A Study on Investors' Investment Decision Factors in Platform Startup (플랫폼 스타트업에 대한 투자결정요인에 관한 연구)
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- Asia-Pacific Journal of Business Venturing and Entrepreneurship
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- v.19 no.2
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- pp.109-124
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- 2024
The value of platform companies is rapidly increasing, exerting significant influence across industries. Identifying and fostering promising platform companies is crucial for enhancing national competitiveness. Consequently, tailored evaluation standards are necessary for such companies. This study derived investment decision factors specific to platform companies and compared the importance of each factor using Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP) analysis. Key factors included platform characteristics, finance, entrepreneur (team), market, and product/service attributes. The findings revealed that platform characteristics were deemed the most crucial factor for investors. Specifically, factors such as platform size, ease of value fixation, core participant group, and data value were identified as pertinent for evaluating platform companies. Moreover, analysis distinguished between investors with prior platform investment experience and those without. Significantly, investors with platform investment experience placed greater emphasis on the value of data secured by platform Furthermore, it was observed that investors prioritized future value and growth potential over current value when investing in platform. Notably, founder/team characteristics, typically highly regarded in previous studies, ranked lower in importance in this study, highlighting a shift in focus. The discrepancy between this study's results and prior research on investment decision factors is attributed to the specificity of the questions posed. By focusing on investment decision factors for platform startups rather than generic startup inquiries, investor responses aligned more closely with platform-focused considerations. Given the burgeoning venture investment landscape, there's a growing need for detailed research on startups within specific sectors like IT, travel, and biotech. This approach can replace extensive research covering all startup types to identify investment decision factors suited to the characteristics of each individual industry.
A franchise system develops competitive products for a franchise store through the system established by the franchise head office. Therefore, it has advantages of expanding the marketing effect since the risk of failure is reduced for a founder and the franchise head office supports the overall sales, advertisement and promotional activities. Also, a franchise store has advantages of fulfilling necessary facilities and tools on advantageous terms, reducing expenses by purchasing in bulk, and getting a supply of products with stable qualities. However, aside from such advantages, franchise head offices are forcing franchise stores to make unnecessary investments in equipments and remodel the interior. Also, franchise business operators are being made to share the cost of marketing and multiple franchise stores are being approved within the same business district, and franchise business operators are suffering damages. Therefore, cases of shutting down a franchise store or not renewing the contract are frequent. From the position of a franchise head office, profits that are generated from franchise fees, interior remodeling fees and supplying facilities and materials will increase as the number of new franchise stores increases. However, franchise stores are faced with difficulties due to excessive competitions between similar types of businesses and the overlapping of business districts that come from increases in the number of stores, and they eventually end up shutting down. Therefore, in order for a franchise business operator and franchise head office to grow and develop continuously, opening new stores is important, but successfully renewing the contract by maintaining a relationship with an existing franchise business operator is desirable. In this aspect, a study that examines the elements that can affect the relationship between a franchise business operator and franchise head office is believed to be important for the development of the franchise industry and creating safe jobs for the public. With an emphasis on the relationship between a franchise head office and franchise store, this study attempted to examine the effect of characteristics of a franchise head office and franchise business operator on the bilateral relationship such as the faith and immersion, and wished to review the effects of such faith and immersion on the satisfaction of a franchise store, including an intention of renewing the contract. In particular, in the current situation of great uncertainties in the market, this study also wished to examine how uncertain market elements will affect