• Journal of Communications and Networks
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• v.18 no.3
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• pp.411-419
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• 2016

This article investigates the problem of distributed channel selection in opportunistic spectrum access networks from a perspective of interference minimization. The traditional physical (PHY)-layer interference model is for information theoretic analysis. When practical multiple access mechanisms are considered, the recently developed binary medium access control (MAC)-layer interference model in the previous work is more useful, in which the experienced interference of a user is defined as the number of competing users. However, the binary model is not accurate in mathematics analysis with poor achievable performance. Therefore, we propose a real-valued one called stochastic MAC-layer interference model, where the utility of a player is defined as a function of the aggregate weight of the stochastic interference of competing neighbors. Then, the distributed channel selection problem in the stochastic MAC-layer interference model is formulated as a weighted stochastic MAC-layer interference minimization game and we proved that the game is an exact potential game which exists one pure strategy Nash equilibrium point at least. By using the proposed stochastic learning-automata based uncoupled algorithm with heterogeneous learning parameter (SLA-H), we can achieve suboptimal convergence averagely and this result can be verified in the simulation. Moreover, the simulated results also prove that the proposed stochastic model can achieve higher throughput performance and faster convergence behavior than the binary one.

• KSII Transactions on Internet and Information Systems (TIIS)
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• v.5 no.3
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• pp.542-559
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• 2011

Most game-theoretic works of Aloha have emphasized investigating Nash equilibria according to the system state represented by the number of network users and their decisions. In contrast, we focus on the possible change of nodes' utility state represented by delay constraint and decreasing utility over time. These foregone changes of nodes' state are more likely to instigate selfish behaviors in networking environments. For such environment, in this paper, we propose a repeated Bayesian slotted Aloha game model to analyze the selfish behavior of impatient users. We prove the existence of Nash equilibrium mathematically and empirically. The proposed model enables any type of transmission probability sequence to achieve Nash equilibrium without degrading its optimal throughput. Those Nash equilibria can be used as a solution concept to thwart the selfish behaviors of nodes and ensure the system stability.

• Journal of the Korean Operations Research and Management Science Society
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• v.40 no.2
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• pp.43-61
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• 2015

The valuation of patents is very important, since technology competitiveness is crucial for firms to maintain global competitiveness. But, the patent valuation is difficult and challenging because of the uncertainty affecting their returns. Hence, we propose a patent valuation method by incorporating game theory into the real option model, which can not only potentially recognizes the effect of uncertainty on patent value, but also consider investment decision in a competitive market, as a game between firms. With the model, we can consider dynamic strategy involving an option of patent leveraging strategies enabling the firm to switch among compete, cooperate, or wait modes under different demand or competitive advantage condition.

• Journal of Korean Society of Industrial and Systems Engineering
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• v.34 no.3
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• pp.41-48
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• 2011

Recently, the increasing power of distributors has given them the opportunity of introducing private brand (PB) products. Based on the game theory, this study analyzes the decision making of a distributor regarding the optimal pricing and quality strategies for the PB product. By analyzing the game model, it is shown that the pricing mechanism heavily depends not only on the market power of the distributor but on the quality of the PB product. It is also shown that, counter intuitively, as the market power of the distributor increases, the optimal quality of the PB product should be decreased.

• Journal of the Korea Institute of Information Security & Cryptology
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• v.19 no.1
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• pp.135-144
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• 2009

This paper deals with an information security problem that involves the strategies of both an attacker and an administrator of a web-based system. A game-theoretic model for the problem, based on an Stackelberg game environment, is presented. In the model, the administrator selects a set of anti-virus vaccines to cope with potential system attackers and the intruder chooses attacking modes that are most effective against the administrator's chosen set of vaccines. Moreover, the model considers a number of practical constraints, such as a budget limit on the vaccine purchase and a limit on the system performance. In addition, two different scenario analyses are provided, based on the results of the proposed model applied to a simulated pseudo-real-world data.

• KSII Transactions on Internet and Information Systems (TIIS)
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• v.9 no.10
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• pp.3771-3788
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• 2015

This paper studies the distributed energy efficient resource management in the Internet of Things (IoT). Wireless communication networks support the IoT without limitation of distance and location, which significantly impels its development. We study the communication channel and energy management in the wireless communication network supported IoT to improve the ability of connection, communication, share and collaboration, by using the game theory and distributed learning algorithm. First, we formulate an energy efficient neighbor collaborative game model and prove that the proposed game is an exact potential game. Second, we design a distributed energy efficient channel selection learning algorithm to obtain the global optimum in a distributed manner. We prove that the proposed algorithm will asymptotically converge to the global optimum with geometric speed. Finally, we make the simulations to verify the theoretic analysis and the performance of proposed algorithm.

