The Improvement Measurement on Dispute Resolution System for Air Service Customer (항공서비스 소비자 분쟁해결제도의 개선방안)
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- The Korean Journal of Air & Space Law and Policy
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- v.33 no.2
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- pp.225-266
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- 2018
In 2017, 1,252 cases of damages relief related to air passenger transport service were received by the Korea Consumer Agency, a 0.8% drop from 1,262 cases in 2016, the first decline since 2013. In 2017, 444 cases (35.4%) out of received cases of damages relief in the field of air passenger service received by the Korea Consumer Agency were agreed on, and out of cases that were not agreed on, the most number of 588 cases (47.0%) were concluded due to information provision and counseling, and 186 cases (14.9%) were applied to the mediation of the Consumer Dispute Mediation Committee. Major legislations that contain regulations for the damages relief and disputes resolution of air service consumers include the Aviation Business Act and the Consumer Fundamental Act, etc. The Aviation Business Act provides the establishment and implementation of damage relief procedure and handling plan, and the receiving and handling of request of damage relief by air transport businessman, and the notice of protection standard for air traffic users. The Consumer Fundamental Act provides the establishment and management of the consumer counseling organization, the damage relief by the Korea Consumer Agency, the consumer dispute mediation, and the enactment of the criteria for resolving consumer disputes. The procedures for damages relief of air service consumers include the receiving and handling of damages relief by air transport businessman, the counseling, and receiving and handling of damages relief by the Consumer Counseling Center, the advice of mutual agreement by the Korea Consumer Agency, and the dispute mediation system by the Consumer Dispute Mediation Committee. The current system of damage relief and dispute mediation for air service consumer have the problem in the exemption from obligation of establishment and implementation of damage relief plan by air transport businessman under the Aviation Business Act, the problem in the exemption from liability in case of nonfulfillment and delay of transport by aviation businessman under the criteria for resolving consumer disputes in the aviation sector, and the uppermost limit in procedure progress and completion of consumer dispute mediation under the Consumer Fundamental Act. Therefore, the improvement measurements of the relevant system for proper damage relief and smooth dispute mediation for air service consumer are to be suggested as follows: First is the maintenance of the relevant laws for damage relief of air service consumer. The exemption regulation from obligation of establishment and implementation of damage relief plan by air transport businessman under the Aviation Business Act shall be revised. To enhance the structualization and expertise of the relevant regulation for protection and damage relief of air service consumer, it will be necessary to prepare the separate legislation similar to the US Federal Regulation 14 CFR and EU Regulation EC Regulation 261/2004. Second is the improvement of criteria for resolving air service consumer disputes. For this, it will be necessary to investigate whether the cause of occurrence of exemption reason was force majeure, and distinguish the exemption from liability in case of nonfulfillment and delay of transport by aviation businessman under the criteria for resolving consumer disputes in the aviation sector, and revise the same as exemption reasons regulated under the air transport chapter of the Commercial Act and Montreal Convention 1999, and unify the compensation criteria for the nonfulfillment of transport that the substitute flight was provided and the delay of transport. Third is the reinforcement of information provision for damage relief of air service consumer. Aviation-related government agencies and concerned agencies should cooperate with airlines and airports to provide rapidly and clearly diverse information to the air traffic users, including laws and policies for damages relief of air service consumers. Fourth is the supplement to the effectiveness, etc. of consumer dispute mediation. If there is no sign of acceptance for dispute mediation, it is not fair to regard it as acceptance, therefore it will be necessary to add objection system. And if a dispute resolution is requested to another dispute settlement agency in addition to the Consumer Dispute Mediation Committee, it is excluded from the damage relief package, but it should be allowed for the party to choose a mediation agency. It will be necessary to devise the institutional measures to increase the completion rate of mediation so that the consumer dispute can be resolved efficiently through the mediation. Fifth is the introduction of the air service consumer arbitration system. A measure to supplement the limitations of the consumer dispute mediation system is to introduce the consumer arbitration system, but there are two measurements which are the introduction of the consumer arbitration under the Consumer Fundamental Act and the introduction of the consumer arbitration under the Arbitration Act. The latter measurement is considered to be appropriate. In conclusion, as a policy task, the government should prepare laws and system to enhance the prevention and relief of damages and protection of the rights and interests of air service consumers, and establish and implement the consumer-centric policy for the advancement of air service.
