• Journal of architectural history
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• v.25 no.1
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• pp.47-57
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• 2016

The purpose of this paper is to review and analyse the influence of Hegel on architectural historiography. With the point of view that Hegel is the origin of architectural history, this study try to find out how Hegel's philosophy and aesthetics deeply influenced the principle and method of architectural historiography. As a kind of meta-history Hegel's idealism played a important role in the interpretation of architecture and its historiography. We can call it Hegelian legacy and it gave a determinant idea in the discours of architecture, especially Modernism. With a critical view point this study tries to reveal the mythical character of the premise and hypothesis of Hegel's historicism and also reviews its positive aspects in the history of writing architectural history. Today Hegelian thinking in architectural historiography is seriously criticized and considered as a old way of writing history. But this study tries to find a possibility to recognize the contemporary architectural situation with Hegel's concept of universal history. The return of Hegel necessarily does not mean the idea of totality and universality in practice as like in Modernism, but to widen the recognition in contemporary practice and historiography.

• Journal of Korean Philosophical Society
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• v.142
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• pp.295-321
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• 2017

This paper discusses Hegel's concept of Art criticism, focusing on the article "${\ddot{U}}ber$ die Bekehrten" in 16. Vol. of Hegel's Gesammelte Werke. Hegel is a theorist of the system of art, but also an art critic who actively participated in popular art practice. Until now, Hegel has been interpreted mainly as a theorist who usually constitutes the system of art. According to many interpretations, Hegel has been criticized for his theories frame interpretation of the Artwork compulsorily. But in this article we see another aspect of Hegel as an art critic. First, in this article Hegel shows as an art critic how romanticists distort the work with an emphasis on the theory. Hegel argues in his article written in early 1826 that romantic ironic theory does not help at all in understanding the "die Bekehrten" of Laupach. Whereas ironic theory emphasizes the contradiction between character and its action as the essential value of the work, Hegel interprets that the comic is at the center of the work, which lets the unessential sides of the unified character disappear, so that the unity of the character expresses itself. Hegel also interprets that the theory of irony represents the work of art for the scholars, which harms the objectivity of artwork and defends the artwork for the public. Second, Hegel began to apply the achievement of his criticism to his aesthetic lectures. Since 1826 Hegel has focused intensively on discussing two concepts, romantic irony and 'artwork for the public' in his aesthetics lectures. Thus, this article provides a basis for Hegel 's criticism of ironic theory after 1826 and the concept of artwork for the public. In this respect, we can confirm that Hegel has reinforced and extended his theories through his practice of criticism of concrete works of art rather than imposing systematic theories upon art criticism

• Journal of Korean Philosophical Society
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• v.117
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• pp.161-189
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• 2011

This thesis aims to examine the discussions on communitarianism and liberalism, which was actively debated post-1990's in the West. The paper will focus on the concepts of morality and ethics of Hegel's "Philosophy of Law" in order to connect the discussions on communitarianism and liberalism to our society's political reality. Specifically, through the introduction of Hegel's point of view, this paper will shed new light co the concept of communitarianism, which was viewed from the perspective of political philosophy within the West post-1990's. Through "Philosophy of Law," Hegel imbues a critical and fundamental meaning to modern ethical-political order. For Hegel, Kant's acceptance of morality has a foundational and compositional meaning for the concepts of law and nation. This paper will discuss this topic within the boundaries of Hegel's morality and ethics and regard this as a chance to look back on our political situation with a regretful introspection. International and national reviewers tend to regard the various perspectives of Hegel's philosophy of law as inspirational. However, it seems that the fundamental introspection of why our reality must adhere to his philosophy is lacking. Based on this concern, the paper aims to examine Hegel's "Philosophy of Law" to apply his perspectives to our political reality for a fundamental self-evaluation.

• Journal of Korean Philosophical Society
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• v.123
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• pp.111-134
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• 2012

The article aims to elaborate on the fundamental insights of Hegel's political philosophy from a 'public freedom theory and public philosophy' perspective. The article is based on the understanding that Hegel's theory of freedom desires public freedom, and explains the contemporary meanings of the theory of freedom. The article critiques two subjects based on the interpretation of Hegel's public philosophy-the first is atomistic individualism and the other is the absolute alterity theory supported by Levinas and Derrida. In other words, through this article the author emphasizes that Hegel's public freedom theory clearly illustrates the limitations of atomistic individualism, and goes on to provide a subject theory that includes a dual/multiple theory on 'the other' that is distinct from the Levinas-Derrida approach.

