• International Commerce and Information Review
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• v.13 no.1
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• pp.97-120
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• 2011

Purpose of this study is to define competitiveness and attribution factors of Busan port on attracting high value added business such as transshipment cargo. Research finds condition to become optimal transshipment port comprises both internal and external circumstances. As for the internal circumstance, scale and location of the distripark as well as port facilities and the rates, for the external circumstance, international network and information technology on logistics managements are providing positive effects. Optimal plans to attract transshipment cargo should include, first, development of total logistics management system from port entry to unloading, transportation, processing, loading to departure. Second, assign port as free trade zone under customs law to attract foreign investment and goods traffic through tax exemption. Third, unless it is illegal, government needs to grant substantial freedom to shift capital for the foreign investors which will lead increase in cargo traffic and foreign investment.

• KDI Journal of Economic Policy
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• v.42 no.4
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• pp.1-25
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• 2020

The international community's sanctions against North Korea, triggered by North Korea's nuclear tests and by missile development in the country, are considered the strongest sanctions in history, banning exports of North Korea's major items and limiting imports of machinery and oil products. Accordingly, North Korea's trade volume decreased to the level of collapse after the sanctions, meaning that the sanctions against North Korea were considered to be effective. However, according to this paper, which analyzed the price fluctuations of refined petroleum products in North Korea through the methodology of an event study, the market prices of oil products were only temporarily affected by the sanctions and remained stable over the long run despite the restrictions on the volumes of refined petroleum products introduced. This can be explained by evidence that North Korea has introduced refined oil supplies that are not much different from those before the sanctions through its use of illegal transshipments even after the sanctions. With regard to strategic materials such as refined oil, the North Korean authorities are believed to be desperately avoiding sanctions by, for instance, finding loopholes in the sanctions to meet the minimum level of demand.

• Journal of Fisheries and Marine Sciences Education
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• v.27 no.4
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• pp.912-923
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• 2015

In the results of analyzing Korean corrective action for what are required to be improved according to EU listing Korea as yellow-card non-cooperating third countries against IUU fishing, in order to establish advanced fishery order, it is thought that the following additional improvements are required. (1) The introduction of integrated management system of fishing vessel sailing route, fishing activity, fish catch, and inshore fishing vessel must be considered. (2) It is necessary to establish a system to cross check catch transaction, catch landing, and fish catch report submitted by fishing vessel. (3) Catch transshipment approval system shall be introduced. And a system of reporting and checking catch transshipment at sea shall be reinforced. (4) Punishment shall be strengthened to the extent of making people to perceive that loss due to punishment is larger than profit made from illegal fishing. (5) It shall be so improved that more than a certain percentage of all vessels with fish and fish products caught in waters outside Korea's judicial waters shall be arbitrarily chosen and searched besides a case of being suspected to be IUU fishing. In conclusion, on being listed by EU as yellow-card non-cooperating third countries against IUU fishing, Korean fishery management system shall be generally reexamined, and it shall serve as an occasion to exterminate IUU fishing and to advance fishery management system.

• Strategy21
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• s.46
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• pp.239-276
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• 2020

The failure of early economic sanctions aimed at hurting the overall economies of targeted states called for a more sophisticated design of economic sanctions. This paved way for the advent of 'smart sanctions,' which target the supporters of the regime instead of the public mass. Despite controversies over the effectiveness of economic sanctions as a coercive tool to change the behavior of a targeted state, the transformation from 'comprehensive sanctions' to 'smart sanctions' is gaining the status of a legitimate method to impose punishment on states that do not conform to international norms, the nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction in this particular context of the paper. The five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council proved that it can come to an accord on imposing economic sanctions over adopting resolutions on waging military war with targeted states. The North Korean nuclear issue has been the biggest security threat to countries in the region, even for China out of fear that further developments of nuclear weapons in North Korea might lead to a 'domino-effect,' leading to nuclear proliferation in the Northeast Asia region. Economic sanctions had been adopted by the UNSC as early as 2006 after the first North Korean nuclear test and has continually strengthened sanctions measures at each stage of North Korean weapons development. While dubious of the effectiveness of early sanctions on North Korea, recent sanctions that limit North Korea's exports of coal and imports of oil seem to have an impact on the regime, inducing Kim Jong-un to commit to peaceful talks since 2018. The purpose of this paper is to add a variable to the factors determining the success of economic sanctions on North Korea: preventing North Korea's evasion efforts by conducting illegal transshipments at sea. I first analyze the cause of recent success in the economic sanctions that led Kim Jong-un to engage in talks and add the maritime element to the argument. There are three conditions for the success of the sanctions regime, and they are: (1) smart sanctions, targeting commodities and support groups (elites) vital to regime survival., (2) China's faithful participation in the sanctions regime, and finally, (3) preventing North Korea's maritime evasion efforts.