the relationship between the characteristics of a franchise head office and franchise business operator, and the faith and immersion. The study revealed that among the characteristics of a franchise head office, the standardization management of a franchise head office hinders a franchise store's faith and immersion in a franchise head office. Also, a franchise head office's support was shown to increase a franchise store's faith and immersion. However, it was revealed that a franchise head office's regulation and incentive policies for a franchise store do not affect a franchise store's faith and immersion. Among characteristics of a franchise business operator, a franchise store's healthy financial status and entrepreneur spirits were shown to enhance the faith and immersion in a franchise head office. However, it was shown that excellent business abilities of a franchise business operator actually reduce the immersion for a franchise head office. Also, the faith and immersion in a franchise head office were shown to enhance the intention of renewing the contract by increasing the satisfaction for a franchise head office. In addition, it was originally believed that the effects of a franchise business operator's characteristics on the faith and immersion in a franchise head office will vary depending on the market uncertainty, but the effect of a franchise business operator's characteristics depending on the recognition of uncertainties was shown to be insignificant. Such findings show that instead of making a franchise store pay for equipment investments and marketing and obtaining profits by force, a franchise head office should actively support a franchise store so that a franchise store's business activities can be conducted well, which will bring profits to a franchise store and ultimately to a franchise head office. This is a more desirable direction for the development of both parties. Implications of such findings are summarized as follows. First, it was shown that a franchise head office's standardization management actually reduces a franchise store's faith and immersion. Therefore, it is believed that instead of conducting standardization managements for regulating and managing franchise stores, measures should be developed so that franchise stores can actually participate voluntarily. For this, a head office should put in efforts to develop and provide standardized manuals, and make sure that a self-review system takes root. Second, a franchise head office's incentives did not have significant effects on the faith and immersion, but the support was shown to be effective. Therefore, it can be seen that instead of taking post-measures for a franchise store, taking pre-measures of actively supporting is more effective in maintaining a franchise store. Third, among characteristics of a franchise head office, it was shown that a franchise store's healthy financial status increased the faith and immersion in a franchise head office. Therefore, when selecting a franchise business operator, instead of thoughtlessly opening up franchise stores for the profit of a head office, it is believed that reviewing a franchise business operator's financial firepower and credit status is necessary. As for academic implications, previous studies examined the relationship by focusing on the characteristics of a franchise head office and franchise store, but this study focused on the characteristics of a franchise business operator. Therefore, this study dealt with the importance of a franchise business operator's competence, and is significant because it revealed the fact that a franchise business operator's excellent commercialization ability can become an element that hinders the immersion in a franchise head office. It was originally believed that a franchise store's characteristics will have different effects on the faith and immersion depending on the market uncertainty, but it was shown that the effect of a franchise store's characteristics depending on the recognition of uncertainties was insignificant, and that is the limitation of this study.
1. The 'Kao Zheng Pai(考證派) comes from the 'Zhe Zhong Pai' and is a school that is influenced by the confucianism of the Qing dynasty. In Japan Inoue Kinga(井上金娥), Yoshida Koton(吉田篁墩) became central members, and the rise of the methodology of historical research(考證學) influenced the members of the 'Zhe Zhong Pai', and the trend of historical research changed from confucianism to medicine, making a school of medicine based on the study of texts and proving that the classics were right. 2. Based on the function of 'Nei Qu Li '(內驅力) the 'Kao Zheng Pai', in the spirit of 'use confucianism as the base', researched letters, meanings and historical origins. Because they were influenced by the methodology of historical research(考證學) of the Qing era, they valued the evidential research of classic texts, and there was even one branch that did only historical research, the 'Rue Xue Kao Zheng Pai'(儒學考證派). Also, the 'Yi Xue Kao Zheng Pai'(醫學考證派) appeared by the influence of Yoshida Kouton and Kariya Ekisai(狩谷掖齋). 3. In the 'Kao Zheng Pai(考證派)'s theories and views the 'Yi Xue Kao Zheng Pai' did not look at medical scriptures like the "Huang Di Nei Jing"("黃帝內經") and did not do research on 'medical' related areas like acupuncture, the meridian and medicinal herbs. Since they were doctors that used medicine, they naturally were based on 'formulas'(方劑) and since their thoughts were based on the historical ideologies, they valued the "Shang Han Ja Bing Lun" which was revered as the 'ancestor of all formulas'(衆方之祖). 4. The lives of the important doctors of the 'Kao Zheng Pai' Meguro Dotaku(目黑道琢) Yamada Seichin(山田正珍), Yamada Kyoko(山田業廣), Mori Ritsi(森立之) Kitamura Naohara(喜多村直寬) are as follows. 1) Meguro Dotaku(目黑道琢 1739
