• Journal of Korea Game Society
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• v.10 no.3
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• pp.47-59
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• 2010

Differing from most of current studies which recognizing game item cash-trade as simple static system, this study approaches game item cash-trade as Complex Adaptive System through historical analysis. The item-trade is a complex phenomenon converging between cyber-economy and real-economy, and production and consumption process of game-item are evolving dynamically over time. The results are following: first, the early item-trade emerges in endogenously rather than results from purposed system designed by singular actor. Second, after the early item-trade, the trade system as a CAS which various voluntary actors(single user, factory, game company, user community, agency, etc.) participates in is self-organizing for trading safety and efficiency. Third, the complex adaptive item-trade system satisfies actor's needs interdependently and accelerate positive feedback powerfully. This study implies that purposeful control disregarding emergent adaptive item-trade system distorts system efficiency and can lead to unintended policy failure.

• Journal of Korea Game Society
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• v.7 no.2
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• pp.41-52
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• 2007

Presently, the online game industry of Korea are growing up fastly. The growth of online game give rise to the new problem of regulation on Real Money Trade(RMT). This article analyzed the market failure of RMT, and showed whether or not the government regulate RMT. The results showed that the RMT has efficiency in monopoly and external economie, and inefficiency in external diseconomies and uncertainty. But, the inefficiency in external diseconomie and uncertainty is based on the regulation of RMT by the game company. So, it is necessary for government to deregulate the RMT for curing the inefficiency of RMT.

• Journal of Korean Society of Industrial and Systems Engineering
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• v.41 no.3
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• pp.162-169
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• 2018

Net neutrality, which has not been a problem, has recently become a problem for ISPs (Internet Service Providers), and their complaints have been paid by domestic platform companies, but overseas global IT companies such as Google and YouTube, generate huge revenues from domestic markets. In this situation, domestic IT companies claim that it is natural to impose more expensive charges or restrict speed on users who generate huge traffic. On the other side, however, the telecommunication network has become an essential public good that is essential to our everyday life, and because it has been given a monopoly position by a private company to efficiently respond to the explosive demand for telecommunication services, It is necessary to provide equal and universal service and fulfill public duty. In this paper, we deal with the network neutrality problem, focusing on the price elasticity between the CP (Contents Provider) and the ISP, rather than the user who is one side of the two-sided market for the already saturated satellites communication market. We present a game model that determines the optimal price for each platform by Nash equilibrium and analyze how the net neutrality affects CP according to the change of exogenous variables through the proposed game model.

• Journal of Korean Institute of Industrial Engineers
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• v.39 no.4
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• pp.260-270
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• 2013

This paper proposes a strategic portfolio model for managing performance of online games. The portfolio matrix is composed of two dimensions: financial performance and non-financial performance. Financial performance is measured by the conventional measure, average revenue per user (ARPU). In terms of non-financial performance, five non-financial key performance indicators (KPIs) that have been widely used in the online game industry are utilized: RU (Register User), VU (Visiting User), TS (Time Spent), ACU (Average Current User), MCU (Maximum Current User). Data envelopment analysis (DEA) is then employed to produce a single performance measure aggregating the five KPIs. DEA is a linear programming model for measuring the relative efficiency of decision making unit (DMUs) with multiple inputs and outputs. This study employs DEA as a tool for multiple criteria decision making (MCDM), in particular, the pure output model without inputs. Combining the two types of performance produces the online game portfolio matrix with four quadrants: Dark Horse, Stop Loss, Jack Pot, Luxury Goods. A case study of 39 online games provided by company 'N' is provided. The proposed portfolio model is expected to be fruitfully used for strategic decision making of online game companies.

• Proceedings of the Safety Management and Science Conference
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• 2012.04a
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• pp.623-638
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• 2012

Since six sigma program was first introduced in late 1990's, it has been evolved in Korea. The number of six sigma adopting company are getting increased and diversify manufacturing, service, government. In these days, the rapid innovation of internet technology change the media industry's game rule. This paper is concerned with a six sigma applications to internet media portal service company. The main focus of this study is to introduce an empirical study on the implementation of DMAIC procedures for internet media portal service company.

• Cartoon and Animation Studies
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• s.39
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• pp.85-109
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• 2015

have been transformed to many products and game of various platform as successful animation be making for 26 seasons. However past studies were concentrated on characteristic of as an TV animation series, almost never focused on transforming strategy. is showing distinguished strategy for how long living TV animation series can be made to user participating contents constantly. This paper analyzed a characteristic transforming strategy to game of as focusing on that EA company was made for mobile platform and it has been popular for a long time comparatively. So first we analyzed characteristic narrative of animation, and then searched how it is appeared to space managing simulation game . It will be helpful study how to build narrative strategy when TV animation series will be transformed to game as analyzing gamification process of .

