• Journal of Radiation Protection and Research
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• 제48권3호
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• pp.131-143
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• 2023

Background: This study examined the detection limit of thyroid screening monitoring conducted at the time of the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant (FDNPP) accident in 2011 using a Monte Carlo simulation. Materials and Methods: We calculated the detection limit of a NaI(Tl) survey meter to measure ¹³¹I accumulation in the thyroid gland of children. Mathematical phantoms of 1- and 5-year-old children were developed in the simulation of the Particle and Heavy Ion Transport code System code. Contamination of the body surface with eight radionuclides found after the FDNPP accident was assumed to have been deposited on the neck and shoulder area. Results and Discussion: The detection limit was calculated as a function of ambient dose rate. In the case of 40 Bq/cm² contamination on the body surface of the neck, the present simulations showed that residual thyroid radioactivity corresponding to thyroid dose of 100 mSv can be detected within 21 days after intake at the ambient dose rate of 0.2 µSv/hr and within 11 days in the case of 2.0 µSv/hr. When a time constant of 10 seconds was used at the dose rate of 0.2 µSv/hr, the estimated survey meter output error was 5%. Evaluation of the effect of individual differences in the location of the thyroid gland confirmed that the measured value would decrease by approximately 6% for a height difference of ±1 cm and increase by approximately 65% for a depth of 1 cm. Conclusion: In the event of a nuclear disaster, simple measurements carried out using a NaI(Tl) scintillation survey meter remain effective for assessing ¹³¹I intake. However, it should be noted that the presence of short-half-life radioactive materials on the body surface affects the detection limit.

• 방사성폐기물학회지
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• 제21권4호
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• pp.543-558
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• 2023

Currently, Japan is undertaking a nationwide project to measure and map radioactive contamination around Fukushima, as part of the efforts to restore normalcy following the nuclear accident. The Japan Atomic Energy Agency (JAEA) manages the Fukushima Environmental Safety Center, located approximately 20 km north of the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant in Minamisōma City, Fukushima Prefecture. In collaboration with the JAEA, this study involved conducting comparison experiments and analyses with radiation detectors in high radiation environments, a challenging task in Korean environments. Environmental radiation surveys were conducted using three types of detectors: CZT, NaI(Tl), and LaBr₃(Ce), across two contaminated areas. Dose rate values were converted using dose rate conversion factors for each detector type, and dose rate maps were subsequently created and compared. The detectors yielded similar results, demonstrating their feasibility and reliability in high radiation environments. The findings of this study are expected to be a crucial reference for enhancing the verification and supplementation of procedures and methods in future radiation measurements and mobile surveys in high-radiation environments, using these three types of radiation instruments.

• Nuclear Engineering and Technology
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• 제49권2호
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• pp.286-294
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• 2017

The events at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station in March 2011 point out, among other matters, that concurrent accidents at multiple units of a site can occur in reality. Although site risk has been deterministically considered to some extent in nuclear power plant siting and design, potential occurrence of multi-unit accident sequences at a site was not investigated in sufficient detail thus far in the nuclear power community. Therefore, there is considerable worldwide interest and research effort directed toward multi-unit site risk assessment, especially in the countries with high-density nuclear-power-plant sites such as Korea. As the technique of probabilistic safety assessment (PSA) has been successfully applied to evaluate the risk associated with operation of nuclear power plants in the past several decades, the PSA having primarily focused on single-unit risks is now being extended to the multi-unit PSA. In this paper we first characterize the site risk with explicit consideration of the risk associated with spent fuel pools as well as the reactor risks. The status of multi-unit risk assessment is discussed next, followed by a description of the emerging issues relevant to the multi-unit risk evaluation from a practical standpoint.