• Cross-Cultural Studies
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• v.52
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• pp.111-132
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• 2018

The way of approaching 'the relationship between love and justice' varies from person to person. We can argue for superiority of love or for superiority of justice by understanding the relationship between the two as conflicting. We can also argue that we need each other by understanding each other as a complementary relationship rather than an oppositional relationship. Hegel, however, sees love and justice as independent constitutive principles valid in different areas and does not regard the two as opposing nor complementary. This can only be understood when the structure of Hegel's theory of recognition is properly assumed. The relationship between love and justice will be considered mainly in Hegel's theory of recognition. Key philosophical points of Hegel's theory of recognition and consequences drawn on the relationship between love and justice on the basis of the theory will be examined. This can be summarized in the form of a thesis, roughly as follows. - Hegel presents love, justice and solidarity, that are various forms of recognition, to a family, a civil society and a state, that are three forms of social relations, as their constitutive principles. He does not grasp the relationship between love and justice as oppositional nor as complementary, that is different from many people's general perspective on the relationship of the two. - In Hegel's theory of recognition, love and justice differ in the areas in which they are valid. Love is a valid principle in the intimacy, and justice is a valid principle in non-intimacy. So, if justice and rights are asserted in intimacy, the area of intimacy is destroyed. Conversely, if love is asserted in non-intimacy, it cannot exercise real influence. - In the political community such as a state, where intimacy and non-intimacy overlap each other, the principle of solidarity is needed as a new constitutive principle, since a state does not stand on the principle of love as in a family nor on the principle of justice as in a civil society.

• Journal of Korean Philosophical Society
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• no.114
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• pp.241-263
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• 2016

History is not only Hegel's philosophical subject, but it corresponds to his entire system of philosophy. Because his system of philosophy is a description of the self-movement of spirit and 'world history' reveals the overall movement of spirit. Hegel's 'historical and philosophical standpoint' goes through the description of his entire system, and this tendency is more and more reinforced towards the later Hegel. If it is reasonable to find the corresponding relationship between Hegel's system of philosophy and 'world history', the relationship between 'objective spirit' and 'absolute spirit' must be systematically unraveled in the horizon of world history. The world-historical perspective in 'objective spirit' has the limit to consider 'modern European nations' as a final destination. On the contrary, world history that acts as a mediator in the transition from 'objective spirit' to 'absolute spirit' makes it possible to jump in absolute horizon by recognizing limitations of nation states and avoiding specific and limited conditions dialectically. So what is revealed through the study of 'world history' in Hegel's system of philosophy is that in the view of 'absolute spirit' of art, religion, philosophy 'political state' is not the end that all mankind should aim at. Therefore, it is undesirable only to criticize Hegel's philosophy of history as 'Eurocentrism'.

• Journal of Korean Philosophical Society
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• v.147
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• pp.29-58
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• 2018

The purpose of this article is to demonstrate that Hegel's philosophy of right is a dialectic critique of liberalism. The dialectical criticism in this article does not mean the formal logical denial, but a return to self by self-negation. Thus, if Hegel's philosophy of right is a dialectical critique of liberalism, Hegel's philosophy of right will be critical of liberalism and at the same time, it will not reject liberalism, but rather have aspects of liberalism. The criticism of liberalism implies that individual freedoms and rights can not be realized subjectively through individual free acts, but are realized intersubjectively through social mediums. And this is also found in controversies among modern liberalists because modern liberalism requires the government's role and institutional arrangements for the realization of individual freedoms and rights. We can find the aspects of liberalism in Hegel's philosophy of right since Hegel's ethical life entails ultimately the concrete realization and extension of individual freedom and rights.

• Journal of Korean Philosophical Society
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• v.143
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• pp.267-290
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• 2017

At the end of the 'observing reason' of the chapter of 'the Reason' in Hegel's PhdG, reads that 'Spirit is a bone' and it is an 'infinite judgement'. We will concentrate on the following problems to clarify the meaning of this infinite judgement. First, this paper introduces the various interpretations on the meaning of the 'Spirit is a bone' and makes a comparative investigation of that problem. If we do not examine the various interpretations, there may be the probability of arbitrary interpretation of this judgement. Second, we will discern the difference between Kant's and Hegel's interpretations with regard to the meaning of the infinite judgement. Hegel obviously understands the content more than the meaning of Kant's forms of infinite judgement (S is not-P). If we do not explicate the reason which Hegel expands beyond the form to the content, it is difficult to understand the meaning which Hegel has said on it. With regard to this, we do not restrict our study to the PhdG. We also refer to the meaning of the infinite judgement on 'the judgement of Dasein' in Hegel's small and large Logics. Third, We are going to explore the various interpretations concerning those problems. Above all, we note ${\check{Z}}i{\check{z}}ek^{\prime}s$ interpretation who relates it to Psychoanalysis. While examining ${\check{Z}}i{\check{z}}ek^{\prime}s$ interpretation, we expecially note how he can interpret it well.