• Journal of Korea Game Society
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• v.5 no.2
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• pp.19-27
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• 2005

The core price policy of on-line game marketing are FPP(Fixed Pre Paid model and PPU(Pay Per Use) model. These two models have been a on-line game company's billing system and a fundamental of MMORPG in Korea. However, they took root billing system only for first movers recently. In now, the market share of several first movers is exceeding 80%, late movers witch have same billing system cannot take part in pair competition. Even though in MMORPG, many games of late movers were favorably noticed by a lot of gamers during Evaluation. Test, a lot of companies are bankrupt before make business. Late Movers declare free game first thing, they maintain their existence and win over customers in on-line game market. And next, they guarantee item selling, give multiple experience value and game money, at last, induce their customers to pay service. As it makes trouble between pay user and free user, and it linked up with the collapse of game contents balance that designed for FPP billing system, And then meet unexpected result which reduction of game life cycle. In this Paper, we classified several contents services based on game contents, and suggested contents premium services which adopted low cost strategy lead to micro payment. we hope it will apply to late movers' new billing system in MMORPG.

• Journal of Environmental Policy
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• v.8 no.4
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• pp.75-94
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• 2009

The process of obtaining third-party financing contacts was analyzed via a two-stage game model: a "signaling game" for the first stage,and a "principal-agent model" for the second stage. The two-stage game was solved by a process of backward induction. In the second stage game, the optimal effort level of the energy saving company (ESCO), the optimal compensation scheme of the energy user, and the optimal payoffs for both parties were derived for each subgame. The optimal solutions forthe different subgames were then compared with each other. Our main finding was that if there is some restriction on ESCO's revenue (e.g. a progressive sales tax) that causes ESCO's revenue toincrease at a decreasing rate, then the optimal sharing ratio is uniquely determined at a level of strictly less than one under a linear compensation scheme, i.e. a unique balance exists. Subgames have a unique equilibrium arrived at separately for each situation,. Within this equilibrium, energy users accept energy audit proposals from H-type ESCOs with high levels of technology, but reject proposals from L-type ESCOs with low levels of technology. While L-type ESCOs cannot attain profits in the third-party financing market, H-type ESCOS can pocket the price differential between L-type and H-type audit fees. Accordingly, revenues in an H-type ESCO equilibrium increase not only in line with the technology of the ESCO inquestion, but also faster than in an L-type equilibrium due to more advanced technology. At the same time, energy users receive some positive payoff by allowing ESCOs to perform third-party financing tasks within their existing energy system without incurring any extra costs.

• Asia-Pacific Journal of Business Venturing and Entrepreneurship
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• v.19 no.2
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• pp.159-179
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• 2024

Based on the case of collaboration between large companies and startups, this study suggests the importance of establishing mutual cooperation and trust relationships for the success of open innovation strategy from the perspective of cooperative game theory. It also provides implications for how this can be implemented. Due to information asymmetry and differences in organizational culture and decision-making structures between large companies and startups, collaboration is likely to proceed in the form of non-cooperative games among players in general open innovation, leading to the paradox of open innovation, which lowers the degree of innovation. Accordingly, this study conducted a case study on collaboration between large company 'G' and startup 'S' based on the research question "How did we successfully promote open innovation through cooperative game-type collaboration?" The study found that successful open innovation requires (1) setting clear collaboration goals to solve the organizational problem between large companies and startups, (2) supporting human resources for qualitative growth of startups to solve reliability problems, (3) leading to strategic investment and joint promotion of new projects to solve the profit distribution problem. This study is significant in that it contributes to expanding the discussion of the success factors of open innovation to the importance of interaction and strategic judgment considering the organizational culture and decision-making structure among players, and empirically confirming the success conditions of open innovation from the perspective of cooperative game theory.

• Journal of the Economic Geographical Society of Korea
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• v.11 no.3
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• pp.375-388
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• 2008

The early studies on the cultural industries had mainly emphasized the viewpoint of "efficiency" based on the "flexible specialization" theory, but they have gradually shed light on the viewpoint of "creativity": creative human resources and various networks generating creative energies. Despite the importance of these studies, it is impossible to explain every cultural industrial agglomeration phenomena from specific and few viewpoints due to the diversity of each cultural industry. This study describes the dissimilarity of agglomeration factors between the Japanese animation and home video game industries which form salient agglomeration in the same region. Both industries share similar characteristics with industrial agglomeration of SMEs in Tokyo and close inter-firm relationships. However, they differ in their historical development paths and each firm's behavior and strategy because of their own distribution systems and production processes. In particular, the difference in distribution systems clearly affects whether a company values "efficiency" factors of agglomeration advantage or "creativity" factors of that in case of locational choice. The distribution sector of the cultural industry, compared with the production sector, has a tendency to value profitability rather than creation itself. Therefore, a cultural industry with the strong distribution sector tends to form the industrial system emphasizing profitability. The Japanese animation firm is apt to choose its location from the perspective of efficiency, which easily contributes to profitability, because television broadcasting stations are strong distribution sector. Conversely, the Japanese game firm chooses its location from the perspective of creativity due to the absence of strong distribution sector.