• 사회경제평론
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• v.29 no.1
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• pp.1-29
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• 2016

This paper looks critically, in the light of the Capital Controversies of the 1950s and the 1960s, at the Neoclassical claim that the Funded-Pension system is economically superior to the Pay-As-You-Go (PAYG) pension system. This claim rests crucially upon the inverse relation between the rate of interest and the volume of investment (the investment demand function) and the positive relation between the capital intensity and labour productivity (the 'intensive- form' production function), The Capital Controversies proved that the two relations do not always hold; then, the claim in question loses much of its ground. Further, the absensce of the relations makes plenty room for effective demand in determining the level of income and the volome of employment even in the long period. This positive role of effective demand in the long period highlights the problems of the Funded-Pension system and, at the same time, supports the competitiveness of the PAYG pension system.

• Journal of Labour Economics
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• v.25 no.3
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• pp.59-86
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• 2002

Using the simulated data set which is based upon the data set merging Economically Active Population Survey(EAPS) and the Supplementary Survey (SS) in 1998-2001, this paper examines the relevance of alternative programs Unemployment Insurance Savings Account (UISA) and Pension-funded Unemployment Benefit (PUB) - to unemployment insurance system in Korea. Estimating the relative size of unemployment benefit and IA balance under a specific type of UISA or PUB by simulation, this paper yields the two main results. First, replacing UI by UISA with the same benefit being maintained would be beneficial in terms of search efficiency in general, although its effectiveness is a little doubtful as for the non-regular workers. Second, the PUB is better than UISA as an alternative to UI, and also works relatively well even for the non-regular workers.

• Journal of Labour Economics
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• v.26 no.2
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• pp.31-59
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• 2003

This paper analyzes a social insurance system that integrates unemployment insurance with a pension program, allowing workers to borrow against their future wage income to finance consumption during an unemployment episode and thus improving their search incentives while reducing risks. This paper identifies the conditions under which the integration improves welfare and the factors which determine the optimal degree of integration. A fully integrated system is one in which no reliance is placed at all on a separate tax-funded unemployment insurance program. We show that when the duration of unemployment is very short compared to the period of employment or retirement, the optimal system involves an exclusive reliance on pension-funded self-insurance. This system imposes a negligible risk burden for workers while avoiding attenuating search incentives. We also argue that a joint integration of several social insurance programs with a pension program through an individual account is desirable unless the risks are perfectly correlated to each other.

• Korean Journal of Social Welfare
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• v.37
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• pp.89-118
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• 1999

The goal of this paper is to define the distinguishing characteristics of Korea's National Pension Scheme compared to the National Pension types of other countries and sees if those characteristics are significant enough in order to warrant calling these the "Korean Model". Also, another point to consider is, if this "Korean Model" does indeed exist, whether it is a 'sustainable' model or not. The National Pension Scheme, which was implemented in 1988, is similar to the public pension system formerly used in Japan. The National Pension Scheme broke away from this 'Japanese Model' in 1995 with implementation of the Farmers and Fishermen Pension, and the unique "Korean Model National Pension" was completed in 1998 with revision of the National Pension Law. The characteristics of the Korean National Pension can be defined as being balanced equally on ability and equality, possessing strong intergenerational income redistribution, having a nationally integrated structure, an incomplete funded method financial neutralism of the government and also as being a Monroe-oriented pension system. There are several limits to the sustainable development of this Korean Model National Pension, though. Even though the precondition of "the income determination problem of self-employed persons", which has strong intra-generational income redistribution. in actuality there are still many policy issues to be confronted such as the structure which 'transfers the burden to the future generation', the 'inter-generational inequity' of the incomplete funded system, persons excluded from coverage under the national integrated structure, 'compulsory loaning of the public sector by the National Pension Fund' under the government's principle of finance neutralism, the separate existence of the 'Monroe-oriented National Pension' from other pensions, etc.,. Therefore, it need to reform of NPS once again to sustainable development of KMNP.

• KDI Journal of Economic Policy
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• v.30 no.2
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• pp.225-270
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• 2008

We analyze macroeconomic consequences of pay-as-you-go (PAYGO) public pension system with a simple overlapping generations model. Contrary to large body of existing literatures offering quantitative results based on simulation study, we take another route by adopting a highly simplified framework in search of qualitatively tractable analytical results. The main contribution of our results lies in providing a sound theoretical foundation that can be utilized in interpreting various quantitative results offered by simulation studies of large scale general equilibrium models. We present a simple overlapping generations model with a defined benefit(DB) PAYGO public pension system as a benchmark case and derive an analytical equilibrium solution utilizing graphical illustration. We also discuss the modifications of the benchmark model required to encompass a defined contribution(DC) public pension system into the basic framework. Comparative statics analysis provides three important implications; First, introduction and expansion of the PAYGO public pension, DB or DC, result in lower level of capital accumulation and higher expected rate of return on the risky asset. Second, it is shown that the progress of population aging is accompanied by lower capital stock due to decrease in both demand and supply of risky asset. Moreover, risk premium for risky asset increases(decreases) as the speed of population aging accelerates(decelerates) so that the possibility of so-called "the great meltdown" of asset market cannot be excluded although the odds are not high. Third, it is most likely that the switch from DB PAYGO to DC PAYGO would result in lower capital stock and higher expected return on the risky asset mainly due to the fact that the young generation regards DC PAYGO pension as another risky asset competing against the risky asset traded in the market. This theoretical prediction coincides with one of the firmly established propositions in empirical literature that the currently dominant form of public pension system has the tendency to crowd out private capital accumulation.