• The Journal of Fisheries Business Administration
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• v.25 no.2
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• pp.89-102
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• 1994

This paper is to survey the major results of the game-theoretic models and recent research directions of the literature on auctions and competitive biddings. This paper classifies the auctions and competitive biddings into the following four major types:(i) English auction, (ii) Dutch auction, (iii) the first-price sealed-bid auction, (iv) the second-price sealed-bid auction. In order to survey the major ideas related to auctions and competitive biddings, we use two representative theoretical models developed under the game-theoretic framework : (i) the independent private value model are summarized as follows ; (1) The Dutch auction and the first-price auction are strategically equivalent, and so are the English auction and the second-price auction. (2) At the symmetric equilibria, the expected selling price is the same for all four types of auction. Meanwhile, the major results of the general model are as follows ; (1) When bidders are uncertain about their value extimate, the English and second-price auctions are not equivalent, but the dutch and the first-price auctions are still strategically equivalent. (2) The English auction generates the higher expected prices than the second-price auction. Also, when bidders are risk-neutral, the second-price auction generated higher average prices than the Dutch and the first-price auctions.

• International Journal of Computer Science & Network Security
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• v.22 no.6
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• pp.390-399
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• 2022

Cyber security and resilience are phrases that describe safeguards of ICTs (information and communication technologies) from cyber-attacks or mitigations of cyber event impacts. The sole purpose of Risk models are detections, analyses, and handling by considering all relevant perceptions of risks. The current research effort has resulted in the development of a new paradigm for safeguarding services offered online which can be utilized by both service providers and users. customers. However, rather of relying on detailed studies, this approach emphasizes task selection and execution that leads to successful risk treatment outcomes. Modelling intelligent CSGs (Cyber Security Games) using MLTs (machine learning techniques) was the focus of this research. By limiting mission risk, CSGs maximize ability of systems to operate unhindered in cyber environments. The suggested framework's main components are the Threat and Risk models. These models are tailored to meet the special characteristics of online services as well as the cyberspace environment. A risk management procedure is included in the framework. Risk scores are computed by combining probabilities of successful attacks with findings of impact models that predict cyber catastrophe consequences. To assess successful attacks, models emulating defense against threats can be used in topologies. CSGs consider widespread interconnectivity of cyber systems which forces defending all multi-step attack paths. In contrast, attackers just need one of the paths to succeed. CSGs are game-theoretic methods for identifying defense measures and reducing risks for systems and probe for maximum cyber risks using game formulations (MiniMax). To detect the impacts, the attacker player creates an attack tree for each state of the game using a modified Extreme Gradient Boosting Decision Tree (that sees numerous compromises ahead). Based on the findings, the proposed model has a high level of security for the web sources used in the experiment.

• Proceedings of the KIEE Conference
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• 2000.07a
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• pp.400-402
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• 2000

This paper presents a game theoretic approach for power transactions analysis in a competitive market. The considered competitive power market is regarded as PooICo model, and the participating players are restricted by only two generating entities for simplicity in this paper. The analysis is performed on the basis of marginal cost based relations of bidding price and bidding generations. That is, we assume that the bidding price of each player is determined by the marginal cost when the bidding generation is pre-determined. This paper models the power transaction as a two player game and analyzes by applying the Nash eauilibrium idea. The generalized game model for power transactions covering constant-sum(especially zero-sum), and nonconstant-sum game is developed in this paper. Also, the analysis for each game model are performed in the case studies. Here, we have defined the payoff of each player as the weighted sum of both player's profits.

• Journal of Environmental Policy
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• v.6 no.3
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• pp.91-114
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• 2007

The cooperative cost sharing scheme for Dust and Sand Storm(DSS) in North East Asia, as suggested in Song and Nagaki(2007), may not be feasible due to possible defection(s) of participating countries. If non-cooperative strategies are more plausible, Nash equilibrium can suggest possible outcomes of the cost sharing game. The result from the continuous strategy model shows that there exists an infinite number of Nash equilibrium such that the summation of investment from each country is always equal to the required budget of the ADS pilot project. It is also discussed that the discrete strategy model points to only 3 Nash equilibria in continuous strategy game outcome and the cooperative game solution may be just one of the infinite equilibria.