• Nuclear Engineering and Technology
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• 제53권3호
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• pp.967-973
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• 2021

In 2011, an earthquake and subsequent tsunami hit the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant, causing simultaneous accidents in several reactors. This accident shows us that if there are several reactors on site, the seismic risk to multiple units is important to consider, in addition to that to single units in isolation. When a seismic event occurs, a seismic-failure correlation exists between the nuclear power plant's structures, systems, and components (SSCs) due to their seismic-response and seismic-capacity correlations. Therefore, it is necessary to evaluate the multi-unit seismic risk by considering the SSCs' seismic-failure-correlation effect. In this study, a methodology is proposed to obtain the seismic-response-correlation coefficient between SSCs to calculate the risk to multi-unit facilities. This coefficient is calculated from a probabilistic multi-unit seismic-response analysis. The seismic-response and seismic-failure-correlation coefficients of the emergency diesel generators installed within the units are successfully derived via the proposed method. In addition, the distribution of the seismic-response-correlation coefficient was observed as a function of the distance between SSCs of various dynamic characteristics. It is demonstrated that the proposed methodology can reasonably derive the seismic-response-correlation coefficient between SSCs, which is the input data for multi-unit seismic probabilistic safety assessment.

• Nuclear Engineering and Technology
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• 제44권3호
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• pp.225-236
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• 2012

The Fukushima-Daiichi accident shook the world, as a well-known plant design, the General Electric BWR Mark I, was heavily damaged in the tsunami, which followed the Great Japanese Earthquake of 11 March 2011. Plant safety functions were lost and, as both AC and DC failed, manoeuvrability of the plants at the site virtually came to a full stop. The traditional system of Emergency Operating Procedures (EOPs) and Severe Accident Management Guidelines (SAMG) failed to protect core and containment, and severe core damage resulted, followed by devastating hydrogen explosions and, finally, considerable radioactive releases. The root cause may not only have been that the design against tsunamis was incorrect, but that the defence against accidents in most power plants is based on traditional assumptions, such as Large Break LOCA as the limiting event, whereas there is no engineered design against severe accidents in most plants. Accidents beyond the licensed design basis have hardly been considered in the various designs, and if they were included, they often were not classified for their safety role, as most system safety classifications considered only design basis accidents. It is, hence, time to again consider the Design Basis Accident, and ask ourselves whether the time has not come to consider engineered safety functions to mitigate core damage accidents. Associated is a proper classification of those systems that do the job. Also associated are safety criteria, which so far are only related to 'public health and safety'; in reality, nuclear accidents cause few casualties, but create immense economical and societal effects-for which there are no criteria to be met. Severe accidents create an environment far surpassing the imagination of those who developed EOPs and SAMG, most of which was developed after Three Mile Island - an accident where all was still in place, except the insight in the event was lost. It requires fundamental changes in our present safety approach and safety thinking and, hence, also in our EOPs and SAMG, in order to prevent future 'Fukushimas'.

• Nuclear Engineering and Technology
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• 제53권10호
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• pp.3236-3246
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• 2021

Lessons learned from the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant accident directed that multiple failures should be considered more seriously rather than single failure in the licensing bases and safety cases because attempts to take accident management measures could be unsuccessful under the high radiation environment aggravated by multiple failures, such as complete loss of electric power, uncontrollable loss of coolant inventory, failure of essential safety function recovery. In the case of the complete loss of electric power called station blackout (SBO), if there is no mitigation action for recovering safety functions, the reactor core would be overheated, and severe fuel damage could be anticipated due to the failure of the active heat sink. In such a transient condition at CANDU-6 plants, the seal failure of the primary heat transport (PHT) pumps can facilitate a consequent increase in the fuel sheath temperature and eventually lead to degradation of the fuel integrity. Therefore, it is necessary to specify the regulatory guidelines for multiple failures on a licensing basis so that licensees should prepare the accident management measures to prevent or mitigate accident conditions. In order to explore the efficiency of implementing accident management strategies for CANDU-6 plants, this study proposed a realistic accident analysis approach on the SBO transient with multiple-failure sequences such as seal failure of PHT pumps without operator's recovery actions. In this regard, a comparative study for two PHT pump seal failure modes with and without coolant seal leakage was conducted using a best-estimate code to precisely investigate the behaviors of thermal-hydraulic parameters during transient conditions. Moreover, a sensitivity analysis for different PHT pump seal leakage rates was also carried out to examine the effect of leakage rate on the system responses. This study is expected to provide the technical bases to the accident management strategy for unmitigated transient conditions with multiple failures.