The International Atomic Energy Agency's Statute in Article III.A.5 allows it“to establish and administer safeguards designed to ensure that special fissionable and other materials, services, equipment, facilities and information made available by the Agency or at its request or under its supervision or control are not used in such a way as to further any military purpose; and to apply safeguards, at the request of the parties, to any bilateral or multilateral arrangement, or at the request of a State, to any of that State's activities in the field of atomic energy”. Safeguards are essentially a technical means of verifying the fulfilment of political obligations undertaken by States and given a legal force in international agreements relating to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The main political objectives are: to assure the international community that States are complying with their non-proliferation and other peaceful undertakings; and to deter (a) the diversion of afeguarded nuclear materials to the production of nuclear explosives or for military purposes and (b) the misuse of safeguarded facilities with the aim of producing unsafeguarded nuclear material. It is clear that no international safeguards system can physically prevent diversion. The IAEA safeguards system is basically a verification measure designed to provide assurance in those cases in which diversion has not occurred. Verification is accomplished by two basic means: material accountancy and containment and surveillance measures. Nuclear material accountancy is the fundamental IAEA safeguards mechanism, while containment and surveillance serve as important complementary measures. Material accountancy refers to a collection of measurements and other determinations which enable the State and the Agency to maintain a current picture of the location and movement of nuclear material into and out of material balance areas, i. e. areas where all material entering or leaving is measurab e. A containment measure is one that is designed by taking advantage of structural characteristics, such as containers, tanks or pipes, etc. To establish the physical integrity of an area or item by preventing the undetected movement of nuclear material or equipment. Such measures involve the application of tamper-indicating or surveillance devices. Surveillance refers to both human and instrumental observation aimed at indicating the movement of nuclear material. The verification process consists of three over-lapping elements: (a) Provision by the State of information such as - design information describing nuclear installations; - accounting reports listing nuclear material inventories, receipts and shipments; - documents amplifying and clarifying reports, as applicable; - notification of international transfers of nuclear material. (b) Collection by the IAEA of information through inspection activities such as - verification of design information - examination of records and repo ts - measurement of nuclear material - examination of containment and surveillance measures - follow-up activities in case of unusual findings. (c) Evaluation of the information provided by the State and of that collected by inspectors to determine the completeness, accuracy and validity of the information provided by the State and to resolve any anomalies and discrepancies. To design an effective verification system, one must identify possible ways and means by which nuclear material could be diverted from peaceful uses, including means to conceal such diversions. These theoretical ways and means, which have become known as diversion strategies, are used as one of the basic inputs for the development of safeguards procedures, equipment and instrumentation. For analysis of implementation strategy purposes, it is assumed that non-compliance cannot be excluded a priori and that consequently there is a low but non-zero probability that a diversion could be attempted in all safeguards ituations. An important element of diversion strategies is the identification of various possible diversion paths; the amount, type and location of nuclear material involved, the physical route and conversion of the material that may take place, rate of removal and concealment methods, as appropriate. With regard to the physical route and conversion of nuclear material the following main categories may be considered: - unreported removal of nuclear material from an installation or during transit - unreported introduction of nuclear material into an installation - unreported transfer of nuclear material from one material balance area to another - unreported production of nuclear material, e. g. enrichment of uranium or production of plutonium - undeclared uses of the material within the installation. With respect to the amount of nuclear material that might be diverted in a given time (the diversion rate), the continuum between the following two limiting cases is cons dered: - one significant quantity or more in a short time, often known as abrupt diversion; and - one significant quantity or more per year, for example, by accumulation of smaller amounts each time to add up to a significant quantity over a period of one year, often called protracted diversion. Concealment methods may include: - restriction