• KDI Journal of Economic Policy
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• v.12 no.1
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• pp.127-148
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• 1990

A Milgrom-Roberts style signalling model of limit pricing is developed to analyze the possibility and the scope of limit pricing in general, noncooperative oligopolies. The model contains multiple incumbent firms facing a potential entrant and assumes an information asymmetry between incombents and the potential entrant about the market demand. There are two periods in the model. In period 1, n incumbent firms simultaneously and noncooperatively choose quantities. At the end of period 1, the potential entrant observes the market price and makes an entry decision. In period 2, depending on the entry decision of the entrant, n' or (n+1) firms choose quantities again before the game terminates. Since the choice of incumbent firms in period 1 depends on their information about demand, the market price in period 1 conveys information about the market demand. Thus, there is a systematic link between the market price and the profitability of entry. Using Bayes-Nash equilibrium as the solution concept, we find that there exist some demand conditions under which incumbent firms will limit price. In symmetric equilibria, incumbent firms each produce an output that is greater than the Cournot output and induce a price that is below the Cournot price. In doing so, each incumbent firm refrains from maximizing short-run profit and supplies a public good that is entry deterrence. The reason that entry is deterred by such a reduced price is that it conveys information about the demand of the industry that is unfavorable to the entrant. This establishes the possibility of limit pricing by noncooperative oligopolists in a setting that is fully rational, and also generalizes the result of Milgrom and Roberts to general oligopolies, confirming Bain's intuition. Limit pricing by incumbents explained above can be interpreted as a form of credible collusion in which each firm voluntarily deviates from myopic optimization in order to deter entry using their superior information. This type of implicit collusion differs from Folk-theorem type collusions in many ways and suggests that a collusion can be a credible one even in finite games as long as there is information asymmetry. Another important result is that as the number of incumbent firms approaches infinity, or as the industry approaches a competitive one, the probability that limit pricing occurs converges to zero and the probability of entry converges to that under complete information. This limit result confirms the intuition that as the number of agents sharing the same private information increases, the value of the private information decreases, and the probability that the information gets revealed increases. This limit result also supports the conventional belief that there is no entry problem in a competitive market. Considering the fact that limit pricing is generally believed to occur at an early stage of an industry and the fact that many industries in Korea are oligopolies in their infant stages, the theoretical results of this paper suggest that we should pay attention to the possibility of implicit collusion by incumbent firms aimed at deterring new entry using superior information. The long-term loss to the Korean economy from limit pricing can be very large if the industry in question is a part of the world market and the domestic potential entrant whose entry is deterred could .have developed into a competitor in the world market. In this case, the long-term loss to the Korean economy should include the lost opportunity in the world market in addition to the domestic long-run welfare loss.

• Environmental and Resource Economics Review
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• v.24 no.3
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• pp.523-549
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• 2015

This paper investigates an oil refiner's asymmetric behavior in the adjustments of gasoline and diesel prices to changes in his own price and his rivals' prices as well as input costs. An asymmetric error correction model which allows a firm's pricing behavior to the deviation of other firms' prices from their long-run equilibrium level is employed for estimation using weekly data for the period April 2009 to January 2015. Evidence is found that there is a significant degree of asymmetry in the adjustment of wholesale prices to changes in crude oil price. A similar result in regard to the exchange rate is also found by the data. The estimation results for firm's response to changes in other firms' prices indicates that implicit collusion could be more easily exploited in the wholesale petroleum market as results of firms' interaction with each other and anticipation of rivals' pricing behavior. A few refiners show competitive price adjustment in response to the upward deviation of the others' prices from their equilibrium level.

• Journal of KIBIM
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• v.11 no.2
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• pp.43-53
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• 2021

The 'public agency oil joint purchase system' was introduced to lower public sector oil prices and contribute to the stability of the overall consumer oil market. The present study used spatial regression to analyze the factors affecting domestic gasoline price, focusing on the impact of potential implicit collusion among gas stations in determining domestic gasoline prices. Also, this study investigated the effect the location characteristics of the market convention gas stations and government offices on the pressure of price competition in the market and the gasoline price at general gas stations. To summarize the results of the spatial lag model (SLM), the individual characteristics of gas stations such as convenience stores (+), self-fuelling (-), commercial areas (+), subway stations (+), population density (-), and sales (-) are correlated to gasoline prices at gas stations, and the institutional location factors of gas stations (+) affected the average of 9 won per liter, 11 won per liter. In order to solve these problems, the establishment of a monitoring system reflecting the location characteristics of the region and the ongoing review of the system should be carried out. In addition, separate, expanded and promotional measures should be prepared for the convenience of general and public oil buyers.