• Nuclear Engineering and Technology
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• 제51권3호
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• pp.738-745
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• 2019

Coprecipitation using hydrous ferric oxide (HFO) has been effectively used for the removal of radionuclides from radioactive wastewater. This work studied the dynamic behavior of HFO floc formation during the neutralization of acidic ferric iron in the presence of several radionuclides by using a photometric dispersion analyzer (PDA). Then the coagulation-flocculation system using HFO-anionic poly acrylamide (PAM) composite floc system was evaluated and compared in seawater and distilled water to find the effective condition to remove the target nuclides (Co-60, Mn-54, Sb-125, and Ru-106) present in wastewater generated in the severe accident of nuclear power plant like Fukushima Daiichi case. A ferric iron dosage of 10 ppm for the formation of HFO was suitable in terms of fast formation of HFO flocs without induction time, and maximum total removal yield of radioactivity from the wastewater. The settling time of HFO flocs was reduced by changing them to HFO-PAM composite floc. The optimal dosage of anionic PAM for HFO-anionic PAM floc system was approximately 1-10 ppm. The total removal yield of Mn-54, Co-60, Sb-125, Ru-106 radionuclides by the HFO-anionic PAM coagulation-flocculation system was higher in distilled water than in seawater and was more than 99%.

• Journal of Advanced Marine Engineering and Technology
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• 제40권3호
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• pp.165-173
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• 2016

2011년 3월 11일 리히터 스케일 9.0의 강진과 10-14m파도로 인해 Fukushima Daiichi(FD) 원자력 단지의 주전력과 보조전력이 끊어져 냉각장치가 작동하지 않았고 노심의 열이 제거되지 못해 폭발이 일어나는 사고가 발생했다. 노심의 열이 제거되지 못하면 핵연료 피복재인 지르칼로이(zircaloy)와 같은 금속이 고온 상태에서 수증기와 산화 반응하여 수소를 발생시킨다. 발생된 수소는 격납건물로 방출되는데 방출된 수소가 연소하는 경우 격납건물의 안정성에 영향을 줄 정도의 큰 충격을 유발할 수 있는 수소폭발로 이어질 수 있다. 본 연구에서는 격납건물 내부의 수소 분포를 분석한 연구 [1]에서 제시한 폭발의 위해도가 높은 영역에 대하여 폭발해석을 수행하였으며 수소 폭발이 격납건물의 건전성에 미치는 영향에 대하여 분석하였다. 격납건물 중앙부를 제외하고 수소폭발이 발생하였고 상부에 전체 수소의 40%이상이 모였을 때와 하부 좌측, 우측의 격벽사이에 수소가 모였을 때 큰 폭발이 발생했으며 격납건물 벽면에 큰 응력을 동반하였다.

• Nuclear Engineering and Technology
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• 제51권1호
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• pp.104-115
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• 2019

Since the Fukushima Daiichi accident, there has been an emphasis on the risk resulting from multi-unit accidents. Human reliability analysis (HRA) is one of the important issues in multi-unit probabilistic safety assessment (MUPSA). Hence, there is a need to properly identify all the human and organizational factors relevant to a multi-unit incident scenario in a nuclear power plant (NPP). This study identifies and categorizes the human and organizational factors relevant to a multi-unit incident scenario of NPPs based on a review of relevant literature. These factors are then analyzed to ascertain all possible unit-to-unit interactions that need to be considered in the multi-unit HRA and the pattern of interactions. The human and organizational factors are classified into five categories: organization, work device, task, performance shaping factors, and environmental factors. The identification and classification of these factors will significantly contribute to the development of adequate strategies and guidelines for managing multi-unit accidents. This study is a necessary initial step in developing an effective HRA method for multiple NPP units in a site.

• 한국유체기계학회 논문집
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• 제17권6호
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• pp.84-88
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• 2014

A long term passive cooling system is considered as the most important safety feature for the nuclear design after the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant accident in 2011. The conventional active pump driven safety systems are not available during a station Black Out (SBO) accident. The current design requirement on cooling time of the Passive Auxiliarly Feedwater System (PAFS) is about 8 hours only. To meet the 72 hours cooling time, the pool capacity of cooling water tank should be increased as much as 3~4 times larger than that of current water cooling tank. In order to extend the cooling time for 72 hours, a new passive air-water combined cooling system is proposed. This paper provides the feasibility of the combined passive air-water cooling system. The current pool capacity of water cooling system is preserved, and the cooling capability is extended by an additional air cooler.