• Journal of Communications and Networks
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• v.16 no.4
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• pp.363-370
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• 2014

Despite several years of intense research, the security and cryptography in wireless sensor networks still have a number of ongoing problems. This paper describes how identification (ID)-based node authentication can be used to solve the key agreement problem in a three-layer interaction. The scheme uses a novel security mechanism that considers the characteristics, architecture, and vulnerability of the sensors, and provides an ID-based node authentication that does not require expensive certificates. The scheme describes the routing process using a simple ID suitable for low power and ID exposure, and proposes an ID-based node authentication. This method achieves low-cost communications with an efficient protocol. Results from this study demonstrates that it improves routing performance under different node densities, and reduces the computational cost of key encryption and decryption.

• Journal of the Korea Institute of Information Security & Cryptology
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• v.19 no.5
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• pp.25-34
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• 2009

Many conference systems over the Internet require authenticated group key agreement (AGKA) for secure and reliable communication. After Shamir [1] proposed the ID-based cryptosystem in 1984, ID-based AGKA protocols have been actively studied because of the simple public key management. In 2006, Zhou et al. [12] proposed two-round ID-based AGKA protocol which is very efficient in communication and computation complexity. However, their protocol does not provide user identification and suffers from the impersonation attack by malicious participants. In this paper, we propose improved ID-based AGKA protocol to prevent impersonation attack from Zhou et al.'s protocol. In our protocol, the malicious insider cannot impersonate another participants even if he knows the ephemeral group secret value. Moreover, our protocol reduces the computation cost from Zhou et al.'s protocol.

• Journal of Communications and Networks
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• v.14 no.6
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• pp.682-691
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• 2012

Key agreement protocol is a fundamental protocol in cryptography whereby two or more participants can agree on a common conference key in order to communicate securely among themselves. In this situation, the participants can securely send and receive messages with each other. An adversary not having access to the conference key will not be able to decrypt the messages. In this paper, we propose a novel identity-based authenticated multi user key agreement protocol employing a symmetric balanced incomplete block design. Our protocol is built on elliptic curve cryptography and takes advantage of a kind of bilinear map called Weil pairing. The protocol presented can provide an identification (ID)-based authentication service and resist different key attacks. Furthermore, our protocol is efficient and needs only two rounds for generating a common conference key. It is worth noting that the communication cost for generating a conference key in our protocol is only O($\sqrt{n}$) and the computation cost is only O($nm^2$), where $n$ implies the number of participants and m denotes the extension degree of the finite field $F_{p^m}$. In addition, in order to resist the different key attack from malicious participants, our protocol can be further extended to provide the fault tolerant property.