of access of inspectors - falsification of records, reports and other material balance areas - replacement of nuclear material, e. g. use of dummy objects - falsification of measurements or of their evaluation - interference with IAEA installed equipment.As a result of diversion and its concealment or other actions, anomalies will occur. All reasonable diversion routes, scenarios/strategies and concealment methods have to be taken into account in designing safeguards implementation strategies so as to provide sufficient opportunities for the IAEA to observe such anomalies. The safeguards approach for each facility will make a different use of these procedures, equipment and instrumentation according to the various diversion strategies which could be applicable to that facility and according to the detection and inspection goals which are applied. Postulated pathways sets of scenarios comprise those elements of diversion strategies which might be carried out at a facility or across a State's fuel cycle with declared or undeclared activities. All such factors, however, contain a degree of fuzziness that need a human judgment to make the ultimate conclusion that all material is being used for peaceful purposes. Safeguards has been traditionally based on verification of declared material and facilities using material accountancy as a fundamental measure. The strength of material accountancy is based on the fact that it allows to detect any diversion independent of the diversion route taken. Material accountancy detects a diversion after it actually happened and thus is powerless to physically prevent it and can only deter by the risk of early detection any contemplation by State authorities to carry out a diversion. Recently the IAEA has been faced with new challenges. To deal with these, various measures are being reconsidered to strengthen the safeguards system such as enhanced assessment of the completeness of the State's initial declaration of nuclear material and installations under its jurisdiction enhanced monitoring and analysis of open information and analysis of open information that may indicate inconsistencies with the State's safeguards obligations. Precise information vital for such enhanced assessments and analyses is normally not available or, if available, difficult and expensive collection of information would be necessary. Above all, realistic appraisal of truth needs sound human judgment.
The wall shear stress in the vicinity of end-to end anastomoses under steady flow conditions was measured using a flush-mounted hot-film anemometer(FMHFA) probe. The experimental measurements were in good agreement with numerical results except in flow with low Reynolds numbers. The wall shear stress increased proximal to the anastomosis in flow from the Penrose tubing (simulating an artery) to the PTFE: graft. In flow from the PTFE graft to the Penrose tubing, low wall shear stress was observed distal to the anastomosis. Abnormal distributions of wall shear stress in the vicinity of the anastomosis, resulting from the compliance mismatch between the graft and the host artery, might be an important factor of ANFH formation and the graft failure. The present study suggests a correlation between regions of the low wall shear stress and the development of anastomotic neointimal fibrous hyperplasia(ANPH) in end-to-end anastomoses. 30523 T00401030523 ^x Air pressure decay(APD) rate and ultrafiltration rate(UFR) tests were performed on new and saline rinsed dialyzers as well as those roused in patients several times. C-DAK 4000 (Cordis Dow) and CF IS-11 (Baxter Travenol) reused dialyzers obtained from the dialysis clinic were used in the present study. The new dialyzers exhibited a relatively flat APD, whereas saline rinsed and reused dialyzers showed considerable amount of decay. C-DAH dialyzers had a larger APD(11.70
The wall shear stress in the vicinity of end-to end anastomoses under steady flow conditions was measured using a flush-mounted hot-film anemometer(FMHFA) probe. The experimental measurements were in good agreement with numerical results except in flow with low Reynolds numbers. The wall shear stress increased proximal to the anastomosis in flow from the Penrose tubing (simulating an artery) to the PTFE: graft. In flow from the PTFE graft to the Penrose tubing, low wall shear stress was observed distal to the anastomosis. Abnormal distributions of wall shear stress in the vicinity of the anastomosis, resulting from the compliance mismatch between the graft and the host artery, might be an important factor of ANFH formation and the graft failure. The present study suggests a correlation between regions of the low wall shear stress and the development of anastomotic neointimal fibrous hyperplasia(ANPH) in end-to-end anastomoses. 30523 T00401030523 ^x Air pressure decay(APD) rate and ultrafiltration rate(UFR) tests were performed on new and saline rinsed dialyzers as well as those roused in patients several times. C-DAK 4000 (Cordis Dow) and CF IS-11 (Baxter Travenol) reused dialyzers obtained from the dialysis clinic were used in the present study. The new dialyzers exhibited a relatively flat APD, whereas saline rinsed and reused dialyzers showed considerable amount of decay. C-DAH dialyzers had a larger APD(11.70