• Korean Journal of Social Welfare
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• v.51
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• pp.5-28
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• 2002

The purpose of this paper is to examine the issues and the characteristics of the recent social security pension debate in the United States. For the purpose the transforming process from the funded system to the pay-as-you-go system in the 1930s, three alternatives of social security reform proposed by the Social Security Administration in 1996, and the other various alternatives proposed by the politicians, the business leaders and the scholars were analysed. While the alternatives were compared, the critical issues could be identified. The core issues were as follows. First, the individual accounts should be newly made or not? Second, who is the main administrator, government or private investment companies? Third, what is important, the inter-generational and the vertical income redistribution effect or the individual equity in social security pension system? Besides, the different positions of the social forces were also examined. The supporters of privatizing the social security pension, supporters of IA and PSA, prefer the value of equity, the effect of promoting savings, the private management of the social security funds, and the investment of the funds to the private capital markets. The supporters of pay-as-you-go system, supporters of MB, prefer the inter-generational and the vertical income redistribution effect of social security pension, and were convinced that fundamental changes of the systems are not necessary, and the insolvency problem could be overcome through a few reform, for example, increasing the rate and decreasing the benefits.

• KDI Journal of Economic Policy
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• v.13 no.1
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• pp.115-134
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• 1991

The role of pension plans in the macroeconomy has been a subject of much interest for some years. It has come to be recognized that pension plans may alter basic macroeconomic behavior patterns. The net effects on both savings and labor supply are thus matters for speculation. The aim of the present paper is to provide quantitative results which may be helpful in attaching orders of magnitude to some of the possible effects. We are not concerned with the providing empirical evidence relating to actual behavior, but rather with deriving the macroeconomic implications for a alternative possibilities. The pension plan interacts with the economy and the population in a number of ways. Demographic variables may thus affect both the economic burden of a national pension plan and the ability of the economy to sustain the burden. The tax transfer process associated with the pension plan may have implications for national patterns of saving and consumption. The existence of a pension plan may have implications also for the size of the labor force, inasmuch as labor force participation rates may be affected. Changes in technology and the associated changes in average productivity levels bear directly on the size of the national income, and hence on the pension contribution base. The vehicle for the analysis is a hypothetical but broadly realistic simulation model of an economic- demographic system into which is inserted a national pension plan. All income, expenditure, and related aggregates are in real terms. The economy is basically neoclassical; full employment is assumed, output is generated by a Cobb-Douglas production process, and factors receive their marginal products. The model was designed for use in computer simulation experiments. The simulation results suggest a number of general conclusions. These may be summarized as follows; - The introduction of a national pension plan (funded system) tends to increase the rate of economic growth until cost exceeds revenue. - A scheme with full wage indexing is more expensive than one in which pensions are merely price indexed. - The rate of technical progress is not a critical element in determining the economic burden of the pension scheme. - Raising the rate of benefits affects its economic burden, and raising the age of eligibility may decrease the burden substantially. - The level of fertility is an element in determining the long-run burden. A sustained low fertility rate increases the proportion of the aged in total population and increases the burden of the pension plan. High fertility has inverse effects.

• Korean Journal of Social Welfare
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• v.58 no.3
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• pp.295-312
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• 2006

The use of the national pension funds to welfare has been criticized due to its low profitability, with concern about financial instability and the lack of funds. Despite the small amount of the funds employed to the welfare, therefore, it has been decreasing so far. It is resulted from the fact that the use of funds to the welfare sector failed to provide its valid reasons, and take the policy direction firmly. There are three main logical reasons for the welfare investment of national pension funds: Firstly, no state is capable to take the full responsibility for the entire social welfare, and therefore, the funds can be used for social welfare. Secondly, the funded system, contrasted with the case of pay-as-you-go system, has inevitably caused discriminations to the present elderly through excluding them institutionally from pension participation. At last, so as to its selective system, the minimum contribution period of 10 years brings about the equity problem between the people who can afford it and the people who hardly can. Therefore, investing a proportion of funds to the welfare is entirely reasonable in that it can alleviate the discriminations to the present elderly generation and the marginal participants, rather than to meet their social welfare needs. With regard to the policy decision, the profitability of the investment, and the choice of the welfare work, on the other hand, the policy direction should be given a sufficient consideration of a various policy factors such as the necessity of social consensus, independence of the welfare work in relations with other national welfare work, policy identity to judge whether the work is worth long-run or short-run, and the reliance of direct-operated work and indirect-operated work. As a result of all these efforts above mentioned, an investment to the welfare of the national pension funds could be vitalized, and gain public confidence.