1.The 'Kao Zheng Pai'(考證派) comes from the 'Zhe Zhong Pai(折衷派)' and is a school that is influenced by the confucianism of the Qing dynasty. In Japan Inoue Kinga(井上金峨), Yoshida Koton(古田篁墩
Land was originally communized by a community in the primitive society of Korea, and in the age of the ancient society SAM KUK-SILLA, KOKURYOE and PAEK JE-it was distributed under the principle of land-nationalization. But by the occupation of the lands which were permitted to transmit from generation to generation as Royal Grant Lands and newly cleared lands, the private occupation had already begun to be formed. Thus the private ownership of land originated by chiefs of the tribes had a trend to be gradually pervaded to the communal members. After the, SILLA Kingdom unified SAM KUK in 668 A.D., JEONG JEON System and KWAN RYO JEON System, which were the distribution systems of farmlands originated from the TANG Dynasty in China, were enforced to established the basis of an absolute monarchy. Even in this age the forest area was jointly controlled and commonly used by village communities because of the abundance of area and stocked volume, and the private ownership of the forest land was prohibited by law under the influence of the TANG Dynasty system. Toward the end of the SILLA Dynasty, however, as its centralism become weak, the tendency of the private occupancy of farmland by influential persons was expanded, and at the same time the occupancy of the forest land by the aristocrats and Buddhist temples began to come out. In the ensuing KORYO Dynasty (519 to 1391 A.D.) JEON SI KWA System under the principle of land-nationalization was strengthened and the privilege of tax collection was transferred to the bureaucrats and the aristocrats as a means of material compensation for them. Taking this opportunity the influential persons began to expand their lands for the tax collection on a large scale. Therefore, about in the middle of 11th century the farmlands and the forest lands were annexed not only around the vicinity of the capital but also in the border area by influential persons. Toward the end of the KORYO Dynasty the royal families, the bureaucrats and the local lords all possessed manors and occupied the forest lands on a large scale as a part of their farmlands. In the KORYO Dynasty, where national economic foundation was based upon the lands, the disorder of the land system threatened the fall of the Dynasty and so the land reform carried out by General YI SEONG-GYE had led to the creation of ensuing YI Dynasty. All systems of the YI Dynasty were substantially adopted from those of the KORYO Dynasty and thereby KWA JEON System was enforced under the principle of land-nationalization, while the occupancy or the forest land was strictly prohibited, except the national or royal uses, by the forbidden item in KYEONG JE YUK JEON SOK JEON, one of codes provided by the successive kings in the YI Dynasty. Thus the basis of the forest land system through the YI Dynasty had been established, while the private forest area possessed by influential persons since the previous KORYO Dynasty was preserved continuously under the influence of their authorities. Therefore, this principle of the prohibition was nothing but a legal fiction for the security of sovereign powers. Consequently the private occupancy of the forest area was gradually enlarged and finally toward the end of YI Dynasty the privately possessed forest lands were to be officially authorized. The forest administration systems in the YI Dynasty are summarized as follows: a) KEUM SAN and BONG SAN. Under the principle of land-nationalization by a powerful centralism KWA JEON System was established at the beginning of the YI Dynasty and its government expropriated all the forests and prohibited strictly the private occupation. In order to maintain the dignity of the royal capital, the forests surounding capital areas were instituted as KEUM SAN (the reserved forests) and the well-stocked natural forest lands were chosen throughout the nation by the government as BONG SAN(national forests for timber production), where the government nominated SAN JIK(forest rangers) and gave them duties to protect and afforest the forests. This forest reservation system exacted statute labors from the people of mountainious districts and yet their