programs.

• Journal of Information Processing Systems
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• v.15 no.5
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• pp.1036-1054
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• 2019

Recently, concomitant with a surge in numbers of Internet of Things (IoT) devices with various sensors, mobile crowdsensing (MCS) has provided a new business model for IoT. For example, a person can share road traffic pictures taken with their smartphone via a cloud computing system and the MCS data can provide benefits to other consumers. In this service model, to encourage people to actively engage in sensing activities and to voluntarily share their sensing data, providing appropriate incentives is very important. However, the sensing data from personal devices can be sensitive to privacy, and thus the privacy issue can suppress data sharing. Therefore, the development of an appropriate privacy protection system is essential for successful MCS. In this study, we address this problem due to the conflicting objectives of privacy preservation and incentive payment. We propose a privacy-preserving mechanism that protects identity and location privacy of sensing users through an on-demand incentive payment and group signatures methods. Subsequently, we apply the proposed mechanism to one example of MCS-an intelligent parking system-and demonstrate the feasibility and efficiency of our mechanism through emulation.

• Journal of the Korean Operations Research and Management Science Society
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• v.34 no.3
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• pp.55-69
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• 2009

It is often to apply revenue sharing models in rental industries which consist of a retailer and a wholesaler. This research analyzed the influences to profit of the supply chain if we adopt the revenue sharing model when the demand is uncertain and price sensitive. We found the conditions of the revenue sharing model to maximize the profit of the supply chain, and identified incentive compatible conditions for revenue sharing. It is proved that vertical integration guarantees maximization of profit for the supply chain. Also we found that it is possible to derive Incentive compatible schemes by controlling ranges of revenue sharing ratios.

• Environmental Engineering Research
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• v.19 no.4
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• pp.369-373
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• 2014

In view of the problem of the invalidity of the incentive mechanism of the ecological subsidies, which is due to the information asymmetry between the government's supervision and the enterprise endeavor to fulfill their ecological responsibilities, this paper attempts to analyze the supervision of ecological subsidies based on the Principal-agent Model. Two conclusions are drawn: firstly, the government's supervision regarding the effect of the enterprises' fulfilling the ecological responsibilities can significantly reduce the information asymmetry; secondly, the government's incentive strength and the enterprises' endeavor level of fulfilling the ecological responsibilities are both improving the surveillance dynamics. Here is the suggestion: with the increasing of the surveillance dynamics of the government and the transparency of the enterprises' fulfilling the ecological responsibilities, the government should meanwhile increase the subsidies incentive strength, therefore, to promote the effort level of the enterprises' fulfilling the ecological responsibilities to approach to the Pareto optimal value.