• Journal of architectural history
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• v.7 no.3 s.16
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• pp.87-105
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• 1998

Surveying the literature of architecture since the nineteenth century, one can identify two dominant but problematic attitudes, among several, that pursue the task of defining what modern architecture is and should be. The first is the search for meaning and the second is the pursuit of form. This study, following Michel Foucault, asserts that the dual formation of meaning and form is a historical product of modernity and belies architecture's uncritical dependence on language since the nineteenth century. This study is a critique and historical analysis of this pernicious reliance, and constitutes a first step towards thinking of alternative relations between 'words and architecture' in the modern world. In reconstructing this problematic, the paper has called on Foucault's seminal The Order of Things. The study follows his construction of the Renaissance, the Classical and the Modern episteme, and in brief fashion, reconstructs the relation between language and architecture in each episteme. In analysing the Modern, the study focuses on Hegel's Lectures on Aesthetics. Hegel placed architecture in a genre hierarchy within which architecture, because of its material basis, was fundamentally limited in its ability to express the Spirit. For Hegel it was, among the arts, poetic language, and beyond art, the language of philosophy, through which the Absolute Spirit could be atttained. Much of post-nineteenth century architecture has remained within the shadow of Hegel, where architecture's materiality is perceived to be a burden, and in order to secure its relevance in modern society, architecture was deemed to pursue the role of language. As the most recent and sophisticated example of architecture's pursuit of form, the paper analyses the work of Peter Eisenman. Though Eisenman's theoretical writings are replete with post-Hegelian rhetoric, his architecture remains dependent upon the model of language, albeit a structuralist one. The paper concludes that ultimately, the pursuit of meaning and form is unable to face the crucial issue of value in modernity. While the former decides to easily what it is, the latter evades the issue itself. The second installment of this ongoing study will pursue a third possibility alluded to by Foucault, where language remains silent, pointing only to its 'ponderous' material existence.

• Journal of the Daesoon Academy of Sciences
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• v.24_2
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• pp.197-229
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• 2015

The aim of this study is to determine the property of Daesoon thought in theory of God. The difference with precedent research is that this study catch the point in which theism as theology conflicts ontology as philosophy. It is elusive without philosophical analysis to detect this point for reasons of religious expression on scriptures. To find this point is beginning of academic communication at religious position. So I tried to draw boundary between theology and philosophy in Daesoon thought so as to apprehend Daesoon thought treats the contradiction of that. The contradiction is found that hierarchy between Sangje and taegeuk reverses on Daesoon thought. Fundamentally two substance can't be arranged to ontology but only one can be. It seems that Daesoon thought has got antinomy. However superiority of Daesoon thought is appeared at this point. The antinomy is just the process to absolute truth of Tao. That is a progressive system of thought in both religious and philosophical aspect. Finally, the result of this study can be organized with five items. First is to get new direction to study of Daesoon thought to catch the clash between theology and ontology. Second is that Daesoon thought can communicate the mainstream philosophy like Hegel's while the argumentation makes progress with Hegel's thought. Third is that Daesoon thought has originality in ontology of tao, mugeuk, tageuk as compared with neo-Confucianism. Forth is that theology of Daesoon thought has the possibility to peace among religions. Fifth is that Daesoon thought transcends religion and philosophy to absolute truth. Particularly, the noteworthy item is about peace among religions as theme of religious practice as the needs of times. The conflict of religion is very serious impact to historic future. So Daesoon thought suggests that all the religions harmonize with each other in universality and respect each other in distinctiveness. It makes it possible to aims for world peace beyond theory to practical orientation on religious creed. In history of philosophy the dialetic of Hegel is the very adequate to explain that principle. Hegel argued that human mind can reach to the absolute knowledge at 『Phänomenologie des Geistes』. He elucidates the process that mind attain the absolute knowledge through movement of negation at 『Phänomenologie des Geistes』. The dialetics leads all the process of mind to finality of the absolute spirit.