commons of the forest were restricted rigidly. This consequently aroused their strong aversion against such forest reservation, therefore those forest lands were radically spoiled by them. To settle this difficult problem successive kings emphasized the preservation of the forests repeatedly, and in KYEONG KUK DAI JOEN, the written constitution of the YI Dynasty, a regulation for the forest preservation was provided but the desired results could not be obtained. Subsequently the split of bureaucrats with incessant feuds among politicians and scholars weakened the centralism and moreover, the foreign invasions since 1592 made the national land devasted and the rural communities impoverished. It happned that many wandering peasants from rural areas moved into the deep forest lands, where they cultivated burnt fields recklessly in the reserved forest resulting in the severe damage of the national forests. And it was inevitable for the government to increase the number of BONG SAN in order to solve the problem of the timber shortage. The increase of its number accelerated illegal and reckless cutting inevitably by the people living mountainuos districts and so the government issued excessive laws and ordinances to reserve the forests. In the middle of the 18th century the severe feuds among the politicians being brought under control, the excessive laws and ordinances were put in good order and the political situation became temporarily stabilized. But in spite of those endeavors evil habitudes of forest devastation, which had been inveterate since the KORYO Dynasty, continued to become greater in degree. After the conclusion of "the Treaty of KANG WHA with Japan" in 1876 western administration system began to be adopted, and thereafter through the promulgation of the Forest Law in 1908 the Imperial Forests were separated from the National Forests and the modern forest ownership system was fixed. b) KANG MU JANG. After the reorganization of the military system, attaching importance to the Royal Guard Corps, the founder of the YI Dynasty, TAI JO (1392 to 1398 A.D.) instituted the royal preserves-KANG MU JANG-to attain the purposes for military training and royal hunting, prohibiting strictly private hunting, felling and clearing by the rural inhabitants. Moreover, the tyrant, YEON SAN (1495 to 1506 A.D.), expanded widely the preserves at random and strengthened its prohibition, so KANG MU JANG had become the focus of the public antipathy. Since the invasion of Japanese in 1592, however, the innovation of military training methods had to be made because of the changes of arms and tactics, and the royal preserves were laid aside consequently and finally they had become the private forests of influential persons since 17th century. c) Forests for official use. All the forests for official use occupied by government officies since the KORYO Dynasty were expropriated by the YI Dynasty in 1392, and afterwards the forests were allotted on a fixed standard area to the government officies in need of firewoods, and as the forest resources became exhausted due to the depredated forest yield, each office gradually enlarged the allotted area. In the 17th century the national land had been almost devastated by the Japanese invasion and therefore each office was in the difficulty with severe deficit in revenue, thereafter waste lands and forest lands were allotted to government offices inorder to promote the land clearing and the increase in the collections of taxes. And an abuse of wide occupation of the forests by them was derived and there appeared a cause of disorder in the forest land system. So a provision prohibiting to allot the forests newly official use was enacted in 1672, nevertheless the government offices were trying to enlarge their occupied area by encroaching the boundary and this abuse continued up to the end of the YI Dynasty. d) Private forests. The government, at the bigninning of the YI Dynasty, expropriated the forests all over the country under the principle of prohibition of private occupancy of forest lands except for the national uses, while it could not expropriate completely all of the forest lands privately occupied and inherited successively by bureaucrats, and even local governors could not control them because of their strong influences. Accordingly the King, TAI JONG (1401 to 1418 A.D.), legislated the prohibition of private forest occupancy in his code, KYEONG JE YUK JEON (1413), and furthermore he repeatedly emphasized to observe the law. But The private occupancy of forest lands was not yet ceased up at the age of the King, SE JO (1455 to 1468 A.D.), so he prescribed the provision in KYEONG KUK DAI JEON (1474), an immutable law as a written constitution in the YI Dynasty: "Anyone who privately occupy the forest land shall be inflicted 80 floggings" and he prohibited the private possession of forest area even by princes and princesses. But, it seemed to be almost impossible for only one provsion in a code to obstruct the historical growing tendecy of private forest occupancy, for example, the