• 무역학회지
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• 제44권2호
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• pp.83-94
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• 2019

Article 17 of the Marine Insurance Act (MIA) states that "A contract of marine insurance is a contract based upon the utmost good faith, and if the utmost good faith be not observed by either party, the contract may be avoided by the other party." In the Carter v. Boehm case, Lord Mansfield was the first to provide a comprehensive description of the duty of utmost good faith, which is analyzed here. This judgement not only laid the foundation for the Modern English Insurance Act, but it also influenced the draft of the English Insurance Act of 2015, which aimed at correcting distortions that occurred during the application of statue law and common law thereafter. The duty of utmost good faith, applied between Lord Mansfield's insured and insurer presents the context of information asymmetry of the insured and insurer entering contracts. In the absence of information asymmetry, in contrast to the effects of being in both sides of the duty of utmost good faith, alleviating the duty of disclosure of the insured, and it is also clear that the warning of the severity of the retrospective avoidance of the breach of duty of disclosure and the need for its limited application have already been pointed out. Furthermore, considering the principle of retrospective avoidance, the duty of utmost good faith should be understood as a concept limited to the duty of disclosure before a contract is concluded

• 무역상무연구
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• 제14권
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• pp.103-152
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• 2000

English contract law has traditionally taken the view that it is not the duty of the parties to a contract to give information voluntarily to each other. In English law, one of the principal distinctions between insurance contract law and general contract law is the existence of the doctrine of utmost good faith in insurance law. The doctrine gives rise to a variety of duties, some of which apply before formation of the contract while others apply post-formation. This article is, therefore, designed to analyse the overall structure and problems of the doctrine of utmost good faith in English marine insurance law. The results of analysis are as following : First, the requirement of utmost good faith in marine insurance law arises from the fact that many of the relevant circumstances are within the exclusive knowledge of the assured and it is impossible for the insurer to obtain the facts to make a appropriate calculation of the risk that he is asked to assume without this information. Secondly, the duty of utmost good faith provided in MIA 1906, s. 17 has the nature as a bilateral or reciprocal, overriding and absolute duty. Thirdly, the Court of Appeal in Skandia held that breach of the pre-formation duty of utmost good faith did not sound in damages since the duty did not arise out of an implied contractual term and the breach did not constitute a tort. Instead, the Court of Appeal held that the duty was an extra-contractual duty imposed by law in the form of a contingent condition precedent to the enforceability of the contract. Fourthly, the scope of the duty of utmost good faith is closely related to the test of materiality and the assured is required to disclose only material circumstances subject to MIA 1906, s. 18(1) and 20(1). The test of materiality, which had caused a great deal of debate in English courts over 30 years, was finally settled by the House of Lords in Pan Atlantic and the House of Lords rejected the 'decisive influence' test and the 'increased risk' test, and the decision of the House of Lords is thought to accept the 'mere influence' test in subsequent case by the Court of Appeal. Fifthly, the insurer is, in order to avoid contract, required to provide proof that he is induced to enter into the contract by reason of the non-disclosure or misrepresentation of the assured. Sixthly, the duty of utmost good faith is, in principle, terminated before contract is concluded, but it is undoubtful that the provision under MIA 1906, s. 17 is wide enough to include the post-formation duty. The post-formation duty is, however, based upon the terms of marine insurance contract, and the duty lies entirely outside s. 17. Finally, MIA 1906, s. 17 provides expressly for the remedy of avoidance of the contract for breach of the duty. This means rescission or retrospective avoidance of the entire contract, and the remedy is based upon a fairly crude 'all-or-nothing' approach. What is needed in English marine insurance law is to introduce a more sophiscated or proportionate remedy.

• 무역상무연구
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• 제53권
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• pp.207-229
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• 2012

In IP 7 and LCCP 201, Law Commission considers the insured's duty of good faith after the formation of the contract. This article intends to review and analyse the legal implications of proposals in IP 7 and LCCP 201. The results of analysis are following. First, Law Commission propose to end the remedy of avoidance under MIA 1906 section 17, because avoidance of past claims is unprincipled, impractical and unnecessarily harsh. Secondly, LC proposes that an insured who makes a fraudulent claim should forfeit the whole claim which the fraud relates, but that the fraud should not invalidate previous and legitimate claims. Thirdly, LC proposes to introduce a statutory right for the insurer to claim damages for the reasonable, foreseeable costs of investigate a fraudulent claim in specific circumstances and that damages would be limited to those cases where the insurer can show an actual, net loss. Finally, LC provisionally propose that an express fraud clause should be upheld in business insurance, whereas in consumer insurance, any term which purports to give the insurer greater rights in relation to fraudulent claims that those set out in statute would be of no effect.

• 무역상무연구
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• 제49권
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• pp.257-281
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• 2011

The duty of utmost good faith is found in sections 17-20 of MIA 1906. Critics of the current legal regime on the pre-contractual duty from the viewpoint of the assured, have been concentrated on two points in particular. First, the scope of the duty is so wide that it imposes too high burden on the assured. The second criticism is directed at the remedy, prescribed by the MIA 1906, s.17, against breach of the duty. This article intends to analyse the legal implications of proposals in CP 2007 for reforming pre-contractual duty of utmost good faith of business assured in English insurance contracts law and the problems of proposals. The Law Commissions are proposing four fundamental changes to meet the long-standing criticism and the results of analysis are as following. First, the Law Commissions are proposing a change in the test of constructive knowledge in relation to the duty of disclosure so that a business assured will be obliged to disclose facts which he knows or a reasonable ought to know in the circumstances. Secondly, deviating from the current legal position, the Law Commissions are proposing that if a business assured has made a misrepresentation, but the assured honestly and reasonably believe what it said to be true, the insurer should not have any remedy due to the misrepresentation. The proposal is designed to protect the reasonable expectations of business assured at the pre-contractual stage. Thirdly, the Law Commissions are proposing to change the test for materiality by replacing the "prudent insurer" test by a "reasonable assured" test. The proposed test would focus on the question of what a reasonable assured in the circumstances would think what is relevant to the judgment of the insurer. Finally, the Law Commissions are proposing flexible remedies in case of the breach of the duty. The Law Commissions are proposing no remedy when an assured is acting honestly and reasonably, while avoidance in case of dishonesty. On the other hand, The Law Commissions seem to have an intention to introduce a compensatory remedy in case of negligent breach of the duty.

• 무역상무연구
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• 제67권
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• pp.119-142
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• 2015

Many insurers have traditionally incorporated "fraud clauses" into insurance policies, setting out the consequences of making a fraudulent claim. Even in the absence of an express terms, English courts provide insurers with a remedy for a fraudulent claim. However, the law in this area is complex, convoluted and confused. English Law Commission think that the law in this area needs to be reformed for three reasons; (1) the disjunctive between the common law rule and section 17 generates unnecessary disputes and litigation, (2) increasingly, UK commercial law must be justified to an international insurance society, and (3) the rules on fraudulent claims are functioned as a deterrent if they are clear and well-understood. In order for these purposes, English Law Commission recommends a statutory regime to the effect that, when an insured commits fraud in relation to a claim, the insurer should (1) have no liability to pay the fraudulent claim and be able to recover any sums already paid in respect to the claim, and (2) have the option to treat the contract as having been terminated with from the time of the fraudulent act and, if chosen the option, be entitled to refuse all claims arising after the fraud, but (3) remain liable for legitimate losses before the fraudulent act. LC is not recommending a complete restatement of the law on insurance fraud generally. For example, LC does not seek to define fraud, instead, recommends the introduction of targeted provisions to confirm the remedies available to an insurer who discovers a fraud by a policyholder.