• Korean Journal of Logic
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• v.21 no.3
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• pp.373-393
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• 2018

Manipulation arguments purport to show that source freedom is incompatible with determinism. According to manipulation arguments, (1) intuitively, an agent manipulated in a certain manner to do A is not free, and (2) there is no significant difference between manipulation and determination. It follows that an agent determined to do A is not free. A compatibilist hard-line reply ('HR') denies (1), whereas a soft-line reply ('SR') denies (2). HR, which is arguably compatibilists' favorite, is assessed from the 'neutral stance.' HR turns out to fall short of adequately rejecting manipulation arguments. Recently Sartorio defends HR by claiming that (1) commits some sort of psychological fallacy. I argue that it does not work. I claim that SR is more promising. I examine the difference between intentional manipulation by design and ordinary determination. I argue that this difference suggests some determination scenario without intentional manipulation to which SR and manipulation arguments make different predictions, and that SR is better supported. Finally, incompatibilist objections are considered and replied.

• Korean Journal of Logic
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• v.22 no.2
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• pp.233-251
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• 2019

In this paper, I raise objections to Sungsu Kim's argument that Sartorio's hard-line reply to the manipulation argument fails. In attacking Sartorio's argument, Sungsu Kim claims that there are two problems with Sartorio's. I argue that Sungsu Kim's argument fails by responding to these two problems. With respect to the first problem, I provide a new example of dilution of responsibility. With respect to the second problem, I argue that, contrary to what Sungsu Kim assumes, for Sartorio's argument to succeed, our intuition that Ernie is responsible in the Lightning Strike Scenario does not have to be as strong as our intuition that Ernie is not responsible in the Diana scenario.