King, SEONG JONG (1470 to 1494 A.D.), himself granted the forests to his royal families in defiance of the prohibition and thereafter such precedents were successively expanded, and besides, taking advantage of these facts, the influential persons openly acquired their private forest lands. After tyrannical rule of the King, YEON SAN (1945 to 1506 A.D.), the political disorder due to the splits to bureaucrats with successional feuds and the usurpations of thrones accelerated the private forest occupancy in all parts of the country, thus the forbidden clause on the private forest occupancy in the law had become merely a legal fiction since the establishment of the Dynasty. As above mentioned, after the invasion of Japanese in 1592, the courts of princes (KUNG BANGG) fell into the financial difficulties, and successive kings transferred the right of tax collection from fisherys and saltfarms to each KUNG BANG and at the same time they allotted the forest areas in attempt to promote the clearing. Availing themselves of this opportunity, royal families and bureaucrats intended to occupy the forests on large scale. Besides a privilege of free selection of grave yard, which had been conventionalized from the era of the KORYO Dynasty, created an abuse of occuping too wide area for grave yards in any forest at their random, so the King, TAI JONG, restricted the area of grave yard and homestead of each family. Under the policy of suppresion of Buddhism in the YI Dynasty a privilege of taxexemption for Buddhist temples was deprived and temple forests had to follow the same course as private forests did. In the middle of 18th century the King, YEONG JO (1725 to 1776 A.D.), took an impartial policy for political parties and promoted the spirit of observing laws by putting royal orders and regulations in good order excessively issued before, thus the confused political situation was saved, meanwhile the government officially permittd the private forest ownership which substantially had already been permitted tacitly and at the same time the private afforestation areas around the grave yards was authorized as private forests at least within YONG HO (a boundary of grave yard). Consequently by the enforcement of above mentioned policies the forbidden clause of private forest ownership which had been a basic principle of forest system in the YI Dynasty entireely remained as only a historical document. Under the rule of the King, SUN JO (1801 to 1834 A.D.), the political situation again got into confusion and as the result of the exploitation from farmers by bureaucrats, the extremely impoverished rural communities created successively wandering peasants who cleared burnt fields and deforested recklessly. In this way the devastation of forests come to the peak regardless of being private forests or national forests, moreover, the influential persons extorted private forests or reserved forests and their expansion of grave yards became also excessive. In 1894 a regulation was issued that the extorted private forests shall be returned to the initial propriators and besides taking wide area of the grave yards was prohibited. And after a reform of the administrative structure following western style, a modern forest possession system was prepared in 1908 by the forest law including a regulation of the return system of forest land ownership. At this point a forbidden clause of private occupancy of forest land got abolished which had been kept even in fictitious state since the foundation of the YI Dynasty. e) Common forests. As above mentioned, the forest system in the YI Dynasty was on the ground of public ownership principle but there was a high restriction to the forest profits of farmers according to the progressive private possession of forest area. And the farmers realized the necessity of possessing common forest. They organized village associations, SONGE or KEUM SONGE, to take the ownerless forests remained around the village as the common forest in opposition to influential persons and on the other hand, they prepared the self-punishment system for the common management of their forests. They made a contribution to the forest protection by preserving the common forests in the late YI Dynasty. It is generally known that the absolute monarchy expr opriates the widespread common forests all over the country in the process of chainging from thefeudal society to the capitalistic one. At this turning point in Korea, Japanese colonialists made public that the ratio of national and private forest lands was 8 to 2 in the late YI Dynasty, but this was merely a distorted statistics with the intention of rationalizing of their dispossession of forests from Korean owners, and they took advantage of dead forbidden clause on the private occupancy of forests for their colonization. They were pretending as if all forests had been in ownerless state, but, in truth, almost all the forest lands in the late YI Dynasty except national forests were in the state of private ownership or private occupancy regardless of their lawfulness.