• KDI Journal of Economic Policy
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• v.42 no.2
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• pp.1-30
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• 2020

This paper analyzes how injunctions relate to patent hold-up problems. To this end, we present a simple model of licensing negotiations between a patent holder and a downstream firm in the shadow of litigation. More specifically, we consider the situation in which an injunction is granted as a matter of course if a patent is found valid and infringed upon in litigation, but the patent holder may be under-compensated due to aspects of the patent remedy system other than injunctions. We show that if the downstream user is unaware of the patent before any investment in initially designing its product, the patent hold-up problems created by injunction threats are worrisome when (i) the redesign process is costly, (ii) the degree of patent protection (by aspects of the patent remedy system other than injunctions) is sufficiently strong and (iii) the injunction is requested not to practice the patented technology exclusively but to collect excessive patent royalties. Even if the downstream user is aware of the patent before the initial investment, the patent hold-up problems do not disappear. The findings here imply that a discretionary approach is required towards denying injunctions against patent infringement. If the degree of patent protection is not sufficiently strong, denying injunctions can exacerbate the under-compensation problem. However, once patent protection improves enough (not necessarily perfectly), we may see a surge of patent hold-up problems, and it would be better to apply alternative patent remedies in place of injunctions when necessary. Lastly, we discuss several possible alternatives to injunctions and their pros and cons.

• Journal of Arbitration Studies
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• v.16 no.3
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• pp.161-189
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• 2006

This paper is aiming at analyzing case law of India in relation with reasonable time to make decision whether to accept or to refuse the documents received from the presenter in credit transactions. As specified in UCP, the failure to refuse to accept the documents within a reasonable time precludes the Issuing Bank, Confirming Bank (if any) and Nominated Bank from asserting that they are discrepant. Compliance of the stipulated documents on their face with the terms and conditions of the credit shall be determined by international standard banking practice as reflected in this Articles of UCP 500. The Issuing bank is only to be held responsible for honoring the documents presented by beneficiary through the nominated banks if they are strictly in compliance with terms and conditions of the Credit. As any well experienced banker knows, however, a word-by-word, letter-by-letter correspondence between the documents and the credit terms means a practical impossibility. Thus the notion of reasonable care in conjunction with the doctrine of strict compliance mixed with International Standard Banking Practices has not played a right functional standard for checking the documents as stipulated in the credit and UCP 500. And so the rejection rate is highly estimated at approximately 50% in EU and 40 to 70% according to their geographical locations in the USA. As a result, it can possibly be inferred from this fact that the credit industry would be facing the functional failure as the international trade credit facility, if not supported with motive power as a relevant scheme in UCP 500. It is quite important to note that UCP 500 Article 13(b) which specify the time limit for the banks to notify the presenter their decision not to accept the documents within a reasonable time not to exceed seven banking days following the day of receipt of documents would be the motive engine to improve the negotiability of documents in international trade financial facility.